

Long histories of globalization

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Introduction

How old is globalization or when did it begin? In view of the contemporary feel of many globalization effects, the question seems moot. The common understanding in media and in many scholarly accounts is to view globalization as a trend of recent decades. ‘The usual timescale in which “globalization” is considered is at minimum post–Cold War, at maximum post–Second World War’ (Wilkinson 2006: 69). A collection of articles on the 2008 crisis titled ‘Crises in the era of globalization’ adopts a contemporary perspective and refers to recent decades (Gills 2010). For several social science and humanities disciplines this is the relevant time frame for the accelerating density of global flows and effects. In economics, cultural studies, communication, media and film studies, studies of marketing, international relations and much political science, the effective database of globalization trends runs from the 1970s or 1980s onward.

What then is the significance of global history, of world-system studies and those who date globalization or global trends from earlier times? Are these mere antecedents of globalization? Does it make sense that a process as momentous as globalization would just be a few decades old? Understandings of globalization such as ‘complex connectivity’ (Tomlinson 1999: 2) may situate globalization in recent decades, but perspectives on globalization such as material exchange, economic, social and cultural flows take us much further back in time.

Several issues are at stake in periodizing globalization. First, because of its presentist leanings much research treats globalization unreflexively, may overlook structural patterns, present as novel what are older features and misread contemporary trends. Second, a presentist view implies a Eurocentric view and thus recycles the massive cliché according to which world history begins with the ‘rise of the West’. Conventional cut-off points in globalization history, 1500 and 1800, echo old-fashioned Eurocentric history, famously critiqued over three decades ago by the anthropologist Eric Wolf in his book *Europe and the people without history*: ‘The central assertion of this book is that the world of humankind constitutes a manifold, a totality of interconnected processes, and inquiries that disassemble this totality into bits and then fail to reassemble it falsify reality’ (1982: 3). Third, this view of globalization is not global. It ignores or downplays non-Western contributions to globalization, such as those documented in this volume. This approach does not match historical records and makes little sense in times

of growing multipolarity when multicentric readings of history have become more pertinent. Fourth, it is out of step with current and wider globalization research, including research in archaeology, which this volume sets forth. Fifth, the periodization of globalization is an area of controversy in globalization research.

Periodizing globalization raises many problems. The aim of this discussion is to make *explicit* the analytics and criteria that inform periodizing globalization; the treatment is organized around key questions. The first section discusses the problems of presentism and Eurocentrism. The second section scans approaches that inform world history such as universal, civilizational and comparative history, the Annales school and world-system analysis and discusses their implications for historicizing globalization. The third section asks what is the unit of analysis, which is a key variable in timing globalization. The fourth question arises from looking beyond Eurocentrism: if occidental globalization is inadequate and we look further back, then how far back do we go? Even if we consider only Eurasian oriental globalization (from approximately 500 CE) as an alternative, without broadening our view to include the various other scenarios developed in this volume, we raise a further question: if oriental globalization is pertinent, what about its antecedents and infrastructure? This also brings us to archaeology – though ‘a latecomer to the party’ (Pitts this volume), what does archaeology bring to globalization? How, confining ourselves still only to Eurasia, do the history of antiquity, the ancient empires and the Greco-Roman world relate to globalization? Several accounts situate these as extensions of the Bronze Age, against the wider backdrop of Afro-Eurasia. But, as other contributors to this volume make clear, there were always other globalizing processes afoot, at best only tangentially associated with developments in Europe and Central Asia, as around the Indian Ocean rim in the late first and early second millennium CE, and elsewhere, as in the New World, Australasia and the Pacific, entirely unrelated until after 1500. The concluding section reviews the arguments and incorporates the various historical streams and perspectives in proposing a framework of phases of globalization. In the process, this exercise of combining history and globalization seeks to provide an X-ray of globalization thinking.

Presentism and Eurocentrism

As noted in a number of the other chapters in this volume, the term globalization emerged first in business studies in the 1970s and then sprawled widely and rose steeply in the 1990s. Its rise followed the postwar development of multinational corporations and subsequent spurts in information and communication technology (ICT), global value chains (GVC), global advertising, global finance and jet travel.

Because the theme of globalization took off in the 1990s and key texts on globalization were written in this period, much of the discussion is marked by 1990s themes and sensibilities. Then key works on globalization were written so globalization was colonized by then reigning perspectives that were superimposed on globalization, even though they were not particularly global. Themes prevalent in 1990s sociology were transposed to globalization, such as by Giddens (1990), who defined globalization as an ‘extension of modernity’. Modernity, of course, is a Western project. David Harvey’s (1989) ‘time–space compression’ became an oft-quoted description of globalization, even though the idea of the ‘annihilation of distance’ is mechanical and inappropriate. Yes, communication and travel across the planet have become easier and faster, yet time, space and distance still matter, in some respects more so because access to communication and mobility is differentiated by class, as ample discussions of intricate relations of the global and local in anthropology and geography show. What is at issue then is the reorganization and re-signification of time, space and distance, rather than their compression or annihilation.

Several disciplines date globalization from the 1970s with the formation of global value chains and accelerated communication (most economics, international relations, political science, and media studies). A further periodization refers to neoliberal globalization, from the 1980s.

In much sociology the time frame widens, for a keynote is modernity, which is assumed to unfold with the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, followed by industrialization, from c.1800. In political economy and Marxist views, the time frame widens again and the threshold is 1500, following Marx's dictum 'the conquest of the world market marks the birth of modern capitalism'. Here globalization is equivalent to 'modern capitalism'. Thus, capstone moments of globalization are 1500 and 1800. Each links back to the Renaissance: the 1500 view via the journeys of reconnaissance and Columbus, and the 1800 view via the Renaissance humanists, the seventeenth-century scientific revolution and the Enlightenment philosophes, setting the stage for modern times. By implication each also links back to antiquity, so these views on globalization incorporate the classical world, but do so via a conventional historical lens. Clearly this is an occidental account of globalization, not a global account.

The disadvantage of taking contemporary times (1970s) as the start time of globalization is presentism or ignoring history. The disadvantage of modernity (from 1800) as cut-off in globalization thinking is Eurocentrism, an 'intellectual apartheid regime' (Hobson 2004: 283), a 'great wall' (Jennings 2011) that cuts Europe off from global history and gives us a biased and shallow perspective on both history and modernity. The disadvantage of using 'modern capitalism' (from 1500) as cut-off is ignoring earlier forms and infrastructures of capitalism; as Fernand Braudel asked, why not the thirteenth century? Even in 1500, as McAnany and Yoffe (2010: 10) note,

some of the most powerful and largest cities in the world existed [not in Europe but] in China, India, and Turkey. In the year 1000 [CE], many of the mightiest cities were located in Peru, Iraq, and Central Asia. In the year 500 [CE] they could be found in central Mexico, Italy, and China. In 2500 [BCE] the most formidable rulers lived in Iraq, Egypt, and Pakistan.

Table 10.1.1 gives an overview of disciplines and perspectives on globalization and their different timelines, listed from recent to early (discussion is in Nederveen Pieterse 2015a).

We can cluster perspectives on globalization according to three main time frames, each of which involves different sets of assumptions (Table 10.1.2).

Norbert Elias (1994) recommended that social science adopt *Breitsicht und Langsicht*, a broad view and a long view. Applying this to globalization research yields wide-angle and historically deep perspectives on globalization. First, several features that are associated with contemporary globalization existed also in earlier eras, which gives us a finer understanding of what is distinctive for contemporary times. Second, the long view breaks the spell of Eurocentrism, which is essentially the nineteenth-century view when the West was triumphant. Third, the long view enables us to understand that the contemporary rise of emerging economies, particularly in Asia, is not just a rise but a comeback, which gives us a clearer perspective on ongoing trends and an account of globalization that is more relevant in global contexts. Fourth, the long view synchronizes with the broad definition of globalization as growing connectivity over time, the growing density of connections between distant locations. Fifth, it breaks with representations of the past as immobile – segmented – which is refuted by research on material exchanges (e.g. Versluys this volume), technology (McNeill 1982), travel, migrations (Hoerder 2002) and the movement of knowledge and religion. Sixth, the long view embeds globalization in evolutionary time. Taken in this sense globalization becomes a human species feature, part of its ecological adaptability

Table 10.1.1 Globalization according to social science and humanities disciplines

<i>Disciplines</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Agency, domain</i>	<i>Keywords</i>
Political science, international relations	1980	'Internationalization of the state', INGOs	Competitor states, post-international politics, global civil society
Development studies		IMF, World Bank	Debt crisis, structural adjustment
Geography		Space, place	Glocalization, local–global interactions
Economics	1970	MNCs, technologies, ICT, banks, hedge funds	Global corporation, GVC, world product
Cultural studies		Media, film, advertising	Global village, McDonaldization, Disneyfication, hybridization
Philosophy	1950	Ethics	Global problems, global ethics
Sociology	1800	Modernity	Capitalism, industrialism, urbanization, nation states
Political economy	1500	Modern capitalism	'Conquest of the world market'
History, historical anthropology	3000 BCE	Population movements, trade, technologies, world religions	Widening scale of social cooperation. Bronze Age, global flows, ecumene
Biology, ecology	Time	Integration of ecosystems	Evolution, global ecology, Gaia

Table 10.1.2 Major perspectives on start of globalization

<i>Time frame</i>	<i>Dynamics of globalization</i>	<i>Disciplines</i>
Short 1970 CE	Production technologies, form of enterprises, value chains, marketing; cultural flows	Economics, political science, cultural and communication studies
Medium 1800 CE	Modernity	Sociology
1500 CE	World market, modern capitalism	Political economy
Long 3000 BCE	Growing connectivity, urbanization, forms of social cooperation	History, anthropology, archaeology

that enables it to inhabit all of planetary space. It becomes part of Big History, which situates planetary evolutionary processes within cosmic evolution (Spier 2010). The disadvantage of the long view is that globalization becomes too general, too all-encompassing a framework. The counterpoint to this objection is to identify phases and shifting centres of globalization, which the closing section takes up.

World history, history of globalization

Global history is a delta of multiple streams. The widest stream is *universal history*, which straddles world history. The origins of universal history as a genre can be traced to Greek historiography around the fifth century BCE 'in the effort to encompass the notable happenings of all the poleis and their neighbors' (Mazlish 1993: 3). Universal history 'acknowledges the totality of history' and taken in a broad sense 'can be understood as the total temporal, spatial and structural process

of human development' (Kossok 1993: 93, 96–97). Its lineages include eighteenth-century encyclopedic history, von Humboldt (*Kosmos* 1845), Laplace, d'Holbach, Kant and Hegel (Spier 2010). Kindred views are Barraclough's 'general history' (1955) and Braudel's 'total history', 'the study of time in all its manifestations' (1980: 69).

Some approaches to universal history situate human *evolution* in a wider context. The *Columbia history of the world* opens with chapters on 'The Earth and the Universe', 'The geological evolution of the Earth' and 'The evolution of life' (Garraty and Gay 1985). The Big History approach updates these perspectives, goes back to the Big Bang 13.7 billion years ago, adopts a perspective of cosmic evolution, situates human evolution in the 'galactic habitable zone' and notes that humanity represents no more than 0.005 per cent of planetary biomass (Spier 2010: 27, 31).

Other approaches emphasize the history of *civilizations*, as in Gibbon, Spengler, and Toynbee's classic *Study of history*. World history is a confluence of several currents. Among the oldest strands is the empirical history of trade routes and nodes (as in Pirenne, Curtin). The Annales school combines the history of trade networks with structural transformations in the *longue durée*. The Chicago school (McNeill, Hodgson) combines civilizational and anthropological history and archaeology. McNeill's *Rise of the West* (1963) was followed by *A world history* (1967). The *Journal of World History* was founded in 1990.

Old-school, state-centric national history widened to regional history (as in Reid, Gunn) and gave rise to comparative studies (as in Bayly, Pomeranz) and to parallel and connected history (Lieberman). Imperial and colonial history and the broad palette of thematic history (economic, social, military, cultural, art history, history of science, technology, ideas, language, mentalities, etc.) all feed into global history. Histories of commodities (such as sugar, salt, cotton, indigo) make wider trade links visible, while histories of diasporas and migration show widening social networks. To each of these approaches there are narrow and broad, Eurocentric and non-Eurocentric versions. Eurocentric perspectives count world history from the sixteenth-century rise of the West and treat 1500 as a major caesura in global history.

'Globalization' is a latecomer to this delta and figures in accounts from the 1990s onward (Mazlish and Buultjens 1993; Hopkins 2002, 2006). Global history, in contrast to world history, refers to 'world history in the global age' (Mazlish 1993). Arguably, it takes only a partial step forward.

The timeline of the conventional Western history curriculum is the premodern (pre-1500 CE), early modern (1500–1850 CE), modern (1850–1945 CE) and contemporary era, a timeline that echoes in many accounts of globalization (e.g. Held *et al.* 1999; Robertson 2003; Marks 2007). Hopkins's volume *Globalization and history* (2002) follows Bayly's time frame in which 'archaic globalization' (preindustrial, before 1500) is followed by 'proto-globalization' (1600–1800), 'modern globalization' (from 1800) and 'contemporary globalization' (from 1950) (Bayly 2004). The volume's chapters mostly deal with developments post-1600. In other words, in this account 'real globalization' refers to 'modern globalization', which is European, Western, and what comes before are preludes to, infrastructures of globalization. This caesura in which globalization unfolds from 1500 and 1800 reaffirms that Eurocentrism – 'modern history' and modern globalization start with Europe. Informed by comparative studies and acknowledging sprawling contributions to Europe's take-off, this narrative both opens wider to the past and shuts it by means of the conventional rupture of modernity (Nederveen Pieterse 2005 provides a recent critique). While this approach makes non-Western infrastructures more visible (as both Wolf 1982 and Trouillot 2003 argued for), the 'product' remains European. This global history approach rectifies presentism, while recycling Eurocentrism.

By one account this is a semantic issue. Many historians have traced wide and deep infra-structures of global connectivity without using the term globalization. By another account, terminology matters and periodizing globalization is representing and negotiating world history. Beyond semantics, the essential issue is whether or not a caesura that privileges Europe (read: modernity, modern capitalism, modern world-system, modern globalization) is appropriate. Several contributions to world history question or reject this rupture. McNeill (1979) and Hodgson (1974, 1993) are concerned with broad civilizational lineages, drawing on the archaeology and anthropology of Childe, Renfrew and others. ‘Globalization’ doesn’t figure in these accounts but neither does a rupture of ‘modernity’. Many historians reject this caesura (such as Blaut 1993; Stavrianos 1998; Frank 1998; Goody 2006).

Another current of global history is world system studies. Wallerstein’s approach combines Marx, dependency theory and Annales school history. Wallerstein’s focus on the ‘long sixteenth century’ (1480–1620 CE) follows Marx. Fernand Braudel (1979), rather, argued that the onset of modern capitalism in Europe took place in the thirteenth century with Venice and Genoa as centres of the Levant trade. Janet Abu-Lughod (1989) pushed not only the timeline back but also changed the geographical focus to Egypt and the Middle East. Their arguments are complimentary: while Braudel focuses on the northern Mediterranean, Abu-Lughod looks at the southern Mediterranean, as twin sides of the Levant trade. The Mediterranean circuit was the infrastructure of the Atlantic journeys of reconnaissance, undertaken by Spain and Portugal in league with the Genoese and informed by Arab navigators (Parry 1973). The Mediterranean economy set the stage for the Atlantic economy, the focus of Marx and Wallerstein. In addition, Wallerstein (1974) is concerned with the Low Countries and the Baltic trade. Recent accounts treat the Low Countries as an extension of the Mediterranean economy, too (Morris 2005). Wallerstein’s ‘modern world-system’ that over time has incorporated peripheral areas, and continues to do so, is a strong version of Eurocentrism.

Many subsequent studies criticize Wallerstein’s Eurocentrism, his preoccupation with the ‘long sixteenth century’ and the Baltic–Atlantic economies, and go further back in time (e.g. Chase-Dunn and Hall 1991; Frank and Gills 1993; Denmark *et al.* 2000; Chase-Dunn and Anderson 2005; Friedman and Friedman 2008). Because it is mostly undertaken by social scientists rather than historians, this approach is better known in social science and anthropology than in history. An exception to this is in Indian Ocean studies, which has fostered numerous critically informed historical studies that have sought to redirect attention away from Europe and Europeans as significant actors in the shaping of Indian Ocean history. The most comprehensive recent attempt is probably Phillipe Beaujard’s (2012) two-volume *Les mondes de l’océan*, which draws on world system theory. Other more regionally oriented studies (e.g. Chaudhuri 1985; Lombard and Aubin 2000; Pearson 2005; Ho 2006; Sheriff 2010; Alpers 2013) focus on the contributions of different non-European actors and historical forces (such as Islam).

World-system studies focus on system features as the unit of analysis: core and periphery relations (and semi-periphery), the incorporation of outlying regions, cycles and crises. Much effort has gone into measuring cycles of expansion and contraction, A and B phases, via changes in city size (Frank 1993) and variables such as climate change (Chew 2006). Cores and peripheries are now measured in terms of population densities (Gills and Thompson 2006b: 11).

Wallerstein’s ‘modern world-system’ is not merely Eurocentric; it is also *centrist* in claiming a single central world-system. Centrist (and its kin universalism) is a trope that is as old as the first civilizations, empires and religions that claimed a dominant status. In nineteenth-century anthropology, diffusionism traced cultural traits to centres of diffusion, in which Egypt held the centre stage. New archaeological findings in the 1930s pointed to Sumer and Mesopotamia as older civilizations that influenced ancient Egypt. David Wilkinson (1987) develops this in the

idea that from the confluence of Mesopotamian and Egyptian civilizations, a 'central civilization' emerged around 1500 BCE; a restatement of diffusionism that expands the classic focus on Egypt with Mesopotamia.

Frank and Gills (1993, 2000) expand on Wilkinson's argument. They argue that 'interpenetrating accumulation' or 'interdependence between structures of accumulation and between political entities' ranged wider, extending to the Levant and to the Indus valley civilization, and occurred earlier, around 2700–2400 BCE (Frank and Gills 1993: 84). Thus they trace the history of the world-system back from 500 to 5,000 years. According to Frank, given 'the evidence for the existence of *one* immense Afro-Eurasian world system in the early Bronze Age', 'there is an unbroken historical continuity between the central civilization and world system of the Bronze Age and our contemporary modern capitalist world system'; 'the present world system was born some 5,000 years ago or earlier in West Asia, North Africa, and the Eastern Mediterranean' (1993: 392, 387, 390).

Thus while historical world-system studies break with Eurocentrism, they do not necessarily break with centrism. The notion of a single centre lives on in some world-system approaches to globalization. According to Gills and Thompson, 'systemic expansion is very much akin to globalization' (2006: 10). Cioffi-Revilla (2006: 87) distinguishes two dynamics of globalization, *endogenous* ('a process of growth or expansion that takes place within a given world region') and *exogenous* (which 'occurs between or among geographically distant world systems that had previously been disconnected from each other'). If we apply this to the Atlantic system, from a European viewpoint its development is endogenous whereas from the viewpoint of Africa, the Americas or Oceania it is exogenous globalization; so the distinction is tenuous. Centrist world-system thinkers privilege globalization as system expansion (endogenous globalization) over exogenous globalization. Of course, 'incorporation' is a major recurrent process (Hall 2006), but it is only part of the wider story.

The significance of multiple civilizations is a widely shared premise. Centrist approaches have been outliers ever since Toynbee's world history. Regional and comparative history has gradually sidelined the once dominant focus on Europe and the West. Eurocentrism, a mainstay of hegemonic history, has been refuted many times over. Wallerstein's modern world-system has been overtaken by comparative world system studies; it lives on in approaches that adopt a totalizing take on contemporary world capitalism (such as Harvey 2005 and the transnational capitalist class approach) but has negligible influence in global history. The centrist approach in world-system studies extrapolates dependency theory's centre-periphery structure to the point of reification; its key weakness is that it is too one-directional. Classic world-system theory resembles structural functionalism in overemphasizing structure and has been criticized for downplaying the role of local forces in shaping world systems. Fine-grained studies of imperialism correct centrist metropolitan approaches with pericentric and web approaches (Fieldhouse 1973; Nederveen Pieterse 1989).

Frank's thesis of a single world-system raises several problems: the archaeological evidence is thin and sparse and the argument is loose (see comments appended to Frank 1993). Asserting a *continuous world system* does not make much sense and at any rate must be combined with multiple dynamics and changes of centres and routes. Its heuristic value is minor, for the discontinuities are as important as the continuities and its metaphoric value is counterproductive.

Chase-Dunn contrasts continuationist, in the sense of asserting a single continuous world system, and comparativist world system studies (Frank 1993: 407). Comparative world system studies recognize multiple civilizations around the globe, avoid centrism and do not claim continuity between past world-systems and the contemporary world-system (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997).

A variant on the theme of multiple civilizations is the parallel and connected history approach, which recognizes not just multiple civilizational zones but tracks parallel developments across them and argues that while many have been interconnected they are not reducible to one another (Subrahmanyam 1997; Lieberman 1999, 2003). The comparative world system approach concurs but differs in terms of the unit and methods of analysis by focusing on systems, rather than civilizations. The evolutionary world politics approach concurs but emphasizes transformations of political organization over time. Scanning the delta of global history there are several currents such as anthropocentric and evolutionary accounts and centric and multicentric perspectives. Table 10.1.3 gives a schematic overview.

In recent work the distinction between the history of world-systems and the history of globalization fades into the background (Gills and Thompson 2006a). According to Jerry Bentley, the study of

historical globalization . . . maintains that the world has never been the site of discrete, unconnected communities, that crosscultural interactions and exchanges have taken place since the earliest days of human existence on planet earth, that Europe has not always been a unique or privileged site of dynamism and progress, that identities have always been multiple and malleable.

(Bentley 2006b: 29)

The same expansive perspective is certainly brought to the fore in the regional surveys in the present volume.

The unit of analysis

Units of analysis in approaches to world history include empire (Gibbon), civilization (Toynbee, Spengler), ecumene or the interplay of multiple zones (McNeill, Hodgson), world-economy (Braudel), world-system (Wallerstein), networks (Mann, Castells, Chase-Dunn), cities (Jennings), innovations (Korotayev) and transcultural material exchange (archaeology, this volume). The category ‘globalization’ is a latecomer; while world history has a long lineage, ‘history of globalization’ is a recent preoccupation. The question is how does globalization enter the conversation?

Table 10.1.3 Approaches to global history

<i>Approaches</i>	<i>Keywords and variants</i>	<i>Sources</i>
Eurocentric history	World history ruptures 1500, 1800	Mainstream, Bayly, Hopkins
World history	Multiple civilizations	Toynbee, Barraclough, McNeill, etc.
	Parallel and connected history	Subrahmanyam, Lieberman
World system studies	Modern world-system from 1500	Wallerstein, Cioffi-Revilla
	A single world-system 5,000 years	Frank and Gills
	Comparative world-system studies	Chase-Dunn/Anderson, Friedman
Archaeology	Connectivity, material exchange, networks, cities	LaBianca/Scham, Jennings, this volume
Evolutionary world politics	Transformation of political institutions	Thompson, Modelski
Evolutionary history, Big History	Embedded in planetary evolution	Garrathy/Gay, Spier

Economists prefer hard, quantifiable definitions of globalization. O'Rourke and Williamson (2002) take as the criterion for globalization the convergence of commodity prices across continents, which they time in the 1820s. Flynn and Giraldez ask, 'at what point does the integration of world regions become "globalization"?' (2006: 234). In their view globalization means 'the permanent existence of global trade' when all major zones of the world 'exchange products continuously . . . and on a scale that generated deep and lasting impacts on all trading partners' (244). They conclude that 'The birth of globalization occurred in 1571, the year that Manila was founded as a Spanish entrepôt connecting Asia and the Americas' (244).

The emergence of a *world economy* is a familiar threshold of globalization: in Braudel's terms, the merger of economic worlds into a world economy, or 'the "compression" of human history into a worldwide system of reciprocal communication . . . penetrations, influences, and dependencies' (Kossok 1993: 97). This is often timed to occur around 1500. Braudel and Abu-Lughod date this in the 1200s and research on Asia (Frank 1998; Gunn 2003) broadly concurs. John Hobson times this much earlier. In his view, while global connections run as far back as 3500 BCE, 'the big expansion of global trade occurred during the post-600 period' (2004: 35), so Hobson takes 500 CE as the start time of globalization, under the heading of oriental globalization, spurred by 'the revival of camel transport between 300 and 500' (34). A different perspective holds that a 'commercial revolution' unfolded from 1000 BCE:

a web of direct commercial ties that linked a very large portion of the world, with active points in the eastern Mediterranean, south China, and India, and with connections to Europe, West Africa, East Africa, Indonesia, Central Asia, the north Pacific and the western Pacific. The main elements of this new system of commerce and its changes from earlier systems of exchange included: an expanded set of commodities; the use of widely recognized systems of money; the development of new technology of shipping, accounting, and merchandising; the establishment of well-traveled commercial routes, with ports and caravanserais; the creation of social institutions of commerce such as trade diasporas; and the development of ideas and philosophies to address the problems of commerce.

(Manning 2005: 87; Ehret 1998)

The era of the commercial revolution was also a time in which major new traditions developed in religion and ethical philosophy. Zoroaster and the Buddha, Confucius, Laotse, the Hebrew prophets, the Greek philosophers, Jesus and others preached about the fundamental issues of life, death, community, and destiny.

(Manning 2005: 89)

This era matches Karl Jaspers' axial age (800–200 BCE) and signals growing global consciousness.

If we adopt a wider criterion and take the development of trade links between distant regions as a minimal threshold of globalization, it leads further back. To return to my Eurasian example, for instance, that means the Bronze Age. Early trade across that region is mixed in with tribute and booty. Besides silk and cotton from China, early trade includes lapis lazuli, turquoise, agate and beads. The Jade Road from Central Asia to China dates back to 3000 BCE and the early Silk Road, from Xian to the Mediterranean, goes back to 800 BCE (Mair 1998: 64, 258, 555). This matches the timing of early technologies of commerce such as charging interest on loans, which dates back to 3000 BCE in Sumer (Mieroop 2005).

Archaeologists such as Jennings take the formation of cities as a threshold of globalization in the sense of nodal points in connectivity and in the emergence of 'global culture' (loosely defined). The Uruk period (4200–3100 BCE) ranks 'as a critical period of rapid urbanization and

Table 10.1.4 Thresholds of globalization

<i>Time</i>	<i>Criterion</i>	<i>Sources</i>
4200 BCE	Development of cities	Jennings
3000 BCE	Trade linking multiple regions	Mair, Goody
	Innovations, diffusion of technology and information	Korotayev
1000 BCE	Trade linking a large portion of the world	Manning, Ehret
500 CE	Emergence of a world-economy	Hobson
1200		Braudel, Abu-Lughod
1500		Marx, Wallerstein
1571	Trade linking all major zones of the world	Flynn/Giraldez
1820s	Convergence of commodity prices across continents	O'Rourke/Williamson
1960s	Multinational corporations	General
1980s	ICT, containerization, end of Cold War	

social change in the wider Mesopotamian world', with Uruk-Warka as the major urban centre, which at its peak was three times the size of Athens (2011: 58). In sum, we have the following thresholds for globalization, from early to recent (Table 10.1.4).

However, what most of these thresholds have in common is that they are measures not of globalization but of *globality*. They assume that for globalization to occur there must first be globality, so in effect they diagnose the product as a precondition for the *process* through which it comes about. This reflects a recurrent confusion between globalization as process and as condition or outcome, between globalization and globality. Should globalization be *global* in a literal sense and encompass the world? Should it refer to conditions that are 'sufficiently global' according to a minimum threshold? Rejoinders to this view are, first, that globalization refers to a process, not a condition. Second, as Abu-Lughod notes, global connections are never *entirely* global: 'No world system is *global*, in the sense that all parts articulate evenly with one another' (1989: 8). This point is also well made by the archaeological contributions to this volume and, indeed, one might even go so far as to say that archaeological research provides the best, or at least the most tangible, evidence in support of Abu-Lughod's statement. Third, recent history of antiquity suggests an analytical shift to a less structuralist and more processual understanding of globalization, a turn to processes, trade routes and nodes, migrations and interconnections (cf. Frank 1996). Here, globalization functions as a heuristic, 'a shift in attention paid to questions of knowledge, communication flows, actor-network relations, interconnections, spatiality, medality, agency, etc.' (Holban 2011). An example is focusing on the diffusion of innovations and technologies as a driver of globalization (Korotayev 2005).

I define globalization as the trend of growing worldwide connectivity (Nederveen Pieterse 1995; 2015a: 19). Connectivity is a better yardstick than 'integration', which is too strong a term. Growing worldwide connectivity is the keynote in many recent accounts of globalization. This definition is general, matter-of-fact and processual. It implies a long view for obviously growing connectivity is not a recent trend. It does not require a specific definite beginning or threshold. In this view globalization is spurred by transport and communication technologies, institutions of commerce, and security conditions. The rhythms of globalization follow the vicissitudes of connectivity, which aren't always in forward motion; there are accelerations as well as decelerations of connectivity. These dynamics then frame the phases of globalization (discussed below).

Oriental globalization in the Old World

The sixteenth-century Portuguese writer Tomé Pires observed, ‘Whoever is lord of Malacca has his hands on the throat of Venice’ (quoted in Abu-Lughod 1989: 291). ‘Venice survived because Egypt survived, sustained by the persistence of the southern route to Asia’, according to Abu-Lughod (1989: 215). Abu-Lughod views the thirteenth-century world system of Egypt and the Levant as part of eight interlinked subsystems which ‘can be grouped into three larger circuits – the western European, the Middle Eastern and the Far Eastern’ (1989: 33–34). This perspective matches Frank’s *ReOrient* and historians of Asia and the Indian Ocean (on the latter, see above). This places the beginnings of a world economy in Song China and India from 1000 or 1100 CE. Asia remained the driving force of the world economy until 1800 (Pomeranz 2000 and others concur). A shorthand account of this phase of globalization is the later Silk Routes.

Much Silk Roads history, in view of its heading, focuses on the East–West movement of trade and culture. This downplays that the East–West movement was preceded and accompanied by West–East movements, from the Middle East to Asia, as part of a long history of osmosis in both directions. An essential part of this history is Muslim traders going east, as far as China and Korea. Muslim traders reconnected China and East Asia with the world economy that was centred at the time in the Middle East; reconnected because there were earlier trade links between East Asia and the Greco-Roman world but the overland silk routes declined after the fall of the Roman Empire (Abu-Lughod 1989: 265; Sherratt 2006; Teggart 1939). Ninth-century postmasters in Persia and the Arab world kept detailed records of Asian routes as far as Korea (Hoerder 2002). According to Goody, ‘In the ninth century there were said to be over 100,000 Muslim merchants in Canton’ (2010: 254). Muslim Afro-Eurasia was a vast intercultural expanse in which merchants and scholars travelled; the world of Ibn Battuta, Ibn Khaldun, Ibn Rushd, Maimonides, a world in which Chinese, Indian, Persian, Turkic, Central Asian, Muslim, Arabic, Mongol, Jewish and Berber cultures were interconnected. The *Dār al-Islām*, the ‘abode of Islam’ was not the world’s earliest cosmopolitanism, but one that stretched further and endured longer than any other (Hodgson 1974; Nederveen Pieterse 2007). This gave rise to the encounter of the trading religions Buddhism and Islam (Elverskog 2010). Zheng He, the great Chinese mariner and contemporary of Columbus, was a Hui-Muslim, also known as Ma Sanbao and Hajji Mahmud Shamsuddin. Surely the ‘*Pax Islamica* that stretched from Morocco to Mataram’ (Hopkins 2002: 33) is a major part of globalization history, a point also made by many archaeologists of the Indian Ocean rim and West Africa (including in this volume).

Abu-Lughod adopts a world-system approach while being critical of the definition of world-systems (1989: 9), so hers is a crossover study that is open to wider horizons. While her focus is the 1250–1350 CE period as a ‘world-system’ she discusses earlier trade and prosperity. In brief, she notes that among the routes between Asia and the Levant, by comparison to the northern overland route via Armenia, and the southern Red Sea route via Egypt, the ‘middle route’ via the Persian Gulf was the older and most convenient link; Baghdad declined after the reign of Harun al-Rashid and the Abbasids (191; cf. Kazim 2000, Hoerder 2002). This suggests a timeline similar to Hobson’s. Hobson places the origins of a world economy around 500 CE with the resumption of the caravan trade, centred on Baghdad and Mecca: ‘oriental globalisation was the midwife, if not the mother, of the medieval and modern West’ (2004: 36). In later work Hobson (2012) distinguishes four historical phases, marked by the varying relative strengths of Oriental and Occidental influences.

Thus, in short, we have multiple phases of oriental globalization: (a) Eurasian globalization of the early Silk Roads; (b) West Asian (Middle East) globalization with caravan trade moving towards East Asia, west to east; (c) East Asia-driven globalization of the later Silk Roads (including the various maritime routes) from the Tang era onward, east to west; (d) and the twenty-first century comeback of East Asia with the rise of China.

This view differs markedly from Eurocentric accounts, provides nuances of relative influence and credits oriental influences, past and present. I find this perspective meaningful, with provisos. First, it should be viewed as part of long ongoing processes of East–West osmosis further back in time: ‘globalization is braided’ (Nederveen Pieterse 2015a). Second, the terminology of modernity (and variants premodern, postmodern) carries Eurocentric luggage so it is best avoided in periodizing globalization. Further, considering that mapping and timing globalization are co-dependent, it makes sense to combine geographical and temporal markers to identify phases of globalization (discussed below). This is a view shared, also, by many of the contributors to this book, albeit from various analytical perspectives.

Archaeology and globalization

Historians of antiquity used to view globalization as a ‘modern’ or contemporary phenomenon and kept their distance from it. Hopkins’s volume *Globalization and history* (2002) prompted historians of antiquity to take up the question whether the Greco-Roman world is part of globalization history (Pitts 2011; Pitts and Versluys 2015). Archaeologists joined the globalization discussion, adopting a networks approach (LaBianca and Scham 2006) and focusing on the formation of cities (Jennings 2011).

In archaeology the focus is on material exchange and connectivity, which overlaps with cultural networks, as many of the papers in this volume illustrate. Social hierarchy and stratification also matter. Material connectivity includes obsidian in the Stone Age, copper, tin in the Bronze Age, ceramics, gemstones, metals, weapons, cattle, food and cloth. Transcultural material exchange further includes knowledge and techniques and sheds light on inter-regional interaction networks.

With their insights in connectivity along with comparative data across multiple regions, archaeologists push the timelines of connectivity back. Thus the long-distance trade in obsidian centred in Catalhöyük, Anatolia, for example, goes back to 5000 BCE (Rice 1997). Finds in Uruk–Warka, Mesopotamia push urbanization back to the late fifth millennium BCE. In Southeast Asia, the ‘globalization of food’ is traced to the fourth millennium BCE and extensive seafaring to the second millennium BCE (this volume). Persia is part of inter-regional networks during the first millennium BCE, and so forth. How these findings and understandings of connectivity affect the globalization discussion depends on the theories and analytics of globalization that archaeologists use – which are as varied and diverse among archaeologists as they are among social sciences and humanities generally (a diversity that this volume well illustrates).

Returning to oriental globalization in the Old World, if we accept that the Arab-Muslim world was the epicentre of early oriental globalization we cannot fully understand it without taking into account its Hellenistic character and its role as a ‘middleman civilization’, brokering between worlds. This suggests that starting Eurasian globalization in 500 CE is inadequate; if this was the onset of a world-economy, this too had its precursors. This includes *inter alia* the contributions of the Greco-Roman world as a nexus between different globalization phases and as a major accelerator of globalization.

The development of a world economy in the strict sense of a trans-regional division of labour that is necessary for social reproduction, plainly applies to the Roman world, which established

and sustained an inter-regional division of labour that comprised olive-grape (Gaul, Spain), grain (Egypt, North Africa) and Mediterranean trades (Going 1992; Nayyar 2006). The map of Roman value chains matches the ‘greater Mediterranean’ of recent accounts, which extends from Sumer to the Danube (and by the sixteenth century to Antwerp) (Morris 2005: 36, 45; Horden and Purcell 2000). Roman networks further included significant trade with India and China (in wine, silk and muslin).

The significance of the Bronze Age has been widely discussed (Mair 1998, 2006; Goody 2010). Vankilde (this volume) adopts the term ‘Bronzization’ as a stand-in for globalization. The Bronze Age brought plough agriculture, animal traction in agriculture and an urban revolution in much of Eurasia.

The Hellenic-Roman world may be viewed as a Western extension of Eurasian Bronze Age culture; it was contemporaneous with the expansion of Han China in the east (McNeill 1979). As part of Eurasian trade and culture networks the Hellenic-Roman world is linked to the East, is part of East-West osmosis and an East-West hybrid. The Greco-Roman world, then, is a nexus between the Bronze Age phase of Eurasian globalization and the phase of oriental globalization that started in around 500 CE. The Eurasian backdrop sheds light on the world of interconnected knowledge, religions and technologies; the world of Mesopotamia, Egypt, India, Persia, Phoenicia, Greece and Rome; the world of Karl Jaspers’ *Achsenzeit* and Martin Bernal’s *Black Athena*.

This also raises questions of mobility and global consciousness. Stereotypical representations of the past as immobile, fragmented, segmented have been refuted by research on mobility and migrations during the first millennium and in the ancient world (Hoerder 2002; Isayev 2015) and on the spread of knowledge, technology and religions from the Bronze Age onward (McNeill 1982). The Greco-Roman world is also significant in the evolution of cosmopolitanism (Edwards and Woolf 2003) and in globalization as subjectivity, or global consciousness. The Stoics figure as an early cosmopolitanism (Nussbaum 2006). Polybius’s *Histories* is often mentioned as a precursor of global sociology, centuries before Ibn Khaldun (Inglis and Robertson 2006; Isayev 2015). After the Punic wars between 160 and 120 BCE, Polybius wrote,

Now in earlier times the world’s history had consisted, so to speak, of a series of unrelated episodes, the origins and results of each being as widely separated as their localities, but from this point onwards [after the Second Punic war] history becomes an organic whole: the affairs of Italy and Africa are connected with those of Asia and of Greece, and all events bear a relationship and contribute to a single end.

(*Histories 1.3, quoted in Pitts and Versluys 2015: 18*)

‘*Orbis terrarum*’ is an early world consciousness. The major ancient Eurasian cosmopolitanisms, the Roman world with Latin and Indic civilization with Sanskrit, overlap in time (Pollock 1996). After the Latin and Sanskrit worlds shrank and gave way to local vernaculars, Islamic civilization and Arabic emerged as the next major cosmopolitan world, bridging East and West, stretching at its widest expanse from Muslim Iberia to China. The Ottoman Millet system – an early multiculturalism – continued the legacy of Mediterranean, Hellenic and Muslim cosmopolitanism.

Conclusion: retiming globalization

As discussed, assessments of the timing of globalization range widely, from globalization as part of planetary evolution, as a long-term process going back to 3000 BCE and possibly a millennium earlier, as a commercial revolution unfolding around 1000 BCE; as a world economy

taking shape around 500 CE, 1100, 1200 or 1500; as modernity, 1800; and as a recent trend from the 1970s.

So when did globalization begin? How we identify the start time of globalization depends on how we define globalization and what we take to be the unit of analysis. If globalization is defined as a condition of *being globally connected* a start time after 1500 would make sense. The problem is that this makes the outcome (global connectedness) a precondition for the process through which it comes about (becoming globally connected); it places the result before the process, the cart before the horse. For instance, according to Leslie Sklair globalization requires the simultaneous occurrence of eight trends (time–space compression, deterritorialization, standardization, unevenness, homogenization, heterogeneity, re-embedding of local culture, and vulnerability), which are rather a mishmash (Sklair 2006; Jennings this volume).

If globalization is defined as the process of *becoming globally connected* and the awareness of this happening, we can distinguish several levels of connectedness, with different start times. At one level, if the unit of analysis of globalization is *growing connectivity*, the connections are as old as human history, as old as when people dispersed and wandered across the planet (Gamble 1993). Connections became substantial and sustained once surplus was generated as a basis for exchange and trade, which points to agriculture, particularly plough agriculture, and urbanization – conditions that in Eurasia first became widely available during the Bronze Age (Goody 2010). This enables inter-regional trade which, in turn, received a boost around 1000 BCE, which was accompanied by a surge in global consciousness: the Eurasian axial age.

Many globalization studies are steeped in presentism and Eurocentrism. The general principle is the later the timing of globalization, the greater Europe's role and the more Eurocentric the perspective (Nederveen Pieterse 2015a). The long view gives us deeper insight in the history and depth of human interconnectedness. While the advantage of taking the long view is that it embeds globalization in the *longue durée* and in evolutionary time, the disadvantage is that globalization becomes too general, wide and sprawling a category. Remedying this requires identifying phases and zones of global history, which poses problems of demarcating and labeling periods.

The general idea of phases of globalization that synchronize with advances in transport, communication, travel and awareness is well-established; Robertson (1992) notes such accelerations of globalization in 1500, the 1800s, the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries. If globalization is defined as growing connectivity, the rhythms of globalization are a function of connectivity conditions, which are spurred by technologies of transport and communication, and conditions of security (such as the Pax Romana and Pax Britannica). Reviewing the literature, 3000 BCE is a relevant time range in the Old World, with the additional stipulation of the commercial revolution of 1000 BCE as a major acceleration and deepening of connectivity and cross-border awareness, which matches many findings.

On the basis of the preceding discussion we can revisit the timing of globalization and fill in lacunae by showing early and intermediate phases of globalization (Table 10.1.5). Considerations that inform the periodization in Table 10.1.5 are the following: in Eurasia, globalization in the sense of sustained inter-regional trade unfolds with the Bronze Age. Inter-regional trade underwent a boost from 1000 BCE and linked Afro-Eurasia. Antiquity and the Greco-Roman world are intermediary phases between the Eurasian Bronze Age and oriental globalization (OG). In the first phase of oriental globalization (OG1), trade flows are primarily eastward, from West Asia (Middle East) towards East Asia. In OG2, the balance is westward, from East Asia towards West Asia (Middle East), resuming the early Silk Routes and with additional maritime Spice Routes. Distinctive for the period from 1500 is the growing role of Europe and the Americas, the triangular trade and the Atlantic exchange while the role of Asia is ongoing. Characteristic of

Table 10.1.5 Phases of globalization

<i>Phases</i>	<i>Start time</i>	<i>Central nodes</i>	<i>Dynamics</i>
Bronze Age globalization	3000 BCE	Eurasia, Mesopotamia, Egypt	Agricultural and urban revolutions, trade, ancient empires
Afro-Eurasian	1000 BCE	West Asia, Greco-Roman world, Africa	Commercial revolution, growing cross-cultural awareness
OG1	500 CE	West Asia (Middle East)	Emergence of a world economy, caravan trade
OG2	1100	East and South Asia and multicentric	Productivity, technology, urbanization; Silk Routes
Multicentric	1500	Atlantic expansion	Triangular trade; spice trade
Euro-Atlantic	1800	Euro-Atlantic economy	Industrialization, colonial division of labour
20C globalization	1950	US, Europe, Japan: Trilateral	Multinational corporations, (end of) Cold War, global value chains
21C globalization	2000	East Asia, China, emerging economies	New geography of trade; global rebalancing

the phase from 1800 is industrialization along with colonialism and imperialism, when Oceania came firmly into the global picture. Twentieth-century globalization includes the world wars, the rise of multinational corporations and the Cold War. The period from 2000 ushers in a new pattern of twenty-first-century globalization, which is a work in progress. Obviously this is only a shorthand overview.

Another major question is centrism or multicentrism. Multicentrism is based on the premise of ‘multiple origins of social complexity, not on a single origin from which social complexity radiated’ (Cioffi-Revilla 2006: 89). This premise is widely shared. That multicentrism can go together or be interspersed with periods of hegemony does not undermine the premise itself. Rather it sheds light on the diversity of practices of empire and hegemony, particularly at the frontiers, whether during the Roman Empire (Wells 1999: 122–47; Woolf 1997), the British Empire or American hegemony. This is important not merely in historical terms but also conceptually. The premise of multicentrism unsettles the proclivity towards the *singular* that is widespread in social science and the humanities – as in globalization, capitalism, modernity, rather than globalizations, capitalisms, modernities (Nederveen Pieterse 2009, 2014). Bentley (2006a, 2006b) rightly criticizes ‘modernocentrism’ as a deeper problematic than Eurocentrism.

Reviewing histories of globalization shows that globalization has been multicentric all along, which is relevant also for later and contemporary trends. In light of the array of ancient globalizations considered in this volume, Western hegemony is a latecomer. Twenty-first century globalization breaks the 200-year pattern of dominant North–South relations with an East–South turn (Nederveen Pieterse 2011), so the era of Western hegemony emerges as a historical interlude (approximately 1800–2000) and present times indicate a return to a historical ‘normal’ in which Asian dynamics have been the driving force of the world-economy through most of the career of globalization.

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