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Ancient Rome and globalisation: decentring Rome

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According to Haverfield, 'Greece taught men to be human and Rome made mankind civilized ... the form it took was Romanization'. This is a brief version of the Romanisation paradigm, which is now an old and weary narrative in Roman history and archaeology.[1] Romanisation is a diffusionist perspective, assuming Rome as the centre and standard, without necessarily much reflection on how this centre and standard came about. Some Roman archaeologists and historians are turning to globalisation as a possible alternative, which has sparked discussion.[2] Variables at issue in this discussion are *which* globalisation, which approach to globalisation, and which Roman history, which approach to the Greco-Roman world. In contrast to Romanisation, the globalisation take on the Roman world situates Rome in the stream of history; it decentres Rome. In this view, Rome is globalising by being globalised.

The first section of this chapter discusses approaches to globalisation and global history. The second section turns to different approaches in ancient Roman history and archaeology. The third section asks not what globalisation can do for Rome but what Rome can do for globalisation, and reflects on the importance of Greco-Roman history to the broader field of globalisation studies. The fourth section develops a two-way perspective of Rome being globalised and globalising. The concluding section formulates a timeline of globalisation in the light of revisiting ancient history, synthesising the argument.

Globalisation and global history

The theme of globalisation emerged first in business studies in the 1970s and then rose steeply in the 1990s. Hence much of the globalisation discussion is

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marked by 1990s flavour, themes and sensibilities. It is then that the dominant works on globalisation were written and global studies were occupied and colonised by 1990s perspectives. Thus, most globalisation studies suffer from presentism and eurocentrism. Presentism assumes that globalisation unfolds from 1980 or thereabouts. For many perspectives – such as economics, business studies, media studies and cultural studies – this may be effective for much of the relevant database dates from the 1970s or 1980s onward, such as the rise of multinational corporations, followed by global value chains. Thus many disciplines date globalisation from the 1970s with the rise of multinational corporations and accelerated communication (most economics, international relations, political science and media studies). Another periodisation refers to neoliberal globalisation, 1980–2000.

Eurocentric perspectives assume that globalisation stems from modernity, starting with the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, followed by industrialisation, from circa 1800.[3] Alternatively, Marxist views date globalisation from 1500, from the 'conquest of the world market'. Here globalisation is equivalent to 'modern capitalism' (as in Marx and in Wallerstein's 'long 16th century'). Thus, the capstone moments of occidental globalisation are 1500 CE and 1800 CE. Each links back to the Renaissance: the 1500 CE view via the age of reconnaissance and Columbus, and the 1800 CE view via the Renaissance humanists, the seventeenth-century scientific revolution and the Enlightenment philosophers. By implication, each eventually links to Antiquity so the conventional views on globalisation incorporate the Greco-Roman world, and do so via a thoroughly conventional historical lens and periodisation.

Some treatments in Roman history and archaeology discuss, criticise or take as yardstick the 1990s globalisation perspectives to understand the globalisation of the Roman world.[4] However, at this stage the question is not simply engagement with globalisation but with *which* globalisation. The globalisation literature now ranges over thirty years and has become increasingly diverse, sprawling according to disciplines (economics, sociology, international relations, ecology, etc.), theoretical leanings and historical timelines.

Historians used to view globalisation as a 'modern' or contemporary phenomenon and kept their distance from it. This changed with Hopkins' volume, *Globalization in World History* (2002), which has also prompted historians of ancient Rome to reconsider and to view the Greco-Roman world as part of globalisation history.[5] However, with this perspective on globalisation in the *longue durée* comes a timeline that adopts a caesura in global history in which globalisation unfolds from 1500 CE and that what goes before is 'archaic globalisation'. In other words, 'real globalisation'

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refers to 'modern globalisation', which is European, Western, and what come before are preludes to, infrastructures of globalisation. This view is widely shared,[6] also in wider globalisation studies.[7] This timeline restates the Eurocentric perspective – 'modern history' and modern globalisation start with Europe; the difference is that the new eurocentrism comes with a larger appetite and acknowledges wider, sprawling contributions to the European take-off from different eras and civilisations. This view both opens wider to the past and shutters it by means of the conventional rupture of modernity.[8] While the infrastructures become more visible, the 'product' remains European.

By one account, this is a semantic issue. Many historians have traced wide and deep infrastructures of global connectivity and mobility, without using the terminology of 'globalisation'. By another account, terminology matters and periodising globalisation is representing and negotiating world history. Looking beneath questions of terminology, what is essentially at issue is whether or not a caesura or rupture that privileges Europe (modernity, modern capitalism, modern world system, modern globalisation) is appropriate. Several contributions to global history, whether or not they use the framework of globalisation, question or reject this rupture.

The Chicago history tradition of McNeill and Hodgson is concerned with deep and broad civilisational lineages,[9] drawing on the anthropological history of Marshall Sahlins and others. 'Globalisation' does not figure in these accounts but neither does a rupture of 'modernity'. Frank and Gills trace the history of the world system back from 500 to 5000 years.[10] They follow David Wilkinson's argument of a 'central civilization' that emerged from the confluence of Egypt and Sumer around 1500 BCE.[11] Using economic criteria of 'interpenetrating accumulation', Frank and Gills argue that this confluence included the Indus Valley civilisation and the area of Syria and the Levant and occurred earlier, around 2700–2400 BCE. While their unit of analysis is the 'world system', not 'globalisation', their argument is critical of the Eurocentrism of Wallerstein's 'modern world-system'. Stavrianos's global history also starts from prehistory and does not privilege Europe.[12]

Abu-Lughod traced capitalism back to 1250, situated in Egypt and the Middle East.[13] Hobson's thesis of oriental globalisation traces the beginnings of globalisation further back to circa 500 CE.[14] Keynotes of oriental globalisation are the resumption of the Middle East caravan trade around 500 CE, and Asia emerging as the centre and driving force of the world economy from 1000 CE or 1100 CE, where it remained until 1800 CE.[15] A shorthand account of this phase of globalisation is 'the Silk Routes'.

In subsequent work Hobson distinguishes four historical phases, marked by varying relative strengths of oriental and occidental influences.

In the first phase, from 500 CE to 1450 CE, the extensity, intensity, velocity, and impact of Afro-Eurasian interactions qualify as 'proto-globalisation'.[16] In this phase orientalisation was dominant in the sense that the 'proto-global network was crucial for delivering Eastern resource portfolios into Europe'. In the second phase, 'early globalisation' (1450/1492 CE–1830 CE), 'the diffusion of "resource portfolios" from East to West' led to the 'fundamental re-organization of societies across the world including Europe', a period characterised as 'Orientalization dominant and Occidentalization emergent'. The third phase, 'modern globalisation' (1830 CE–2000 CE), witnessed 'Occidentalization in the ascendance, with the West being the dominant civilization', which was achieved by colonisation and neocolonial globalisation (i.e. Western capitalism). The current phase, 'postmodern globalisation', witnesses 'the return of China to the center of the global economy'. This account adopts a caesura between 'proto-' and early globalisation, times 'modern globalisation' from 1830 CE and adds postmodern globalisation after 2000 CE. Terminology aside, this account differs radically from more traditional narratives and gives much greater credit to oriental influences, past and present. I also view globalisation as a process of East–West osmosis and interplay: 'globalisation is braided',[17] and view the phase of globalisation after 2000 CE as an 'East-South turn'.[18]

Greco-Roman history

Within Roman history and archaeology very different approaches exist, and each of these strands tends to hold different perspectives on globalisation.

In recent archaeological studies of the Greco-Roman world, mobility and connectivity loom large. According to Morris, a new model is taking shape in Mediterranean history: 'Where the old model emphasized static cells, rigid structures, and powerful institutions, the new one sees fluidity and connectedness'.[19] In its strongest form the new model links up 'the whole period from later prehistory to the eighteenth, nineteenth, or even twentieth century'.[20] 'The three concepts of mobility, connectivity and decentring are at the heart of recent historical/anthropological treatments of the Mediterranean', which 'sets it apart from many 1970s and 1980s accounts of ancient Mediterranean history'.[21] The principles of materiality, mobility, contact and identity inform a new archaeology and history of the Mediterranean; 'material connections' and 'processes such as long-distance and prolonged migrations, hybrid practices and object diasporas', as part of the 'social biography of objects', take centre stage.[22]

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We find similar sensibilities in cultural studies of Greco-Roman history. Hybrid Rome, or the 'inherent pluralism' of the Roman world, is well established.[23] Other tropes are syncretism, Creolisation and multicultural antiquity.[24] The Roman world is an assemblage of diverse influences in every sphere – economic, cultural, political and symbolic. Greece and Egypt are prominent influences along with the Etruscans, Persia and the influence of the colonised lands and peoples. Egypt's influence, as Versluys points out, includes casting the Roman emperor in the image of the pharaoh.[25]

Both archaeological and cultural studies of ancient Rome tend to accept globalisation as a productive approach to Roman history, or at any rate, share sensibilities such as an emphasis on mobility, connectivity and mélange. In contrast, state-centric accounts of Roman history tend to adopt views that centre on Rome and the evolution of state institutions. Thus in Hitchner's view, the Roman super-state unified the fragmented world of the ancient empires and with the institution of Roman citizenship in 212 CE, this process of unification evolved at a further level, with a gradual process of decline setting in from the third century CE.[26] While Hitchner recognises push-back from Rome's peripheries in the first century CE, his is generally a Rome-centric account and a restatement of the Romanisation paradigm, in which the empire is the globalising force.[27] 'Romanisation', of course, matters and new archaeological and cultural accounts emphasise that they do not seek to ignore or marginalise the significance of institutions and empire. Rather, the emphasis falls differently. In state-centric accounts it is structures and institutions that unify the Mediterranean world, while in globalisation perspectives connectivity, mobility, objects, and knowledge networks do.

These and other strands of Roman history are criss-crossed by macro-historical views – in which Greco-Roman history is more often a bystander than a protagonist. Thus, some historians of ancient Rome who adopt the globalisation perspective follow Bayly's and Hopkins' periodisation of globalisation,[28] while a wider periodisation would be more appropriate and relevant to understanding the Greco-Roman world (discussed below).

Ask not what globalisation can do for Rome, but what Rome can do for globalisation

Historians of ancient Rome may look to globalisation as an alternative perspective to overcome the limitations of Romanisation, while scholars of globalisation ask, rather, how can we learn from Roman history and archaeology to deepen and refine understandings of globalisation? Keynotes

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that emerge from Greco-Roman history concern the timeline of globalisation, the analytics and the unit of analysis of globalisation, questions of mobility, and lineages of cosmopolitanism.

First, Roman history matters with regard to the timeline of globalisation. If we accept that the Arab-Muslim world was the epicentre of early oriental globalisation (following Hobson's argument), we cannot understand it properly without taking into account both its Hellenic character and its role as a 'middleman civilization', brokering between wider civilisational worlds. Greco-Roman history shows that starting globalisation in 500 CE is inadequate; we must go further back in time. It draws attention to the contributions of the Greco-Roman world to globalisation both as a *nexus* between different globalisation phases and as a major accelerator of globalisation.

With regard to analytics, ancient history and archaeology confront us with the recurrent confusion between globalisation as process and as outcome or condition, or between globalisation and globality (or globalness).[29] Should globalisation be 'global'? Should globalisation be literally global and encompass the world; or else, should it refer to conditions that are 'sufficiently global'?

Economists prefer 'hard', quantifiable definitions of globalisation, such as the permanent existence of global trade, when all major zones of the world 'exchange products continuously . . . and on a scale that generated deep and lasting impacts on all trading partners',[30] or price convergence across continents.[31] But oddly this measures not globalisation but globality; it concerns a condition or outcome, not the *process* through which it comes about. However, globalisation refers to a process, not a condition. A fundamental consideration is to distinguish between the *form* of globalisation in a specific era and globalisation as a process. As Robertson notes, we must distinguish between the forms and the trend of globalisation and should not mistake a specific form of globalisation (e.g. neoliberalism) for globalisation per se.[32]

A familiar form of this question is the idea of the *world economy* as the threshold of globalisation, in the sense of a trans-regional division of labour that is necessary for social reproduction (as in Wallerstein's world-system approach). A world economy in this sense does not apply to all ancient empires but does apply to the Roman world, which established and sustained an inter-regional division of labour that comprised olive–grape agriculture (Gaul, Spain), grain (Egypt, North Africa) and Mediterranean trades.[33] The map of Roman value chains matches the 'greater Mediterranean' argued in recent accounts, extending from Sumer to the Danube (and in the sixteenth century CE, to Antwerp).[34] This included significant trade with India

and China (wine, silk, muslin). Silk was part of Roman culture and of Rome's foreign trade,[35] but was not necessary for social reproduction. However, ancient history and archaeology in their current guises also suggest an analytical shift to a less structuralist and more processual understanding of globalisation, a turn to globalisation as processes, to trade routes and nodes, migrations and interconnections.

Third, with regard to mobility, the Roman world breaks with stereotypical representations of the past as immobile, fragmented, segmented, sheltered, closed off, which is belied by research on ancient mobility,[36] on migrations[37] and on the spread of religion and the travel of knowledge and technology.[38]

Fourth, the Greco-Roman world is significant in relation to globalisation as subjectivity, or world consciousness, and the evolution of cosmopolitanisms.[39] The Stoics often figure as an early cosmopolitanism.[40] Polybius's *Histories* are often mentioned as a precursor of global sociology.[41] *Orbis terrarum* is an early world consciousness. Another consideration is that there was no racism in the ancient Mediterranean world in our modern understanding of the word, even if we consider the role and treatment of corsairs, slaves and prisoners of war.[42] The major ancient cosmopolitanisms, Indic civilisation with Sanskrit and the Greco-Roman world with Greek and Latin, overlap in time.[43] After the Latin and Sanskrit worlds shrank and gave way to local vernaculars, Islamic civilisation with Arabic emerged as the next major cosmopolitan world, geographically bridging East and West, stretching at its widest expanse from Muslim Iberia to Muslim traders in China, and as subjectivity, while carrying Hellenic legacies.[44] The Ottoman millet system continued Mediterranean and Muslim cosmopolitanism.

If we explore how ancient Roman history can learn from globalisation, the key point is to decentre Rome. This concerns, first, the difference between inward- and outward-looking perspectives on the unit of analysis. Decentring Rome means viewing Roman history from the outside, as a regional subset of history embedded in the broad sway of Eurasia and the Bronze Age, which, in turn, is part of wider and, if one will, evolutionary history.

Jack Goody's work takes us back to the Bronze Age, ranges widely across Eurasia and offers articulate criticisms of Eurocentric views. In his view there is not one but 'many Renaissances' and the miracle is not Europe but Eurasia.[45] Bronze Age culture, stretching across Eurasia, was marked by the use of animal traction, plough agriculture, an urban revolution and the ongoing existence of urban culture. This perspective is profoundly relevant to the history of ancient Rome. From this viewpoint, the Hellenistic-Roman

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world was a western extension of Bronze Age culture, contemporaneous with the expansion of Han China in the east.[46] As part of Eurasian trade and culture networks, the Hellenic-Roman world is linked to the east, part of East–West osmosis and an East–West hybrid. The Greco-Roman world, then, emerges as a nexus and bridge in-between the Bronze Age phase of globalisation and the phase of oriental globalisation, starting c. 500 CE. The Eurasian perspective sheds light on the world of interconnected knowledge, religions and technologies; the world of Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, Persia, Phoenicia, ancient Greece and Rome; the world of Karl Jaspers' *Achsenzeit*, Martin Bernal's *Black Athena* and McNeill's *The Pursuit of Power*.[47] The Hellenistic-Roman Stoics are part of a wider cultural lineage. The Roman world, then, emerges as a Western extension of Eurasian urban culture.

The decline of the Roman empire meant the West losing urban culture and relapsing into rural culture, hence the long period of feudalism and the castle system. Most of Europe was forest and after Rome's decline it reverted to forest, making a gradual comeback only from the eleventh century onward. The decline and fall of Rome meant Europe gradually losing urban culture. The castle system ended in the late Middle Ages with the introduction of Chinese gunpowder and cannon.

Rome is globalised and globalising: a two-way perspective

First, Rome is globalised; witness the 'inherent pluralism' of the Roman world and Rome as an eclectic 'successor culture'.[48] Thus, the trope of multiple identities and 'multiple sources of the self' that is often viewed as characteristic of postmodern times,[49] we find in antiquity as well. To refer to a well-known example: King Herod, who was appointed King of Judea by the Romans, was 'by birth an Idumean (i.e. Edomite), by profession a Jew, by necessity a Roman, by culture and by choice a Greek'.[50] Multiple and intersecting cultural layers and overlapping jurisdictions, then as now, generate multiple identities.

Conversely, Rome is globalising, as a successor to and westward extension of Egypt, Persia, Macedonia, Greece, the Hittites, the Phoenicians, Carthage, enabled by precursors, building on their infrastructures – in criss-crossing the Mediterranean, wiring East and West, and as a westward extension of Eurasian culture. Part of Rome's western expansion was that it brought aqua and wine/grape culture to northwest Europe, as well as widespread olive oil consumption not seen again until the late twentieth century.[51]

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Of course, Romanisation matters, but what does it mean? More precisely, how Roman is Rome? Rome is globalised and globalising. If we accept that Rome was globalised, it follows that *Romanisation is globalisation*. The peripheries define the centre as much as the centre shapes the peripheries. The peripheries are many and there is also travel between peripheries, before, during and after the Roman era. The Romans globalised their peripheries by bringing in their own influence and elements of *other peripheries*. Mesopotamians guarded Hadrian's Wall and legionaries from Africa served on the German frontier.[52] The Romans brought *garum*, fermented fish sauce, possibly from a recombination of Asian recipes, all over the empire. In early Roman London (Londinium), an emergent 'taste' for seafood seems to have contrasted with avoidance and possible religious reverence in Iron Age Britain[53]; in an early demonstration of the relationship between power, social formation and 'taste' within the British Isles, revered sea fauna became seafood. *Liquamen* or *garum* are in many respects similar to fermented fish sauces used in contemporary Thai and Vietnamese cooking and, in a coincidental continuity, they are one of the most widely available and used flavourings in east London today.[54]

The dialectics of empire and emancipation are that as the empire gobbles up the peripheries, the peripheries influence and reshape the centre.[55] In the endgame the frontiers often take over the centre.[56] Christianity becomes the religion of the empire like barbarian mercenaries guarding the imperial frontiers take over the empire itself. Part of fine-grain imperial history and the network approach to empire is the recognition that the peripheries polemicise with the centre; indeed, every point is a centre.

At the same time, the centre polemicises with the periphery. Tacitus's *Germania* blamed the decline of Rome on its absorption of foreign, alien elements: 'The German tribes are stronger because they are pure'. This theme was taken up by Edward Gibbon and influenced Europe's eighteenth- and nineteenth-century elites and their thinking about decay and decadence – as in Comte de Gobineau's thesis that mixture produces decay. Purity (of 'blue blood' and of 'race') thus became a key sensibility of Europe's declining aristocracy,[57] and exercised a profound influence on Nazism.[58]

Part of the nexus *Romanisation as globalisation* is that during Hellenistic-Roman times Europe was linked to the East. In time Latin Christianity, driving the Crusades, weakened Byzantium and contributed to the West-East split. Latin cosmopolitanism lingered in the Roman Catholic Church (the 'oldest international') and revived in Renaissance humanism. The Renaissance meant Europe resuming urban culture *and* its links to the East (via Venice, the Levant trade, the Silk Routes).[59] The

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infrastructure of the Greco-Roman world contributed to Europe's trade networks. Meanwhile, part of the subtext of 'modern' Europe, while explicitly neo-classical (Greco-Roman) in style and outlook, is that it rejoined Eurasia.

In aesthetics and symbolism the Roman empire framed imperial power in the West – in Napoleon's empire style and Napoleonic code; in the British empire's notions of law, citizenship and infrastructure modelled on the Roman example; and in Italian fascism, Nazism and American superpower.[60] To the East also, the Ottomans (adopting imperial-style architecture in the Topkapi Palace) and the Russian tsars echoed elements of the Roman empire. The American and French Revolutions, led by elites reared in the classics, were also steeped in Roman imagery.[61]

In this context, is empire a productive theme? Then, which imperialism? Relevant approaches are the pericentric theory of empire,[62] in which peripheries play a central, not just a marginal role, and multicentric and network understandings of empire. This generates multiple and layered understandings of the Roman world including the diversity, polyphony and dynamics of Romanness: unfolding across nine centuries, multi-centric Rome involves many actors, many different Romanisations and Roman identities.

While Roman history and archaeology involve accomplished methodology, large databases and impressive case studies, monuments, artefacts and texts defined the case. To the extent that archaeological data lead the argument, because the data are monumental (as traditionally studied in Classical archaeology) the argument takes on a monumental bend. The monumental bias in Roman history drives state-centric approaches. This formal framework may mistake the stage (monumental remnants of which remain) for the performance, which may have been more polyphonic than the monuments would suggest. By contrast, more recent archaeological and cultural studies of the Greco-Roman world are 'backstage inquiries' and shifted their focus from the centre to the peripheries, and from the monumental to the mundane.

Second, there is a Western bias in Roman history. Part of the 'the spell of Rome' and the Rome of Cecil B. de Mille and Walt Disney is a whitewash of Rome, as Bernal discussed in relation to ancient Greece.[63] While the eastward extension of Hellenism is extensively on record in the Gandhara civilisation, Rome's eastward extension is relatively little explored. Rome's links with the East, with Parthia, Bactria and Asia are understated and remain relatively under-researched.[64]

This includes the links with China and East Asia.[65] Chinese traders reached the Roman world, known as 'Da Qin', probably mainly as far as Syria. A Chinese embassy reached Da Qin in 130 BCE and a Roman envoy

visited the Chinese emperor as alleged in Chinese records of 166 CE.[66] Second-century CE Chinese records discuss routes to Da Qin. The main overland route led via the 'Jade Gate' through central Asia, but sea routes were also used. Of Da Qin, first-century CE records note: 'they regularly make a profit by obtaining Chinese silk, unravelling it, and making *hu* ('Western') silk damasks. That is why this country trades with Anxi (Parthia) across the middle of the sea'.[67] Chinese descriptions of products of Da Qin show detailed knowledge: 'Gold-threaded embroidery, polychrome (warp twill) fine silk or chiffon, woven gold cloth, purple handkerchiefs, *falu* cloth, purple *chiqu* cloth, asbestos cloth, fine silk gauze cloth, shot silk, "clinging cloth" or "cloth with swirling patterns", *dudai* cloth, Wensu cloth, multi-coloured *tao* cloth, crimson curtains woven with gold, and small, round multi-coloured mosquito nets'. This research also brings the silk routes further back in time.[68]

Conclusion: re-timing globalisation

The importance of Greco-Roman antiquity for global studies is fourfold. First, it establishes a clear link between Bronze Age cultures and later developments. Second, it sheds light on oriental globalisation taking shape in the Middle East. Third, it makes the entire sway from prehistory to the present more intelligible. Fourth, the plural, Creole, multicultural Mediterranean of recent historical and archaeological research debunks another Eurocentric myth, the myth of antiquity itself along with the misguided narrative of an East–West split (ranging from the battle of Troy to Huntington's 'clash of civilizations').

Assessments of the timing of globalisation range widely, from globalisation as a planetary evolutionary process, or as a long-term historical process going back to 3000 BCE (in historical anthropology and heterodox world system thinking); as a world economy, with dates ranging from 500 CE (Hobson), 1100 CE (Frank, Chaudhuri), 1200 CE (Abu-Lughod, Gunn, Braudel), to 1500 CE (Marx, Wallerstein); as modernity, 1800 CE (Giddens); and as a recent trend from the 1970s. A general principle is, the later the timing of globalisation the greater Europe's role and the more Eurocentric the perspective (which changes again after 2000 CE).

According to a general, matter-of-fact definition of globalisation, globalisation is the trend of growing worldwide interconnectedness.[69] It refers to the growing scope and density of connections between distant lands and locations. Hence globalisation is spurred by technologies of transport and communication, which include the institutions and security conditions of an

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Table 10.1: Phases of globalisation (after Nederveen Pieterse 2009, 125).

Phase	Start time	Central nodes	Dynamics
Eurasian	3000 BCE	Eurasia	Agricultural and urban revolutions, migrations, trade, ancient empires
Greco-Roman world	1000 BCE	Greater Mediterranean and west Asia	Hellenism
Oriental globalisation 1	500 CE	Middle East	Integration of the world economy
Oriental globalisation 2	1100	East and South Asia	Productivity, technology, urbanisation
Atlantic expansion	1500	Multipolar and Europe	Triangular trade, Americas
Industrialisation	1800	Euro-Atlantic economy	Enlightenment, colonialism, colonial division of labour
20C globalisation	1950	United States, Europe, Japan	Multinational corporations, Cold War, global value chains
21C globalisation	2000	East Asia, BRICS, emerging societies, petro-economies	A new geography of trade, global rebalancing

imperial pax. Thus, the rhythms of globalisation follow the conditions and vicissitudes of connectivity, which are not always in forward motion; there are accelerations as well as breakdowns of connectivity. These dynamics frame the phases and periods of globalisation (Table 10.1).

Resuming the wider historical discussion, the sequence of early globalisation is that Bronze Age Eurasia sets the stage for the ancient empires, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, Greece, Ashok India and Han China. Their common features include developed agriculture and urban culture. Hellenism, in turn, enabled the Roman empire and Greco-Roman Hellenism set the stage and the preconditions for oriental globalisation.

Turning to the timeline of globalisation, the disadvantage of taking contemporary times as cut-off and as start time of globalisation is presentism or ignoring history. The disadvantage of using modernity (whether from 1500 CE or 1800 CE) as cut-off in globalisation thinking is Eurocentrism, or cutting Europe off from global history. The advantage of taking the long view is that it embeds globalisation in the *longue durée*; the disadvantage is that globalisation becomes too wide and general a category. This disadvantage can be overcome by identifying different phases and shifting centres in

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global history, which poses the problem of identifying and labelling periods (Table 10.1).

Features of the periodisation in Table 10.1 are, first, globalisation starts with the Bronze Age and Eurasia. Second, Antiquity and the Greco-Roman world are an intermediary phase, a westward extension of the Eurasian momentum. Third, in oriental globalisation Mark 1, the direction of trade flows is on balance eastward, from the Middle East towards Asia, and in oriental globalisation Mark 2, the balance is westward, from East and South Asia towards the Middle East, resuming the early Silk Routes. Fourth, distinctive for the period from 1500 CE is the growing role of Europe, the addition of the Americas, and the triangular trade, in short the Atlantic turn, in addition to the ongoing central role of Asia. Fifth, characteristic of the phase from 1800 CE is industrialisation. I refrain from categorising the latter two phases as 'early modern' and 'modern' because of the Eurocentric associations of these terms.

To conclude on a general note: scholars often expect too much from paradigms, as if they could be an all-purpose elixir to serve their needs and wishes. Change the paradigm, say from Romanisation to globalisation, and the problems do not disappear, they just relocate. The question then becomes *which* globalisation, according to which approach? A further question is agency. Globalisation is often reified and treated as an agent – as if globalisation overwhelms other agents – the agency of sovereignty, empire, state, the nation, the local. Globalisation taken and used in this sense is disabling, not enabling. Thus, using paradigms means reworking them in the process.

Notes

1. Haverfield (1912). For the Romanisation debate, see Mattingly (2004; 2006) and Pitts & Versluys (Chapter 1, this volume) and Hingley (Chapter 2, this volume).
2. Hingley (2005); Naerebout (2006/7); for an overview of the debate so far, see Pitts & Versluys (Chapter 1, this volume).
3. Giddens (1990).
4. Naerebout (2006/7).
5. Pitts & Versluys (Chapter 1, this volume).
6. Bayly (2004); Hopkins (2006).
7. Robertson (2003).
8. A critique is Nederveen Pieterse (2005).
9. McNeill (1963, 1979); Hodgson (1974).
10. Frank & Gills (1993, 2000).

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11. e.g. Wilkinson (2000).
12. Stavrianos (1998).
13. Abu-Lughod (1989).
14. Hobson (2004).
15. Frank (1998); Pomeranz (2000).
16. Hobson (2012).
17. Nederveen Pieterse (2006, 2009).
18. Nederveen Pieterse (2011a).
19. Morris (2005, 31).
20. Ibid., 31.
21. Ibid., 37.
22. van Dommelen & Knapp (2010b, 1, 6); van Dommelen (2006a).
23. Versluys (2010a); Hingley (2005).
24. e.g. Webster (2001). See also Witcher (Chapter 9, this volume) for further discussion.
25. Versluys (2010a).
26. Hitchner (2008).
27. Alternative perspectives are Witcher (2000) and Geraghty (2007); see also the various contributions to this volume.
28. Discussed further in Pitts & Versluys (Chapter 1, this volume).
29. cf. Pitts & Versluys (Chapter 1, this volume), and Morley (Chapter 3, this volume).
30. Flynn & Giraldez (2006, 244).
31. O'Rourke & Williamson (2002).
32. Robertson (1992).
33. cf. Woolf (1990).
34. Morris (2005, 36, 45); Horden & Purcell (2000).
35. Cohen (2000, 12).
36. Isayev (Chapter 6, this volume).
37. Hoerder (2002).
38. McNeill (1982).
39. Edwards & Woolf (2003).
40. Nussbaum (2006).
41. Inglis & Robertson (2006). After the Punic wars, between 160 and 120 BCE, Polybius wrote: 'Now in earlier times the world's history had consisted, so to speak, of a series of unrelated episodes, the origins and results of each being as widely separated as their localities, but from this point onwards [after the Second Punic war] history becomes an organic whole: the affairs of Italy and Africa are connected with those of Asia and of Greece, and all events bear a relationship and contribute to a single end'. (*Histories* 1.3). For this text, see also Pitts & Versluys and Isayev (Chapters 1 and 6, respectively, this volume).
42. I refer here to the scholarly discussion that has shown the premise of Isaac (2004) that racism was invented in Antiquity to be not convincing.
43. Pollock (1996).
44. Hodgson (1974); Nederveen Pieterse (2007, Chapter 7).
45. Goody (2010a, 2010b); Nederveen Pieterse (2011b).

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46. McNeill (1963, 1979).
47. McNeill (1982).
48. Versluys (2010a, 17).
49. Taylor (1989).
50. Quoted in Nederveen Pieterse (2007, 9). See, more in general, Pitts (2007), Versluys (2013) and Wallace-Hadrill (2008).
51. Pitts, Dorling & Pattie (2007).
52. Tolia-Kelly (2011).
53. On fish in Iron Age Britain, see Dobney & Ervynck (2007); on fish in Roman London and Britain, Cool (2006, 104–6).
54. Rhys-Taylor (2010, 165); cf. Kurlansky (2002).
55. Nederveen Pieterse (1989).
56. Wells (1999).
57. Nederveen Pieterse (1989, Chapter 11).
58. Krebs (2010).
59. Goody (2010a); Nederveen Pieterse (2011b).
60. Bondanella (1987); Hingley (2000); Murphy (2008).
61. Bondanella (1987).
62. Fieldhouse (1973).
63. Bernal (1987).
64. See Parker (2008) and Versluys (2010b). Ball (2000) is an important (and programmatic) exception.
65. Hill (2011a, 2011b).
66. Sitwell (1986, 130, 146–7).
67. From a translation of the Chronicle on the 'Western Regions' from the *Hou Hanshu*, composed in 107–125 CE compiled by Fan Ye, 398–446 CE.
68. Hill (2011a, 2011b).
69. Nederveen Pieterse (2009, 43). For (more) definitions, see the introduction to this volume.

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