The Handbook of Global Media Research

Handbooks in Communication and Media

This series aims to provide theoretically ambitious but accessible volumes devoted to the major fields and subfields within communication and media studies. Each volume sets out to ground and orientate the student through a broad range of specially commissioned chapters, while also providing the more experienced scholar and teacher with a convenient and comprehensive overview of the latest trends and critical directions.

The Handbook of Children, Media, and Development, *edited by Sandra L. Calvert and Barbara J. Wilson*
The Handbook of Crisis Communication, *edited by W. Timothy Coombs and Sherry J. Holladay*
The Handbook of Internet Studies, *edited by Mia Consalvo and Charles Ess*
The Handbook of Rhetoric and Public Address, *edited by Shawn J. Parry-Giles and J. Michael Hogan*
The Handbook of Critical Intercultural Communication, *edited by Thomas K. Nakayama and Rona Tamiko Halualani*
The Handbook of Global Communication and Media Ethics, *edited by Robert S. Fortner and P. Mark Fackler*
The Handbook of Communication and Corporate Social Responsibility, *edited by Øyvind Ihlen, Jennifer Bartlett and Steve May*
The Handbook of Gender, Sex, and Media, *edited by Karen Ross*
The Handbook of Global Health Communication, *edited by Rafael Obregon and Silvio Waisbord*
The Handbook of Global Media Research, *edited by Ingrid Volkmer*

Forthcoming
The Handbook of International Advertising Research, *edited by Hong Cheng*
The Handbook of Global Online Journalism, *edited by Eugenia Siapera and Andreas Veglis*

The Handbook of Global Media Research

Edited by

Ingrid Volkmer

WILEY-BLACKWELL
A John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Publication

This edition first published 2012

Blackwell Publishing was acquired by John Wiley & Sons in February 2007. Blackwell's publishing program has been merged with Wiley's global Scientific, Technical, and Medical business to form Wiley-Blackwell.

Registered Office
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK

Editorial Offices
350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK
The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK

For details of our global editorial offices, for customer services, and for information about how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material in this book please see our website at www.wiley.com/wiley-blackwell.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Handbook of global media research / Ingrid Volkmer. – 1st ed.
p. cm. – (Handbooks in communication and media)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4051-9870-7 (hardback)
1. Mass media–Research–Methodology. 2. Mass media and globalization. I. Title.
P91.3.V635 2012
302.23072–dc23

2012015390

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Cover image: Spiral of television screens © Ian McKinnell/Getty
Cover design by Simon Levy

Set in 10/12.5pt Galliard by SPi Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India

1 2012

Contents

Notes on Contributors

Kavita Abraham Dowsing is Director of Research and Learning at BBC Media Action, managing a global team of forty researchers based in London and in the Trust's fourteen country offices located internationally. She is also a Fellow at the London School of Economics (LSE). Dr Abraham Dowsing published her PhD with the LSE in 2008, investigating public and private sector partnership change over a period of 11 months, entitled *When Consultants meet Civil Servants: Convergence or Conversion in the Representations of Change*.

Ehab Bessaiso is a media analyst and writer, holding a PhD in International Communication and a Masters Degree in International Journalism. His research interests involve media strategies, international political communication, and reporting conflicts. Dr Bessaiso has contributed to several publications on Arab media and war coverage, and has been invited by academic institutes and universities in the United Kingdom and the Arab world on Arab media, to lecture about communication strategies and coverage of international conflicts. He has also participated in various media conferences, symposia, and workshops, discussing issues in media and international communication, war propaganda and coverage, media strategies, Arab media, and Al-Jazeera.

Oliver Boyd-Barrett is Professor of Journalism in the School of Media and Communication, at Bowling Green State University, Ohio. He has taught at California State University (Pomona), Leicester University (Centre for Mass Communication Research), and The Open University. He has authored, co-authored, edited, or co-edited 30 books, and authored over 120 articles and chapters for scholarly journals, books, and professional publications. His books include: *The International News Agencies* (1980), *Le Trafic des Nouvelles* (1981, with Michael Palmer), *Contra-Flow in Global News* (1992, with Daya Thussu), *Educational Reform in Democratic Spain* (1996, with Pamela O'Malley), *The Globalization of News* (1998, with Terhi Rantanen), *Communications Media, Globalization and Empire* (2006), and *News Agencies in the Turbulent Era of the Internet*, *Hollywood and the CIA* (2011, with David Herrera and Jim Baumann).

Miriam Burton joined BBC Media Action in 2009, focusing on education, livelihoods, and climate change projects. She has coordinated national and multi-country qualitative and quantitative studies in Asia and in Africa, including research exploring the public understanding of climate change in Cambodia, DR Congo and Senegal. Fluent in French and English, she holds a B.A. in French and Spanish from the University of Cambridge, UK. Having been a key part of the research and reporting team on Africa Talks Climate, she is currently working on a similar multi-country study in South and South-East Asia.

Lisbeth Clausen is Associate Professor at Copenhagen Business School at the Department of Intercultural Management and Communication and the Vice-Director of the Asian Studies Program. Her research interest is newsroom studies, news flow, and audience reception. She is the author of the book *Global News Production* (2003) concerning international news production in Japanese newsrooms. For one and a half years she observed the political decision-making processes in the newsrooms at the public service station NHK and the commercial station TV Asahi. She interviewed forty journalists, foreign correspondents, editors, and popular anchors at the five Japanese national news producers about their production of international news and made comparative studies of Danish and Japanese news programs. Her research has been published in Media, Culture and Society, Nordicom Review, Keio Communication Review, and in a number of encyclopedia and handbooks on journalism and globalization. She is currently working on a management and communications project addressing Cultural Intelligence as a Strategic Resource.

Akiba A. Cohen is the Moshe Theumim Professor of Communication at Tel Aviv University, and the founding chair of the department. He is a former President of the International Communication Association and a Fellow of the Association. His main research interest is the comparative study of news. He has published ten books, including *News Around the World: Content, Practitioners and the Public* (2006, with Pamela Shoemaker), *Global Newsrooms, Local Audiences: A Study of the Eurovision News Exchange* (1996, with Mark R. Levy, Michael Gurevitch, and Itzhak Roeh), *The Holocaust and the Press: Nazi War-Crimes Trials in Germany and Israel* (2002, with Tamar Zemach-Marom, Jürgen Wilke, and Birgit Schenk), and *Media, Minorities and Hybrid Identities: The Arab and Russian Communities in Israel* (2006, with Hanna Adoni and Dan Caspi). He is currently a visiting scholar at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania.

Nick Couldry is Professor of Media and Communications at Goldsmiths, University of London and Director of its Centre for the Study of Global Media and Democracy. He is the author or editor of nine books including, most recently, *Media Consumption and Public Engagement: Beyond the Presumption of Attention* (2007, new paperback edition February 2010, co-authors Sonia Livingstone and Tim Markham), *Media Events in a Global Age* (2009, co-edited with Andreas Hepp and Friedrich Krotz), and *Why Voice Matters: Culture and Politics After Neoliberalism* (2010). Between 2007 and 2011 he has been Vice-Chair and then Chair of the Philosophy of Communication Division of the International Communications Association.

Klara Debeljak is Project Manager at InterMedia in London. She works across multiple teams and has completed a range of qualitative and quantitative research projects in Africa, South Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and South-East Asia. She managed the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation-funded AudienceScapes research in Kenya, Zambia, and Tanzania and authored AudienceScapes' report on Communicating with Policymakers about Development in Zambia. Prior to joining InterMedia, she headed up the EchoSonar team at Echo Research in the United Kingdom, focusing on media content analysis for international clients. Before that, Klara Debeljak worked at the international media research institute Media Tenor in South Africa, where she managed media content analysis projects and advised clients on reputation management. Before moving to South Africa, she worked as a journalist for the Slovenian Press Agency and other Slovenian media. She holds a BA in Political Science from University of Ljubljana, Slovenia.

Claes H. de Vreese is Professor and Chair of Political Communication and Scientific Director of The Amsterdam School of Communication Research ASCoR in the Department of Communication Science at the University of Amsterdam. For publications see claesdevreese.com.

John D.H. Downing is Professor Emeritus and Founding Director of the Global Media Research Center at Southern Illinois University. Previously he had worked at the University of Texas (Austin), Hunter College (City University of New York), the University of Massachusetts (Amherst), and Greenwich University (UK). Professor Downing was elected Vice-President of the International Association for Media and Communication Research (2008–2012), and Editor of the ICA journal *Communication, Culture and Critique* (2011–2013). He is on the Executive Editorial Committee of *Global Media and Communication*. His books include *Internationalizing Media Theory* (1996), *Radical Media: Rebellious Communication and Social Movements* (2nd edn, 2001), *Representing 'Race': Racisms, Ethnicities and Media* (2005, with Charles Husband), and *Sage Encyclopedia of Social Movement Media* (2010). He served as Area Editor for International Communication in W. Donsbach (ed.), *The Blackwell International Encyclopedia of Communication* (2008).

Lauren Dyll-Myklebust is Lecturer at The Centre for Communication, Media and Society at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Media in a Global World and Communication for Participatory Development. She is a key contributor to the Kalahari Research project, Rethinking Indigeneity, within which both her MA and PhD are based. Research interests and publication topics include development communication, cultural tourism, issues of identity, and critical indigenous qualitative research, having recently contributed to *The Handbook of Critical and Indigenous Methodologies* (2008, with Denzin *et al.*).

Frank Esser is Professor of International and Comparative Media Research at the University of Zurich. He was Assistant Professor at the University of Mainz and the University of Missouri -Columbia, and Visiting Professor at the University of Oklahoma and the University of Texas-Austin. Professor Esser's research focuses on cross-national studies of news journalism and political communication. He published five books including *Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases, and Challenges* (2004), and 70 book chapters and journal articles. Frank Esser is on the editorial boards of *Journalism, Communication Studies, International Journal of Press/Politics*, and *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, and serves as Chair of the Journalism Studies Division of the International Communication Association (ICA). In Zurich he is co-director of a National Research Center on the Challenges to Democracy in the Twenty-first Century (NCCR Democracy).

Eva Flicker is sociologist and Associate Professor, Department for Sociology, University of Vienna, Austria, where she also holds the position of Program Director for Gender Studies. Her research fields include film and media studies, visual sociology, gender studies, and sociology of communication. Her main research focus is the representation of social themes, groups and discourses in the media, for example, female scientists in mainstream movies since 1930, age and the elderly, social inequality, poverty, and gender. Professor Flicker's recent work involves visual gender knowledge in the public as well as visual media and images of female politicians in international media.

Myria Georgiou teaches at the Department of Media and Communications, London School of Economics (LSE), UK. Her research and teaching focuses on migration, diaspora, media, and the city. Dr Georgiou is currently leading a three-country team within the European consortium Transnational Television and Citizenship funded by the European Commission (consortium leader: C. Slade). The consortium examines the relation between transnational television consumption and Arab speakers' experiences of citizenship in seven European countries. Her book *Diaspora, Identity and the Media* was published in 2006 and she is currently writing a book titled *Media and the City* (forthcoming).

Anna Godfrey is responsible for research operations at BBC Media Action. Since joining in 2005, she has played an instrumental role in building the organization's research capacity. She currently oversees a large global research team based in fourteen countries across Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the United Kingdom. Anna Godfrey has more than ten years' experience in directing international research that has helped shape and evaluate media and communication activities. She has formerly worked in central government where she specialized in research in conflict and post-conflict societies. Anna Godfrey read Mathematics at the University of Sheffield and holds a post-graduate qualification in Applied Statistics. With a team of researchers across Sub-Saharan Africa, she led BBC Media Action's research for *Africa Talks Climate*.

Gerard Goggin is Professor of Digital Communication and Deputy Director of the Journalism and Media Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. His books include *Disability and the Media* (2012, with Kathleen Ellis), *Mobile Technology and Place* (2012, with Rowan Wilken), *New Technologies and the Media* (2011), *Global Mobile Media* (2011), *Internationalizing Internet Studies* (2009, with Mark McLelland), *Mobile Technologies: From Telecommunications to Media* (2009, with Larissa Hjorth), *Mobile Cultures* (2008), *Cell Phone Culture* (2006), *Virtual Nation: The Internet in Australia* (2004), and *Digital Disability* (2003).

Rodrigo Gómez García is Senior Lecturer at Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana (Metropolitan Autonomous University of Mexico) Campus Cuajimalpa. He also teaches at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (National Autonomous University of Mexico) in the graduate program in political sciences and society studies. He coordinates the Observatory of the Industries, Policies and Cultural Consumes that is based in UAM-Cuajimalpa (http://hermes.cua.uam.mx/obseruam/). In 2008, he received the Faculty Research Program (FRP) Grant by the Canadian Government and in 2010 he accepted a Visiting Research Fellowship at the Institute of Communication Studies in University of Leeds, UK.

Kai Hafez is a Professor (Chair) for International and Comparative Communication Studies at the University of Erfurt, Germany. He was a Senior Associate Fellow of the University of Oxford, a Visiting Scholar at the American University of Cairo, and has been a frequent academic advisor to German governments. Professor Hafez is on the Editorial Boards of several academic journals (*Journal of International Communication, Global Media Journal, Arab Media and Society, Journalism: Theory, Practice and Criticism, Global Media Journal, Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication, Political Communication* (2001–2007)). Among his English publications are: *Islam and the West in the Mass Media* (2000), *The Myth of Media Globalization* (2007), *Arab Media – Power and Weakness* (2009), and *Radicalism and Political Change in the Islamic and Western Worlds* (2010).

Cees J. Hamelink is Emeritus Professor of International Communication at the University of Amsterdam. He is currently Professor of Management of Information and Knowledge for Development at the University of Aruba, and Professor of Human Rights and Public Health at the Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam. He is the Editor-in-Chief of the *International Communication Gazette*, past President of the International Association for Media and Communication Research, and founder of the People's Communication Charter. Professor Hamelink has guest-lectured in over forty countries and has published over 250 articles, papers, and chapters in academic publications. He is author of seventeen monographs on communication and culture. The most recent books are *Media and Conflict* (2010), *On the Escalation of Evil* (2010), and forthcoming with Sage is *How to Study World Communication?*

Thomas Hanitzsch is Professor of Communication at the University of Munich, Germany. As a former journalist, his teaching and research foci is on global journalism cultures, crisis and war communication, tabloid and celebrity news, as well as comparative methodology. He was the founding Chair of the Journalism Studies Division of the International Communication Association and is co-editor of the *Handbook of Journalism Studies* (2009) and the *Handbook of Comparative Communication Research* (2011). Professor Hanitzsch is currently leading the Worlds of Journalism Study, a collaborative network of journalism researchers from around the world.

Ramaswami Harindranath is Professor of Media at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia. His major publications include *Approaches to Audiences* (1998), *The 'Crash' Controversy* (2001), *Perspectives on Global Cultures* (2006), *Re-imagining Diaspora* (2007), and *Audience-Citizens* (2009). He is currently completing a manuscript entitled *Southern Discomfort*, which re-assesses the concept and politics of cultural imperialism.

Maria Hellman is a researcher at the Department of Journalism, Media and Communication, Stockholm University. Her research interests are globalization, Europeanization, comparative television news, and journalistic cultures. She has published in *International Journal of Cultural Studies* and *International Political Sociology*. Her dissertation *Televisual Representations of France and the UK during Globalization* was defended in 2006.

Andreas Hepp is a Professor of Media and Communication studies with the special area of media culture and communication theory at the IMKI, University of Bremen, Germany (www.imki.uni-bremen.de). His main research areas are media and communication theory, media sociology, transnational and transcultural communication, cultural studies, media change, and methods of media culture research. Recent books include *Media Events in a Global Age* (2010, with Nick Couldry and Friedrich Krotz), *Cultural Studies und Medienanalyse* (2010), and *Transkulturelle Kommunikation* (2006).

Klaus Bruhn Jensen is Professor, Department of Media, Cognition, and Communication, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Publications include *A Handbook of Media and Communication Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Methodologies* (2002, 2nd edition in preparation), contributions to the *International Encyclopedia of Communication* (2008, 12 volumes), for which he serves as Area Editor of Communication Theory and Philosophy, and *Media Convergence: The Three Degrees of Network, Mass, and Interpersonal Communication* (2010).

Umi Khattab is Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Arts and Business at the University of the Sunshine Coast (USC), Queensland, Australia, and was previously Associate Professor in the Communication Programme, School of Social Sciences at University Malaysia Sabah (UMS). She has taught and researched previously in the University of Melbourne, Australia, and University Kebangsaan Malaysia. She also wrote as a columnist for *The New Straits Times*. Her research involves national identity and the media, transnational media, promotional culture, and audience studies.

Samia Khatun is Research Assistant at InterMedia in London, supporting a range of assignments across Africa and Asia. Prior to joining InterMedia she worked as a Researcher for a grant awarding trust. She holds a BSc honours degree in Politics and Economics from Brunel University and an MSc in Political Economy of Development from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. Her research interests include economic trade theory (a topic she focused on in her Masters dissertation entitled *A Case Study of the Ready Made Garments Industry in Bangladesh: The Role of the (MFA) Multifibre Agreement*) and economic development of South Asia and South-East Asia.

Vipul Khosla is the Research Manager at the Australian Broadcasting Corporation's (ABC) division for International Development. He is responsible for the design and implementation of monitoring and evaluation activities across research projects. Before joining the ABC in 2011, Vipul Khosla worked with BBC Media Action in London, where he managed a research project funded by the UN in Mozambique, Vietnam, and Peru. He has supported and managed international research projects in countries across Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. He holds a Master of Science in Media and Communications from London School of Economics.

Emily LeRoux-Rutledge is a Research Manager with BBC Media Action. Since 2007, she has worked on a wide range of quantitative and qualitative research across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. She currently manages research for BBC Media Action in Bangladesh and Cambodia. From 2009 to 2010 she helped to deliver *Africa Talks Climate*, which looks at the public understanding of climate change in Africa. Besides this, she also worked for the Forum for African Women Educationalists in Kenya, has researched, written, and presented on drama for development. She holds an MSc in Social and Public Communication from the London School of Economics, and a BA (Hons) in International Relations and English from the University of Toronto.

Dina Matar is Lecturer in Arab Media and International Political Communication at the Centre for Film and Media Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies. Before turning to academia, she was as a foreign correspondent and editor covering the Middle East, Europe, and Africa with various news agencies. Dina Matar's research covers cultural politics, the state, Islamist politics, and gender issues in the Middle East. She is a co-editor the journal *The Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication*. She has published journal articles and book chapters on the Palestinian diaspora in Britain and news, cultural politics, Arab women and media, and Hizbullah. She is a member of a number of international organizations, including IAMCR. ICA, MESA, the War and Media Group, and the Royal Institute of International Affairs. She is the author of *What It Means to be Palestinian: Stories of Palestinian Peoplehood* (2010).

Graham Mytton has more than forty-five years' experience in broadcasting and in qualitative and quantitative audience research. He is currently a self-employed consultant and trainer in audience, opinion, and market research, project evaluation, promotional planning and marketing, and in the study of the market impact of new broadcasting technologies. He worked for the BBC World Service for more than twenty-five years, first as a producer of radio programs for Africa, and then in audience research and marketing. His last two jobs at the BBC World Service were Head of Audience Research for fourteen years, and then he created and led a new marketing department, becoming Controller of Marketing from 1996 to 1998. He is the author of several books on media in Africa, as well as on audience and market research. His *Handbook on Radio and Television Audience Research*, first published in 1993, is a major training manual in the field of audience research and has now appeared in English and five other languages.

Lisa Parks is Professor of the Department of Film and Media Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Her research explores uses of satellite, computer, and television technologies in a transnational context. She is the author of *Cultures in Orbit: Satellites and the Televisual* (2005), and co-editor of *Planet TV* (2003), *Undead TV* (2007), and *Down to Earth: Satellite Technologies, Industries and Cultures* (2012). She is currently writing two books: *Coverage: Media, Space and Security after 911* (Routledge) and *Mixed Signals: Media Infrastructures and Cultural Geographies.*

Jan Nederveen Pieterse (www.jannederveenpieterse.com) is Mellichamp Professor of Global Studies and Sociology at University of California, Santa Barbara and specializes in globalization, development studies, and cultural studies. His current focus is on twenty-first century globalization. He was previously at University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, University of Cape Coast, Ghana, and the University of Amsterdam. He holds a part-time chair in globalization at Maastricht University. Recent books are *Is There Hope for Uncle Sam? Beyond the American Bubble* (2008), *Ethnicities and Global Multiculture: Pants for an Octopus* (2007), and *Globalization or Empire?* (2004).

Gerry Power, Managing Director, InterMedia, London, UK. Before joining InterMedia, Dr Power served as Director of Research and Learning at BBC Media Action, London, working across radio, television, Internet, and mobile platforms. He is credited with building up the Trust's knowledge management practice, making research a fundamental strategic part of all communication for development projects, and for establishing a highly motivated network of researchers that spans Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Under his stewardship, the research team received the 2009 Global Reith Award for Professional Services from the Global News Division at the BBC. He has served on the faculty at the University of Texas, the Universidad de las Américas, Puebla, Mexico, the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA), the London School of Economics, and holds a Fellowship at the University of Melbourne, Australia. Dr Power holds a PhD (Media Theory and Research) and an MA (Communication Management) from the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California.

Kristina Riegert is Professor of Media and Communications at Stockholm University. She is co-editor of *Media Houses: Architecture, Media and the Production of Centrality* (2010) and co-author of *Transnational and National Media in Global Crisis* (2010, with Maria Hellman). She has published in a range of journals including *International Journal of Cultural Studies*, *International Journal of Communication*, *Nordicom*, and *Journalism Practice*.

Katharine Sarikakis is Professor of Media Governance at the Institute of Communication Science, University of Vienna. Prior to this, she was the founder and director of the Centre for International Communication Research at the University of Leeds, UK. She is also the Chairperson of Communication Law and Policy Section of the European Communication Research and Education Association (ECREA) and an elected member of the International Council of IAMCR. Her publications include: *Feminist Intervention* *in International Communication* (2008, with L. Shade), *Media Policy and Globalisation* (2006, with P. Chakravarrty), *Powers in Media Policy* (2004), and *British Media in a Global Era* (2004). She is the editor of *Media and Cultural Policy in the European Union* (2007) and co-editor of the *International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics.*

Saskia Sassen is the Robert S. Lynd Professor of Sociology and Co-Directs The Committee on Global Thought, Columbia University (www.saskiasassen.com). Her recent books are *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages* (2008), *A Sociology of Globalization* (2007), and the 4th fully updated edition of *Cities in a World Economy* (2011). *The Global City* came out in a new fully updated edition in 2001. Her books are translated into twenty-one languages. She contributes regularly to www.OpenDemocracy.net and www.HuffingtonPost.com.

Christina Slade is Dean of Arts and Social Sciences at City University London. She was formerly Dean of Humanities at Macquarie University and has taught at a number of universities including Universiteit Utrecht, as Professor of Media Theory, New York University, La Universidad Ibero Americana, and the ITESM, in Mexico City. In 1996–1997 she was Harkness Fellow in New York and from 1976 to 1977 a Commonwealth Fellow at Somerville College, Oxford. Her research interests range from issues in the philosophical foundations of communication theory, through issues of the global public sphere and its fragmentation under the impact of new technologies to questions relating to the development of reasoning skills using television product. She leads a seven nation EU-funded FP7 project entitled Media and Citizenship: Transnational Television Cultures: Reshaping Political Identities in the European Union.

Ruth Teer-Tomaselli is Deputy Dean of Postgraduate Studies in the Faculty of Humanities, Development and Social Sciences at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. She has published widely on South African media and her research interests include research methodology and social theory in development and public service broadcasting, and global media. Professor Teer-Tomaselli is Vice-President of the International Association for Media and Communication Research (IAMCR) and holds the UNESCO Chair in Communications for South Africa.

Daya Kishan Thussu is Professor of International Communication and founder co-director of India Media Centre at the University of Westminster in London. He has a PhD in International Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is the Founder and Managing Editor of the Sage journal *Global Media and Communication.* Among his main publications are: *Electronic Empires* (1998, 2nd edn 2006), *International Communication – Continuity and Change; War and the Media: Reporting Conflict 24/7* (2003), *Media on the Move – Global Flow and Contra-flow* (2007), *News as Entertainment* (2007), and *Internationalizing Media Studies* (2009).

Rens Vliegenthart is Associate Professor in Political Communication in the Department of Communication Science and at the Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR), University of Amsterdam (UvA), as well as a board member of the Center of

Politics and Communication (CPC). His research deals with the interaction between politics, media, and public opinion, (Dutch) election campaigns, and social movements. Recent publications appeared in *Acta Politica*, *Journal of European Public Policy*, and the *International Journal of Press/Politics.*

Ingrid Volkmer is Associate Professor and Head of the Media and Communications program, Faculty of Arts, University of Melbourne, Australia. She has had visiting positions at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard, University of Amsterdam, the London School of Economics, and in 2011/2012 she has been appointed as Guest Professor, University of Vienna. Ingrid Volkmer's research field is global public communication and the implications on societies. She has submitted various books and articles on these issues. Volkmer is on the Editorial Boards of a number of leading international journals, such as Journal of *Global Media and Communications* (Sage), the *International Journal of Communication* (Annenberg, University of Southern California), and *Media, Conflict and Society* (Sage). Volkmer has held various positions in the International Communication Association (ICA), such as Chair of the Philosophy of Communication division.

Saskia Witteborn is Associate Professor in the School of Journalism and Communication at The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Her research areas are culture, communication, and transnational migration, with a focus on political advocacy, intercultural dialogue, collective identity formation, and the construction of locality in a globalized world. Her work has been published in the *Journal of Communication, Cultural Studies, Research on Language and Social Interaction, Chinese Journal of Communication,* and the *Journal of International and Intercultural Communication*. A chapter on new media and political advocacy has appeared in an edited collection on transnational media cultures by R.S. Hegde (New York University Press, 2011).

Introduction

Communication has become one of the most powerful drivers of globalization processes. However, despite the relevance of communication for increasingly complex globalization processes, which began about thirty years ago, it is surprising that theoretical debates of globalized forms of communication remain on the periphery in disciplines such as media and communication studies and journalism.

It is quite interesting to take a look across disciplinary borders where, for example, in social sciences, the conceptualization of globalization has been at the core of theory building for at least two decades. In many cases, these discussions have shifted traditional terminologies and – as a consequence – have led to a paradigmatic renewal of the discipline. For example, in sociology, the diversity of "globalizing" spheres has been in the focus since the mid-1980s and is addressed through the conceptual lens of multiple – often fine-lined – trajectories of globalized diversity. Sociological globalization theories have helped to identify early on the dialectic of global/local and, more recently, advanced forms of theory building, for example, in contexts of globalized "risk" society (Beck 2009), the connectedness of global cities and the understanding of the transformation of the "nation" as a site of globalization (Sassen 2006, 2007). Furthermore, sociological discourses have also resulted not only in theorizing the macro-structures of the "network society" (Castells 1996, 2009) but also new networked forms of power (Castells 2011).

Similar processes can be observed in another field, political science, where the diversity of globalization has been a focus for conceptual refinements of the field of "international relations" for quite some time. As an outcome of these debates, new disciplinary fields emerged, such as a new area called "post-international" theory, which, as a consequence, allows the emerging contours of specific terrains of today's advanced phase of globalization to be identified. An example for these emerging conceptual terrains are debates about the "de-", or "post-territorialization" as new spheres of epistemological and ontological

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

diversity as well as perceptions of "nonterritorial" demarcations of national borders. Other areas focus on forms of "global governance", public accountability, and cosmopolitanism (Held 2010). This is another new area of theory building, public deliberation through spheres of "alterglobalization" (Pleyers 2010).

These are only a few examples for core debates in social sciences, which no longer address linear forms of global modernities but rather diverse *reciprocal* formations that emerge through the relativity of transnational political, social, economic, cultural, and communicative topographies as a spectrum of advanced globalization.

Compared to these highly specific conceptions of what I describe as *advanced* globalization in sociology and political science, the discourse of transnational communication in media and communication studies began quite late. Research of these globalized spheres is, in our discipline, also often labeled as "cross-national research"; that is, it identifies transnational communication in national frames. However, when comparing these approaches of "cross-" and transnational research, six conceptual phases emerge that reflect broad frameworks for the mapping of "globalized communication". The first sphere could be described as the "geopolitical" paradigm of transnational communication. This paradigm emerged in the early days of the Cold War in the power vacuum of the East/West dichotomy, between the United States and the Soviet Union. This geopolitical paradigm captures the sphere of strategic international communication of the two post-World War Two superpowers and their allies aimed to influence "foreign" audiences in various world regions. This "geopolitical" paradigm has been refined since the end of the Cold War and today includes approaches to "soft" power and frameworks of "public" diplomacy (e.g., Seib 2009).

The second paradigm is the sphere of "political economy", which – an outcome of the geopolitical paradigm – emerged in the "North/South" dichotomy. Debates, initiated by scholars from developing regions and UNESCO in the late 1970s, reframed the paradigmatic "modern" notion of international communication and addressed the imbalances of communication flows. This transnational sphere of "political economy" addressed the phenomenon of hegemonic media power of industrialized nations (mainly the United States and Europe) as a new structural imperial "mechanism", aiming to dominate not only the media sphere but the public sphere of countries across various world regions. Conceptions of post-colonial and media imperialism, as well as information and digital divides as power imbalances of media macro-structures constitute further refinements of this paradigm, allowed the disentanglement of the paradigmatic angle from the traditions of Western modernity to new communicative formations of multiple "modernities" (Boyd-Barrett 2007; Chakravartty and Zhao 2008).

A third paradigm could be broadly described as the "transnational spheres of conflicts". These debates of globalized communication emerged with satellite delivered "breaking news" and the delivery of crisis and humanitarian disasters in the late 1980s. Today, these spheres are further refined, for example, through the conceptualization of transnational "mediation" processes, such as "distant suffering" (Chouliaraki 2006) and global crisis reporting (Cottle 2009).

"Transnational media extensions" constitute the conceptual sphere of a fourth paradigm. This paradigm mainly relates to the complexity of transnationalization of political television. Recent refinements relate, for example, to the transnationalization of political satellite television (Chalaby 2005; Straubhaar 2007; Curtin and Shah 2010) and to specific public transformations in particular regions, such as the Arab region (Sakr 2007).

The paradigmatic sphere of "translocality" is the fifth approach, which emerged in contexts of "hybrid" and "mobile" cultures (Lash and Urry 1994; Tomlinson 1999) and helped to identify implications of the translocal for new forms of "reflexive" subjectivity and discourse.

A sixth paradigmatic sphere emerged more recently, mainly in non-Western regions, which conceptually frames the particularities of a "regional network" sphere in order to identify regional distinctions, but within the globalized network space, for example, in Malaysia (Chan and Ibrahim 2008) and the digital space of the African region (Mudhai, Tettey, and Banda 2009).

This Handbook aims to provide a platform for (a) a critical reflection of these approaches and (b) the identification of new emerging terrains of globalized communication. For this purpose, the Handbook is divided into five conceptual parts.

The opening part serves as an overview of the history of transnational communication. This chapter incorporates three distinct perspectives of such a critical historical assessment: John Downing's chapter critically reflects the various conceptions of intercommunication theory. The implication of these conceptions on supranational media policy frameworks, in particular in the context of UNESCO, is the focus of Cees Hamelink's chapter. In a third, media-centered perspective, Graham Mytton, the former Head of the BBC's audience research, provides an insight to the ways in which one of the first transnational broadcasters, the BBC, has historically conceptualized its transnational audience.

The second part, "Reconceptualizing Research across Globalized Network Cultures", brings together ten authors, each of whom identifies new paradigmatic dimension, emerging through globalized "densities" and digital cultures. Jan Nederveen Pieterse critically reflects the Western hegemonic frame of globalization which dominates and misguides the perception of the "global South". Using the term of a "media divide", he describes how Western media create not only stereotypical but ideological frames of the transformation of societies of the global South. Sassen argues that digital forms of knowledge "open up the categories of formalized knowledge". These "informal" knowledge formations are newly assembled and constitute new knowledge forms as "socio-digital formations". Sassen perceives this space as an important sphere of articulation between politics and knowledge, which she relates in her chapter to two increasingly important areas: financial markets and "electronic activism". Other authors address media cultures as transcultural "communicative thickenings" (Couldry and Hepp) and Volkmer attempts to de-construct what she calls the methodological paradox of the "state-society" nexus. Satellite platforms and "footprint" cultures constitute an – often overlooked – research area. Satellite "footprints" constitute, so Parks argues, not only a regional but a communicative "counter-hegemonic" space. Parks employs the relevance of satellite cultures in South America and Africa as case studies for these regional struggles for "political", "economic", and "cultural" autonomy in areas that are labeled as the "global South". Global media policy and structures of "media governance" are also the focus of Sarikakis's chapter. These areas of information policy are often related to UNESCO and information society approaches.

However, Sarikakis's chapter goes far beyond these, what might be called "traditional", supranational policy domains and argues that the "field of media policy has expanded from the 'usual suspects' and the role of national governments to a range of issues, objects and actors shifting policymaking paradigms and policy studies in more and complex stratifications". These are, as Sarikakis argues, often related to de-nationalizing processes, processes where a process that she describes as "policy laundering" emerges, i.e. the practice of "policy adoption without the necessary politically and legally established procedures". Hellman and Riegert's chapter goes beyond traditional conceptions of global crises journalism and aims to identify the complexity in which a "transnational news sphere" is "intertwined" with "national/local structures, contents and networks". The last chapter of this part critically reflects the term of a "global public sphere", which – so Hafez emphasizes – is often related to superficial assumptions of transnational communication and less to deep-seated formations of "interdependence". Hafez claims that in an "interdependent global system, autonomous national systems change into partly autonomous subsystems of a global macro-system". Using a system theory approach, Hafez reconstructs the fine lines of these media-related systems of "interdependence."

Whereas these conceptual approaches aim to "map" transnational communicative spheres, supra- and sub-national terrains emerge that require specific approaches. Chapters in this third part discuss conceptual frames for the critical assessment of regional specific transnational spaces. Matar and Bessaiso's chapter identifies these spheres in the regions of the Middle East, which as they argue not only "lurk" in the "shadow of Western theoretical frameworks" but, if included in debates at all, are often perceived as a one-dimensional, as the authors argue, "monolithic Islamic" space. Garcia's chapter outlines a four-dimensional framework for local cultural policy of global media industries and Umi Khattab deconstructs translocal diasporic media spheres in Southeast Asia. As she argues, the construction of "diaspora" "in Southeast Asia and within the periphery has been a neglected field of study" as diaspora is mainly addressed in contexts of traditional Western, that is, modern societies, and we need more approaches for conceptualizing "diaspora" in other society types. Other contributions in this section address rarely discussed communicative spheres: civic information access in African regions, which, as Power, Khatun, and Debeljak argue, does not so much relate to "connectivity" but rather to a complex framework that allows the integration of cultures of public communication. Daya Thussu suggests that a new field of media and communication studies be designed, based on new South–South relations, using India as a site of international media industries producing increasingly complex forms of what he calls "the global popular" as a case study. Khosla and Abraham argue that, in development discourses, "governance" often appears as an "abstract" term. The authors suggest the deconstruction of "governance" from the perspective of citizens and suggest a participatory action research approach to identify constructions of "voice" and "accountability". The authors discuss their research in Sierra Leone and Tanzania and, based on these case studies, suggest parameters of subjective perceptions of civic communication in a world region that is often neglected in communication research. Saskia Witteborn's contribution also covers an often overlooked, but increasingly important, field in "diaspora" studies: the media use of "forced" migrants.

The fourth part of the Handbook focuses on new areas of transnational comparison. These could be related to transnational media forms, such as news agencies, which are in the focus of Oliver Boyd-Barrett's chapter. Goggin's chapter describes a transnational model for the research of "Internets". He notes that "global media research requires a truly international account of the range of global Internets" and suggests a three-level framework for analysis: "infrastructure"; "access and use"; and "culture, language, and history". Myria Georgiou proposes a model of a "multi-spatial framework" for cross-national diaspora research. This methodical "matrix" allows spaces of mediation to be captured between the national and the transnational and to situate "diaspora" within a multispatial cosmopolitan culture. Harindranath also critically reflects the methodological "post-colonial" frame and Slade and Volkmer discuss transnational diasporic media culture through the lens of civic communication. Another area where new forms of transnational comparison is required is the analysis of visual representations. It is in particular the gendered image that is in the focus of Eva Flicker's chapter. The author argues that the politics of visual gender codes relates in new ways to networked spaces of "global media events".

The fifth part of the Handbook focuses on comparative approaches in a new globalized communicative sphere. Klaus Bruhn Jensen proposes a qualitative approach for a "three-step flow" of communication, integrating personal, mass, and networked communication. Jensen argues that communication research in such a model aims to investigate not only the collection but rather the "co-construction" of data. Teer-Tomaselli and Dyll-Myklebust discuss a number of case studies, conducted in South Africa, which aim to assess the subjective constructions of what they call "global identity". De Vreese and Vliegenthart critically reflect models of comparative communication research within the European context. However, comparative research not only in a transnational comparative context but in a comparative context of transnational journalism spheres beyond the European framework is the focus of Lisbeth Clausen's chapter. Based on a study of Japanese television newsrooms, Clausen develops a framework for a "newsroom ethnography" as a matrix for the analysis of local journalistic cultures. So-called "risk" communication, such as climate change as a thematic area of globalized research, constitutes another new area. The chapter by Godfrey, Burton, and LeRoux-Rutledge discusses a study conducted in ten countries in Sub-Saharan Africa aiming to deconstruct the local perception of the changing environment. As comparative research is an increasing area of relevance, Esser and Hanitzsch's chapter identifies organizational models of collaborative research and Akiba Cohen reports "from the field" and addresses comparative research in very practical terms.

The Handbook aims to serve two purposes: it provides an introduction to current issues of transnational media research for those new to the field. However, it might also help conceptually to structure contemporary formations of advanced globalization processes and – hopefully – inspire a debate of communication – not only between the "global" and the "local" but in new terrains of transnational communicative density, which we are only beginning to explore.

Ingrid Volkmer
University of Melbourne, Australia

References

Beck, U. (2009) *World at Risk*. Cambridge: Polity.

Boyd-Barrett, O. (ed.) (2007) *Communications Media, Globalization and Empire*. Eastleigh, UK: John Libbey.

Chakravartty, P. and Zhao, Y. (eds) (2008) *Toward a Transcultural Political Economy*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Castells, M. (1996, *2009) The Rise of the Network Society*. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.

Castells, M. (2011) *Communication Power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chalaby, J. (ed.) (2005) *Transnational Television Worldwide: Towards a New Media Order*. London and New York: I.B. Tauris.

Chan, G. and Ibrahim, M.Z. (2008) Conceptualizing the network society in Malaysia, *Asian Journal of Social Science*, **36** (5/6), 773–791.

Chouliaraki, L. (2006) *The Spectatorship of Suffering*. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Cottle, S. (2009) *Global Crisis Reporting: Journalism in the Global Age*. Maidenhead, England: Open University Press.

Curtin, M. and Shah, H. (eds) (2010) *Re-orienting Global Communication: Indian and Chinese Media beyond Borders*, Urbana, IL: University of Ilinois Press.

Held, D. (2010) *Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities*. Cambridge: Polity.

Lash, S. and Urry, J. (1994) *Economies of Signs and Spaces*. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Mudhai, O.F., Tettey, W.J. and Banda, F. (2009) *African Media and the Digital Public Sphere*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Pleyers, G. (2010) *Alterglobalization*. Cambridge: Polity.

Sakr, N. (2007) *Arab Media and Political Renewal: Community, Legitimacy and Public Life*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Sassen, S. (2006) *Cities in a World Economy*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.

Sassen, S. (2007) *Sociology of Globalization*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Seib, P. (ed.) (2009) *Toward a New Public Diplomacy: Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Straubhaar, J.D. (2007) *World Television: From Global to Local*. Los Angeles, CA: Sage.

Tomlinson, J. (1999) *Globalization and Culture*. Oxford: Polity.

Part 1

History of Transnational Media Research

1

Comparative Research and the History of Communication Studies

John D.H. Downing

This brief historical survey opens with a framing of its narrative. It then addresses three early classics of comparative media studies: *Four Theories of the Press* (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm 1956); *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Lerner 1958); and *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit/Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (Habermas 1962/1989) (later referred to as *Four Theories*, *Passing*, and *Public Sphere*). Thereafter the survey trifurcates comparative research studies into those with a regional focus (e.g., Latin America, East-Central Europe); those with a medium-specific focus (television, cinema, networks); and those addressing media and society more generally, focusing on politics and policy, and minority-ethnic media.[1]

Framing Comparative Communication Research

Given the relative paucity of comparative media research, it is tempting to promise the reader a rather cursory chapter evaluating its history. Yet given the paramount importance of comparative studies for developing cogent theory, a critical survey is needed. If communication media research is to have heft, it must never be permitted to slumber inside a national cocoon. Max Weber's sociological studies of religions, Barrington Moore Jr's six-nation study *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966/1993), Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's *The Civic Culture* (1963/1989), the Princeton School's influential cross-national studies of "modernization", the four-volume *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986), and the long-established journal *Comparative Studies in Society and History* (1958–): these and others, whatever the judgments on their specifics, have helped to define properly ambitious research.

Yet a substantial number of the texts reviewed below date only from the mid-1990s, evincing the very slow expansion of this field's comparative focus until recently. Both

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

holistic and segmented[2] media theorizing – *Öffentlichkeit* (public sphere), *egemonia* (hegemony), "mediatization", cultural hybridization, functionalism, "cultural industries", cultural capital, agenda-setting, priming, framing, and the rest – have indisputably been stunted by the failure to routinely compare and contrast between nations.

Worth underscoring, moreover, is the typically unacknowledged dismissal of the need for comparative research found in US and UK Media Studies texts, where findings drawn are repeatedly presented *and* cited as telling us something worth knowing about "the" media, that is, implicitly all media everywhere. It is a common flaw in many national studies, but given Anglo-American ascendancy in media studies this fallacy has damaging consequences (Stam and Shohat 1994; Curran and Park 2000).

Generalizations about media *as such* based upon the United States or the United Kingdom are automatically rendered flawed because of the near-implausibility of replicating them on a wide scale. Despite certain easily identifiable differences between British and US media and societies, in many ways Britain and the United States may be said to have a great deal more in common with each other than with most of the nearly 200 nations recognized by the UN: language, Protestant brands of Christianity, affluence, political stability, imperial pretensions and cultures. These are comparable but atypical nations. Many other countries have even more extreme class inequalities and entrenched exclusion of women from the political arena, and suffer from acute political instability, civil or sectarian strife, heavy dependence on foreign powers, the petroleum and minerals traps, unaffordable education, illiteracy, and ruthless regimes. As a consequence, the societal roles of their media vary sharply.

Comparative research need not only be across nation states. Highly populated nations such as China, India, and Brazil palpably offer significant internal regional variations in media practice and uses. Population size alone understates this variety. "Sub-national" nations, such as Catalunya, Québec, and Scotland, nations with linguistic–religious–regional divisions, such as Belgium and Sri Lanka, and substantially multi-ethnic nations, such as Nigeria, offer very substantial scope for comparative media research within a single nation state.

Valuable, too, are cross-national comparisons within global regions, despite the frequently negative framing of such work in response to the late Samuel Huntington's misconceived *The Clash of Civilizations* (1998). This chapter will review some comparative work on Latin America, East Asia, and East-Central Europe. The notions of geo-linguistic and geo-cultural proximity (e.g., Sinclair, Jacka, and Cunningham 1996, pp. 11–14), framed initially to analyze trade in cultural products, are germane to this dimension of comparative communication research.

Thankfully, though, the comparative media studies scenario is now changing and even picking up a little speed. Research on media in a number of nations other than the US/UK duo is finally becoming fairly routinely available, at least permitting comparative study from secondary data. Yet even so, research on global South nations is often dominated by global North scholars or by researchers strongly stamped by Anglo-American (or Francophone) paradigms.

There are many continuing challenges. Cross-national research may be expensive and often requires cross-national teams. Furthermore, it is easy to acknowledge the language impediment in conducting comparative research, given that many researchers are monolingual, but unfortunately the hurdles cannot be reduced to that single practicality.

For example, imperial and post-imperial mentalities are evident in the way that even English language communication research routinely goes unnoticed and unreviewed in the United States and the United Kingdom, if published in Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, and other countries with a significantly Anglophone academy. The hurdles are still more visible when research is on and especially *from* countries outside a tiny elite circle in the global North. EU funding has often required multiple national partners following the accession of new East-Central European nations, which is to be welcomed, but still operates within Fortress Europe.

One caveat: as Gunther and Mughan (2000, p. 412) very importantly stress, media "is a plural noun". Yet comparative media research has tremendously favored news media of various kinds over all forms of entertainment media and, no doubt in part for archival reasons, print media over others. The tendency to use "media" as a singular noun efficiently lures us into fogging vital distinctions and often claims the part (news, journalism) in synecdoche for the whole. Three further caveats must be issued: (a) the focus here is on overall contributions to comparative media research, so many tempting targets for specific empirical critique will reluctantly be passed over; (b) not reviewed here, though of great potential value, are comparative longitudinal studies within nations; (c) this chapter does not venture into intercultural communication studies, interesting and important as their focus potentially is and despite their comparativist bent.

Lastly, let us note a constructive but complicating factor in comparative communication research, namely the growth of interest in aspects of globalization. Positive in principle, obviously, but it complicates the task here inasmuch as many studies of globalization and media inevitably incorporate comparisons, whether fleeting or substantive, in support or critique of propositions concerning globalizing media trends.

Four Theories, Passing, and *Public Sphere*

Both *Four Theories* and *Passing* represented a critical step forward inasmuch as the former study set out the first clear schema for analyzing media in different nation states across the planet, and Lerner's (1958) work incorporated, admittedly from a pro-US Cold Warrior's perspective, the global South and global regions as a crucial terrain for media research. Indeed, at the same time as Lerner's fellow researchers in the United States were mostly insisting that media changed little or nothing in "society", he was concluding they could be significant agents of change in "society" outside the United States through spreading commoditization and entrepreneurialism ("psychic mobility").

Siebert and his colleagues (1956), in a media studies field dominated then as now by an extreme obsession with the present moment, sought to balance historical evolution and contingency with an acknowledgement of the role of differing state-forms in shaping media structures. Their model firmly eschewed media-centric analysis of media, and did not fall into the trap of concluding that research findings on US media applied to all nations. However, while they made it clear that by the "press" they intended to designate all media technologies and did give some attention to a variety of media formats, their primary focus was on news, journalism, and censorship practices. This is not in itself a critique, as research needs to delimit, but it did anticipate the strong emphasis on these issues in subsequent comparative research.

On the debit side, Siebert and his colleagues wobbled uneasily between two approaches. At times they derived the societal organization of media historically and structurally from "the system of social control" (Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm 1956, p. 1). For example, they identified what they termed "libertarianism" with the emergence of European capitalism and scientific reasoning. At others, they sought to explain media structures in idealist terms, by recourse to the ascendancy of particular normative theories. These they defined as

> certain basic beliefs and assumptions which *the society* holds: the nature of man, the nature of society and the state, the relation of man to the state, and the nature of knowledge and truth (Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm 1956, p. 2, my emphasis).

The notion that an entire nation would subscribe to one or other of these positions – Lockean liberalism, Stalinism, "social responsibility of the press" (*á la* 1947 Hutchins Commission) – implausibly homogenized national belief-systems and enthroned them in a smoothly functionalist model.

Contestation of media structures only appears in their argument in connection with liberalism's attack on authoritarianism and, glancingly, in connection with the "social responsibility" paradigm, their solution to the negatives in monopolistic media ownership (e.g., Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm 1956, pp. 5, 85). Otherwise their implicit image seems to be that of four theories, born from different socio-economic formations, which then, depending on the nation in question, become normatively elephantine, "the dominant ideologies" generating ongoing media performance of four different kinds. In the case of the "social responsibility" paradigm, however, this framework implicitly broke down since they argued it to be a trend in the process of becoming dominant, but had no explanation of *why* contemporary US media should follow a "social responsibility" model other than as a result of the high ethical principles of those owners, executives, and journalists who shared their vision – idealism, then, in both senses of the word.

Later proposals based upon this model and initially summarized by McQuail (1994) added development communication and democratic-participatory communication to these deontic categories. As a step toward complicating the picture, this was to be welcomed, although in practice much media performance conducted under the aegis of "development" was distinctly authoritarian in one mode or another, and democratic-participatory communication practice evinced a much larger variety of formats than conventional mainstream media, so this designation begged many questions. The latter category also destabilizes Siebert and his colleagues' implication of a homogeneous, uncontested normative paradigm.

Christians *et al.* (2009) have recently proposed a substantial departure from the "four theories" schema, focusing only on democratic regimes and on news, and generating three major categories, namely normative traditions, models of democracy, and media roles, each with four sub-categories. In the case of media roles, the sub-categories are defined as monitorial, facilitative, radical, and collaborative. This approach is less ambitious globally and does not pivot strictly on the normative, but repeatedly runs the risk of being overly schematic.

Lerner's *The Passing of Traditional Society* was cross-national but also regional in focus, although he derided the "Western invention" of the term "Middle East" to denote the region (Lerner 1958, p. 403). He and a team of eleven conducted interviews in Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Iran in 1950–1951, with country summaries updated subsequently. They sought to understand the conditions for the emergence of "modernity", which Lerner defined at one point as achieving "public power and wealth for private comfort and fun" (Lerner 1958, p. 79). Among those conditions he argued that literacy and radio were destined to be central in promoting a growing class of what he called the "Transitionals", people who embraced what he variously termed "psychic mobility" and "empathy", namely "the spread of curiosity and imagination among a previously quietistic population [through which] would come the human skills needed for social growth and economic development" (Lerner 1958, p. 412) along capitalist lines.

These were not the only decisive elements of his analysis. He also emphasized shifting definitions of old age and female gender; styles of political leadership; the importance for political stability of a slow and steady increase of Transitionals rather than a sudden rush in their numbers; the roles of marginalized subcultures in developing media; and the dichotomy, which haunts contemporary Orientalist discourse to this day concerning the Islamic world, of "Mecca or mechanization" (Lerner 1958, p. 405).

This was all a mixed bag, to say the least, but in principle represented an approach to comparative media research, which, although ethno-centric, was not media-centric; which sought to identify key determinants without homogenizing their operation; which was alert to sub-national as well as national variations within a regional context; and gave full weight to the dynamic of social change rather than presuming political stability to be the norm.

Between them, these two early US studies set out a series of parameters for comparative media research that were in many ways constructive, at the very least in pushing researchers' attention toward extending their national horizons and in eschewing media-centric analysis of media. Celebration of their own nation's culture, explicit in Lerner's case, implicit in the case of Siebert *et al.*, certainly sullied their claim to academic neutrality but did not extinguish their contributions.

Habermas' *Public Sphere* (1962/1989) consisted of a comparison between the rise and decline of public debate on political matters in Britain, France, and Germany. The delay of 27 years in its English language publication as a full text rather than fragments meant that many Anglophone researchers came to it late. His historical analyses have been challenged, notably regarding France, and the section on nineteenth-century Germany was the least developed of the three cases. Nonetheless, the 'public sphere' terminology has grown from this comparative history into a huge ongoing range of studies in many contexts, for example, the essay collections edited by Calhoun (1993) and Bastien and Neveu (1999), up to a collection of nearly forty research papers debating the applicability of the concept on the African continent (CODESRIA 2008).[3]

Comparative Communication Research on Global Regions

Some of the most interesting comparative media research has indeed taken Lerner's path and engaged with regions, not simply with individual nations, often within the context of globalizing or Americanizing trends. Examples include Latin America, East Asia, and the former Soviet sphere of influence in East-Central Europe and the Balkans. Concepts of geo-linguistic or geo-cultural proximity have played a significant heuristic role in exploring comparative and global media change on this scale. The former term applies more closely to Anglophone, Lusophone, Arabophone, and other international language zones, while the latter is better fitted to multilingual but geographically proximate areas, for example, to East Asian cultures historically influenced by Buddhism, Confucianism, and Western imperialism.

The first comprehensive study of Latin American cinemas appeared in 1981 (Hennebelle and Gumucio-Dagron 1981). In English language studies of Latin American media, the initial major comparative works were on media and political developments (Fox 1988), social documentary (Burton 1990), trends in national cinemas (Pick 1993), and national television systems (Sinclair 1999). These were followed by Waisbord's (2000) study of the growth of investigative journalism in the region and Fox and Waisbord's (2001) edited collection on Latin American media and political change. The quarterly *Revista Latinoamericana de Ciencias de la Comunicación*, the official journal of the ALAIC (Asociación Latinoamericana de Investigadores de la Comunicación), and Intercom's (Brazil's communication research association) *Intercom – Revista Brasileira de Ciências da Comunicação*, both have come to carry a number of comparative and regional studies, including in *Intercom* studies of Lusophone nations.

Notably, Mastrini and Becerra (2006) brought out the very first systematic study of media ownership concentration in Latin America. Their analysis covered all the continental Latin American countries except for Ecuador, Paraguay, and the Central American nations. Noting increasing marketization and the retreat of the state over the 1990s, they mapped market structures and levels of concentration, and developed a Concentration Index of the major culture and information firms. While their study is rich in details of national specifics, they nonetheless concluded overall that generally low levels of access to telecommunications and cultural products paralleled UNDP development indices; that ownership concentration in the media sector was significant and growing; and that certain firms in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela had developed a major regional presence. The potential political implications of their findings, however, they explicitly reserved for a later study.

Regarding the East Asian region, Iwabuchi (2002) argued for the importance of understanding media flows within East Asia's specific forms of modernity and cultural tradition, and contrasted media culture shifts in Japan, Taiwan, and Hong Kong to illustrate his point. His later volume with Chua on popular cultural flows between Japan and South Korea, and *Hallyu*, the regionally influential Korean "cultural wave" spreading even as far as northeastern India (Iwabuchi and Chua 2008), explored these issues further. Ehrlich and Desser's (2000) more specific comparison of Chinese and Japanese cinemas and arts delved deeply into longer-term dimensions of regional cultural flows. The journal *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* (1999–) draws on a variety of disciplines to present research on eastern and other regions of Asia.

The former Soviet sphere of influence embraces, as well as sharply different nations, significantly different sub-regions, namely East-Central Europe, the Balkans, the Transcaucasus, and Central Asia. (To this writer's knowledge, little work has been published to date on the two latter.) The focus of much of this research, not surprisingly, has been on the dynamics of media change since the 1980s.

Splichal (1995), the present writer (Downing 1996), and Sparks (1998) sought to analyze these changes somewhat differently. Splichal, focusing on Slovenia and East-Central Europe, argued the "Italianization thesis", namely, that after Communism's collapse regional news media were moving in the direction of Italy's media: strong state control, political partisanship, the integration of top journalists within political elites, and the absence of consensus on professional norms. Sparks (1998), however, marshaled evidence from Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary to dispute any radical break between the domination of media under sovietized regimes and their successors. He then built upon this analysis to argue that conventional western scholarship on media and power was deeply flawed.

The present writer compared how four interacting and mutually escalating political–economic and media–cultural processes drove the collapse of the Soviet system over time in the specific cases of Russia, Poland, and Hungary. These were (a) accelerating internal political–economic shifts; (b) insurgent and dissident media of many kinds; (c) swiftly widening cracks in the dam of official media; and (d) each country's differing relations with forces external to the Soviet bloc. He also compared the often very fraught roles of these countries' news media in the tumultuous years following 1989–1991, and concluded, somewhat like Sparks, that conventional media theories must engage far more deeply with conflict, instability and macro-political change than they generally do.

More recently, two regional essay collections were published, one entirely on East-Central European media change, the other partly so (Dobek-Ostrowska *et al.* 2010). The former text includes detailed country case studies focused on the Baltic states, Poland, Hungary, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Romania, and some comparative and conceptual overviews of the region as a whole. The focus is mostly on broadcasting, especially the key instance of television, but also maps the sudden impact of globalization in the national media systems under review. The editors, building upon Splichal's "Italianization" thesis and Hallin and Mancini (2004), argue there to be a regional trend towards the "Mediterraneanization" of media, namely their domination by governments and profit-hungry firms. Dobek-Ostrowska *et al.* provided case studies of media in Russia, Ukraine, the Baltic and Czech republics, and two in Poland, but also proposed comparisons from Turkey and two from Spain, along with several chapters of comparative analysis.

Iordanova's studies compared national cinemas in the Balkans during the lethal conflicts of the 1990s, and more generally of media and culture in that region (Iordanova 2006, 2008). They provided very searching and authoritative accounts of the region's media at a time of rapid and sometimes brutal change, and brushed away many standard misconceptions. Her focus was principally but not exclusively textual.

Balabanova's (2007) study contrasting British and Bulgarian news coverage of NATO's 1998 Serbia and Kosovo bombing campaign used the comparison to critique the so-called CNN effect and other theories of the news media/foreign policy relation for their US-centric limitations. Geographical proximity to the bombing generated twice as many Bulgarian news stories as in Britain, mostly very sympathetic to the human suffering generated. Yet it did not dent the Bulgarian government's support for NATO. British elite press coverage, while not priming the move to bomb, served to generate public consent for bombing only in the initial month, but shifted to dispute its strategic appropriateness – though not the framing of the conflict – in the campaign's third month.

Balabanova underscored the multiple constraints operating on both Bulgaria's government and its journalists in the immediate post-Soviet era: the former determined at all costs to enter the European Union and NATO but journalists still suffering from ingrained public skepticism in the sovietized era regarding their independence. Thus government policy and news media framing were at loggerheads in Bulgaria, while in Britain news coverage came to query the bombing's strategic effectiveness while continuing to support its officially proclaimed objective.

These regional comparative studies have challenged many crude generalizations and opened important new paths to analysis. We now turn to our second category of comparative media research.

Comparative Medium-Specific Research

Under this heading are included studies of television, of cinema, and of digital information networks.

One of the most influential – and contested – comparative studies of television was by Nordenstreng and Varis (1974), who argued that national television and cultures around the world were increasingly threatened with virtual extinction by US television exports. This argument quickly developed beyond television to an argument that the contrast between the abundance of communication infrastructures, news flows, and cultural images in the Global North, and their weakness in the Global South, was growing apace. The apogee of this analysis came in the even more controversial book-length Report *Many Voices, One World* (UNESCO 1980/2003), which the Reagan and Thatcher administrations quickly targeted with a vitriolic denunciatory campaign. It served as a rationale in 1983 for both governments to pull out of UNESCO altogether. Their reasons for pulling out were several, but their endlessly repeated allegation that the Report sought to muzzle journalists proved an effective, if entirely erroneous, public smear.

This particular comparative frame for global television analysis was also assailed by a series of scholars, notably on the grounds (1) that it reduced TV viewers in the Global South to cultural dupes and confused the spread of modernity with cultural imperialism and (2) that cultural hybridization was a more nuanced concept than one-way domination. Nonetheless, few outright disputed the aching disparity between South and North in communication infrastructures and in the mutual exchange of news. Liebes and Katz (1990) produced a widely cited study of the varied receptions of the US soap opera *Dallas* in different countries, arguing from their results that active cultural frames were constitutive of audiences' appropriations of foreign televisual material. Sinclair, Jacka and Cunningham (1996, pp. 17–18), however, responded that this culturalist frame was equally reductive in its own way and cited a variety of studies of the reception of *Dallas* in different countries that illustrated the often decisive power of scheduling, program philosophy, and cultural environment in determining program popularity.

Important further steps in this debate were taken in Buonanno's edited volume comparing television fiction across seven European nations (Buonanno 1999) and in

Albert Moran's studies of program format trade (Moran 1998; Moran and Keane 2004). Their analyses in each case are too rich in detail to summarize, but it should be said that through using comparative data these volumes contributed to a far more nuanced and multifaceted analysis of television in society than the sterile confrontation between culturalists and an earlier generation of media political economists. Striking out once more in the audience appropriation direction, Straubhaar (2007) proposed a model accommodating multiple vectors around television's influence, based in part on his long research on Brazilian TV, but also on contrasts with Italy, India, Japan, and some other nations. He argued, based upon these comparative data, that in their different ways "glocalization", hybridization, and multilayered cultural identities were all essential concepts adequately to encompass the impacts of global television flows.

Surveys of world cinema and of national cinemas are quite common, but comparative studies less so. Here we will focus on just four. The oldest is the "Third Cinema" research tradition. In its major initial manifesto Solanas and Getino (1969/1983) claimed that a distinctive cinema was emerging from revolutionary movements in the Global South, representing a radical break with both Hollywood (First Cinema) and art movies (Second Cinema). "Third Cinema", they argued, was determinedly subversive, democratic in its production process, committed to interactive audience settings (and implicitly documentary in focus). Various attempts to pin down the term "Third Cinema" followed, from claiming that Global South political film-making was distinctively collectivist (Gabriel 1982) to rather exhaustive arguments that effectively seemed to conclude that "Third Cinema" and politically engaged cinema (but not, obviously, from the Right) were overlapping categories (Pines and Willemen 1990; Wayne 2001). Dissanayake and Guneratne (2003) were among the voices arguing that the comparative distinction broke down when considering many Global South movies, not least from Asia. A lively debate continued.

Three more specific but seminal studies deserve attention. Stam *et al.* (1997) developed a detailed comparison between Brazilian and US media representations of "race" and slavery, in the process successfully avoiding a long tradition of endeavoring to show one of these national histories morally superior to the other. Naficy (2001) developed a distinctive category of cinema that he terms "accented cinema", namely, the corpus of film work produced in various parts of the world by film-makers forced into political exile or experiencing diasporic uprootedness. He traced subtly and delicately the composition of diasporic "accents" in film works, ever more pervasive over the past forty years. Marciniak, Imre, and O'Healy's (2007) studies of transnational feminism and cinema pick up on a number of these issues, focusing especially on media and film representations of women as migrant workers, often "undocumented", and quite frequently working as nurses, cleaners, and prostitutes. Their own feminist position excludes facile homogenization of women's experiences, identities, or representations, and contests the "ghettoizing rubrics" (Marciniak, Imre and O'Healy 2007, p. 9) of "ethnic cinema", "minority cinema", or "immigrant cinema".

Let us finally under this medium-specific heading address a masterwork of comparative research into digital networks, namely Manuel Castells' (1996–1998/2009) *The Information Age* trilogy. Extensive comparative case studies abounded, some of them quickly dating as with his blanket dismissal of the African continent as digitally excluded, but all of them carefully studied by his teams of collaborators. While it is common, and fair, to note that media in general are absent from his analysis, there can be no question but that by the sheer weight and global extent of his comparative research he compelled media researchers to start bringing digital networks into the mainstream of their concerns. Thus he helped gradually to overturn the crippling "division of labor" between information society research and cultural and media studies research.

Comparative Studies of Media and Society

Two[4] clusters predominated under this heading, one around media, politics, and the state, the other a smaller but growing corpus on media, racism, and ethnicity. Within the former cluster the focus varied among macro-political issues, election processes, and communication regulation. That order is followed below.

The essays in Popkin (1995) compared the roles of media during revolutionary processes, largely focusing on print. The national case studies were drawn from seventeenth-century Britain, the American and French revolutions, Germany in 1848, early Soviet Russia, China, the US Civil Rights turmoil of the 1950s and 1960s, and the "Velvet revolutions" of East-Central Europe in 1989. The contributing authors concentrated on how media have shaped "conflicts in the chaotic periods that follow the overthrow of established authority or on the media's role in the reconstruction of new institutions" (Popkin 1995, p. 10), but did not focus on their roles in building momentum toward revolution.

The introductory essay acknowledged that the terms "revolution" and "media" were being rather stretched in order to encompass the cases. However, it concluded that comparing the cases did succeed in showing

> a sudden multiplication of competing publications or media organs, a rapid shift from one dominant medium to another (from pamphlets to newspapers, for example), a marked change in the form or substance of media content, or a major alternation in different groups' access to the media (Popkin 1995, p. 4).

Popkin proposed that "there are enough suggestive similarities in the evolution of media in different revolutionary crises that one can plausibly argue for [there being] … substantial regularities". Among these are the

> explosion of new voices in the media, the invention of new forms of presentation, and the search for ways to enlarge the potential audience and shorten the time necessary for reaching it … an intensification of direct [oral] interchange, and the more structured media find their importance in the influence they exercise on this stream of spoken words (Popkin 1995, pp. 24–25).

The essays in Morris and Waisbord (2001) directly addressed the debate about the supposed contemporary etiolation of the state as a result of globalization processes by examining a variety of cross-national cases – Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, South

Africa, South Korea, and the European Union – in which the state's decisive roles regarding media and telecommunications were abundantly evident. In a different political register, the essays in Mattelart (2002) compared a variety of cases in which state censorship had been challenged from outside its borders, ranging from Iran to Cuba, North Korea, and various African nations. These studies served to confirm cross-nationally that in certain spheres of certain states, if not all, contemporary communication technologies may have an erosive potential.

Gunther and Mughan's collection, *Democracy and the Media* (2000), was unusual in that it focused both on media roles within macro-level dimensions of the political process (transition from dictatorship in Spain, Russia, Hungary, and Chile) and on its micro-level routine informational and electoral dimensions (in the United States, Japan, the Netherlands, Britain, and Germany).

From the experiences of Spain, Russia, Hungary, and Chile, Gunther and Mughan concluded that inadvertent and partial media liberalization by states – "inadvertent" in the sense that these dictatorial governments, self-evidently, did not lessen controls in order to bring down their own regimes – set up nonetheless an unstable and unpredictable dynamic, exacerbated by increasingly severe conflicts within the elite on whether and how far to permit further media freedom or retract it. The image of cracks in a dam is not one they use, but that irresistibly comes to mind.

The other essays in Gunther and Mughan strove to identify trends and dynamics in media performance in "actually existing" democracies. The conclusions were far from sanguine, not least in identifying severe problems in the framing and provision of relevant information relevant to election decisions in the United States (Gunther and Mughan 2000, p. 441) and the commercialization of the electoral process there. They noted the failure of Internet options to realize the utopian potential originally predicted by some, and identified with alarm a US trend toward knee-jerk cynicism among news media commentators concerning the political process. They also suggested a gradual process of approximation to US models in other democracies, and those democracies' consequent deterioration.

They concluded from this comparative analysis that the notion a free market automatically produces diverse and productive news media was wishful thinking, unsupported by compelling evidence. They also conclude that the public service broadcasting model, especially as realized in Japan and Britain, offered a higher level of electorally relevant information than a system dominated by the bottom line.

Ward and Lange's collection, *The Media and Elections* (2004), focused only on the micro-process through seven studies (Italy, the United States, Germany, South Africa, France, Russia, and Britain). The essays set out simply to describe the legislation addressing media conduct during elections (and did not reference Gunther and Mughan), and the comparative conclusions chapter was considerably less robust than its equivalent in Gunther and Mughan, offering a general set of principles for media election coverage to be fair and free rather than a systematic probing of the data in previous chapters. The principles set out were unexceptionable but predictable, such as journalists' need for personal security, the importance of a vigorous civil society, and the difference between the letter of the law and its enforcement.

Esser and Pfetsch's essay collection, *Comparing Political Communication* (2004), sought to advance the role of comparative study in political communication research both theoretically and methodologically, but focusing upon Western liberal democracies and largely upon routine procedural and electoral dimensions. The essays were marked by (1) a resolute focus on defining politics as a discrete sub-system best researched by positivist methodologies; (2) an attempt nonetheless to extend political communication research in a comparative direction by using notions of political culture largely derived from its definition in Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture* (1963/1989); (3) a notable disinterest in economic dimensions of politics and media; (4) a primary focus on the procedures of liberal democracy, rather than the macro-political issues addressed by some of the Gunther and Mughan essays; (5) inattention to global South polities, balanced to some extent by several chapters addressing globalization; (6) a legacy media, rather than media-and-Internet, focus; and (7) an implicit constriction of "media" and "politics", despite using the terms "culture" and "communication", to news media and formal politics.

The editors' agenda was to advance the construct of a "political communication system", meaning the routine interface between politics and media as systems, based upon the assumption of the so-called "mediatization" of contemporary politics (Gunther and Mughan 2000, p. 387). Pfetsch (2004, pp. 359–360) proposed four categories in which the "political communication system" operates: (a) a commercial broadcasting system, autonomous press, and weak political parties, generating influential media (she instanced the United States); (b) public service broadcasting, a party-run press and strong parties, generating influential parties (she instanced Germany); (c) broadcasting with some public service attributes, a partisan press, and weak parties (she instanced Switzerland); (d) a strongly commercial broadcasting operation, a nonparty press, and strong parties (no example was cited). Four aspects of the "political communication system" the editors argue to be central to its analytical utility: political socialization; public opinion processes; political public relations; and the mutual relation of political communication structures and political culture (Pfetsch 2004, p. 389).

This collection links interestingly to Hallin and Mancini (2004), who also made use of the "system" construct. They did so less rigidly, using the term almost in the sense of "complex" or "formation", but restricted it to news media, especially print, and forms of legal regulation of news media. They conceived their prime task as developing categories capable of encompassing the news media of Western Europe and North America (minus Mexico). Early on they acknowledged the importance of "film, music, television … telecommunication, public relations" for a complete analysis of "media systems" (Hallin and Mancini 2004, p. 7), but excluded them from consideration on the ground they would demand different concepts and draw on different corpuses of research.

They emphasized four issues: the strength of news media markets; the degree of parallelism between media and political parties; the development of what they termed "journalistic professionalism" (Hallin and Mancini 2004, p. 21), by which they meant a degree of autonomy, rather than a striving for political neutrality; and the degree of state intervention into news media functioning. Overall they generated three categories, characterized in both regional and political science terms: a "Mediterranean" or "polarized pluralist" model; a "North-Central European" or "democratic corporatist" model; and a "North Atlantic" or "liberal" model.

Their text contained many well-honed analytical insights, but particularly raised the thorny issue of how best to delimit when conducting comparative media research.

There is little question but that the title of their book should have been "Comparing Print News Media and Political Life" – they spent little time on broadcast and none on internet news – rather than *Comparing Media Systems*. The failure to address media corporations as entire market entities rather than simply their news divisions, or to acknowledge the increasing dominance of public relations in the provision of news, was problematic. The dynamic linkage between the sharp growth of media concentration, neo-liberal re-regulation and the dizzying expansion of digital networks was only summarily and very hesitantly handled toward the end, where they wrote that

> commercialization seems clearly to involve an erosion of the professional autonomy journalists gained in the latter part of the twentieth century, and also, *possibly*, a subordination of the media to the political interests of business that *could diminish* political balance … (Hallin and Mancini 2004, p. 295, my emphasis).

Their overall emphasis on media history and change was most welcome, but far-reaching changes were currently ongoing and this hyper-cautious conclusion was far from giving them the weight due. However, the authors' self-restriction to the United States, Canada, and Western Europe was entirely defensible, and their plea that their three categories should not be applied to incomparable regions was perfectly sensible. Notwithstanding critiques above, their work offered an interestingly argued step in the formulation of comparative research models.

A very tightly focused example of comparative research can be found in a triangular study of news media, government bureaucracy, and foreign aid responsiveness by Van Belle, Rioux, and Potter (2004). Dwelling simply upon the press salience of particular countries (and in the US case, of disasters) and correlating that with the amount of foreign aid disbursed by the state bureaucracies responsible, produced exceptionally high correlations, supported by varied statistical significance tests. This applied across the United States, Britain, France, Canada, and Japan. (Their study was not of the so-called "CNN effect" on switches in government policy-making.)

The authors, political scientists, proposed what they called "The Cockroach Theory of Bureaucracy": "… the bureaucracy that finds itself caught out in the light – [i.e. of news media attention] – is the one that is going to be stomped on" (Van Belle, Rioux, and Potter 2004, p. 31), and therefore acts pre-emptively/"responsively" to avoid negative publicity. The *fear* of the stick (news media) they argued to be the primary stimulus to bureaucratic distribution of foreign aid. The authors did not involve themselves in detailed analysis of media operations or texts, only going so far as to argue that "corporate media [are] driven by business imperatives to seek out government failures that can be depicted as scandals" (Van Belle, Rioux, and Potter 2004, p. 32), while qualifying this with Lance Bennett's "indexation" theory (Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston 2008) of "the overwhelming predominance of officialdom in the media" (Van Belle, Rioux, and Potter 2004, p. 145).

The studies in Goldberg, Prosser, and Verhulst (1998) addressed the changing context of communication re-regulation during the critical decade of the 1990s, with chapters on Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Hungary, the European Union and the Council of Europe, the United States, and Australia. In doing so they chose countries with differing federal structures (Australia, Germany, the United States) and none; with differing levels of court activism (the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia); with differing levels of effective central government intervention in policy change (Hungary, Italy, the United Kingdom); and with varied regulatory bodies and processes (e.g., the US Federal Communications Commission, which has joint responsibility for media and telecommunications, as opposed to other countries with several or even multiple such agencies). All, however, were market economies, Hungary being the weakest.

The study's objective was in part to challenge the reductivist but quite dominant theses of the period regarding media "convergence", which claimed, following Ithiel de Sola Pool's *Technologies of Freedom* (1983), that digitization and massive channel diversity had rendered the need for communication regulation virtually obsolete. Their comparisons, however, indicated rather clearly that convergence theses, which saw policy in this area "as a process of resolving essentially technical tasks assumed to be similar in any market-oriented economy, neglect the particular constraints of political and legal culture which may be of the utmost importance" on the ground (Goldberg, Prosser, and Verhulst 1998, p. 295).

While less populated a research field than comparative research into media and politics in their various dimensions, cross-national research on migration, ethnicity, and media began to take root. A 1980s UNESCO project on the information rights of migrant workers, led by Taisto Hujanen and Charles Husband, began the ball rolling (see Hujanen 1988, 1989). Additional impetus was provided by Arjun Appadurai's (1990) widely cited "scapes" articles in *Public Culture* and *Theory, Culture and Society*, which pinpointed human migration and media as principal vectors of contemporary cultural change. This was followed by the research studies on migrant and diasporic media assembled by Canadian scholars Riggins (1992) and Karim (2003).

Cunningham and Sinclair's (2001) collection, focused on migrant communities' media in Australia, proposed that they represent a fresh phenomenon, namely the emergence of a series of "sphericules" rather than Habermas's unified public sphere. Browne (2005) provided short case studies of minority-ethnic media, including indigenous media, from Australia, Germany, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United States, and a scatter of fleeting examples from elsewhere. In his final chapter he isolated certain factors as being of common significance in the survival prospects of such media: finance, volunteer energy, government policies, and community support. The research essays in Mattelart (2007), introduced by his extended conceptual essay, examined transnational media whose audiences were often barred from free media access, ranging from Kurds in Turkey to Arabic-speaking minorities in France, to Cuban-Americans in Florida.

Markelin and Husband (2007), in Guedes Bailey, Georgiou, and Harindranath (2007), developed a three-way comparison of indigenous radio broadcasting among the Saami peoples of Finland, Sweden, and Norway. In Downing and Husband (2005, Chapter 5) Husband underscored "the distinctive challenge of indigeneity" for research in this area, vigorously contesting the facile lumping of diasporic and minority-ethnic media together with indigenous peoples' media. In Chapters 3 and 4 of the same work, comparisons and contrasts were firstly drawn between mainstream media coverage of urban minority-ethnic populations in some metropolitan nations. Subsequently, comparisons and contrasts were drawn among local and international coverage of sectarian, nationalist and "tribal" issues in – respectively – Northern Ireland during its civil war, during the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and during the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath. The power of media in politically fragile and dangerous conjunctures was underscored.

Conclusions

That this historical survey has been partial, not least as a result of its brevity, cannot be gainsaid. It has sought to pinpoint some of the most energetic and stimulating features of a story whose career, despite having roots in the 1950s, has only recently begun to flower, in response, no doubt, to the tremors of globalization and the emergence of rapid access in affluent nations to information sources via the Internet. It has striven to escape from the field's inherited US/UK academic hegemony.[5]

If there is a lesson to be drawn for future research, it is that – with exceptions, such as some East-Central European scholars' uses of Hallin and Mancini's work (2004) – there is a tendency for specialists to write as though only their voice deserved to be heard above the buzzing of other voices, and thus less *careful* critique than there should be of prior comparative studies by other scholars.

Acknowledgments

I would like to record my thanks to faculty and students of the Information and Media Studies Department, Århus University, especially Per Jauert, Poul Erik Nielsen, and Henrik Bødker, for their support and engagement during the fall semester 2010 while I was a visiting professor, and not least to Ms Lisbeth Karlsson of the Department's library specialists, who helped considerably in my preparation of this essay.

Notes

1. Some category overlap is unavoidable, so that, for example, the Hallin and Mancini (2004) study could be covered under the regional or the media/society heading (the latter was chosen).
2. By "segmented" theorizing I denote conceptualizations focused on a particular media technology or function (e.g. news); by "holistic", non-media-centric theories (e.g., functionalism, neo-marxism, etc.).
3. I am grateful to Mr Teke Ngomba, doctoral student in the Information and Media Studies Department, Århus University, for drawing this source to my attention.
4. For reasons of space we will neglect a scatter of valuable but less easily categorized works, such as that of Drotner and Livingstone (2008).
5. A colossal gap was reflected in many syllabi and undergraduate study programs within the United States (Downing 2009), although some textbooks have appeared that bucked this trend (Chapman 2005; McKenzie 2006; and, earlier, Downing, Mohammadi and Sreberny-Mohammadi 1995).

References

Almond, G.A. and Verba, S. (1963/1989) *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press/Sage Publications Inc.

Appadurai, A. (1990) Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy, *Public Culture*, **2** (2), 1–24 (long version); *Theory, Culture and Society*, **7** (2–3), 295–310 (short version).

Balabanova, E. (2007) *Media, Wars and Politics: Comparing the Incomparable in Western and Eastern Europe*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.

Bastien, F. and Neveu, E. (eds) (1999) *Espaces Publics Mosaïques: Acteurs, Arènes et Rhétoriques des Débats Publics Contemporains*. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.

Bennett, L., Lawrence, R.G. and Livingston, S. (2008) *When the Press Fails: Political Power and the News Media from Iraq to Katrina*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Browne, D.R. (2005) *Ethnic Minorities, Electronic Media and the Public Sphere: A Comparative Study*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Buonanno, M. (ed.) (1999) *Shifting Landscapes: Television Fiction in Europe*. Luton, UK: University of Luton Press.

Burton, J. (1990) *The Social Documentary in Latin America*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Calhoun, C. (ed.) (1993) *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Castells, M. (1996–1998/2009) *The Information Age*, 3 volumes, 2nd edn. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.

Chapman, J. (2005) *Comparative Media History*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.

Christians, C.G., Glasser, T.L., McQuail, D., Nordenstreng, K. and White, R.A. (2009) *Normative Theories of the Media: Journalism in Democratic Societies*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.

CODESRIA (2008) *12th General Assembly Plenary Sessions and Parallel Working Sessions on The Public Sphere in Africa*, accessed 28/09/2010, http://www.codesria.org/spip.php?rubrique134&lang=en.

Cunningham, S. and Sinclair, J. (2001) *Floating Lives: The Media and Asian Diasporas*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Curran, J. and Park, M.-J. (eds) (2000) *De-Westernizing Media Studies*. London: Routledge.

de Sola Pool, I. (1983) *Technologies of Freedom*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Dissanayake, W. and Guneratne, A. (eds) (2003) *Rethinking Third Cinema*. London: Routledge.

Dobek-Ostrowska, B., Głowacki, M., Jakubowicz, K. and Sükösd, M. (eds) (2010) *Comparative Media Systems: European and Global Perspectives*. Budapest: Central European University Press.

Downing, J.D.H. (1996) *Internationalizing Media Theory. Transition, Power, Culture: Reflections on Media in Russia, Poland and Hungary, 1980–95*. London: Sage Publications Co.

Downing, J.D.H. (2009) International media studies in the U.S. Academy: a sampling of programmes and textbooks, in D. K. Thussu (ed.) *Internationalizing Media Studies*. New York:Routledge, pp. 267–276.

Downing, J.D.H. and Husband, Ch. (2005) *Representing "Race": Racisms, Ethnicities, and Media*. London, Thousand Oaks, and New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Downing, J.D.H., Mohammadi, A. and Sreberny-Mohammadi, A. (eds) (1995) *Questioning the Media: A Critical Introduction*, 2nd edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc.

Drotner, K. and Livingstone, S. (eds) (2008) *International Handbook of Children, Media and Culture*. London: Sage Publications Co.

Ehrlich, L.C. and Desser, D. (eds) (2000) *Cinematic Landscapes: Observations on the Visual Arts and Cinemas of China and Japan*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Esser, F. and Pfetsch, B. (2004) *Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases, and Challenges*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Fox, E. (1988) *Media and Politics in Latin America: The Struggle for Democracy*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc.

Fox, E., and Waisbord, S. (eds) (2001) *Latin Politics, Global Media*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Gabriel, T. (1982) *Third Cinema for the Third World*. Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press.

Goldberg, D., Prosser, T. and Verhulst, S. (eds) (1998) *Regulating the Changing Media: A Comparative Study*. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.

Guedes Bailey, O., Georgiou, M. and Harindranath, R. (eds) (2007) *Transnational Lives and the Media*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gunther, R. and Mughan, A. (eds) (2000) *Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Habermas, J. (1962/1989) *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit/The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*. Neuwied: Luchterhand and Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Hallin, D. and Mancini, P. (2004) *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hennebelle, G. and Gumucio-Dagron, A. (eds) (1981) *Les Cinémas de l'Amérique Latine*. Paris: Lherminier.

Hujanen, T. (ed.) (1988) *The Role of Information in the Realization of the Human Rights of Migrant Workers*. Finland: University of Tampere Press.

Hujanen, T. (ed.) (1989) *The Role of Information in the Realization of the Human Rights of Migrant Workers*. Lausanne, Switzerland: Bureau pour les Immigrés.

Huntington, S. (1998) *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Iordanova, D. (2006) *Cinema of the Balkans (24 Frames)*. London: Wallflower Press.

Iordanova, D. (2008) *Cinema of Flames: Balkan Film, Culture and the Media*. London: British Film Institute.

Iwabuchi, K. (2002) *Re-Centering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Iwabychi, K. and Chua, B.-H. (eds) (2008) *East Asian Pop Culture*. New York: Routledge.

Karim, K.H. (ed.) (2003) *The Media of Diaspora*. New York: Routledge.

Lerner, D. (1958) *The Passing of Traditional Society*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.

Liebes, T. and Katz, E. (1990) *The Export of Meaning: Cross-Cultural Readings of "Dallas"*. New York: Oxford University Press.

McKenzie, R. (2006) *Comparing Media from around the World*. Boston, MA: Pearson.

McQuail, D. (1994) *Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction*, 3rd edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

Marciniak, K., Imre, A. and O'Healy, A. (eds) (2007) *Transnational Feminism in Film and Media*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Markelin, L. and Husband, C. (2007) The Sami media, state broadcasting and transnational identity, in O. Guedes Bailey, M. Georgiou and R. Harindranath (eds), *Transnational Lives and the Media*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 115–129.

Mastrini, G. and Becerra, M. (eds) (2006) *Periodistas y Magnates: Estructura y Concentración de las Industrias Culturales en América Latina*. Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros.

Mattelart, T. (ed.) (2002) *La Mondialisation des Médias contre la Censure: Tiers Monde et Audiovisuel sans Frontières*. Paris-Bruxelles: Institut National de l'Audiovisuel-De Boeck.

Mattelart, T. (ed.) (2007) *Médias, Migrations et Cultures Transnationales*. Paris-Bruxelles: Institut National de l'Audiovisuel-De Boeck.

Moore, B. (1966/1993) *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Moran, A. (1998) *Copycat Television: Globalization, Program Formats and Cultural Identity*. Luton, UK: Luton University Press.

Moran, A. and Keane, M. (eds) (2004) *Television across Asia: Television Industries, Programme Formats and Globalization*. New York: Routledge.

Morris, N. and Waisbord, S. (eds) (2001) *Media and Globalization: Why the State Matters*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Naficy, H. (2001) *An Accented Cinema: Exilic and Diasporic FilmMaking*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

O'Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. (1986) *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Nordenstreng, K. and Varis, T. (1974) *Television Traffic – A One-Way Street? Reports and Papers on Mass Communication*, 70. Paris: UNESCO.

Pfetsch, B. (2004) From political culture to political communications culture: a theoretical approach to comparative analysis, in F. Esser and B. Pfetsch, *Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases, and Challenges*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 344–366.

Pick, Z.M. (1993) *The New Latin American Cinema: A Continental Project*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Pines, J. and Willemen, P. (eds) (1990) *Questions of Third Cinema*. London: British Film Institute.

Popkin, J. (ed.) (1995) *Media and Revolution*. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press.

Riggins, S.H. (ed.) (1992) *Ethnic Minority Media: An International Perspective*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc.

Siebert, F., Peterson, T. and Schramm, W. (1956) *Four Theories of the Press: The Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility and Soviet Communist Concepts of What the Press Should Be and Do*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Sinclair, J. (1999) *Latin American Television: A Global View*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Sinclair, J., Jacka, E. and Cunningham, S. (eds) (1996) *New Patterns in Global Television*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Solanas, F. and Getino, O. (1969/1983) Toward a third cinema, in A. Mattelart, and S. Siegelaub (eds), *Communication and Class Struggle 2: Liberation, Socialism*, trans, 1983. Bagnolet, France: International Mass Media Research Center, pp. 220–230.

Sparks, C. (1998) *Communism, Capitalism and the Mass Media*. London: Sage Publications Co.

Splichal, S. (1995) *Media Beyond Socialism: Theory and Practice in East-Central Europe*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Stam, R. and Shohat, E. (1994) *Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media*. New York: Routledge.

Stam, R., Mignolo, W.D., Silverblatt, I. and Saldívar-Hull, S. (1997) *Tropical Multiculturalism: A Comparative History of Race in Brazilian Cinema and Culture*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Straubhaar, J.D. (2007) *World Television: From Global to Local*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc.

UNESCO (1980/2003) *Many Voices, One World*. Paris: UNESCO and Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield.

Van Belle, D.A., Rioux, J.-S. and Potter, D.M. (2004) *Media, Bureaucracies and Foreign Aid: A Comparative Analysis of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France and Japan*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Waisbord, S. (2000) *Watchdog Journalism in South America*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Ward, P. and Lange, B.-P. (eds) (2004) *The Media and Elections: A Handbook and Comparative Study*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Wayne, M. (2001) *Political Film: The Dialectics of Third Cinema*. London: Pluto Press.

2

Global Media Research and Global Ambitions
The Case of UNESCO

Cees J. Hamelink

Expectations

With the benefit of hindsight it was a touchingly naïve dream: inspired by the brutality of two world wars it seemed possible and necessary to believe that world peace could be achieved.

In 1945 the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) formulated in its Constitution the ambitious expectation that the media of communication could be developed and used to bring people to mutual understanding and knowledge of each other. The international exchange of ideas would be a major contribution to world peace. The Constitution proposed that since "war begins in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed" (UNESCO 1945). In this peace construction process the role of media was seen as essential and the member states of UNESCO were admonished to collaborating in the work of advancing the mutual knowledge and understanding of peoples, through all means of mass communication and recommend international agreements as may be necessary to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image (UNESCO 1945).

In 1946 the delegation of the Philippines presented to the UN General Assembly a proposal for a resolution on an international conference on issues dealing with the press. This United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information was held from March 23 until April 21, 1948 in Geneva. The participants agreed that the international flow of ideas was essential for the cause of peace.

In 1966 the UNESCO General Conference adopted the Declaration on International Cultural Cooperation, which provided that in the education of humanity for peace the free exchange of ideas should be promoted through the increase of means of communication between the people because "ignorance of the way of life and customs of people still presents an obstacle … to peaceful co-operation" (UNESCO 1966).

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

In 1978 the UNESCO General Conference adopted the Declaration on Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid, and Incitement to War. This so-called Mass Media Declaration provided that the UNESCO mandate to contribute to peace requires a mutual understanding and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives through a free flow of ideas made possible through more means of international communication. Article I of the Declaration stated that the mass media have a leading contribution to make to the strengthening of peace and that they should be responsive to concerns of peoples and individuals, thus promoting the participation of the public in the elaboration of information. Article IV suggested that the mass media have an essential part to play in the education of young people in a spirit of peace.

This brief history shows that the UN system and particularly UNESCO fostered from its beginnings a serious aspiration to contribute to world peace guided by the expectation that the mass media would be essential in the achievement of this global ambition.

Media Research

At the same time – early on in the history of UNESCO – it was established that the role of the media of communication needed serious academic study and research. In 1946 UNESCO proposed to set up an "International Institute of the Press and Information, designed to promote the training of journalists and the study of press problems throughout the world". At the time in the mid-1940s, the mass media included mainly press, radio, and cinema – with television still at an experimental stage. Given their propagandistic role during the war, the mass media were recognized as an important factor in the field of international relations.

Yet, it took several years before international research on the role of the mass media would be practically conducted. One reason for this slow progress was the rapid deterioration of East–West relations and the onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s. Issues related to the significance of the formation of public opinion were not only sensitive in domestic politics but became increasingly controversial in international relations.

In 1952 UNESCO took mass media research formally on its agenda and laid down two lines of activity: to set up training centers for journalists and to establish an international organization for the promotion of scientific research on mass communication. On the latter issue a memorandum from the French Institute of the Press on the need for research was submitted to UNESCO in 1953.

Meanwhile, in 1952, the UNESCO Secretariat had established within its Department of Mass Communication a Clearing House "to collect, analyse and disseminate information on press, film, radio and television, pointing out their use for educational, cultural and scientific purposes" (Hamelink and Nordenstreng 2007, p. 6). This Clearing House began to publish a series, "Reports and Papers on Mass Communication", which in December 1956 issued title No. 21: Current Mass Communication Research – I. It included a register of ongoing research projects and a bibliography of books and articles published since early 1955, both divided into eight topics relating to mass communication such as history, economic and legal aspects, government information and propaganda services, advertising and public relations, and psychological and sociological studies on mass communication and public opinion, including the pedagogical and cultural role of mass communication. The register on mass communication research in progress listed nearly 400 projects in 14 countries, while the bibliography listed about 800 publications in 25 countries. This impressive research panorama was compiled with the aid of a questionnaire sent to 32 selected institutions in 19 countries. The data gathering was helped by national clearinghouses established in France, Japan, and the United States. The process encouraged the setting up of clearing houses in other countries, beginning with West Germany and Italy.

1956 was a crucial year for developments in the field of international mass media research. In April a meeting of experts on professional training of journalists was held at the UNESCO headquarters in Paris. This meeting of 40 academics and other media experts, with attendant documents and resolutions, demonstrated that there indeed existed a dynamic field in need of international coordination – a list of establishments for professional training of journalists included 100 institutes from the United States alone and almost another 100 from some 30 other countries. In November–December the General Conference of UNESCO held in New Delhi adopted a resolution "to promote the coordination of activities of national research institutes in the field of mass communication in particular by encouraging the establishment of an international association of such institutes" (UNESCO 1956). Straight after this General Conference a colloquium took place in Strasbourg, where the International Centre for Higher Education in Journalism had been established. It was on this occasion in Strasbourg in December 1956 that a preparatory group called the "Interim Committee" (Comité Intérimaire) was formed. UNESCO formally confirmed the Interim Committee, which met in Paris in April 1957. The tasks to be carried out by the new Association were now foreseen to include not only general promotion of international contacts within the field but also specific clearing house functions such as the production of bibliographies and the lists of institutions as done in UNESCO's recent inventory. The Committee prepared a draft constitution (Statutes) and sent out two circular letters to potential participants. It convened the founding conference in December of the International Association for Mass Communication Research (IAMCR). The association grew out of a rapidly developing media field, particularly in journalism, which created its own branch interest and a need for professional education as well as scientific research. As F. Terrou (who was to become the first president of the IAMCR) wrote in *Etudes de Presse*, the periodical of the French Institute of the Press, in 1956: "The professional training of journalists and the science of communication are the agenda of the day." And he added: "This is very good for the freedom of information" (Terrou 1956). For him the IAMCR was not only a technical project to promote training and research but also an ideological project to serve a broader cause for an international order with peace and freedom. The actual "Constitutive Conference" (as it was called following the French terminology) was held at the UNESCO headquarters in Paris on December 18–19, 1957.

The International Association for Mass Communication Research (later re-baptized as the International Association for Media and Communication Research) was to become in the 1970s and 1980s almost the media research branch of UNESCO. The organization and in particular its president at the time, James D. Halloran, played a key role in the design of a UNESCO agenda for media research that was articulated in the report "Mass media in society. The need of research" (UNESCO 1970). In 1968 the UNESCO director-general was mandated by the General Conference to prepare a long-term programme of research on the role and the effects of the media of mass communication in modern society. In June 1969 an expert meeting was convened in Montreal, Canada, for which Halloran wrote the working paper. The paper presented a broad analysis of the state of mass communication research but hardly touched upon research in relation to the global ambitions of UNESCO. It did point out, though, that it is usually taken for granted that intercultural exchange leads to improved international understanding and questioned the justification for this assumption. The paper also suggested that insufficient attention had been given to the factors that form obstacles to intercultural and international communication and suggested that further research should be carried out on the potential of mass media for improving international understanding.

The Projects

In the 1950s UNESCO commissioned studies in the fields of public opinion and news. Exemplary for this type of project was the project "How Nations See Each Other" by William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril (1953). The study focused on the description and analysis of stereotypical images that people may hold about people in other countries. The basic idea of the study related to the phrase in the Constitution about "men's minds". Because news was seen as a crucial carrier of people's images about each other the study of news became central to the UNESCO research agenda. In 1953 this resulted in a study on News Agencies and One Week's News (by Jacques Kayser). News agencies were seen as the major disseminators of people's information about other people.

The News Agencies Study was inspired by international media surveys carried out by UNESCO in the late 1940s and early 1950s and the recommendations from such survey studies to increase communication capacities around the world. This tallied with the recommendations that came from the first UNESCO studies on media and development: the role of the national media had to be strengthened in the process of promoting modern ideas and attitudes (Schramm 1964).

Whereas the News Agencies Study argued that "The world agencies are not truly international. They maintain their national characteristics …" (p. 200), the One Week's News Study warned that "News has become internationalised, often lacking in that national subjectivity which may be essential to clear understanding" (p. 93).

When in the 1970s the notions of cultural and media imperialism emerged research attention focused on topics related to media and national sovereignty. In the 1978 "Declaration on Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding", a strong emphasis on nation-ness is found. As the Declaration phrased it: "The world consists of individual and national actors, and since it is axiomatic that action is based on the actor's image of reality, international action will be based upon the image of international reality …" (UNESCO 1978).

The nation also surfaced in the TV traffic study "Television traffic – a one-way street?" by Nordenstreng and Varis (1974): "… the flow of information is a vital necessity in the well-being of people and nations". Referring to the 1945 aspirations of the UNESCO Constitution the authors proposed that "information flows should serve the mutual understanding of peoples and the cause of peace" (Nordenstreng and Varis 1974, p. 59).

In the 1980s after the political commotion in the 1970s, which was caused by debates about the re-ordering of communication relations in the world, UNESCO's orientation shifted away from the so-called New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) and turned towards a neo-liberal solution of communication problems. In this period a major project was the news flow study Foreign News in the Media coordinated by Annabelle Sreberny in 1979 and published in 1985. This comparative research project analysed news flows in 29 different countries. Among its conclusions the report stated that national systems play a crucial role in the selection of foreign news and that the foreign news agenda was largely provided by the small number of world news agencies (Sreberny *et al.* 1985, p. 63).

Later in the 1980s and early 1990s personality changes in UNESCO's communication sector led to less emphasis on the scientific tradition represented by the International Association for Media and Communication Research.

Assumptions

Underlying the research projects that UNESCO promoted in line with its global ambition were some contestable assumptions. They reflected the following basic model: people's minds (i.e., their ideas, opinions, and attitudes) need to be changed; the vehicles that can cause this are the mass media and, thus, the more mass media, the better.

War Begins in People's Minds

The implied suggestion in the UNESCO constitution is that the minds of people need to be influenced (through the mass media) in order to develop a culture of peace. However, the very idea that war begins in the minds of people is misleading. Wars among members of the human species start with the material, physical fact of their bodies. The human life form – like other life forms – is constantly involved in a struggle for life. Inevitable components of that struggle are aggression and violence. In such struggles information campaigns directed at people's "hearts and minds" will do little to make conflicts less dangerous.

The More Information, The Better

It is widely held that more and better information and more and open communication are essential for the prevention of the escalation of lethal conflicts. The underlying assumption here is that once people know more about each other, they will understand each other and be less inclined toward violent behavior. The assumption that people treat each other more peacefully if they have more information and thus understand each other better ignores the possibility that once people understand the intentions and motives of the other this can in fact aggravate the aggression. The implied suggestion is also that conflicts and their escalation into violence are primarily caused by insufficient and inadequate information. From this reasoning it follows that conflicts can be controlled once adversaries have correct information about each other. This suggests that if adversaries knew more about each other, it would be easier to reach agreement. It is, however, difficult to find empirical evidence for this and one can equally well propound the view that social harmony is largely due to the degree of ignorance that people have about each other. As a matter of fact, many societies maintain levels of stability because they employ rituals, customs, and conventions that enable their members to engage in social interaction without having detailed information about who they really are.

These assumptions neglect the fact that conflicts often address very real points of contention. Conflicts may be very dangerous precisely because adversaries have full information about each other's aims and motives.

More information about the adversary may actually lead to more conflict. A critical component in nuclear stability between the United States and the USSR (during the Cold War) was the fact that both powers lacked information about the exact location of their nuclear submarines. Since these were difficult to detect, they were difficult to target, might escape a first strike, and render a debilitating second strike to the attacker. The ignorance about their location was a powerful deterrent against a first nuclear strike by either party.

Complete informational openness may enhance conflict and it could be argued that a functional level of secrecy is a positive contribution to societal security. A level of secrecy is also helpful in containing potential conflict escalation, since it leaves ample space for face-saving disclaimers in critical negotiations.

Another footnote is that in conflict situations the problem is often one of an abundance rather than a dearth of information. In decision-making, the flow of messages that need to be evaluated may become dysfunctional once it reaches a critical mass. The overload may seriously impede rational decision-making since the means of coping with it (such as selective filtering, stereotyping, and simplistic structuring) yield misperception and incorrect interpretations.

Causality

A key core problem in exploring the relations between media performance and human behavior is the academic obsession with causality. The obsessive drive to find causal connections is so strong that scientists often forget that correlations are not proof of causal connections. That A and B occur together does not prove that A causes B or vice versa. The discovery of causality has a great attraction. It brings academics political popularity, better fund raising chances, and media attention. Media are most interested in science when causal connections are announced: between media violence and aggressive behavior, between smoking and cancer, between flying and environmental destruction, or between food and health. Causality assumes a simple world of one-to-one linear relations. However, more often than not scientists can only demonstrate (with grave reservations) a correlation, a provisional association among variables, and then speculate, hypothesize, and guess. The "causality obsession" is fatal for a realistic understanding of the world in which we live. We live in a reality of multiple causalities and it is probably impossible ever to single out one specific causal factor.

As a result the leading question is probably not "Do media cause war or peace?" but "Are they among the factors that facilitate destructive versus peaceful relations among people?"

In most research projects there was too much emphasis on the media as causes of conflictual relations and not enough on the real causes of war (such as the power-seeking ambitions of societal elites) or the real obstacles to peace, such as unequal political, economic, and social relations between and within countries. A footnote to be made here is that addressing these issues would have been very difficult to accept for an international organization of national governments, which would be largely to blame for war-inducing factors in the world.

More Obstacles

The assumptions outlined above were serious impediments for the design of research projects that could effectively contribute to the achievement of the global ambition towards peace. Such research projects were also hampered by the prevailing "national" frame of "international" studies, their monodisciplinary orientation, and the definition of communication as transmission.

Nation-ness

Global media research is often in fact local media research in an international context. The researchers may be "cosmopolitan" but in the end their national habitat provides the frame for their observations of the world. Consequently, most studies on international communication are rooted in a framework of national settings. They pose questions such as "How do international flows impact on national cultures?", "How can national autonomy be secured?", or "How do international news flow impact upon national audiences?"

Over past decades, studies on issues like propaganda, media and development, media imperialism, and globalization were rather characterized by "internationalism" than by globalism. News flow studies, for example, described and analysed the news traffic between national units. International news flows were national news flows across borders. The media were primarily conceived of as national media.

In international communication studies the "national model" was dominant. Societies – in cross-national comparative studies – were equated with nation-states and these were therefore the key units of analysis.

The United Nations system had adopted the nation-state as the key political actor in its aspiration to create world peace. UNESCO singled out the media as crucial actors in the achievement of this aspiration. Also the studies on media and development strongly emphasized the role of the nation as central to bringing people into modernity. The creation of "nation-ness" was essential.

The intellectual failure in these approaches was that the inevitable multiplicity of societal identities was not accepted and that it was not seen that the existence of social heterogeneity is not an obstacle to modern development. It was not considered that exactly the emphasis on national identity and national integration could build up the ingredients for conflicts among nations.

Monodisciplinarity

Mass media research developed from a multitude of disciplines such as sociology, psychology, political science, language studies, and anthropology. As Ekecranz observed, "Media studies (and its forerunners) originated as a cross- or interdisciplinary undertaking. Now, it is, in most places, a discipline in its own right with regard to academic institutionalization" (2009, p. 76). It needs to be questioned whether this specialized discipline is capable of addressing the complexities of such questions as the relationships between mass media and global peace. It may well be that this requires a research approach that integrates different disciplinary angles and goes even beyond these disciplines to embrace transdisciplinarity.

Transmission

The transmission model of communication was basic to most UNESCO studies. Practically all the studies on media were based upon the notion of communication as the "transfer of messages". This reflects an interpretation of communication that has become rather common since Shannon and Weaver (1949) introduced their mathematical theory of communication. Their model described communication as a linear, one-way process. This is, however, a very limited and somewhat misleading conception of communication, which ignores that in essence "to communicate" refers to a process of sharing, making common, or creating a community. Communication is used for the dissemination of messages (such as in the case of the mass media), for the consultation of information sources (like searches in libraries or on the world wide web), for the registration of information (as happens in databases), and for the conversations that people participate in. It would seem that particularly the conversational mode of communication might offer pertinent leads into exploring the role of communication in the promotion of peace.

In the UNESCO studies the mass media were seen mainly as "delivery" institutions: organizations that transform the satisfaction of human needs into the delivery of (often addictive) commodities in the form of professional products and services. The basic human need to communicate was over time – certainly in its societal functions – institutionalized in public and commercial corporate structures with mission statements, codes of conduct, hierarchical divisions, finance modalities, governance practices, media authorities, and professional councils. Institutions were developed largely as linear transmission belts for identical contents with identical formats for their delivery. Within those institutions a professional class emerged – often with certificates – that monopolized public communication.

Little attention – if any – was paid to the question of whether the ways in which the mass media were institutionally organized could have fundamentally handicapped them in contributing to a form of social, public communication that might invite people to peaceful relations. By asking such critical questions the research community might have also explored whether alternative types of institutionalization could have contributed more effectively to achievement of the global ambitions. Could mass media be organized as organizations that stimulate personal capabilities for creativity and collective responsibilities for convivial living? Could tools be rather for communicating *with* than communicating *to*?

For future media research on the global issue of peaceful relations it seems useful to focus on transdisciplinarity, de-nationalizing, and the exploration of global conversation.

Transdisciplinarity

With Isaac Newton a form of modern science emerged that could be called Science I. For Science I the mantra was *scientia potestas est* (Bacon), which implies that only scientific knowledge is worth considering and that other forms of knowledge should be banned. In Science I the scientists decided what to investigate and they were, above all, guided by the search for the absolute truth.

In the twentieth century Science II developed in which applied research commissioned by industrial and/or military interests took centre stage. There was more societal input but this was of a very limited nature. In today's Science III research is carried out for both theoretical understanding and practical usefulness. Access to science has become more democratized, scientific findings are more popularized, and the societal interest for the scientific endeavor has grown remarkably.

Science III needs transdisciplinarity. This implies that the research exercise has to shift from the conventional monodisciplinary approach in which research questions are studied from one discipline only to a multidisciplinary approach that treats research questions with the help of more than one discipline. However, in multidisciplinarity the different disciplines may cooperate but stay within their own domain. This can be addressed in an interdisciplinary approach in which research questions are treated through an exchange between different disciplines. For complex questions this is very helpful but still not satisfactory. To address really complex questions one more shift is needed toward a transdisciplinary approach. In "transdisciplinarity" academic disciplines have to engage with multiple forms of knowledge. This means that in addition to academic knowledge experiential and tacit knowledge from nonscientific sources has to be taken seriously. This approach requires the insight that also in the nonscientific community there is solid and relevant knowledge.

Transdisciplinarity means that learning becomes interactive co-learning. The creation of knowledge is in fact a communication process that involves both scientific experience and societal experience. The complexity of social problems demands the cooperation between a multitude of stakeholders that are guided by the insight that singular knowledge cannot solve complex social problems. As Klein (Klein *et al.* 2001, p. 7) observes, "transdisciplinarity is a new form of learning and problem solving involving cooperation between different parts of society and academia in order to meet the complex challenge of society".

Co-learning means that we are all specialists in multiple forms of knowledge about ourselves and the world in which we live. Some of us are specialists with a diploma, others are nonlicensed specialists. In order to further multiple forms of knowledge about ourselves and our world, both types of specialists need to cooperate. The fascinating epistemological question this poses is: To what type of knowledge does co-learning lead? Is this knowledge that can be validated? Are all statements about ourselves and our world equally true or equally good? Is there a reliable middle-ground between referential statements about an objective reality outside and subjectivist spins of the mind? The ultimate yardstick is probably not whether knowledge types are academic or nonacademic but whether they work in the (temporary) solution of complex problems. Do they contribute to the finding of adequate adaptive solutions to the needs of human survival? This can arguably only be achieved through collaborative processes of co-learning in communication between different communities. This requires adoption of the insight that knowledge is always contextualized and part of common practices, uses, and communicative actions. Societal knowledge is always produced in cultural and social contexts through the engagement with a community of social practice.

It is often suggested that if nonscience (lay-) stakeholders are involved in the knowledge process and reject scientific advice this is because they fail to understand scientific reasoning. Rarely is it suggested that the lay people may have better knowledge! They may be the real experts in the management of informational and cultural environments.

An obvious obstacle to co-learning is the organization of universities as disciplinary institutions that have no space for transdisciplinary research. Also, most scientific journals and academic book series are categorized by monodisciplines. It has to be realistically observed that transdisciplinary publishing is not particularly helpful for the academic career.

There is, however, an urgent necessity for the media research community to develop transdisciplinary engagements in communities of practice and establish trans-local epistemic communities. The key challenge for future global media research is the design of standards for the justification of findings from transdisciplinary research as reliable and robust. It needs to be learned to combine scientific knowledge and experiential knowledge for different initiatives and to be concerned with truly international representation.

De-nationalising

There never was a truly international perspective in media studies on the aspiration towards world peace. This is politically understandable as this would have deeply threatened the system of nation-states.

Yet in the early history of an organization such as the IAMCR its leadership saw that no scientific progress was possible without extensive international collaboration. However, this collegial collaboration across national borders did not necessarily do away with an approach fundamentally based in "nation-ness".

When academic books announce a global approach to a specific phenomenon this usually implies that perspectives from different national situations are offered. For example, in a recent book on public diplomacy (Snow and Taylor 2009) the part of "Global Approaches to Public Diplomacy" offers chapters on UK, German, Japanese, Chinese, Central and Eastern European, and Australian forms of public diplomacy. It is a real challenge to explore whether current theoretical thinking about “globalization” can assist in creating a greater distance from “nation-ness”.

One of the questions to be addressed from this perspective is whether the globalization of localized networks through network media such as YouTube promises new potential for process towards global peace.

Global Conversation

Human communication often consists of linear transmissions of signals among individuals and social groups. All the rapidly expanding and increasingly sophisticated transmission belts for this traffic of signals do little to create what communication at its core is: creating community. Early on in human history – before humanoids discovered the need to communicate as a survival mechanism – when their group living expanded and became more complex they knew that only cooperation, mutual assistance, and understanding would make these communities sustainable. They will undoubtedly have screamed at each other in anger and fear and must have warned each other for imminent dangers. It is highly probable that if they had not developed the capacity for listening to each other we would not have made it into the twenty-first century. It is arguably the greatest global challenge for human survival to learn the art of conversation. The odds are stacked high against this because “us versus them” polarization, narrow nationalism, and ideological fundamentalism seem to grow across the globe in strength.

This confers upon the academic community an essential responsibility to reflect on the meaning of global conversation, to design attractive and sustainable models for such conversation, and to investigate the obstacles to its realization.

Conclusion

The global ambition towards the building of peaceful international relations through the spread and use of the mass media has certainly not been realized by the international community. It would be attractive – but obviously wrong – to blame this global failure on the mass media and on media studies. Even so, it would seem useful if the media research community would engage with the issue of “global peace and media” from a transdisciplinary and transnational perspective that explores and discovers new modalities of global conversation.

References

Buchanan, W. and Cantril, H. (1953) *How Nations See Each Other. A Study in Public Opinion.* Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Ekecranz, J. (2009) Media studies going global, in D. K. Thussu (ed.), *Internationalizing Media Studies.* London: Routledge, pp. 75–89.

Hamelink, C.J. and Nordenstreng, K. (2007) *IAMCR in Retrospect.* Paris: IAMCR.

Klein, J.T., Grossenbacher-Mansuy, W., Häberli, R., Bill, A., Scholz, R.W. and Welti, M. (eds) (2001) *Transdisciplinary Joint Problem Solving among Science, Technology and Society. An Effective Way for Managing Complexity*. Basel: Birkhäuser Verlag.

Nordenstreng, K. and Varis, T. (1974) *Television Traffic – A One-Way Street?* Paris: UNESCO.

Schramm, W. (1964) *Mass Media and National Development*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Shannon, C. and Weaver, W. (1949) *The Mathematical Theory of Communication*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Snow, N. and Taylor, P.M. (eds) (2009) *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*. London: Routledge.

Sreberny, A. *et al.* (eds) (1985) *Foreign News in the Media*. Paris: UNESCO.

Terrou, F. (1956) *Etudes de Presse*. Paris: Institut de la Presse.

UNESCO (1945) *Constitution*. Paris: UNESCO.

UNESCO (1956) *Proceedings of the General Conference*. New Delhi: UNESCO.

UNESCO (1966) *Declaration on International Cultural Cooperation*. Paris: UNESCO.

UNESCO (1970) *Mass Media in Society. The Need of Research*. Paris: UNESCO.

UNESCO (1978) *Declaration on Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding*. Paris: UNESCO.

3

Global Media Research

Can We Know Global Audiences? A View from a BBC Perspective

Graham Mytton

We have become accustomed to being able to access statistics on all manner of variables from health to education to imports and exports, on a global basis. News media regularly use statistics in their reporting on global events and developments. In most cases the figures rely on some kind of solid evidence – the returns made by financial institutions, hospitals and medical foundations, government ministries, and aid agencies. Media are, however, a different matter, especially the broadcast media. Data on use are produced from the activity itself. With the Internet however, web-based tools of varying but generally increasing levels of sophistication and accuracy can tell us a lot about how the web is used, what sites are visited, how often, from which parts of the world, and more besides. That is because every transaction on the Internet can be automatically measured. Other human transactions can also be measured, although not always with such precision. However, we increasingly seem to expect that data on almost every aspect of human activity are or ought to be readily available. The problem is that it is not an assumption that we have much basis for making when it comes to broadcast media. Broadcasting by radio and television involves a transaction that leaves no trace, unlike the purchase of an actual object, like a newspaper, a bottle of soda, or a subscription to a service. Listening and viewing have to be measured during or after the transaction. At the time of writing, most of the daily global transactions involving listeners and viewers making a choice of channel or programme are unmeasured on any kind of continuous basis. Research does take place into both radio and TV use, but most of this, outside the advanced industrialized countries, is periodic, rather than continuous. I will be looking at some of this work, mainly from my perspective as a former head of audience research at the BBC World Service and my later work managing nationally representative sample surveys measuring media audiences in countries in many parts of the world. Some of these country surveys were the first ever to be attempted. One important fact to note here is that very many

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

countries have to this day still had no national or even regional or partial media measurement of any kind.

On October 31, 2010, the Chinese pianist Lang Lang appeared on the BBC radio programme *Desert Island Discs* (BBC 2010), a long-running series in which famous people are asked "if you were to be cast away on a desert island, which eight gramophone records would you choose to have with you?" The interviewer on the programme, Kirsty Young, introduced the artist and asserted that he played "to a global audience of four and a half billion at the opening of the Beijing Olympics" in 2008.[1] Such claims of very large global audiences are made on a regular basis, for example, when the Oscar ceremony is broadcast, almost always when a world sports event is televised, and perhaps most famously when Bob Geldof announced live during the globally televised Live Aid Concert from London on July 13, 1985 that "one billion people are now watching this". On his website it is now claimed that "an estimated 1.5 billion viewers in 100 countries watched the live broadcast".[2]

None of these claims can be sustained as none are based on actual research. They are all made up, either on the spot, as in the case with Live Aid, or else invented by the promoters, advertisers, and sponsors, often even before the event has happened. The kind of data that would enable such claims to be made would need to be based on continuous audience measurement of the kind that is done only in the most developed countries, mostly using TV peoplemeters, or in some less developed markets, self-completion TV diaries. Both these methods are relied on by advertisers, program makers and schedulers for their audience figures. Thus, in the United Kingdom, the major TV broadcasters can, normally within 24 hours, say with some degree of confidence what the live audience was for a particular show. Later they can usually add those numbers who watched later on time-shift on their video recorders.[3] However, such detailed and comprehensive TV audience measurement is done only in a minority of the world's 200 or so countries. Moreover, it is important to note at this point that such regular audience measurement is covered only among a minority of the world's population. I estimate that continuous TV audience measurement currently covers only around 20% of the world's nearly 7 billion population. Countries that are presently covered by continuous TV audience measurement are mostly to be found confined to Europe, where almost all countries now have such measurement, plus Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and perhaps a handful more. Extensive TV audience measurement on a regular basis is also carried out now in China, India, and several other countries, both large and small, but in many cases the samples used are partial. In neither India nor China are the entire populations covered in the samples employed for TV measurement.[4] Regular TV audience measurement is carried out in several less developed countries, such as Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Brazil, Argentina, and others. However, much of this has either incomplete coverage, leaving out rural and remote areas, or is not continuous, being done only at certain periods of the year, or in many cases only annually.

Since the 1970s, globally televised events have become commonplace, and when they happen, it is an interesting question to ask what global audience would be likely to watch or, more importantly, what audience was actually achieved. The sponsors, organizers, and broadcasters of such events provide figures obtained from a mixture of guesswork and imagination, with the latter taking the front seat. Then something rather strange happens: journalists, who on most other occasions try to find reliable sources, never seem to ask how these exaggerated figures are arrived at.

The only way to measure audiences for radio and television is to use some form of quantitative research based on a sample of the population or populations under study. The usual methods include face to face or telephone surveys, diaries, and meters. In 1990 two claims were made for globally televised events that I knew at the time were neither possible nor based on any reliable evidence. In April of that year, a concert in support of the then still imprisoned Nelson Mandela was held at Wembley Stadium in London. The organizers made claims of a global audience that varied between 600 million and a billion. A month later the annual Eurovision Song Contest, held that year in Zagreb, Croatia, was said at the time in news bulletins and newspapers to have reached 500 million (Mytton 1991).[5]

At the BBC, at this time and in the years to this date, research staff have been engaged in regular measurement of the World Service's global audience. Quite large sums of money are spent on quantitative audience measurement in order to be able to estimate audiences for the BBC and other international broadcasters. The BBC commissions surveys, usually using questionnaires administered face to face among representative samples of populations in countries in most parts of the world. We knew that no measurements of audiences for these two events would be done in many of these countries; however, we also knew that regular TV audience measurement was being done in some of them. Perhaps it would be possible to obtain audience estimates from those countries where measurement had taken place at the time of these televised events. I therefore wrote to all 41 TV stations around the world that had taken either or both of these concerts in order to find out what audience figures they had achieved. Interestingly, the hosts of the Eurovision Song Contest, Croatia, still then a constituent republic of federal Yugoslavia, had no research being done at the time and the TV station had no idea how many viewers there were in any part of Yugoslavia, but 17 TV stations in 17 countries had measurements of the audiences for the Eurovision concert and 21 had the same for the Nelson Mandela event at Wembley. The total measured reach (those who were estimated to have watched at least some of each event) for the Eurovision was 78.5 million and for Mandela, 32.3 million. If we could assume for the sake of making a plausible global estimate that the average reach in each measured country were to be repeated in the others where the audiences were not measured (and the likely audience in each would in most cases be smaller because these were all or mostly in countries where TV households were fewer in proportion), the maximum achievable audiences for Eurovision and Mandela were 123 million and 57.2 million respectively. These figures are the nearest we can get to the likely true figures, but note that they are only a fraction of the figures claimed – 25% and 6% respectively. The publication of an article showing the results of this research led to some news outlets ending the repeating of such claims in news reports. For example, during the 1990s the BBC tended to leave such claims out of its news bulletins. The *Guinness Book of Records* actually took out the wilder claims that it had printed in earlier editions. Today, however, such absurd global claims for audiences that cannot be substantiated are again commonplace. Matthew Engel in the *Guardian* pointed to the absurdity of such so-called news in an article under the heading "There are lies, damned lies and global television statistics" (quoted in Wilding 2002, p. 62).

Today at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century we do know a lot more about the global use of media than we did only twenty or thirty years ago. Although the status of audience measurement around the world does not yet allow us to make reliable or comprehensive global estimates of audiences for globally televised events, we may very soon be able to do so. Whereas only a generation ago, very little in any detail was known about audiences in much of Africa, all of China, much of the Soviet Union and other communist states, as well as much of Asia, the situation is now completely transformed. There are very few areas of the world now closed to research for reasons of war or politics. Countries like China, Vietnam, Russia, Burma, Iraq, Afghanistan, and many more, previously unknown and closed to on-the-ground research of any kind, are no longer closed and unknown quantities in this respect. At this point only North Korea, Turkmenistan, Libya, and Somalia remain mostly unknown, closed as all three are to research, the first and second for political reasons and the third and fourth because of internal conflict. There are other countries, especially in Africa, that remain mostly unsurveyed, but this is mostly because they are small, very poor, or of little interest to any research sponsor or client until now.

This situation we now find so far as research is concerned is still quite a novel one; in the past few years most of the world has become open to research for the first time. Before this our knowledge of global audiences was rather limited, based on very partial coverage at best. Often we knew very little with any certainty – but this did not mean that nothing was known.

How did media research begin? In the early days of broadcasting, audience measurement was unknown. Broadcasters in the early days of radio in Europe and North America knew remarkably little about their listeners. What they thought they knew was based on often rather unreliable and often misleading methods.

In the very early days of radio in the United States, there was no systematic audience research. Most US broadcasting was (as it still is today) paid for by advertising, and they usually determined what went on air. An advertiser might sponsor a program from personal tastes and preferences (Chappell and Hooper 1944). However, advertisers soon began to realize that they needed information that was independent of their views and opinions or those of the owners of the radio stations.

Some early radio stations in the United States would hazard some guesses about their audiences by counting the number of letters elicited by programs, but as broadcasters were soon to discover, there is little relationship ever between the numbers of letters and the numbers of listeners. Other "measurements" used by broadcasters in the early days were no more reliable. Some radio station managers used to draw a circle on a map with a hundred-mile radius (often their assumed technical coverage area on medium wave) around the station and determine the number of people who lived within that circle. However, such a procedure is entirely meaningless so far as measuring the audience was concerned. Differences in transmitter power, local geography, station programming, wavelengths, and numerous other factors are known to influence the size of the populations habitually reached by each station. That was why during the 1930s audience surveys designed to measure audiences for radio began to be conducted in the United States (Chappell and Hooper 1944).[6]

Broadcasting also began in Europe in the 1920s. In Britain, radio broadcasting began in 1922. Unlike the situation in the United States, most broadcasting in Europe was state sponsored with public monopolies like the BBC dominating the airwaves to the exclusion of others. There was little commercial broadcasting at all in the early days. In Britain there was no commercial broadcasting on television until 1955 and no commercial radio until 1973. I mention this fact because while in the United States there was pressure to provide commercial sponsors and advertisers with data on audiences, this was largely absent in Europe, until the emergence of commercial radio. The first regular audience research, including audience measurement, was begun not for commercial but for public service reasons by the BBC.

Audience research was formally established within the BBC in 1936. Its role has, from the outset, included serving as an instrument of public accountability as well as providing an information system for program makers and management. From before the Second World War for the next 50 years the BBC relied on a daily survey covering the entire United Kingdom in which a representative sample of the population was contacted and asked about what they had listened to (and after the arrival of TV, if watched) on the previous day. Nothing quite so comprehensive yet existed anywhere else in Europe, but in most countries regular audience measurement was gradually established, but mostly in the period after the Second World War.

These early research activities in Britain and elsewhere in Europe mainly concentrated on the measurement of domestic radio listening, although they did also measure audiences to broadcasts coming across borders. International broadcasting began more or less when radio broadcasting began. Transmissions crossed borders, especially in the early days when AM transmissions were used on medium and shortwave. However, the first deliberately international broadcasts began in 1927 from Eindhoven in the Netherlands to the Dutch East Indies. Vatican Radio followed soon after with international radio broadcasts starting in 1931 and the BBC in 1932 with its Empire Service. In those early days the idea of any systematic audience measurement of such long distance broadcasting activity was not considered to be possible. The early broadcasters relied on the mail they received and on anecdotal evidence from target areas and countries.

Before its first official international broadcast in December 1932, the BBC had already been conducting shortwave experiments using a transmitter at Marconi's works at Chelmsford, starting in November 1927. At that time nobody had much idea of what was going to happen. They did not know how many would be able to listen. They did not have any statistics at that time of the numbers of people around the world who had radio sets at home. Nor did they know how many had sets that could receive the shortwave signals that were and still are required for most international radio transmissions. More than that, they had little idea of how shortwave worked. They knew that it could travel over long distances but it was a long time before our present detailed knowledge of the ionosphere and how it bounces shortwave signals from the ground back to the ground again was established and understood. What times of day would people listen and when did they prefer to tune in? What kinds of content would be liked and looked out for? The man given the task of setting up the experimental broadcasts, Captain Peter Eckersley, was worried that shortwave reception would not be reliable enough for any but radio enthusiasts and hobbyists to listen to. The BBC Director General, John Reith, also held the view that only "a handful of amateurs would listen" (Mansell 1982, p. 10). He thought that the main way of reaching listeners would be through re-broadcasts by dominion and colonial local stations, which had better receiving equipment to do this satisfactorily.[7] Eckersley continued to worry about reception problems of people with ordinary sets. He wrote a letter to the *Times.* Shortwave could not be relied on to reach "the lonely listener in the bush" (Mansell 1982, p. 10).

However, the research that was done during the five years of the experiment turned up some very important facts that were crucial in what was to follow. They showed that Eckersley was wrong and that there were plenty of "lonely listeners in the bush" as well as elsewhere. Eckersley left the BBC in 1929 and was replaced by Noel Ashbridge as the man responsible for planning the transmission of the new service. He and Cecil Graves, the first director of the BBC's international services, read the letters and other feedback, some of it coming through official colonial and dominion communications. One of the men who later sat in Graves' seat, Gerard Mansell, wrote about this important early research into listening in his history of the BBC's international radio services. He writes that by 1929, nearly two years into the experimental broadcasts, "it had become clear from the response from overseas that 'the lonely listener in the bush' was far more important than had been imagined" (Mansell 1982, p. 11). An internal and very important planning document was produced to outline what the research had shown and how this should guide subsequent policies:

> Contrary to our original expectation, all correspondence and other evidence go to show that it is the direct listener who most needs, most profits by and most consistently follows the G5SW transmissions. … The principal function of G5SW, if and when stabilised as a programme station, must be to serve the individual direct listener, local relay being of course possible and occasions most desirable, but in no way the ruling consideration of the service (Mansell 1982, p. 11).[8]

These early experiments in international radio broadcasting proved that direct broadcasting was not only possible but that it would become widespread and form the basis of the BBC's and many others international radio broadcasters' subsequent success.

Letters, press content, and anecdotal evidence were used and largely relied on for many years. Mansell notes that most of the letters (more than 60%) came from the United States. This in itself was a very important fact. It meant that there were many listeners in the United States, even thought the service had not actually been planned with them in mind. It was a very important finding. Shortwave broadcasting is a real scatter service, which can often be picked up in unexpected and unintended places. It was a vital lesson for the future.

This early reliance on letters was supplemented by the use of some research using questionnaires sent out by the new speedier air mail services. The BBC began to collect the return postal addresses of listeners in all parts of the world. Selections of these addresses were then used to send questionnaires covering matters of interest to the broadcaster. This practice began at the start of the BBC Empire Service.[9] It continued and became more systematized. For example, at some point in the late 1930s several subscribers to the monthly magazine *BBC Empire Broadcasting* were selected on a regional basis and sent questionnaires.[10] The three parts of the world selected were South Asia, British West Africa, and the Middle East. The names of 600 subscribers to the magazine were selected at random and 200 questionnaires were sent to each area. The questions covered such matters as frequency of listening, reception quality of the BBC, listening times, and program interests.

Throughout the BBC's early period, the major source of information seems to have been the content of listeners' letters, supplemented by information from questionnaires sent to listeners who had written and/or subscribed to the BBC's magazine. These self-selected samples turned out to be rather unrepresentative and in important respects unreliable as a subset representing the audience as a whole. However, for more than fifty years from 1932, listeners' letters were a major source of information about listeners to the BBC in most languages. Summaries of correspondence were produced from 1933 until the end of the century.[11]

There are two problems about this reliance, both interconnected. The first is that in the absence of representative data, the letters – the volume of the mail received, where it came from and the proportions from each area or country, the views expressed, the relative level of apparent interest in different program genres evidenced by the relative numbers of letters referring to each of these – became used as a guide to broadcasting and program policy. Broadcasters and their managers liked to have figures that served as some kind of guide to the impact of what they were putting out. In the absence of real audience ratings, numbers of letters took on a wholly undeserved prominence and importance. The connected problem with listeners' letters is the conundrum: How representative are those who write of the majority who do not?

One misconception from early days was that there is some relationship between the size of the broadcaster's mailbag and the size of the audience. There is, however, none. At one time during the 1980s, the largest mailbag, broken down by the language services to which letters were written, was Tamil. It was then one of the BBC's smallest foreign language services. When we were able to measure the audience in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka, it was quite large, but well below the measured size of other audiences for languages such as Hindi, Urdu, Indonesian, Swahili, or Hausa, all of which received much fewer numbers of letters.

During the 1980s two very important studies were made, one by the BBC and the other by the Canadian equivalent, the CBC. The BBC report used an extensive representative survey in India, not only to measures BBC and other radio station audiences but also to compare them with letter-writing listeners. Those who had written were compared to BBC listeners who had not written. Their listening habits, tastes, preferences, demographics, and more were compared. The CBC study was based on a broadly similar piece of research conducted among listeners contacted through a survey in West Germany. Both studies came to similar conclusions; those who write are different, sometimes very different from the generality of listeners in almost all respects. The only aspect in which letter writers were similar to the rest of the listenership was in the area of the technical matter of reception. Letter writers and the rest of the listeners were more or less very similar in the way that they listened – whether by shortwave or through local rebroadcasts, and their views and experiences of reception quality and related matters. These two studies had a major impact on research policies, especially in the BBC World Service, where resources were shifted heavily towards much more use of and reliance on representative sample surveys.

As noted, the international radio services of the BBC and others had little opportunity in the very earliest days to commission any kind of detailed survey work among samples of target populations. The fact that listeners were in many different countries and territories, and almost certainly very thinly spread, meant that survey work on the ground using face-to-face sample surveys of populations in receiving countries was for the most part out of the question for reasons of cost, and the lack of research resources and experience. However, there is evidence that the idea of on-the-ground research was being actively thought of and planned. There was a survey of this kind in Bombay, India in 1944, and I am as certain as I can be that this was the first time any such survey using face-to-face interviews among samples of a population was undertaken anywhere in the world to discover the size and nature of audiences for any international broadcast. It was, however, not a fully representative survey of the population of Bombay but of people in radio households identified by the fact that they had paid for a radio set license. In all, 600 Indians and 100 Europeans were interviewed. This was in the very early days of survey research, especially in India.[12]

This survey was the first example of something that began to happen regularly after the Second World War. Following the defeat of the Axis forces there were several surveys in liberated countries in Western Europe – France, Italy, West Germany, Scandinavia, and others – that had not become part of the expanding Soviet empire. It is in these latter soon to be closed countries that it is probable, if not certain, that audiences for the BBC and other international broadcasts were large by the very fact of being under continuing totalitarian rule, whereas in the rest of liberated Europe audiences for the BBC declined as local free media developed. There is a general point to note here: audiences for international, mainly Western, radio broadcasts are generally high only in countries where there are state controls on local media or where media are weak for this and other reasons. Where free and independent media develop after a period of state control and interference, audiences for international radio decline. This fact, which has been known for a long time, carried with it a corollary; in many cases, the possibility of carrying out survey research was least likely in those countries where audiences were most likely to be larger. The same state interference in or control of the local media, which might predict larger audiences, also tended to put restrictions on audience research, especially anything commissioned by a foreign broadcaster.[13]

Surveys also took place in other areas of the world, albeit to a rather limited extent. The main barrier, aside from the costs that were likely to be involved, was the fact that market research remained, until well into the 1960s and later, underdeveloped in most countries. There were few market agencies operating outside the industrialized countries. The few surveys that were commissioned by the BBC were often done only in urban areas or with otherwise very limited samples and coverage. This remained largely the case until the middle 1980s with very few exceptions.

What changed the situation in the 1980s mainly arose from two factors. The first was noted earlier; an over-reliance on evidence about audiences from listeners' letters or postal questionnaires sent to them was seen to be misleading and inadequate. The second important factor was that on-the-ground research became possible in a rapidly increasing number of countries. Market research in developing and newly independent countries in Africa and Asia, where they existed at all, had been, until well into the 1980s, very limited in their coverage and also in the capability. There were exceptions. In East Africa, during the 1960s, Marcos Surveys, also known by their longer title, Market Research Company of East Africa, had headquarters in Nairobi. It carried out market, opinion, and media surveys from around the late 1950s for most of the following decade. Most of these surveys were almost or actually fully national in coverage in Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika, and later Tanzania.[14]

However, Marcos was an exception. Nothing like it existed anywhere else in Africa (aside from South Africa), Asia, or indeed Latin America. In most of the developing world, nearly all survey work was confined to urban areas with occasional and usually very limited forays into the more easily accessible rural areas.

What happened to change this? It was not commercial pressure. There were few, if any, commercial clients for market research who were interested in fully national surveys in developing countries. There were, however, some and survey research was growing in unexpected places.

During the 1980s the BBC was able to commission the first ever fully national surveys in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Ghana, and several Arab countries. Previously many surveys in these and other countries had been mostly confined to major urban areas and only a few rural parts. Many of the research agencies used by the BBC at this time had little or no experience in rural areas. Would their sampling be adequate? Would they be able to cover difficult and less accessible areas? The BBC's principal concern was to have data that would reflect the full picture, leaving out no significant parts of the population or areas of the country. For Bangladesh, as one example, we had been able to obtain representative data for only urban parts of the country. When rural coverage had been possible it was confined to easier-to-reach areas. Were fully representative rural samples possible? Would the agency we used cover them adequately? An extensive study of these and related challenges was done in the mid-1980s. This was a pivotal moment for the whole department. We began to realize that no area was closed to research, except for the soon to be declining number of countries where the governments would not allow such research to take place. Prominent among these were all communist countries and a few dictatorships in the Arab world and Africa. However, in the new areas opening up for field research, people in even the remotest areas of any country liked to answer questions about their media access and use. Refusal rates were very much lower than in developed countries. We began to think global research was possible and worth aiming for.

By the 1990s the major activity of the research department was devoted to surveys. The BBC World Service's Director from 1986 to 1992, John Tusa, increased the budget available for surveys from less than £100 000 to well over £2 million. The research department built up a database of audiences in more than 100 countries from our own surveys and from data done for other international broadcasters, especially surveys conducted by the United States Information Agency (USIA) for the Voice of America (VOA) and the research done by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), among travelers from communist countries in East and Central Europe.[15]

The next major development was the end of communism in East and Central Europe. Surveys inside former communist countries became possible and we commissioned many.[16] Even in those countries that remained formally communist the authorities began to allow survey research, although not without difficulty. We commissioned surveys in

China – the first one not long after a visit I made to China in 1987. In Vietnam, through cooperation with the Swedish development agency SIDA the BBC was able to obtain data on listening to the BBC Vietnamese Service in some major cities in 1993. Surveys are now conducted freely throughout Vietnam.

Another major change at the BBC World Service was the realization that research data were valuable for knowing the audiences better and changing program content in response to this information about them. It seems astonishing now to say this but at the time when I became head of audience research in 1982, the overwhelming view within the BBC was that the services knew best about what they should broadcast. The BBC as a whole seemed to take the view that what it did was worthwhile and needed no justification or assessment. I well remember an encounter with a very senior manager over the possibility of commissioning our first ever survey in Nepal in 1986. We had no idea about how many listeners there were, what kinds of people they were, nor what they thought of what they heard. The manager's response was that we did not need to do a survey in Nepal because there was sufficient support in Parliament for the service to continue. This apparent view that research was needed only or mainly for defensive purposes was a major factor at this time and was crucial to BBC policy. When Douglas Muggeridge became Managing Director of the External Services in 1981 he had the task of looking for urgent savings. He instituted an enquiry into whether audience research was necessary at all and whether the activity could be ended or reduced, thus saving useful amounts of money. What saved the department and the activity was mainly, if not entirely, the fact that it provided data to defend services from Government cuts. Little value seemed to have been placed at that time on knowing the audiences better or assessing BBC performance. Sometimes the obsession with saving services and using audience research as the main or major weapon in this fight reached absurd proportions and stretched the use of data far beyond what some of us felt comfortable with. For example, a weekly audience of 0.2% in, let us say, a country of 100 million adults projects to 200 000 listeners. That can sound impressive if you leave out any mention of 0.2%. Anyone who has done survey research knows that you can get a 0.2% "audience" or "market" for any product, service, or indeed radio station, even when such a product, service, or radio station does not actually exist. Surveys that show very small audiences are a poor use of the survey instrument. It may still be worth broadcasting to very small (in percentage terms) audiences, but general population surveys are not the best instrument to find out anything useful about them.

The department and the activity survived these threats and went on to become a central part of BBC World Service's strategy and policy planning. It achieved this by showing that reliable facts about the audience enabled services to change what they broadcast, respond to demands of listeners, and identify aspects that were lacking and which, if added to the service's output, would bring in new listeners. The advances made in global coverage for both quantitative and qualitative research led to the publication of BBC World Service data for the first time in 1993. In the ambitiously titled *Global Audiences* BBC research staff wrote about recent research projects in all continents. It was hoped at the time that this would be the first in a series of such publications making such data and the analysis of it would be available to a wider public. Not long after this, however, BBC policies changed and no further publication was undertaken (Mytton 1993).

Is it possible to say anything with confidence about the size of global audiences? Twenty years before the publication of *Global Audience*, and long before much of the world became open for research, BBC audience researchers took the view that it was then possible to begin to make some estimates of the BBC's global reach. It had data on several large countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas. It was true that a lot of these data were partial, not always covering the whole country that had been surveyed. Nonetheless, it was thought that an attempt could be made to make some informed estimates. The first was made in 1974, using available data from several surveys; the estimate was that the BBC had a regular (at least once a week) global audience of 59 million. This figure was based on survey data for countries where surveys had been completed. With rather questionable bases these data were then extrapolated to countries where there were no audience data by making adjustments based on estimates of the number of radio sets in the country. It is obvious now looking back on this period that there was a significant element of educated guesswork involved. The same basic, rather crude methods were used again in 1978, producing a global estimate of 75 million regular listeners, in 1981 of 100 million, and 1985 of 120 million.

Soon after 1985 it became clear that with surveys gradually improving in coverage and reliability, and especially with the increase in countries being covered, it ought to be possible to be both more rigorous and remove the guesswork entirely. From now on, we would rely on survey evidence, if not exclusively then at least the bulk of the estimate would be based on it.

In 1990 the research executive responsible for these estimates until 2011, Colin Wilding, produced the first estimate based on the new system of calculation. Again the figure produced was 120 million, but it was arrived at using a different and more rigorous method. In the following three years he developed these methods further and by 1994 he had a new set of principles that are still in force at the time of writing. This is how Wilding describes what he does. Because the BBC is now on several media "platforms" he makes reference to measurement of audiences accessing the BBC through radio, TV, and the Internet.[17]

Data are acquired about radio audiences from between 20 and 30 countries each year. Additional data for TV audiences are collected in several countries from standard TV audience measurements. Unique user data are collected for users of BBC Internet services. Estimates are put together on a country by country basis. The estimated global audience Wilding describes as "a collage – or perhaps a jigsaw puzzle" (Wilding 2002, p. 63). It is never based on a snapshot of a global situation because the data that would enable such a picture are not available for a single moment of time. Thus when the BBC claimed in its global estimate made in April 2010 that the global weekly audience for BBC World Service radio was 183 million, it did not mean the global audience had been measured in that one month, but that the estimate represented the state of knowledge at that time with data from different surveys in different countries taken at different times.[18] It is the summary of available knowledge, but the entire estimate is based on audience research and none of it relies on guesswork or estimates made where no data exist. If there is no coverage for any country, either because research is not presently possible (Somalia, North Korea, or Turkmenistan), or surveys have not happened in countries because of budget limitations, or if survey data are over ten years old, nothing is included for these countries or areas. Wilding describes the situation as one where "we take out a piece of the puzzle and leave a blank space" (Wilding 2002, p. 64).

As research develops further in many parts of the world, knowledge of media audiences is gradually increasing and improving. There are now new clients for communications and media research. In the rich industrialized countries the main drivers of and clients for media research are the advertisers and agencies. This remains the case; these commercial interests have driven the development of market and media research in many developing countries, but most of this drive is toward the coverage of cities and of populations there with spending power. Generally speaking they have less interest in the majority who are poor and disadvantaged. The main clients for media research among populations as a whole have been the publicly funded international broadcasters such as the BBC, VOA, RFE/RL, Radio France International, and Deutsche Welle. They have usually been interested in obtaining wider coverage of target populations. Now there are other agencies that are beginning to see the importance of media data in the service of development. Agencies such as UNICEF, USAID, DFID, the Gates Foundation, and many others have shown not only an interest in media research to assist in improving their communication of health, educational, human rights, and other human development topics but are also prepared increasingly to sponsor such research, often in collaboration with others.

New methods are also becoming available. In the developed world the Internet has transformed market and opinion research. This is less likely to happen in developing and poor countries, but there the extraordinarily rapid growth of the mobile phone, already accessed by majorities in some very poor countries, has the potential to transform research processes. New applications on mobile phones open up the possibility of rapid data collection from both easy to access and the very remotest places and people. In a few years from now it should be commonplace to have global media data from every country using the medium of the mobile phone. It is an exciting and intriguing prospect, opening up the possibility of knowing global media audiences rather a lot more accurately and completely than we have yet imagined.

Notes

1. BBC Radio 4. The same claim is made in several other places including the BBC website http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00vknrn. The plain impossibility of the audience figure for the opening of the 2008 Games is not difficult to see. The global population at the time of the Beijing Olympics was 6.7 billion; 4.5 billion alleged to be watching the televised opening would mean two in three of the world's population doing the same thing all at once. Even if the claims were meant to include those who watched the event on news reports and/or recorded and viewed later, it remains more than just far fetched. Even in advanced countries where TV is almost universal, available and watched in virtually all homes, it is unusual for any single piece of TV output to be watched by as many as one in three people – let along a majority. Moreover, with the increasing fragmentation of audiences through the increase in channels available, very large global audiences for globally televised events are becoming less rather than more likely.
2. Geldof (1985), http://www.bobgeldof.info/Charity/liveaid.html.

3. BARB (2010), http://www.barb.co.uk/.
4. CSM Media Research is the main media research supplier for China. Its present people meter panel, although very large (more than 56000 households), is based on cities; rural China is not fully covered. There are two rival data suppliers in India, TAM and aMap, but both concentrate on urban areas to the exclusion of most of rural India.
5. The claim for the Nelson Mandela concert at the time was one billion, but later references claim 600 million, http://wapedia.mobi/en/Nelson_Mandela_70th_Birthday_Tribute.
6. C. E. Hooper was involved in Clark Hooper Inc., one of the early radio audience measurement companies in the US which began work in 1934. See also Mytton (1998, pp. 15–17).
7. It became common practice all over the British Empire where local radio stations existed for them to receive the BBC on shortwave and then re-transmit it on local frequencies. This was a practice also used by many radio stations outside the Empire and Commonwealth, including several stations in the United States. This practice continued until the 1980s, by which time the BBC had established a global satellite delivery service, not only to feed it own transmitters but also as re-broadcasting stations.
8. G5SW was the call name of the experimental BBC service.
9. WAC E4/37, Empire Correspondence: Summaries of Programme Correspondence 1933–1934. This particular section of the file, headed "Summary of Correspondence relating to programmes" was dated February 1933, only two months after the first broadcast, which indicates that research of this kind began as soon as the service began. (WAC refers to the BBC's extensive Written Archives Centre near Reading, United Kingdom, where archives of the BBC from its beginnings are kept.)
10. BBC WAC E4/42. No date is given but it must have been after the beginning of 1937 because that was when the magazine was first called BBC Empire Broadcasting. Publication was suspended for the duration of the War.
11. They seem to have stopped in the last few years, and since I left the BBC in 1998. The main reason for ending this practice seems to have been the fact that most communication from listeners now comes from SMS text messages and emails. These are not now counted or even reported on in the systematic way that letters were for seven decades. A fuller account of the history of research for the BBC's international radio since the beginning is given in Mytton (2011b).
12. WAC E3/1235/1, BBC Survey of Listening: Bombay, June 1944. The field work and the report were produced by the advertising agency, J. Walter Thompson. Note that Bombay is the English name for what is often referred to nowadays as Mumbai, the local language name for the city.
13. Interestingly this has ceased to be a major problem. Whereas it was, for example, difficult or impossible for political reasons to commission on the ground research before the end of communism anywhere in Europe, this is not surprisingly no longer so. However, there are other countries, still officially under communist rule, where research is possible and done regularly. These include Laos, Vietnam, and China. In several Arab countries research was not possible; these included Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia. The obstacles were either political or religious or a combination of the two. Research today is possible in all but a tiny number of countries.
14. Marcos carried out extensive and very important opinion, media, and market surveys of the adult populations throughout the then East African Federation. They did the first ever national radio audience survey in Tanganyika in 1960 (Market Research Company of East Africa 1960). The company seems to have gone out of business at the end of the 1960s.
15. I have written separately on the way that the BBC carried out research into audiences in communist Europe. Mytton (2011a) cooperation between international broadcasters continues; see CIBAR (2010), http://www.cibar.org/.

16. Some survey research became possible even before the collapse of communism in Europe. In 1988 we commissioned the research department of Polish State Radio, OBOP, to do a national survey for the BBC in Poland and similar surveys were also commissioned at that time in Slovenia and Croatia.
17. Much of the content and references in this section comes from the valuable and continuing work done by Colin Wilding, especially from Wilding (2010).
18. BBC (2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6675271.stm.

References

BARB (2010) *Broadcasters' Audience Research Board*, accessed 11/11/2010, http://www.barb.co.uk/.

BBC (2007) *BBC Global Audience Hits New High*. BBC News, accessed 11/11/2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6675271.stm.

BBC (2010) *Desert Island Discs*. BBC Radio 4, accessed 11/11/2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00vknrn.

Chappell, M.N. and Hooper, C.E. (1944) *Radio Audience Measurement*. New York: Stephen Daye.

CIBAR (2010) *Conference of International Broadcasters' Audience Research Services*, accessed 11/11/2010, http://www.cibar.org/.

Geldof, B. (1985) *Live Aid*, accessed 4/12/2010, http://www.bobgeldof.info/Charity/liveaid.html.

Mansell, G. (1982) *Let Truth Be Told*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.

Market Research Company of East Africa (1960) *Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation: Audience Survey Report*, May 1960. Nairobi: Market Research Company.

Mytton, G. (1991) A billion viewers can't be right!, *Intermedia*, **19** (3), 10–12.

Mytton, G. (ed.) (1993) *Global Audiences: Research for Worldwide Broadcasting 1993*. London: John Libbey.

Mytton, G. (1998) *Handbook on Radio and Television Audience Research*. London: UNICEF, UNESCO, and BBC World Service Trust.

Mytton, G. (2011a) Audience research at the BBC External Services during the Cold War, *Journal of Cold War History Special Edition: Listening to the Listener: Popular Reception of Western Cold War Propaganda*, **11** (1), February 2011, 49–67.

Mytton, G. (2011b) Audience research at the BBC World Service 1932–2010. *Participations: Journal of Audience and Reception Studies*, **8** (1) May 2011, http://www.participations.org/Volume%208/Issue%201/special/mytton/htm.

Wilding, C. (2002) 151 million listeners – but what does it mean?, in O. Zöllner (ed.), *An Essential Link with Audiences Worldwide: Research for International Broadcasting*. Berlin: Vistas, pp. 61–69.

Wilding, C. (2010) Numbers that count: measuring the World Service global audience. Paper presented at the Conference on *The Social Life of Methods*, August 31–September 3, 2010, St Hugh's Oxford.

Part II

Re-conceptualizing Research across Globalized Network Cultures

4

Media and Hegemonic Populism
Representing the Rise of the Rest

Jan Nederveen Pieterse

In the buildup to the Iraq war mainstream media were asleep at the wheel. Mesmerized by the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing machinations of power, mainstream media, particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom, allowed the Iraq war to unfold and placed no obstacles in its course. This is widely discussed; here let us consider other media contributions to creating or sustaining global divides. I focus on the following: echoing free market ideology, representing the rise of the rest as a threat, recycling the 9/11 complex, and overusing celebrity as narrative.

We are in a dramatic vortex. Like a giant oil tanker, the world is slowly turning. The emerging centers of the world economy are in the South and East. Globalization once seemed to belong to the West and now the tables are turning. We have entered the era of the 'rise of the rest' – in an economic sense in that industries and multinationals in the global South play an increasingly important role; in international finance with a view to the role of sovereign wealth funds; in a political sense, in the G20; however, less so in a cultural sense.[1] Western media and representations have celebrated the rise of the West for some two hundred years, so how then do they treat the rise of the rest? The main trends are that the rise of the rest is *ignored* because it doesn't fit national narratives in the West, or is represented as a *threat* because it fits or extends existing enemy images, or is *celebrated* in business media as triumphs of the *marketplace*. A summary headline version of this argument might run: Western media are complacent and display West bias. In frequently representing twenty-first century globalization as a source of risk, Western media exemplify Western privilege and conservatism. As mainstream media ignore the rise of the rest, in effect they reinforce the relations between the rest and the

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

An earlier version of this chapter appeared in *Global Media and Communication* (2009, 5(2): 1–17) and is reproduced here by permission of Sage Publications.

Table 4.1 Media and global divides.

Media	*Global divides*
Promoting free market ideology	Wealth polarization
Representing the rise of rest as threat	Economic and political polarization
Cultivating the 9/11 complex	Political and cultural polarization
Overusing celebrity narratives	Existential polarization between celebrities and common masses

rest, rather than between the rest and the West, and may thus contribute to the creeping irrelevance of the West. Table 4.1 gives a précis of the main arguments.

The chapter follows the sequence of these arguments. Recycling the 9/11 complex is part of a wider problematic of representing war, to which I also devote a section. The emphasis in this discussion is on Western mainstream media; a closing section makes brief observations on how media in the global South represent global trends. The chapter closes with reflections on representations before and after the economic crisis of 2008, with a focus on sovereign wealth funds.

American hegemony is part of the wider setting. From the vantage point of the hegemon, the world looks like a series of security problems and threats, of challenges and potential rivals. For instance, Americans have been socialized in viewing the United Nations as ineffective, bureaucratic, corrupt, and irrelevant, quite unlike in most of the world; but then from American viewpoints the UN is a rival to hegemony. In the American bubble, much international reporting is routinely reporting on threats or potential threats. In the hegemonic worldview the world appears as a theatre of paranoia. Hegemonic populism is part of this culture and includes, besides UN bashing, China bashing, Islam bashing, Iran bashing, Chávez bashing, and Cuba bashing. General principles are denigrating and neutralizing competitors and keeping rising forces down. American hegemonic populism resembles the "popular imperialism" of late-nineteenth-century Britain and Germany's "Volksimperialismus", where national cohesion was achieved at the expense of colonized peoples and outward expansion sought to deflect domestic class struggle (Wehler 1972; Nederveen Pieterse 1989). In the United States scathing views of the world outside America are commonplace and implicitly celebrate America's virtues, with popular contests of "pick your worst dictator" and syndicated magazines such as *Parade* dedicating issues to this theme. The Foreign Policy's journal *The Bad Guys Issue* (their wording) asks "Who Is to Blame for Failed States" and its front cover features assorted dictators under the heading "The Committee to Destroy the World" (July/August 2010). *The Wall Street Journal* reports on Brazil's presidential candidate Dilma Roussef under the front page headline "Ex-guerilla on Cusp of Power in Brazil" (she was an activist against Brazil's military government in the 1960s and 1970s) (Prada 2010). Democracy, human rights, free speech, and women's rights may be used as hegemonic hammers: "universal values" are used as hegemonic bludgeons. The vortex of declining hegemony adds further bite. The rise of the rest ushers in a post-American world.

Free Market Paradox

> I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organizations, specifically banks and others, was such that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders (Alan Greenspan, US Congress, October 2008).

In his last published article Jan Ekecrantz (2007) urges media studies to pay more attention to economic inequality and the role of media in sustaining and representing inequality. A pressing question is, after decades of echoing and worshiping market forces, now that the "free market" goes kaput, now what? For years Western media passed on the admonitions of the free market gospel, the Nobel Prize winning economists of the Chicago school, the stipulations of the IMF and World Bank and the tropes of the Washington consensus – don't intervene in the market, cut taxes, rollback government, liberalize, privatize, lift capital controls, the free market and democracy go together. When crisis hit developing countries IMF conditions invariably stipulated cutting government spending.

Since 2008 everything has been topsy-turvy. Crises are supposed to take place in developing countries and to serve as instruments to discipline and punish the periphery and its unruly elites. Now financial crisis, the most serious crisis since the Depression, hit the United States and Europe and by mid-2008 the same economists such as Larry Summers and Jeffrey Sachs who counseled liberalization and market shock therapy for developing and post-socialist countries plead for American government spending and public works programs to stimulate the economy. For decades people were told the free market is superior, is the only viable economic model, there is no alternative – but now that the "free market" is in trouble, sovereign wealth funds rescue Wall Street powerhouses. State capitalism – declared old hat and ineffective by the Western establishment's power/knowledge grid – comes to the rescue as the free market goes down the toilet. According to Martin Wolf, Friday March 14, 2008, the day the US government bailed out Bear Stearns with $30 billion, was "the day the dream of global free-market capitalism died".

> For three decades we have moved towards market-driven financial systems. By its decision to rescue Bear Stearns, the Federal Reserve, the institution responsible for monetary policy in the US, chief protagonist of free-market capitalism, declared this era over. It showed in deeds its agreement with the remark by Joseph Ackermann, chief executive of Deutsche Bank, that "I no longer believe in the market's self-healing power". Deregulation has reached its limits.… The US is showing the limits of deregulation … we must start in the right place, by recognising that even the recent past is a foreign country (Wolf 2008).

Since then there have been many days like that. In the course of 2008, with bailouts climbing on to trillions, those seem days of innocence. There go the banks, the hedge funds, the rating agencies, the boards, and, for that matter, the business pages – each led by the smartest people in the room, now queuing at the exit. One may cherish the irony of this historical twist, but it is do-it-yourself irony because media rarely concede the U-turn and appear oblivious to the gaping contradiction between 25 years of propagating the "free market" and the volte-face of 2008. If you like world history, 2008 to 2010 are good years.

By echoing free market rhetoric unhindered, media have contributed to massive, unprecedented transfers of wealth within countries and on a global scale, a vast wealth polarization in which, according to UNDP figures, some 350 billionaires own as much as half the world population (UNDP 1994; Nederveen Pieterse 2004). Through 25 years of free market propaganda media have been dozing at the wheel and under the heading of trickle-down have enabled or permitted the steep growth of inequality within and between societies.

However, should we not concede that social inequality is nowadays mostly caused by technological change and its growing skills differentials and by the effects of globalization? Not per se. It *is* possible to combine innovation, economic dynamism, and equity. Contrast Scandinavia, Nordic Europe, and East Asia with the United States, the United Kingdom, and the developing countries that underwent structural adjustment. Technological change doesn't cause inequality; political change does. One might argue, too, that when banks, boards, rating agencies, hedge funds, and analysts all lost their marbles because they miscalculated risk, how could media have done better? The point is, however, that by joining the free market bandwagon and falling in line with propaganda and by failing to inculcate civic vigilance, media contributed to a climate of permissive capitalism and lax regulation, which, in turn, fostered creative accounting and corporations making the quarterly numbers by cooking the books. In time these dynamics produced the dotcom bubble (2000), the Enron and Anderson series of corporate scandals (2001), the sub-prime mortgage crisis (2007), and the financial and economic crisis of 2007–2010. The media have been part of a "greed is good" culture, which has fostered a syndrome of elite deviance that has placed profit maximization above all (Robinson and Murphy 2009).

To the extent that business pages and media are an exception in representing the rise of the rest in a welcoming positive light, they tend to display a different bias: "what is good for market forces is good for society". When the West was winning, when it drove and "owned" globalization, free market stories sounded acceptable and attractive. The world is flat and outsourcing is beneficial in the end. Now it appears it has all been bubbles all along – the high tech bubble, dotcom bubble, easy money bubble, real estate bubble, consumer credit bubble, merger and acquisitions bubble, petrol and commodities bubbles, the bailout, stimulus, and now the low interest bubbles. Media followed and fed each of these bubbles.

This includes the role of media *as* market forces. Media play a major role in market development. Hugo Slim, the world's wealthiest man, made his fortune in Mexico's telecoms. Thaksin Shinawatra made his fortune by selling computers to Thailand's police force and then became a telecom magnate. Berlusconi is Italy's media tycoon. Bill Gates' wealth is well known. Dan Schiller (1999) has discussed the role of media and telecoms in the era of digital capitalism, as did Susan Strange (1996). The deregulation of American telecoms in the 1990s was a major contributor to the financialization of the American economy (Phillips 2006) and to the Wall Street frenzy that, in time, produced the WorldCom and Enron scandals. All along media, of course, are major political forces as well. Conrad Black maintained links with rightwing think tanks. Rupert Murdoch's media contribute to pro-market propaganda and sponsor rightwing politics. American media are deeply wired into the military–industrial–media complex (see Barstow 2008).[2]

The paradox of liberalization is that under the banner of the "free market", market forces have been cast as panacea. Business media and accounts such as that of Thomas Friedman (2005) routinely attribute the rise of East Asia, China, and India to liberalization; to Deng's modernization in China in 1981 and India's financial liberalization in 1991. Likewise the World Bank attributed the "East Asian miracle" to export orientation and economic liberalization. Let me make some brief points in relation to this account.

This narrative completely overlooks the role of the public sector. In each of these cases developmental states played a fundamental role in establishing the *conditions* that made market growth possible, from broad-based education, infrastructure, and land reform in East Asia to Mao's reforms in China and Nehru's industrial policies and reforms in India. This is typically ignored in Anglo-American free enterprise accounts of economic success. Washington orthodoxy is about paradigm maintenance, as Robert Wade shows (1996, 2002), and the media tags along.

"Freedom" has historically been a language of power and a doctrine of hegemons (Wallerstein 1984) so the free market is a doctrine of winners. Now winners are becoming losers and the discourse and policies shift to protectionism. This leads to strange headlines such as "Obama Vows to Help Restore US Faith in Globalization" (*Financial Times*, June 27, 2008). The article deals with trade policy and the then senator's criticisms of Nafta; yet, since he is also a "free trader", he seeks to "improve Nafta".

As the new industrialization in the global south produces a commodities boom, including high energy prices, high commodity prices have a relatively equalizing impact on the world economy, as during the post-war economic boom. Western representations zero in on the downside of these trends. Thus, according to Thomas Friedman (2006), the "first law of petro politics" is "that the price of oil and the pace of freedom always move in opposite directions". Cases that prove his point are Iran, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Russia. Aside from criticisms of Hugo Chávez, the message between the lines is that Friedman treasures the American way and bemoans the growth of state capitalism. However, the selection of cases is biased. In states that support American policies, such as Saudi Arabia, petro politics poses no problem (Vitalis 2006); the problem, rather, is *unruly* petro politics. Besides, with hindsight after crisis, freedom and the American way take on different meanings.

Goldilocks Globalization Changed Place

According to opinion surveys in the 1990s, people in the West generally felt that the pace of globalization was just right – not too fast, not too slow. However, according to a Pew survey in 2007, 57% in G7 countries feel that the pace of globalization is "too fast", whereas the majority in the global South deems its pace just right ("Poll Reveals Backlash in Wealthy Countries against Globalisation", *Financial Times*, July 30, 2008, pp. 1, 26–27). Thus, Goldilocks globalization has changed places.

In the 1990s the global South felt threatened and overwhelmed by globalization. The risks of liberalization and financial turbulence were real enough and culminated in the

1997 Asian crisis. In the twenty-first century, advanced countries feel threatened by job loss and, in the United States, by mounting trade and external deficits. According to populist views, competition from the south threatens job loss and undermines prosperity in the West. What mainstream media do *not* discuss, however, is the comparison *between* Western countries: why are Germany, Scandinavia, and other parts of Europe able to combine innovation, economic dynamism, and a welfare state whereas the United States and the United Kingdom are not. What is *not* discussed is the flipside of the story: the other side of offshoring and outsourcing is decades of private sector underinvestment in American plants, technologies, and innovation (Nederveen Pieterse 2008a).

In American media, the problem is, rather, China and its undervalued Renminbi, its cheap exports, its excessive savings, its thirst for commodities and energy. Complaints about China's currency run from media to Congress and the treasury and make a policy point: forcing upon China a similar devaluation of its currency as Japan accepted in the 1985 Plaza Accord, which made Japan's exports to the US much less competitive. China's has learned Japan's lesson. By the end of 2010 US pressure on China to devalue its currency has still come to naught. China bashing signals a shift: in the 1990s China's vast growing consumer market was a dream come true for Western multinationals; in the 2000s it is treated as a threat. China is criticized for its human rights record, for increasing its military spending, and its expansion in the region. After the crisis the discourse is in some respects shifting again (discussed below). In the 2010 congressional elections China emerges as a target in political ads: "candidates from both political parties have suddenly found a new villain to run against: China.… In the past week alone, at least 29 candidates have unleashed new advertisements suggesting that their opponents have been too sympathetic to China and, as a result, Americans have suffered" (Chen 2010).

The underlying script change is that the drivers and winners of globalization, particularly during the closing decades of the twentieth century, are becoming losers in the twenty-first century. At issue, of course, are not merely representations but also policies. Not just attitudes and media, but also policies are changing – advanced countries that used to push free trade now opt for protectionism, not just in agriculture but also in manufactured goods.

A further twist is the idea that the rise of the rest threatens the global environment. The rise of middle class consumption standards for growing numbers in China, India, Brazil, and other developing countries competes with resource use and consumption standards in the West. Indulge for a few hundred years in uncontrolled modernization and then cast the rise of the rest as a threat to planetary survival. Just 4% of the world population in the United States has been absorbing 40% of the world's resources – and now the consumption of rising middle classes in developing countries is viewed as a threat to the global environment.

The 9/11 Complex

In academia and social science Eurocentrism has been taken to the cleaners by Edward Said, Samir Amin, and in post-colonial studies (in media studies see Curran and Park 2000), but it has made a comeback in media and politics, particularly in relation to

Islam. In history and art the contributions of Islam to science and civilization as a broad and early cosmopolitanism have been increasingly widely recognized, but in Western political discourse the "clash of civilizations" prevails.

The 9/11 complex has turned into a Western cul de sac. Go to Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, in fact to most of the world, and the American and west European obsession with the Middle East and Islam just doesn't exist. This is the West's special front seat in the gallery of paranoia. Everything to do with Islam and the Middle East has been tainted with threat. In 2008 the number of terrorism suspects on American security lists exceeded a million.

War-on-terror tunnel vision homogenizes Islam and treats Islam as a threat. This is a boon for security experts (for terrorism is the successor to the Cold War), for rightwing parties (who also have to make do without a communist enemy), for rightwing demagogues, and for Western media (for media love a ready-made narrative). As Abrahamanian (2003) points out, without fail American media have interpreted 9/11 through the lens of Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations perspective. The furor surrounding the "Ground Zero mosque" (an Islamic cultural center) is another installment in this series.

Media such as Copenhagen's *Yillands-Posten* and *Charlie Hebdo* in Paris have volunteered to serve as frontiers in this clash of civilizations. Mainstream media follow or allow rightwing populist trends in the West, notably in Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy, Austria, and the United States. These trends merge anti-immigrant sentiment, denigration of Islam, and ignorant or hostile images of the global South. The Pim Fortuyn ("the Netherlands is full") and Ayaan Hirsi Ali strands recycle Orientalism (an extensive discussion is given in Nederveen Pieterse 2007). Ayaan Hirsi Ali counsels "How to Win the Clash of Civilizations" and does so by nagging about countries in the Middle East that are not pro-Western enough (Hirsi Ali 2010). Italian media in 2008 scapegoated and targeted Roma people, as did French media and politics in 2010. At times, manufacturing or cultivating cultural frictions serves to distract attention from political and economic transformations or geopolitical objectives. Anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States and Europe is another expression of globalization worries. For some time, immigration has been a flashpoint of global inequality, inconveniently located at the intersection of Western labor demand, border controls, and global inequality.

The clash of civilizations is an imagined clash or a political narrative masquerading as cultural friction. Apply double standards to the Middle East for decades (the official terminology is the "Roadmap to Peace") and eventually it boomerangs, especially since the region is also the recipient of major petrol revenues. The clash of civilizations is a self-fulfilling prophecy. View the world through lenses of perverse Orientalism and the Middle East hits back. Attacks on Islam such as the Danish cartoons deflect attention from Israel–Palestine tensions and some argue that they were stage-managed to serve this purpose (Petras 2006).

With the 9/11 complex also comes a trans-Atlantic dispute, the Christopher Hitchens dispute, in which the English assure the Americans that "you can keep him". Like Tony Blair, Hitchens has been honed in Oxford debating circles, is skilled in rhetoric, is therefore media-ready, and is able to turn his eloquence to any cause.

Representing War

Media reflect – stage manage, produce – the different sides to war. Over time media representations of war, at any rate on the part of war parties, have become more, not less, biased because war is increasingly conducted via airspace with media as major arenas of psychological warfare and black information on the frontlines of public opinion.

Media representations in the United States, particularly of conflicts in the Middle East and adjacent regions and of Israel's policies, often diverge from those in the region, clearly so during the neo-conservative project of "transforming the Middle East", as a glance at CNN and, in contrast, *Al Jazeera*, *Al Arabiya*, and other Mideast media shows. The US Secretary of State Madeline Albright, declaring in 1996 of the death of half a million Iraqi children under five because of US sanctions, "we think the price is worth it", exemplifies the divide. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's statement, as Israel's devastation of Lebanon was underway in August 2006, that "a new Middle East is being born", was tone deaf to sentiments in the region.

For years Afghan President Hamid Karzai protests at regular intervals that American air raids killing Afghan civilians are unacceptable and intolerable, without noticeable effect on operations. American air raids have spread to Pakistan's border areas and to nontribal areas such as Bajjaur. Pakistan's prime minister has voiced similar concerns. Meanwhile public perceptions in both countries are that the air operations are part of an arrangement with the Americans and political leaders just go through the motions of protesting for legitimacy's sake.

Reporting of the clash between Georgia and Russia in summer 2008 has been one-sided; for critical treatments one must wander far off the beaten track. Also according to otherwise reasonably independent sources, Russia's intervention in Georgia signals the re-emergence of a totalitarian regime. In the *Financial Times* Philip Stephens (2008a) compares Russia's actions to those of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The *New York Times* op-ed columns feature language such as "W. [short for George W. Bush] and Condi are suddenly waking up to how vicious Vladimir is". Citing Georgia's president Saakashvili's view of Putin ("today we are looking evil directly in the eye"), Maureen Dowd casually uses the language of "evil" (2008). It is a small step from rehearsing unexamined assumptions to war mongering. Months later reports emerged in the BBC and other sources that Georgian forces had used indiscriminate violence against civilians and homes in South Ossetia, which Russia responded to with proportional restraint – the complete opposite of the account that had been circulating for months. By the time these reports emerged the story was long off the front pages and the rites of indignation had come and gone. It takes little for mainstream media to join establishment narratives but it takes a lot to self-correct and to break narratives – a lot more than is usually available.

Reporting on Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen is extensive, yet biased. Regarding Darfur, the public knows about the "Janjaweed" and images of parched stretches of land, but has little information about problems of water that underlie ethnic strife and conflicts with Chad. The International Criminal Court indicts Sudan's head of state for genocides of three tribes that the general public has never heard of. The hiatus between these charges and public knowledge shows the gap in reporting. Reporting on the Gaza war and Israel's blockade and on Israel's attack on the flotilla that sought to bring supplies to Gaza has likewise been biased and inadequate. On American media security experts discuss how to assess and "handle" Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, and other flashpoints of the month.

Overusing Celebrity Narratives

By following Bob Geldof and Bono, Angelina Jolie and Madonna as tour guides to world problems, media offer comic book versions of world problems and relief and adopt tabloid views of globalization, to the dismay of social movements and NGOs who for decades have sought to present images of Africa emancipated and empowered and not as an object of charity.

That media use and create celebrity is ordinary; stardust and glamour serve as emotional glue and media offer collective emoticons with celebrities as props. Locales, regions, and nations are extended families of sorts and media provide their narratives. Through incessant repetition national narratives attain "truthiness" in the sense of generating a common sense. That celebrities and movie actors take up global engagement and articulate social responsibility is welcome and at times their ideas are smarter and more grounded than their media representations (cf. Richey and Ponte 2008 on the Product RED campaign). What is problematic, however, is media overusing celebrity to the point of distorting global relations. Thus, Western discussions have been dominated by Gleneagles promises of debt relief for Africa, which years later turn out to be largely unmet. Discussions of international development have long been dominated by the Millennium Development Goals. A pattern is that the declaration of new targets and goals diverts attention from the circumstance that past targets have not been met. In response to Geldof and Bono escapades, entrepreneurs and investors note that by making Africa look like an object of charity they reduce the actual interest in investing in Africa.

This is not where the energy is and this is not why the ship has been turning. Asian investment in Africa has been rising significantly. The main driver, of course, has been rising demand for commodities, but an additional factor is that, unlike the west, China and India have not been burdened by the mortgage of denigrating representations. Growth in several African countries has risen to 6% – after "lost decades" of marginal or negative growth – largely due to demand and investments from the NICs in the south. The World Bank reports that "for the first time in three decades African economies are growing with the rest of the world", which fuels "hopes of new business era in Africa" (World Bank Report 2007; Russell 2007). Africa "is at the heart of the latest surge of enthusiasm to hit emerging markets. Factors: commodities boom, debt relief, improvements in economic policy. Private capital flows have tripled since 2003 (45 billion in 2006)" (Chung 2007) (see also Kaplinsky and Messner 2008 and Nederveen Pieterse and Rehbein 2009).

If we compare media north and south, the general tenor in media in the global South is more positive about the growing role of the south, more concerned with south–south cooperation, more impatient with the post-war power structure, and more critical of Western bias, as glancing at *Al Jazeera* or *Al Arabiya* programs or leafing through *Frontline*, *Dawn*, *Al Ahram*, *Daily Star*, *Uno Mas Uno*, or *La Jornada* shows. The common experience of Western colonialism and neo-colonialism obviously plays a role. Media in the south are also more aware of the ironies of Western bias. Thus, the *Times of India* reports the story of a US Senator outsourcing a speech on the globalization of Oregon to a firm in Bangalore, India ("US Senator Outsources Speech to India", *Times of India*, November 13, 2006). Another trend in media in the global South is a growing assertiveness. According to Chandran Nair (2007), "Speak up, Asia, or the west will drown you out": "What is needed is the emergence of a confident body of Asian intellectual leaders." Quoting the Finance Minister Palaniappan Chidambaran, a Reuters story in the *Hindustan Times* was headlined "Stop Lecturing Us, India Tells Rich Nations".

> As growth looks sure to slow in much of the rich world, partly due to the fallout from reckless lending in the United States, new economic powerhouses like India say they are tired of being told what to do. "For too long the advanced economies have told the developing economies that this is right and this is wrong," Chidambaram told Reuters.

Chidambaran criticizes the

> financial authorities in developed countries for not keeping up with the new and complex financial market instruments that lay behind recent credit market turmoil. "Their regulators have fallen behind. They are beginning to rethink their regulatory structure," he said. "I am told in the UK there is urgent consideration of the fact that response is divided between three separate institutions – the Financial Services Authority, the Bank of England and the government. They want to know where the buck stops," he said. "In the name of innovation, regulators or governments in the advanced economies have fallen behind the curve," he said.

He adds that the

> "lesson is that the model we have adopted, cautious calibrated opening of the economy, is perhaps the right model. Regulation must stay one step ahead of innovation" (*Hindustan Times*, October 23, 2007).

Another instance of the south talking back is China's human rights report on the United States. Drawing on Human Rights Watch, FBI reports, etc., the report criticizes American violent crime, its large prison population, police brutality, restrictions on workers' rights to unionize, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (AP 2008).

Meanwhile, in one area at least mainstream media north and south tend to agree. "Blessed are the poor" according to one of the prophets, but not according to the world's media, north and south. In the north, economic migrants or jobseekers from the south are easy targets for discrimination and accusations of crime. In the south, crime and disease are associated with poverty (e.g., Davis 2006). Middle-class sensibilities and glitzy marketing aesthetics prevail in most of the world's media (see Berger 2008).

BC/AC

> A weak state has never been synonymous with a strong private sector (President Lula da Silva, September 2010) (Wheatley 2010)

Discussed above are global divides that media uphold in the early twenty-first century. Whether media merely reflect and follow or *create* divides is a question that cannot be addressed here. Mainstream media underestimate and underrepresent the rise of the rest. In this respect they differ from business media, which are keen to identify "new champions" (e.g., Sirkin, Hemerling, and Bhattacharya 2008) and in whose interest it is to do so, whether from the point of view of investment, markets, or competition. They differ also from intelligence agencies – CIA and American defense intelligence reports have long identified the major economic and power realignments to come[3] – but they don't make popular reading. In representing the rise of the rest as a threat, mainstream media send the message that if globalization isn't ours, then it isn't. As long as this is the commonsense in the West, it suggests the diagnosis "does not play well with others".

Their representation of new emerging globalization meets the needs of conservative, complacent societies, a bourgeois response that enables a bourgeois repose. It keeps horizons near and flat. How would conventional wisdom come to terms with the ironies of history? How would media represent self-criticism and reflexivity? For all their influence, media are mostly windows of clichés, air vents of conventional wisdom, knowledge without depth, with occasional smart editorial comments or probing investigative reports. Perspectives such as the American bubble and the European bubble vent regional narratives of power. To the extent that media are bubble media – display windows of collective narcissism in which world events figure as sidebars to national narratives – they institutionalize national and regional comfort zones. The crisis of 2008, however, has been a major game breaker and wakeup call for the "masters of the universe". There are marked differences in public discourses before and after the crisis, BC and AC. The discussion above portrays BC views.[4]

Twenty-first-century shifts manifest to a large extent as economic shifts with finance as a salient dimension and sovereign wealth funds as key players. The sovereign wealth funds mainly come from two sources – surplus accumulated through exports of manufactures, as in Japan, China, and Korea, and energy exports, with the Arab Emirates and Norway in the lead along with other oil exporters. Before the crisis, perspectives on sovereign wealth funds followed the general American pattern of distrust of state institutions. In 2005 the US Congress vetoed China's CNOOC's bid to acquire the oil company Unocal. In 2006 Congress overruled the Dubai Ports World holding company taking over the management of six US ports. Larry Summers voices the philosophy underlying this distrust. According to Summers, sovereign wealth funds "shake the logic of capitalism" and "governments as shareholders … may want to see their national companies compete effectively, or to extract technology or to achieve influence" (Summers 2007). What is wrong, actually, with governments seeking to build the national economy? In Europe industrial policy has been the norm; in East Asia the developmental state has been the path to success. However, in the United States the default ideology is "free enterprise" and government "picking winners" is taboo in American business ethos. Thus, Summers implicitly upholds a singular, American notion of capitalism and condemns forms of mixed economy. Obviously this American position is no longer tenable with banks, insurance companies such as AIG, and Detroit automakers turning to the government for support. The criticism that SWF follow political rather than economic objectives doesn't hold when politics and economics are no longer clearly distinguishable. Philip Stephens notes, "Broken banks put the state back in the driving seat" and "government is no longer a term of abuse" (Stephens 2008b).

After the crisis, the story lines begin to change. Their changing course also reflects five years or so of petrol prices close to $100 a barrel (2003–2008), so oil exporters are flush. The story is essentially simple: "Sovereign Funds Put Cash in the Banks" (*Financial Times*, November 28, 2007). Funds from China to the Arab Emirates buy stakes in Wall Street banks. As the China Investment Corporation buys a 10% stake in Morgan Stanley for $5 billion and a 10% share of Blackstone, "the fund sees a unique opportunity in the credit crisis of developed markets" (Anderlini 2007). It is not just Abu Dhabi buying Manhattan's Chrysler building or sovereign wealth funds from China and Singapore buying into Wall Street powerhouses; it is that the accumulation patterns have changed. The portée of the intervention of sovereign wealth funds is that the 2008 crisis ushers in the comeback of state regulated capitalism. Reviewing the narrative cycle, at one stage sovereign wealth funds are shunned, next they are reluctantly allowed in, then they are embraced, next they are actively sought after, expected to take part in and drawn into institutions, or reprimanded for not taking part – much of this in the course of a year. Daniel Gross sums up the unfolding plot:

> With U.S. banks and financial institutions retrenching in the wake of the subprime debacle, cash-seeking American hedge funds, private-equity firms and corporations will be booking passage for Beijing and Bahrain. "They [SWFs] have almost replaced U.S. pension funds as the principal source of capital for alternative investments," says Michael Klein, chairman of Citigroup's investment-banking unit (Gross 2007–2008).

Gross further argues that the

> rising pace of SWF investment in blue-chip American companies will provoke plenty of angst. SWFs operate with a Cheneyesque opacity. Americans tend to imagine free trade and globalization as McDonald's in Riyadh and shoe factories in Vietnam producing cheap goods. But governments of nondemocratic countries in the Persian Gulf and Asia owning big chunks of America's financial infrastructure? Not so much (Gross 2007–2008).

Consider the shifting nuances in the headlines and story lines in the Western business press from 2007 through 2008, at times with contradictory signals even on the same page or in the same article.

- "Big Spenders: How Sovereign Funds Are Stirring Up Protectionism" (J. Willman, *Financial Times*, July 30, 2007) and "Markets Eye the New Rich Kids on the Block" (J. Chung, *Financial Times*, July 30, 2007).
- "A Passage to the West for Sovereign Wealth Funds" (J.F. Vail, *Financial Times*, October 31, 2007).

- "Officialdom Finds a New, Unprincipled Bogeyman" (J. Dizard, *Financial Times*, November 27, 2007).
- "Sovereign Funds Should Lend Support to Equities" (*Financial Times*, December 13, 2007).
- 'Why SWFs Will Not Fix the Western Financial Mess' (T. Jackson, *Financial Times*, December 17, 2007).
- "Credit Crunch Led to Rapid Rise of Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in US and European Banks": since January 2007 Singapore's Temasek spent $41.7 billion (in stakes in Merrill Lynch and Barclays), the UAE $10.7 billion and China $8 billion (*Financial Times*, March 24, 2008).
- "IMF Clears Way for Development of Sovereign Wealth Funds Code" (*Wall Street Journal*, March 24, 2008).
- "The Wealth of Nations Is Reflected in the Stellar Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds" (*Financial Times*, March 31, 2008).
- "The New Global Wealth Machine" (*New York Times*, April 2, 2008).
- "Do Not Panic over Foreign Wealth" (G. Rachman, *Financial Times*, April 29, 2008).
- "Reject Sovereign Wealth Funds at Your Peril" (*Financial Times*, June 6, 2008).
- "SWFs Attract Controversy but Are Part of the Global Solution" (Arnab Das, *Financial Times*, July 23, 2008).
- "Managers Eye Asian SWF Billions" (*Financial Times*, August 4, 2008).
- "Fifth of SWFs 'Unaccountable'" (*Financial Times*, September 15, 2008).
- "Global Investment: Exec Desperately Seeks SWF. Must Be Rich. No Green Card or English Required. Send Photos and Balance Sheets to Wall Street" (Gross 2007–2008).

A parallel to these changes in representation is the growing charm with Islamic finance instruments, with London, Amsterdam, and other financial centers queuing up to provide the new instruments (Sullivan 2008). This echoes the pattern of eurodollars in the 1970s with a twist: Western institutions seeking to retrieve and corner the money that has gone into paying for the West's energy habits.

Initially the emerging economies appeared to be safe from the impact of crisis (e.g., see T. Fuller, "This Time, Southeast Asia Watches Crisis from Afar", *New York Times*, November 22, 2008, p. 5), but slackening demand in the United States and Europe impacted on emerging economies' exports. Nandan Nilekani, who heads India's Infosys, adds a further twist: "we were riding on a global liquidity boom". "Remove the 'steroid', as is happening now, and 2–3 percent of growth will go." So the crisis also comes as a corrective in emerging economies: "After a few years of 8 percent plus growth, we felt that we were already a superpower. We took credit for global factors, and took the foot off reforms" (Nilekani 2008).

The crisis has accelerated the transition from the G8 to the G20. The G20 edges toward a new global balancing act including a greater role for major emerging societies. A Dutch newspaper headline during the summit reads, soberly, matter-of-factly, "G20 Waits for a New Leader, Preferably One with Money" (*De Volkskrant*, November 15, 2008, p.15). The awareness that the American hegemon is bankrupt is spreading.

The declining value of American assets through 2008 – such as Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Washington Mutual – cost the sovereign wealth funds that went in early dearly. A November headline reads, "Sovereign Funds Go Cold on Rescue Finance" (Sender 2008). Given continued uncertainty, sovereign wealth funds have become much more cautious. In turn, this has increased the political pressure for their involvement.

The ambivalent reporting on the rise of sovereign wealth funds in Western media – oscillating between anxiety and greed – is matched by changing representations of the "rise of Asia". After the crisis, the rise of the rest is gradually being represented in a slightly more positive light and we can anticipate more such changes. After all, one day the "new champions" may be called to the rescue. A cover headline in *The Economist* asks "Can China Save the World?" (November 15–21, 2008). Never mind the question mark, what is new is the question. It signals that the entire landscape has changed radically. If the IMF is to resume its role of stabilizing international finance it can only do so with new inflows of funds, in particular from Saudi Arabia and China. Hence a headline reads "UK Confident Saudis Will Help IMF" (*Financial Times*, November 3, 2008). As 2008 draws to a close, Chinese sovereign wealth funds have announced their withdrawal from investing in Western financial houses and Chinese officials lecture the American treasury on the importance of economic stability ("China Sovereign Wealth Group to Stop Investing in Western Banks", December 4, 2008, p. 1, and G. Dyer, "Chinese Officials Lecture Paulson", December 5, 2008, p. 2).

A recent book refers to sovereign wealth funds as *A Shadow Market: How a Group of Wealthy Nations and Powerful Investors Secretly Dominate the World* (Weiner 2010). The imagery echoes the "Elders of Zion" script, with powerful forces secretly pursuing financial world domination, except that now the ethnicity is different and diverse. The argument is that huge pools of "unregulated capital" have come to dominate the world financial system. Problems with this account are that secrecy is misleading: sovereign wealth funds don't operate in secret; it surmises political coordination while sovereign wealth funds are also competitors; and while rebuking the unregulated nature of these flows it overlooks that for decades the international operations of Western hedge funds and banks were also unregulated.

A comment on president Sarkozy's deporting of Roma from France is headlined "Street Fighter Sarkozy Needs to Lift Head for a Higher Vision" and argues that rather than dividing the nation he should seek to unite it for a wider purpose (Hollinger 2010). This may be relevant advice for media generally: they need to lift their heads for a higher vision.

Acknowledgment

This chapter draws on my keynote address on "Media and Global Divides" to the Annual Conference of the International Association for Media and Communication Research, Stockholm, July 2008, and on subsequent talks at the Institute of Communication Studies, Punjab University and the South Asian Free Media Association in Lahore, November 2008. I am indebted to the comments of Oscar Hemer (2008), Durre Ahmed, and participants. An earlier version appeared in *Global Media and Communication* 1009, **5** (2), 1–17.

Notes

1. Twenty-first-century globalization is discussed in Nederveen Pieterse (2008b). On the 'rise of the rest' see Amsden (2001) and Zakaria (2008).
2. For instance, the retired four-star Army general and military analyst of NBC News, Barry McCaffrey, made hundreds of appearances on MSNBC and other networks and had direct access to top US commanders, all the while being under lucrative contracts with major military equipment suppliers.
3. According to the US National Intelligence Council's report "Global Trends 2025", released in 2008, "India and China could rise to join the US on top of a multipolar world in 2025", reports *The Times of India* (November 22, 2008, p. 1). It is predicted that India will become the world's fourth largest economy.
4. In this script the global South is often blamed for the failure of international negotiations. Thus, according to a headline of *Il Messagiero* on the failure of the Doha round of talks in Geneva in summer 2008, "Guerra Asia-USA, fallisce il WTO" (July 30, 2008, p. 1).

References

Abrahamanian, E. (2003) The US media, Huntington and September 11, *Third World Quarterly*, **24** (3), 529–544.

Amsden, A.H. (2001) *The Rise of 'the Rest': Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Anderlini, J. (2007) China Wealth Fund's Early Coming of Age, *Financial Times*, December 21, p. 18.

AP (2008) China Calls U.S. Record on Rights "Shocking", *International Herald Tribune*, March 14, p. 3.

Barstow, D. (2008) One Man's Military–Industrial Media Complex, *New York Times*, November 30, pp. 1, 26–27.

Berger, G. (2008) What is there in media for poor women and men? The case of South Africa, in L. Rudebeck and M. Melin (eds), *Whose Voices? Media and Pluralism in the Context of Democratisation*. Uppsala: University of Uppsala, pp. 87–98.

Chen, D.W. (2010) China Emerges as Target in Midterm Political Ads, *New York Times*, October 10, pp. 1–19.

Chung, J. (2007) Investors Dive into the Heart of Africa's Markets, *Financial Times*, November 19, p. 19.

Curran, J. and Park, M.-J. (eds) (2000) *De-Westernizing Media Studies.* London: Routledge.

Davis, M. (2006) *Planet of Slums.* London: Verso.

Dowd, M. (2008) Russia Is Not Jamaica, *New York Times*, August 17, WK11.

Ekecrantz, J. (2007) Media and communication studies going global, *Nordicom Review*, Jubilee Issue, 169–181.

Friedman, T.L. (2005) *The World Is Flat.* New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux.

Friedman, T.L. (2006) The First Law of Petropolitics, *Foreign Policy*, May–June, 28–36.

Fuller, T. (2008) This Time, Southeast Asia Watches Crisis from Afar, *New York Times*, November 22, p./ 5.

Gross, D. (2007–2008) Global Investment: Exec Desperately Seeks SWF, *Newsweek*, December 31– January 7, p. 22.

Hemer, O. (2008) The 'Development' Turn, *Glocal Times*, p. 11.

Hirsi Ali, A. (2010) How to Win the Clash of Civilations, *Wall Street Journal*, August 18, p. A17.

Hollinger, P. (2010) Street Fighter Sarkozy Needs to Lift Head for a Higher Vision, *Financial Times*, September 22, p. 2.

Kaplinsky, R. and Messner, D. (2008) Introduction: the impact of Asian drivers on the developing world, *World Development*, **36** (2), 197–209.

Nederveen Pieterse, J. (1989) *Empire and Emancipation: Power and Liberation on a World Scale*. New York: Praeger.

Nederveen Pieterse, J. (2004) *Globalization or Empire?* New York: Routledge.

Nederveen Pieterse, J. (2007) *Ethnicities and Global Multiculture: Pants for an Octopus*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Nederveen Pieterse, J. (2008a) *Is There Hope for Uncle Sam? Beyond the American Bubble*. London: Zed.

Nederveen Pieterse, J. (2008b) Globalization the next round: sociological perspectives, *Futures*, **40** (8), 707–720.

Nederveen Pieterse, J. and Rehbein, B. (eds) (2009) *Globalization and Emerging Societies: Development and Inequality*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Nilekani, N. (2008) Imagining a Better India: Lunch with BS, *Business Standard* (Kolkata), November 25, p. 8.

Petras, J. (2006) *The Power of Israel in the United States*. Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press.

Phillips, K. (2006) *American Theocracy: The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil, and Borrowed Money in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Viking.

Prada, P. (2010) Ex-guerilla on Cusp of Power in Brazil, *Wall Street Journal*, October 1, p.A1.

Richey, L.A. and Ponte, S. (2008) Better (red)TM than dead? Celebrities, consumption and international aid, *Third World Quarterly*, **29** (4), 711–729.

Robinson, M. and Murphy, D. (2009) *Greed Is Good: Maximization and Elite Deviance in America*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Russell, A. (2007) Growth Data Fuel Hopes of New Business Era in Africa, *Financial Times*, November 15, p. 13.

Schiller, D. (1999) *Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Sender, H. (2008) Sovereign Funds Go Cold on Reserve Finance, *Financial Times*, November 10, p. 15.

Sirkin, H.L., Hemerling, J.W. and Bhattacharya, A.K. (2008) *Globality: Competing with Everyone from Everywhere for Everything*. New York: Business Plus.

Stephens, P. (2008a) The Vulnerabilities that Lie Behind Putin's Belligerence, *Financial Times*, August 15, p. 13.

Stephens, P. (2008b) Broken Banks Put the State Back in the Driving Seat, *Financial Times*, November 28, p. 9.

Strange, S. (1996) *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sullivan, R. (2008) Islamic Investment Products Offer Boost to Global Exposure, *Financial Times*, November 3.

Summers, L. (2007) Sovereign Funds Shake the Logic of Capitalism, *Financial Times*, July 30, p. 13.

UNDP (1994) *Human Development Report*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Vitalis, R. (2006) *America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Wade, R. (1996) Japan, the World Bank and the art of paradigm maintenance: the East Asian miracle in political perspective, *New Left Review*, **217** (3), 36.

Wade, R. (2002) The United States and the World Bank: the fight over people and ideas, *Review of International Political Economy*, **9** (2), 201–229.

Wallerstein, I. (1984) The three instances of hegemony in the history of the capitalist world-economy, in I. Wallerstein (ed.), *The Politics of the World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 37–46.

Wehler, H.U. (1972) *Bismarck und der Imperialismus*. Köln: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag.

Weiner, E.J. (2010) *The Shadow Market: How A Group of Wealthy Nations and Powerful Investors Secretly Dominate the World*. New York: Scribner.

Wheatley, J. (2010) Brasil Basks in Petrobras Spotlight, *Financial Times*, September 26, p. 9.

Wolf, M. (2008) The Rescue of Bear Stearns Marks Liberalisation's Limit, *Financial Times*, March 26, p. 15.

World Bank Report (2007) *Africa Development Indicators*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Zakaria, F. (2008) *The Post-American World*. New York: Norton.

5

Digitization and Knowledge Systems of the Powerful and the Powerless

Saskia Sassen

The rapid proliferation of global computer-based networks and the growing digitization of knowledge, which allows it to circulate in those global networks, unsettle the standard meanings of knowledge (Benkler 2006; Mansell *et al.* 2009; Borgman 2010; Castells 2009; Bollier 2009). This in turn problematizes the effectiveness of current framings for understanding what is knowledge. It makes legible the particularity or embeddedness of the putatively "natural" or "scientific" categories through which formal institutions organize "their" knowledge – knowledge that has been defined as pertinent to their aims. In this process, network technologies have the potential to open up the categories of formalized knowledge and formalized knowledge practices. These bodies of knowledge can exit or go beyond hierarchical institutionalized controls. They can get disassembled and navigate the distributive potential of digital networks, and what were once unitary bodies of knowledge ensconced in specific categories can now get redeployed in bits and pieces and across diverse institutional orders (Sassen 2008, Chapters 7 and 8).

Critical to this potential is the informalizing of such bodies of knowledge, and their reassembling into novel mixes that are also likely to be informal, at least initially. The second critical dimension is that these reassembled and informalized bodies of knowledge can feed into novel and existing conditions – including political, economic, technical, cultural, and subjective. Opening up established categories and informalizing particular components of formal knowledge can be seen both in positive terms – for example, it can help the democratizing of spheres once subject to hierarchical controls – and in negative terms – for example, it has fed the increasingly unregulated power of global finance.

In this chapter, I examine these two critical dimensions in order to understand their variable articulations. A basic proposition is the importance of capturing the diversity and specificity of 'socio-digital formations' (Latham and Sassen 2005, Introduction; Benkler 2006; Lovink 2008; Bollier 2009; Wajcman 2002), and hence the possibility of whole new types of articulation between politics and knowledge. In principle, the range

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

of empirical cases we could use to examine some of these issues is vast. The specifics of each case allow us to identify particular patterns. Different kinds of socio-digital formations make legible different ways in which this articulation between informalized knowledge and political enablements can be constituted. Singling out informal types of knowledge allows one to capture what are often highly dynamic but not particularly legible moments in a trajectory that may well wind up formalizing some of the informal. It allows us to capture a far broader range of instances than if we confined the focus to formalized knowledge and practices. It takes the analysis well beyond the more familiar notions of exiting state regulatory frameworks. Indeed, in my research I also find emergent informalities at the center of highly formalized systems.

The focus is on digital interactive domains. For analytical purposes I distinguish the technical capacities of digital networks from the more complex socio-digital formations that such interactive domains actually constitute. Intervening mechanisms that may have little to do with the technology per se can reshape network outcomes such as distributed outcomes (with their strong connotations of democracy and participation). The fact of this re-shaping by the social logics of users and digitized actors carries implications for political practices, including governance and democratic participation.

The Specificity and Variability of Digital Formations

The technical properties of electronic interactive domains deliver their utilities through complex ecologies that include nontechnological variables, such as the social and the subjective, as well as the particular cultures of use of different actors. One synthetic image we can use is that these ecologies are partly shaped by the particular social logics embedded in diverse domains.[1] When we look at electronic interactive domains as such ecologies, rather than as a purely technical condition, we make conceptual and empirical room for informal knowledge and knowledge practices.

The technology can accommodate multiple particularities and still encompass them into a "whole" through horizontal dynamics, such as, for instance, recurrence, rather than vertical integration (Sassen 2008, Chapter 7). Recurrence of conditions/situations constitutes that knowledge as a multisited whole. These possibilities and systemic drives undermine generalization and bring to the fore the difficulty of formalizing these emergent types of knowledge. The greater velocities that digitization makes possible further drive the informalizing of whole bodies of knowledge, or some of their components. Velocity also makes legible, or helps us realize, the fact that a given knowledge might be in a trajectory that can include the use of that knowledge in political practices that in turn can generate emergent types of knowledge – that is, knowledge that is as yet informal, though it may eventually become formalized. One way of saying this is that what becomes legible is the experimental or circumstantial moment in the making of knowledge and, when pertinent, in the making of the political. With the particular applications, the velocity of uploading particular types of knowledge into new political practices and into new broader emergent knowledge, generalization is difficult. Marking/recognizing the recurrence of particularities is one form of generalizing.

The two cases used to develop the argument empirically are electronic financial networks and electronic activist networks.[2] Both cases are part of global dynamics and both have been significantly shaped by the three properties of digital networks – decentralized access/distributed outcomes, simultaneity, and interconnectivity. However, these technical properties have produced strikingly different outcomes in each case. In one case, these properties contribute to distributive outcomes: greater participation of local organizations in global networks. Thereby they help constitute transboundary public spheres or forms of globality centered in multiple localized types of struggles and agency. In the second case, these same properties have led to higher levels of control and concentration in the global capital market, even though the power of these financial electronic networks rests on a kind of distributed power, that is, millions of investors distributed around the world and their millions of individual decisions.

These two cases also illuminate an emergent problematic about the extent to which the combination of decentralized access and multiple choices will tend to produce power law distributions regardless of the social logics guiding users. Thus civil society organizations may well produce outcomes similar to finance in that a limited number of organizations concentrate a disproportionate share of influence, visibility, and resources. One way of thinking about this is in terms of political formats (e.g., Dean, Anderson, and Lovink 2006; Benkler 2006; Mansell *et al.* 2009; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001; Tennant 2007). Many civil society organizations have been subjected to constraints that force them into a format – akin to that of incorporated firms with conventional accountability requirements – that keeps them from using the new technologies in more radical ways. Thus I would argue that finance succeeds in escaping conventional formats when two or more financial exchanges merge and thereby constitute a networked platform, allowing them to maximize the utilities of network technologies (Sassen 2008, Chapters 7 and 8). In this sense, I would argue that finance has been far ahead of civil society in the use of networked technologies. It has actually invented new formats to accommodate its use: multisited networked platforms, where each financial centre is a node in the network. Civil society organizations have had many obstacles put in their way toward these types of networked arrangements. In many ways they have been forced to take the form of incorporated firms rather than networked platforms. There is, in my analysis, a political issue here that is yet another variable that contributes to produce diverse socio-digital formations, even when based on similar network technologies.

Electronic interactive domains are inherently distributive given their technical properties. However, once we recognize that social logics are at work in such interactive domains it is not necessarily the case that those distributive outcomes will be present every time. In politics, this distributive potential has led commentators to say that these electronic networks push towards democratizing outcomes. Again, this is partly an empirical question – it depends on what social logic (i.e., political project) is driving that network. In another finding that goes against much commentary, I have found that the higher the speed and the interconnectedness of the network in global finance, the greater the importance of informal systems of trust and cultures of technical interpretation (Sassen 2008, Chapter 7).

The condition of the Internet as a decentralized network of networks has fed strong notions about its built-in autonomy from state power and its capacity to enhance democracy from the bottom up via a strengthening of both market dynamics and access by civil society. In a context of multiple partial and specific changes linked to globalization, digitization has contributed to the ascendance and greater weight of subnational scales, such as the global city, and supranational scales, such as global markets, where previously the national scale was dominant. These re-scalings do not always parallel existing formalizations of state authority. At its most general these developments raise questions about the regulatory capacities of states and about their potential for undermining state authority as it has come to be constituted over the last century.

However, there are conditionalities not even these technologies can escape. Some that has received attention since the beginning are the social shaping of technology (e.g., MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999; Bowker and Star 1999; Latour 1996; Coleman 2004; Seely Brown and Duguid 2002; Lievrouw and Livingstone 2002), the limits of what speed can add to an outcome (e.g., MacKenzie and Elzen 1994; Sassen 1999, 2008, Chapter 7), the role of politics in shaping communication (e.g., Mansell and Silverstone 1998; Howard 2006; Lovink 2002; Dean 2002; Imbert 2008), the built-in stickiness of existing technical options (e.g., Shaw 2001; Woolgar 2002; Chen and de'Medici 2010), and the segmentations within digital space (e.g., Lessig 1996; Sassen 1999; Koopmans 2004; Monberg 1998).

Thus while digitization of instruments and markets was critical to the sharp growth in the value and power of the global capital market, this outcome was shaped by interests and logics that typically had little to do with digitization per se. This brings to the fore the extent to which digitized markets are embedded in complex institutional settings (e.g., MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Knorr Cetina and Preda 2004; Sassen 1991/2001), cultural frames (Lovink and Dean 2010; Thrift 2005; Zaloom 2003; Pryke and Allen 2000), and even intersubjective dynamics (Knorr Cetina and Bruegge 2002; Fisher 2006). While the raw power achieved by the capital markets through digitization also facilitated the institutionalizing of finance-dominated economic criteria in national policy, digitization per se could not have achieved this policy outcome – it took actual national institutional settings and actors (see Helleiner 1999; Pauly 2002; Sassen 2008, Chapter 5; Harvey 2007; for cases beyond the financial markets see, for example, Barfield, Heiduk, and Welfens 2003; Waesche 2003; Bollier 2009).

In short, the supranational electronic market, which partly operates outside any government's exclusive jurisdiction, is only one of the spaces of global finance. The other type of space is one marked by the thick environments of actual financial centers, places where national laws continue to be operative, albeit often profoundly altered laws. These multiple territorial insertions of private economic electronic space entail a complex interaction with national law and state authority. The notion of 'global cities' captures this particular embeddedness of various forms of global hypermobile capital – including financial capital – in a network of well over forty financial centers across the world.[3] This embeddedness carries significant implications for theory and politics, specifically for the conditions through which governments and citizens can act on this new electronic world (e.g., Latham and Sassen 2005; Roseneau and Singh 2002; Sassen 2008, Chapters 5, 8, and 9), though there are clearly limits (Robinson 2004; Olesen 2005; Lovink 2008; Fernando 2010; Wajcman 2002; Daniels 2009).

Producing capital mobility takes capital fixity: state-of-the-art environments, well-housed talent, and conventional infrastructure – from highways to airports and railways (Debrah, McGovern, and Budhwar 2010; Chen and de'Medici 2010; Sassen 1991/2001). These are all partly place-bound conditions, even when the nature of their place-boundedness differs from what it may have been a hundred years ago when place-boundedness was far more likely to be a form of immobility. However, digitization also brings with it an amplification of capacities that enable the liquefying of what is not liquid, thereby producing or raising the mobility of what we have customarily thought of as not mobile, or barely so. At its most extreme, this liquefying digitizes its object. Yet the hypermobility gained by an object through digitization is but one moment of a more complex condition.

In turn, much place-boundedness is today increasingly – though not completely – inflected or inscribed by the hypermobility of some of its components, products, and outcomes (Sassen 2008, Chapters 5, 7, and 8). More than in the past, both fixity and mobility are located in a temporal frame where speed is ascendant and consequential. This type of fixity cannot be fully captured through a description confined to its material and locational features. The real estate industry illustrates some of these issues. Financial firms have invented instruments that liquefy real estate, thereby facilitating investment in real estate and its "circulation" in global markets. Even though the physical remains part of what constitutes real estate, it has been transformed by the fact that it is represented by highly liquid instruments that can circulate in global markets. It may look the same, it may involve the same bricks and mortar, it may be new or old, but it is a transformed entity.[4]

Perhaps the opposite kind of articulation of law and territory from that of global finance is evident in a domain that has been equally transformed by digitization, but under radically different conditions. The key digital medium is the public access Internet, and the key actors are largely resource-poor organizations and individuals (for a range of instances see, for example, Friedman 2005; Imbert 2008; Daniels 2009; Tennant 2007). This produces a specific kind of activism, one centered on multiple localities yet connected digitally at scales larger than the local, often reaching a global scale. As even small, resource-poor organizations and individuals can become participants in electronic networks, it signals the possibility of a sharp growth in cross-border politics by actors other than states (Warkentin 2001; Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002; Bartlett 2007). What is of interest here is that while these are poor and localized actors, in some ways they can partly bypass territorial state jurisdictions and, though local, they can begin to articulate with others worldwide and thereby constitute an incipient global commons.

We see here the formation of types of global politics that run through the specificities of localized concerns and struggles yet can be seen as expanding democratic participation beyond state boundaries. I regard these as noncosmopolitan versions of global politics that in many ways raise questions about the relation of law to place that are the opposite of those raised by global finance.

From the perspective of state authority and territorial jurisdictions, the overall outcome might be described as a destabilization of older formal hierarchies of scale and an emergence of not fully formalized new ones. Older hierarchies of scale, dating from the period that saw the ascendance of the nation-state, continue to operate. They are typically organized in terms of institutional level and territorial scope: from the international down to the national, the regional, the urban, and the local. However, today's re-scaling dynamics cut across institutional size and across the institutional encasements of territory produced by the formation of national states (Harvey 2007; Mansell *et al.* 2009; Swyngedouw 1997; Taylor 2007; Graham 2003; Borja and Castells 1997).

Electronic Financial Markets: Making Informal Power Politics

Electronic financial markets are an interesting case because they are perhaps the most extreme example of how the digital might reveal itself to be indeed free of any spatial and, more concretely, territorial conditionalities. A growing scholarship examines the more extreme forms of this possibility, vis à vis both finance and other sectors (e.g., *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 1998; Korbin 2001; Benkler 2006; Bollier 2009; Fernando 2010). The mix of speed, interconnectivity, and enhanced leverage evinced by electronic markets produces an image of global finance as hypermobile and placeless. Indeed, it is not easy to demonstrate that these markets are embedded in anything social, let alone concrete, as in cement.

The possibility of an almost purely technical domain autonomous from the social is further reinforced by the growing role played by academic financial economics in the invention of new derivatives, today the most widely used instrument. It has led to an increasingly influential notion that, if anything, these markets are embedded in academic financial economics. The latter has emerged since the 1980s as the shaper and legitimator, or the author and authorizer, of a new generation of derivatives (Callon 1998; MacKenzie 2003; Barrett and Scott 2004; Knorr Cetina and Preda 2012). Formal financial knowledge, epitomized by academic financial economics, is a key competitive resource in today's financial markets; work in that field thus also represents the "fundamentals" of the market value of formal financial knowledge; that is, some of these instruments or models are more popular among investors than others.[5] Derivatives, in their many different modes, embody this knowledge and its market value.

These technical capabilities, along with the growing complexity of instruments, actually generate a need for cultures of interpretation in the operation of these markets, cultures best produced and enacted in financial centers – that is, very territorial, complex, and thick environments. Thus, and perhaps ironically, as the technical and academic features of derivatives instruments and markets become stronger, these cultures become more significant in an interesting trade-off between technical capacities and cultural capacities (Sassen 2008, Chapter 7). We can then use the need for these cultures of interpretation as an indicator of the limits of the academic embeddedness of derivatives and therewith recover the social architecture of derivatives trading markets. More specifically, it brings us back to the importance of financial centers – as distinct from financial "markets" – as key, nested communities enabling the construction and functioning of such cultures of interpretation. The need for financial centers also, then, explains why the financial system needs a network of such centers (Budd 1995; Sassen 1991/2001). This need, in turn, carries implications for territorially bounded authority and signals the formation of a specific type of territoriality, one marked by electronic networks and territorial insertions. Global cities are a more general, less narrowly technical instance of this same dynamic, including sectors other than finance. Beyond these types of formations there are other types of multisited global geographies – such as those binding Silicon Valley to Bangalore and kindred spaces (see generally Derudder *et al.* 2010; Chen and de'Medici 2010; Taylor *et al.* 2007; Graham 2003; Borja and Castells 1997).

Yet alongside these territorial insertions that give national states some traction in regulating even the most global of financial markets (and other kinds of global firms and markets), the massive increases in values traded has given finance a good measure of power over national governments. This increase is probably one of the most significant outcomes of digitization in finance, with three of its capacities particularly critical (Sassen 2008, Chapters 5 and 7).

One is the digitizing of financial instruments. Computers have facilitated the development of these instruments and enabled their widespread use. Much of the complexity can be contained in the software, enabling users who might not fully grasp either the financial mathematics nor the software algorithms involved. Further, when software facilitates proprietary rights it also makes innovations more viable. Through innovations finance has raised the level of liquidity in the global capital market and increased the possibilities for liquefying forms of wealth hitherto considered nonliquid. The overall result has been a massive increase in the securitizing of previously untradable assets, including various kinds of debt, and hence a massive increase in the overall volumes of global finance. Mediated through the specifics of contemporary finance and financial markets, digitization can then be seen as having contributed to a vast increase in the range of transactions.

Second, the distinctive features of digital networks can maximize the advantages of global market integration: simultaneous interconnected flows and decentralized access for investors and for exchanges in a growing number of countries. The key background factor here is that since the late 1980s countries have de- and re-regulated their economies to ensure cross-border convergence and the global integration of their financial centers. This nondigital condition amplified the new capabilities introduced by the digitization of markets and instruments.

Third, because finance is particularly about transactions rather than simply flows of money, the technical properties of digital networks assume added meaning. Interconnectivity, simultaneity, decentralized access, and software instruments, all contribute to multiply the number of transactions, the length of transaction chains (i.e., the distance between instrument and underlying assets), and thereby the number of participants. The overall outcome is a complex architecture of transactions that promote exponential growth in transactions and value.

These three features of today's global market for capital are inextricably related to the new technologies. The difference they have made can be seen in two consequences. One is the multiplication of specialized global financial markets. It is not only a question of global markets for equities, bonds, futures, and currencies but also of the proliferation of enormously specialized global sub-markets for each of these. This proliferation is a function of increased complexity in the instruments, in turn made possible by digitization of both markets and instruments.

The second consequence is that the combination of these conditions has contributed to the distinctive position of the global capital market in relation to several other components of economic globalization. We can specify two major traits: one concerns orders of magnitude and the second the spatial organization of finance. In terms of the first, indicators are the actual monetary values involved and, though more difficult to measure, the growing weight of financial criteria in economic transactions, sometimes referred to as the financializing of the economy. From 1980 to 2000, the total stock of financial assets increased three times faster than the aggregate gross domestic product (GDP) of the 23 highly developed countries that formed the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) for much of this period, and the volume of trading in currencies, bonds, and equities increased about five times faster. This aggregate GDP stood at about US$30 trillion in 2000, while the worldwide value of internationally traded derivatives had reached over US$65 trillion in the late 1990s, a figure that rose to US$168 trillion in 2001. Since 2000 the different growth rates have diverged even faster, with finance reaching US$262 trillion in 2004 and US$640 trillion in 2007, just before the financial crisis broke in September 2008 (Sassen 2011, Chapter 4), compared with US$15 trillion for global trade in 2007 and US$11 trillion for global foreign direct investment (FDI) stock.

A second major set of issues about the transformative capacities of digitization has to do with the limits of technologically driven change or, in other words, with the point at which this global electronic market for capital runs into the walls of its embeddedness in nondigital conditions. There are two distinct aspects here. One is the extent to which the global market for capital, even though global and digital, is actually embedded in multiple environments, some indeed global in scale, but others subnational, that is, the actual financial centres within which the exchanges are located (MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Harvey 2007; Knorr Cetina and Preda 2012; Sassen 2011, Chapters 4 and 5). A second issue is the extent to which it remains concentrated in a limited number of the most powerful financial centers notwithstanding its character as a global electronic market and the growing number of "national" financial centers that constitute it (Sassen 2008, Chapter 5; GAWC 2005; Taylor *et al.* 2007). The deregulation of finance could conceivably have led to wide geographic dispersal of this most electronic and global of markets.

The sharp concentration in leading financial markets can be illustrated with a few facts.[6] London, New York, Tokyo (notwithstanding a national economic recession), Paris, Frankfurt, and a few other cities regularly appear at the top *and* represent a large share of global transactions. This holds even after the 9/11 attacks in New York that destroyed the World Trade Center (though it was mostly not a financial complex) and damaged over 50 surrounding buildings, home to much financial activity. The level of damage was seen by many as a wakeup call to the vulnerabilities of sharp spatial centralization in a limited number of sites. London, Tokyo, New York, Paris (now consolidated with Amsterdam and Brussels as EuroNext), Hong Kong, and Frankfurt account for a major share of worldwide stock market capitalization. London, Frankfurt, and New York account for an enormous world share in the export of financial services. London, New York, and Tokyo account for 58% of the foreign exchange market, one of the few truly global markets; together with Singapore, Hong Kong, Zurich, Geneva, Frankfurt, and Paris, they account for 85% in this, the most global of markets. These high levels of concentration do not preclude considerable activity in a large number of other markets, even though the latter may account for a small global share.

This trend towards consolidation in a few centers, even as the network of integrated financial centers expands globally, is also evident within countries. In the United States, for instance, New York concentrates the leading investment banks with only one other major international financial centre in this enormous country, Chicago. Sydney and Toronto have equally gained power in continental-sized countries, and have taken over functions and market share from what were once the major commercial centers, respectively Melbourne and Montreal. So have Sao Paulo and Bombay, which have gained share and functions from respectively Rio de Janeiro in Brazil and New Delhi and Calcutta in India. These are all enormous countries and one might have thought that they could sustain multiple major financial centers, especially given their multipolar urban systems. It is not that secondary centers are not thriving, but rather that the leading centers have gained more rapidly and gained disproportionately from integration with global markets. This pattern is evident in many countries, including the leading economies of the world.

In brief, the private digital space of global finance intersects in at least two specific and often contradictory ways with the world of state authority and law. One is through the incorporation into national state policy of types of norms that reflect the operational logic of the global capital market rather than the national interest. The second is through the partial embeddedness of even the most digitized financial markets in actual financial centers, which partly returns global finance to the world of national governments although it does so under the umbrella of denationalized (i.e., global-oriented) components of the state regulatory apparatus. Global digitized finance makes legible some of the complex and novel imbrications between law and territory, notably that there is not simply an overriding of national state authority, even in the case of this most powerful of global actors. There is, rather, both the use of national authority for the implementation of regulations and laws that respond to the interests of global finance (with associated denationalizing of the pertinent state capacities involved) and the renewed weight of that authority through the ongoing need of the global financial system for financial centers.

These conditions raise a number of questions about the impact of this concentration of capital in global markets that allow for accelerated circulation in and out of countries. The global capital market now has the power to 'discipline' national governments, that is to say, to subject to financial criteria various monetary and fiscal policies that previously may have been subject to broader economic or social criteria. Does this trend alter the functioning of democratic governments? While the scholarly literature has not directly raised or addressed such questions, we can find more general responses, ranging from those who find that in the end the national state still exercises the ultimate authority in regulating finance to those who see in the larger global economy an emergent power gaining at least partial ascendance over national states.

A Global Space that Can Encompass the Immobile

Digital media are critical for place-centered activists focused on local issues that connect with other such groups around the world. This is cross-border political work centered on the fact that specific types of local issues recur in localities across the world.[7] These are politics that are partly embedded in nondigital environments that shape, give meaning to, and to some extent constitute the event, and in this regard are to be distinguished from the politics posited in the foundational theorizing about hacktivism (Denning 1999) and cyberwar (Der Derian 2001). However, they all share the fact of being forms of activism that contribute to an incipient unbundling of the exclusive authority, including symbolic authority, over territory and people we have long associated with the national state. This unbundling may well happen even when those involved are not necessarily problematizing the question of nationality or national identity; it can be a de facto unbundling of formal authority, one not predicated on a knowing rejection of the national.

None of this is historically new. Yet there are two specific matters that signal the need for empirical and theoretical work on their ICT enabled form. One is that much of the conceptualization of the local in the social sciences has assumed physical or geographic proximity, and thereby a sharply defined territorial boundedness, with the associated implication of closure. The other, partly a consequence of the first, is a strong tendency to conceive of the local as part of a hierarchy of nested scales amounting to an institutionalized hierarchy, especially once there are national states. Even if these conceptualizations hold for most of what is the local today, the new ICTs are destabilizing these arrangements and invite a re-conceptualization of the local able to accommodate instances that diverge from dominant patterns. Key among these current conditions are globalization and/or globality, as constitutive not only of cross-border institutional spaces but also of powerful imaginaries enabling aspirations to transboundary political practice even when the actors involved are basically localized and not mobile.

Computer-centered interactive technologies facilitate multiscalar transactions and simultaneous interconnectivity among those largely confined to a locality. They can be used to develop old strategies further and to develop new ways of organizing, notably electronic activism (Bartlett 2007; Denning 1999; Yang 2003; Rogers 2004; Bollier 2010). Internet media are the main type of ICT used, especially email, for organizations in the global South confined by little bandwidth and slow connections. To achieve the forms of globality that concern me in this chapter, it is important that there be a recognition of these technical constraints among major transnational organizations dealing with the global South. This is what activists began to do in the 1990s, for instance, making text-only databases, with no visuals or HTML, no spreadsheets, and none of the other facilities that demand considerable bandwidth and fast connections (Pace and Panganiban 2002, p. 113; Electronic Frontier Foundation 2002).[8]

As has been widely recognized, new ICTs do not simply replace existing media techniques. The evidence is far from systematic and the object of study is continuously undergoing change. However, we can basically identify two patterns. One is of no genuine need for these particular technologies given the nature of the organizing or, at best, underutilization. Another is creative utilization of the new ICTs along with older media to address the needs of particular communities, such as using the Internet to send audio files to be broadcast over loudspeakers to groups with no Internet connectivity, or that lack literacy. The M.S. Swaminathan Research Foundation in southern India has supported such work by setting up Village Knowledge Centres catering to populations that, even when illiterate, know exactly what types of information they need or want; for example, farmers and fishermen know the specific types of information they need at various times of the seasons. Amnesty International's International Secretariat has set up an infrastructure to collect electronic news feeds via satellite, which it then processes and redistributes to its staff workstations.

Use of these technologies also contributed to forming new types of organizations and activism beginning in the 1980s. Yang (2003) found that what were originally exclusively online discussions among groups and individuals in China concerned with the environment, evolved into active nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The diverse online hacktivisms examined by Denning (1999) are made up of mostly new types of activisms. Perhaps the most widely known case of how the Internet made a strategic difference, the Zapatista movement, became two organizational efforts: one a local rebellion in the mountains of Chiapas in Mexico, the other a transnational electronic civil society movement joined by multiple NGOs concerned with peace, trade, human rights, and other social justice struggles. The movement functioned through both the Internet and conventional media (Cleaver 1998; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001; Oleson 2005), putting pressure on the Mexican government. It shaped a new concept for civil organizing: multiple rhizomatically connected autonomous groups (Cleaver 1998).

Far less known is that the local Zapatistas lacked an email infrastructure (Cleaver 1998) let alone collaborative workspaces on the web. Messages had to be hand-carried, crossing military lines to bring them to others for uploading to the Internet; further, the solidarity networks themselves did not all have email and sympathetic local communities often had problems with access (Mills 2002, p. 83). Yet Internet-based media did contribute enormously, in good part because of pre-existing social networks, a fact that is important in social movements initiatives (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002; Tennant 2007) and in other contexts, including business (see Garcia 2002). Among the electronic networks involved, LaNeta played a crucial role in globalizing the struggle. LaNeta is a civil society network established with support from a San Francisco-based NGO, the Institute for Global Communication (IGC). In 1993 LaNeta became a member of the Association for Progressive Communications (APC) and began to function as a key connection between civil society organizations within and outside Mexico. A local movement in a remote part of the country transformed LaNeta into a transnational information hub.

All of this facilitates a new type of cross-border politics, deeply local yet intensely connected digitally. Activists can develop networks for circulating place-based information (about local environmental, housing, political conditions) that can become part of their political work and they can strategize around global conditions – the environment, growing poverty and unemployment worldwide, lack of accountability among multinationals, and so forth. While such political practices have long existed with other media and with other velocities, the new ICTs change the orders of magnitude, scope, and simultaneity of these efforts. This inscribes local political practice with new meanings and new potentialities. These dynamics are also at work in the constituting of global public spheres that may have little to do with specific political projects (Sack 2005; Krause and Petro 2003), though they do not always work along desired lines (Cederman and Kraus 2005).

Such multiscalar politics of the local can exit the nested scalings of national state systems, an option that already began to emerge strongly in the 1980s (e.g., Williamson, Alperovitz, and Imbroscio 2002; Drainville 2005; Tennant 2007; Bartlett 2007). They can directly access other such local actors in the same country and city or across borders. It is important not to forget the early, often arduous history of activists adapting the technology to their needs. One Internet-based technology that reflects the possibility of escaping nested hierarchies of scale is the now familiar online workspace mostly associated with office work and used for Internet-based collaboration (Bach and Stark 2005). It was developed by activists also as a way of escaping nested hierarchies of scale: to constitute a community of practice or knowledge network. An early example of such an activist online workspace was the Sustainable Development Communications Network (Kuntze, Rottmann, and Symons 2002), set up by a group of civil society organizations in 1998. It is a virtual, open, and collaborative organization to inform broader audiences about sustainable development and build members' capacities to use ICTs effectively. It has a trilingual Sustainable Development Gateway to integrate and showcase members' communication efforts. It contains links to thousands of member-contributed documents, a job bank, and mailing lists on sustainable development. It is one of several NGOs whose aim is to promote civil society collaboration through ICTs; others include the Association for Progressive Communications (APC), One World International, and Bellanet.

The types of political practice discussed here are not the cosmopolitan route to the global. They are global through the knowing multiplication of local practices. These are types of sociability and struggle deeply embedded in people's actions and activities. They also involve institution-building work with global scope that can come from localities and networks of localities with limited resources and from informal social actors. Actors "confined" by domestic roles can become actors in global networks without having to leave their work and roles in home communities. From being experienced as purely domestic and local, these "domestic" settings become microenvironments on global circuits. They need not become cosmopolitan in this process; they may well remain domestic and particularistic in their orientation and continue to be engaged with their households and local community struggles, and yet they are participating in emergent global politics. A community of practice can emerge that creates multiple lateral, horizontal communications, collaborations, solidarities, and supports.

Conclusion: Similar Technical Capabilities but Different Cultures of Use

The key effort of this chapter is to contest the still common proposition that interactive digital domains are an almost purely technical domain autonomous from the social. The chapter argued that interactive domains produce a kind of trade-off between technical capacities and the cultures of use of diverse communities. Further in this trade-off also lies a capacity to unsettle formalized knowledge systems – ranging from the knowledge systems of the actual engineer and computer scientist for developing the technology to the specific logics of diverse types of users.

The empirical cases through which these propositions were developed were high finance and global civil society. Neither can be reduced to the logic of the engineer or computer scientist – the logic of global civil society users and that of finance is not that of the engineer or computer scientist. Each has its own way of producing a knowledge system that is only partly shaped by the engineer or computer scientist and partly by their own concerns. The cultures of use of diverse actors are an indicator of the limits of the technological. In this process there is an informalizing of formal knowledge systems.

Capturing the diversity and specificity of "socio-digital formations" makes visible the possibility of whole new types of articulation between technology, cultures of use, and knowledge systems. It raises the potential to open up the categories of formalized knowledge and formalized knowledge practices. Critical to this potential is the informalizing of such bodies of knowledge, and their reassembling into novel mixes, which are also likely to be informal, at least initially. The second critical dimension is that these reassembled and informalized bodies of knowledge can feed into both novel and existing conditions – including political, economic, technical, cultural, and subjective.

Notes

1. For a full development of these various issues see Sassen (2008, Chapters 7 and 8).
2. The particularities of these two cases serve to address several larger research agendas now under way. They include specifying, among others, advancing our understanding of the actual socio-digital formations arising from these mixes of technology and interaction (Latham and Sassen 2005; Barry and Slater 2002; Bartlett 2007; Lovink 2008; Lovink and Dean 2010; Howard and Jones 2004), the possible new forms of sociality such mixes may be engendering (e.g., Castells 2009; Whittel 2001; Elmer 2004; Himanen 2001; Latham and Sassen 2005; Olesen 2005), the possible new forms of economic development and social justice struggles enabled by these technologies (Avgerou 2002; Gurstein 2000; Mansell *et al.* 2009), and the consequences for state authority of digital networks that can override many traditional jurisdictions (*Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 1998; Rosenau 2002; Klein 2005; Drake and Williams III 2006).
3. For instance, the growth of electronic network alliances among financial exchanges located in different cities makes legible that electronic markets are partly embedded in the concentrations of material resources and human talents of financial centers, because part of the purpose is to capture the specific advantages of each of the financial centers (Sassen 2008, Chapter 7). Thus, such alliances are not about transcending the exchanges involved or merging everything into one exchange.
4. I use the term "imbrication" to capture this simultaneous interdependence and specificity of each the digital and the nondigital. They work on each other, but they do not produce hybridity in this process. Each maintains its distinct irreducible character (Sassen 2008, Chapter 7).
5. The model designed for Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) was considered a significant and brilliant innovation. Others adopted similar arbitrage strategies, despite the fact that LTCM did its best to conceal its strategies (MacKenzie 2003). MacKenzie and Millo (2003) posit that two factors ensured the success of option pricing theory (Black–Scholes) in the Chicago Board Options Exchange. First, the markets gradually changed (e.g., alterations of Regulation T, the increasing acceptability of stock borrowing, and better communications) so that the assumptions of the model became increasingly realistic. Second, the spread of a particular technical culture of interpretation in the context of globalized economic processes gradually reduced barriers to the model's widespread use. The performativity of this model

was not automatic but "a contested, historically contingent outcome, ended by a historical event, the crash of 1987" (MacKenzie 2003, p. 138).

6. Among the main sources of data for the figures cited in this section are the International Bank for Settlements (Basle); International Monetary Fund (IMF) national accounts data; specialized trade publications such as *Wall Street Journal*'s WorldScope, Morgan Stanley Capital International; *The Banker*; and data listings in the *Financial Times* and in *The Economist*. For a more detailed account and full bibliography see Sassen (2011, Chapters 2, 4, and 5).
7. This parallels cases where use of the Internet has allowed diasporas to be globally interconnected rather than confined to a one-to-one relationship with the country or region of origin.
8. There are several organizations that work on adjusting to these constraints or providing adequate software and other facilities to disadvantaged NGOs. An early example is that of Bellanet (2002), a nonprofit organization set up in 1995 that played a critical role in Latin America. It helps poor NGOs gain access to online information and with information dissemination to the South. To that end it has set up web-to-email servers that can deliver web pages by email to users confined to low bandwidths. It has developed multiple service lines. Bellanet's Open Development service line seeks to enable collaboration among NGOs through the use of open source software, open content, and open standards; so it customized the Open Source PhP-Nuke software to set up an online collaborative space for the Medicinal Plants Network. Bellanet adopted Open Content making all forms of content on its web site freely available to the public; it supports the development of an open standard for project information (International Development Markup Language – IDML). Such open standards enable information sharing.

References

Arquilla, J. and Ronfeldt, D.F. (2001) *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.

Avgerou, C. (2002) *Information Systems and Global Diversity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bach, J. and Stark, D. (2005) Recombinant technology and new geographies of association, in R. Latham and S. Sassen (eds), *Digital Formations: IT and New Architectures in the Global Realm*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 37–53.

Barfield, C.E., Heiduk, G. and Welfens, P.J.J. (eds) (2003) *Internet, Economic Growth and Globalization: Perspectives on the New Economy in Europe, Japan and the USA*. New York: Springer.

Barrett, M. and Scott, S. (2004) Electronic trading and the process of globalization in traditional futures exchanges: a temporal perspective, *European Journal of Information Systems*, **13** (1), 65–79.

Barry, A. and Slater, D. (2002) Introduction: the technological economy, *Economy and Society*, **31** (2), 175–193.

Bartlett, A. (2007) The city and the self: the emergence of new political subjects in London, in S. Sassen (ed.), *Deciphering the Global: Its Spaces, Scales and Subjects*. New York and London: Routledge, pp. 221–242.

Bellanet (2002) *Report on Activities 2001–2002*, accessed 18/03/2006, http://home.bellanet.org.

Benkler, Y. (2006) *The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom*. New Haven, CN: Yale University Press.

Bollier, D. (2009) *Viral Spiral: How the Commoners Built a Digital Republic of Their Own*. New York: New Press.

Borgman, C.L. (2010) *Scholarship in the Digital Age: Information, Infrastructure, and the Internet*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Borja, J. and Castells, M. (1997) *The Local and the Global: Management of Cities in the Information Age*. London: Earthscan.

Bousquet, M. and Wills, K. (eds) (2003) *Web Authority: Online Domination and the Informatics of Resistance*. Boulder, CO: Alt-x Press.

Bowker, G.C. and Star, S.L. (1999) *Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its Consequences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Budd, L. (1995) Globalisation, territory, and strategic alliances in different financial centres source, *Urban Studies*, **32** (2), 345–360.

Callon, M. (1998) *The Laws of the Markets*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Castells, M. (1996) *The Rise of the Network Society: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, vol. **1**. Oxford: Blackwell.

Castells, M. (2001) *The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business and Society*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Castells, M. (2009) *Communication Power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cederman, L.-E. and Kraus, P.A. (2005) Transnational communications and the European demos, in R. Latham and S. Sassen (eds), *Digital Formations: IT and New Architectures in the Global Realm*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 283–311.

Chen, X. and de'Medici, T. (2010) Research Note – The 'instant city' coming of age: production of spaces in China's Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, *Urban Geography*, **31** (8), 1141–1147.

Cleaver, H. (1998) The Zapatista effect: the Internet and the rise of an alternative political fabric, *Journal of International Affairs*, **51** (2), 621–640.

Coleman, G. (2004) The political agnosticism of free and open source software and the inadvertent politics of contrast, *Anthropological Quarterly*, **77** (3), 507–519.

Daniels, J. (2009) *Cyber Racism: White Supremacy Online and the New Attack on Civil Rights*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Dean, J. (2002) *Publicity's Secret: How Technoculture Capitalizes on Democracy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.

Dean, J., Anderson, J.W. and Lovink, G. (2006) *Reformatting Politics: Information Technology and Global Civil Society*. London: Routledge.

Debrah, Y.A., McGovern, I. and Budhwar, P. (2010) Complementarity or competition: the development of human resources in the South-East Asian growth triangle: Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, **11**, 314–335.

Denning, D. (1999) *Information Warfare and Security*. New York: Addison-Wesley.

Der Derian, J. (2001) *Virtuous War: Mapping the Military–Industrial–Media–Entertainment Network*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Derudder, B., Taylor, P., Ni, P., De Vos, A., Hoyler, M., Hanssens, H., Bassens, D., Huang, J., Witlox, F., Shen, W. and Yang, X. (2010) Pathways of change: shifting connectivities in the World City Network, 2000–2008, *Urban Studies*, **47** (9), 1861–1877.

Drainville, A. (2005) *Contesting Globalization: Space and Place in the World Economy*. London: Routledge.

Drake, W.J., and Williams III, E.M. (2006) *Governing Global Electronic Networks: International Perspectives on Policy and Power*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Electronic Frontier Foundation (2002) *Activist Training Manual*, presented at the Ruckus Society Tech Toolbox Action Camp, June 24–July 2.

Elmer, G. (2004) *Profiling Machines: Mapping the Personal Information Economy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Fernando, V. (2010) *Think Tank Warns That Hong Kong's Dangerous Dependence on Finance Could Result in Catastrophe*, accessed 30/12/2010, http://www.businessinsider.com/hong-kong-financial-sector-too-big-2010-6.

Fidler, D.P. (1998) Symposium: The Internet and the Sovereign State: the role and impact of cyberspace on national and global governance, *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, **5** (2), 415–421.

Fisher, M. (2006) Wall Street women: navigating gendered networks in the new economy, in M. Fisher, and G. Downey (eds), *Frontiers of Capital: Ethnographic Reflections on the New Economy*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, pp. 209–236.

Fraser, N. (2007) Transnationalizing the public sphere: on the legitimacy and efficacy of public opinion in a post-Westphalian world, *Theory, Culture and Society*, **24** (4), 7–30.

Friedman, E.J. (2005) The reality of virtual reality: the Internet and gender equality advocacy in Latin America, *Latin American Politics and Society*, **47** (3), 1–34.

Garcia, L. (2002) Architecture of global networking technologies, in S. Sassen (ed.) *Global Networks, Linked Cities*. London: Routledge, pp. 39–70.

GAWC (2005) *Globalization and World Cities Study Group and Network*, accessed 18/03/2006, http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/.

Glasius, M., Kaldor, M. and Anheier, J. (eds) (2002) *Global Civil Society Yearbook 2002*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Graham, S. (ed.) (2003) *The Cybercities Reader*. London: Routledge.

Gurstein, M. (ed.) (2000) *Community Informatics: Enabling Communities with Information and Communication Technologies*. Hershey, PA: Idea Group.

Harvey, R. (2007) The sub-national constitution of global markets, in S. Sassen (ed.), *Deciphering the Global: Its Spaces, Scales and Subjects*. New York and London: Routledge, pp. 199–216.

Helleiner, E. (1999) Sovereignty, territoriality and the globalization of finance, in D. A. Smith, Solinger, D.J. and Topik, S. (eds), *States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy*. London: Routledge, pp. 138–157.

Himanen, P. (2001) *The Hacker Ethic and the Spirit of the Information Age*. New York: Random House.

Howard, P.N. (2006) *New Media Campaigns and the Managed Citizen*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Howard, P.N. and Jones, S. (eds) (2004) *Society Online: The Internet in Context*. London: Sage.

Imbert, P. (ed.) (2008) *Theories of Inclusion and Exclusion in Knowledge-Based Societies*. Ottawa, Canada: University of Ottawa Press.

Khagram, S., Riker, J.V. and Sikkink, K. (eds) (2002) *Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Klein, H. (2005) ICANN Reform: establishing the rule of law, prepared for the *World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS)*, accessed 18/03/2006, http://www.ip3.gatech.edu/images/ICANN-Reform_Establishing-the-Rule-of-Law.pdf.

Knorr Cetina, K. and Bruegger, U. (2002) Global microstructures: the virtual societies of financial markets, *American Journal of Sociology*, **107** (4), 905–950.

Knorr Cetina, K. and Preda, A. (eds) (2004) *The Sociology of Financial Markets*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Knorr Cetina, K. and Preda, A. (2012) *Handbook of the Sociology of Finance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Koopmans, R. (2004) Movements and media: selection processes and evolutionary dynamics in the public sphere, *Theory and Society*, **33** (3–4), 367–391.

Korbin, S.J. (2001) Territoriality and the governance of cyberspace, *Journal of International Business Studies*, **32** (4), 687–704.

Krause, L. and Petro, P. (eds) (2003) *Global Cities: Cinema, Architecture, and Urbanism in a Digital Age*. New Brunswick, NJ, and London: Rutgers University Press.

Kuntze, M., Rottmann, S. and Symons, J. (2002) *Communications Strategies for World Bank and IMF-Watchers: New Tools for Networking and Collaboration*. London: Bretton Woods Project and Ethical Media, accessed 18/03/2006, http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/strategy/commosrpt.pdf.

Latham, R., and Sassen. S. (2005) Introduction. Digital formations: constructing an object of study, in R. Latham and S. Sassen (eds), *Digital Formations: IT and New Architectures in the Global Realm*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 1–34.

Latour, B. (1996) *Aramis or the Love of Technology*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Lebert, J. (2003) Writing human rights activism: Amnesty International and the challenges of information and communication technologies, in M. McCaughey and M. Ayers (eds), *Cyberactivism: Online Activism in Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge, pp. 209–232.

Lessig, L. (1996) The zones of cyberspace, *Stanford Law Review*, **48**, 1403–1412.

Lievrouw, L.A. and Livingstone, S. (eds) (2002) *Handbook of New Media: Social Shaping and Consequences of ICTs*. London: Sage Publications.

Lovink, G. (2002) *Dark Fiber: Tracking Critical Internet Culture*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Lovink, G. (2008) *Zero Comments: Blogging and Critical Internet Culture*. London: Routledge.

Lovink, G. and Dean, J. (2010) *Blog Theory: Feedback and Capture in the Circuits of Drive*. UK: Polity.

MacKenzie, D. (2003) Long-term capital management and the sociology of arbitrage, *Economy and Society*, **32** (3), 349–380.

MacKenzie, D. and Elzen, B. (1994) The social limits of speed: the development and use of supercomputers, *IEEE Annals of the History of Computing*, **16** (1), 46–61.

MacKenzie, D. and Millo, Y. (2003) Constructing a market, performing theory: the historical sociology of a financial derivatives exchange, *American Journal of Sociology*, **109** (1), 107–145.

MacKenzie, D. and Wajcman, J. (1999) *The Social Shaping of Technology*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Mansell, R. and Silverstone, R. (1998) *Communication by Design: The Politics of Information and Communication Technologies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mansell, R., Avgerou, C., Quah, D. and Silverstone, R. (eds) (2009) *The Oxford Handbook of Information and Communication Technologies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mills, K. (2002) Cybernations: identity, self-determination, democracy, and the 'Internet effect' in the emerging information order, *Global Society*, **16** (1), 69–87.

Monberg, J. (1998) Making the public count: a comparative case study of emergent information technology-based publics, *Communication Theory*, **8** (4), 426–454.

Olesen, T. (2005) Transnational publics: new space of social movement activism and the problem of long-sightedness, *Current Sociology*, **53** (3), 419–440.

Pace, W.R. and Panganiban, R. (2002) The power of global activist networks: the campaign for an international criminal court, in P.I. Hajnal (ed.), *Civil Society in the Information Age*. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 109–126.

Pauly, L. (2002) Global finance, political authority, and the problem of legitimation, in T.J. Biersteker and R.B. Hall (eds), *The Emergence of Private Authority and Global Governance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 76–90.

Pryke, M. and Allen, J. (2000) Monetized time-space: derivatives – money's "new imaginary"?, *Economy and Society*, **29** (2), 329–344.

Robinson, S. (2004) Towards a neoapartheid system of governance with IT tools, *SSRC IT and Governance Study Group*. New York: SSRC, accessed 18/03/2006, http://www.ssrc.org/programs/itic/publications/knowledge_report/memos/robinsonmemo4.pdf.

Rogers, R. (2004) *Information Politics on the Web*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Rosenau, J.N. (2002) Information technologies and the skills, networks, and structures that sustain world affairs, in R. Rosenau, and J.P. Singh (eds), *Information Technologies and Global Politics: The Changing Scope of Power and Governance*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, pp. 275–288.

Sack, W. (2005) Discourse, architecture, and very large-scale conversation, in R. Latham, and S. Sassen (eds), *Digital Formations: IT and New Architectures in the Global Realm*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 242–282.

Sassen, S. (1991/2001) *The Global City*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Sassen, S. (1999) Digital networks and power, in M. Featherstone and S. Lash (eds), *Spaces of Culture: City, Nation, World*. London: Sage, pp. 49–63.

Sassen, S. (2008) *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Sassen, S. (2011) *Cities in a World Economy*, 4th updated edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage/Pine Forge.

Seely Brown, J. and Duguid, P. (2002) *The Social Life of Information*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

Shaw, D. (2001) Playing the links: interactivity and stickiness in .Com and "Not.Com" web sites, *First Monday* 6, accessed 18/03/2006, http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue6_3/shaw.

Swyngedouw, E. (1997) Neither global nor local: "globalization" and the politics of scale, in K.R. Cox (ed.), *Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local*. New York: Guilford, pp. 137–166.

Taylor, P.J. (2004) *World City Network: A Global Urban Analysis*. London: Routledge.

Taylor, P.J., Derudder, B., Saey, P. and Witlox, F. (eds) (2007) *Cities in Globalization: Practices, Policies Theories*. London: Routledge.

Tennant, E.W. (2007) Locating transnational activists: solidarity with and beyond propinquity, in S. Sassen (ed.), *Deciphering the Global: Its Spaces, Scales and Subjects*. New York and London: Routledge, pp. 119–138.

Thrift, N. (2005) *Knowing Capitalism*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Waesche, N.M. (2003) *Internet Entrepreneurship in Europe: Venture Failure and the Timing of Telecommunications Reform*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Wajcman, J. (ed.) (2002) Addressing technological change: the challenge to social theory, *Current Sociology*, **50** (3), 347–363.

Warkentin, C. (2001) *Reshaping World Politics: NGOs, the Internet, and Global Civil Society*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Whittel, A. (2001) Toward a network sociality, *Theory, Culture and Society*, **18** (6), 51–76.

Williamson, T., Alperovitz, G. and Imbroscio, D.L. (2002) *Making a Place for Community: Local Democracy in a Global Era*. London: Routledge.

Woolgar, S. (ed.) (2002) *Virtual Society? Technology, Cyberpole, Reality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Yang, G. (2003) Weaving a green web: the Internet and environmental activism in China, *China Environment Series*, vol. 6. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Centers for Scholars.

Zaloom, C. (2003) Ambiguous numbers: trading technologies and interpretation in financial markets, *American Ethnologist*, **30** (2), 258–272.

6

Media Cultures in a Global Age

A Transcultural Approach to an Expanded Spectrum

Nick Couldry and Andreas Hepp

"Media" produce narratives that, like all narratives, simplify the social and political space they describe. Traditional narratives of "culture" simplify processes of meaning-making in particular places, by claiming they add up to a coherent whole. The term "media culture" therefore might sound like a simplification of simplifications and so hardly of much use. The aim of this essay is to show that, used in the right way, "media culture" is an important concept for navigating today's cultural complexity (Hannerz 1992); from that basis, we will discuss some priorities for critical media research as it addresses the diversity of media cultures across the world.

The term "media culture" is not a new one,[1] but it is substantially underdeveloped. Much media and communication research within the field of "intercultural communication" and "international communication" still adopts a "container theory" (Beck 2000, p. 23) of society, interpreting "media cultures" as always "national" and bounded by the territorial containers of national states. However, the contemporary media landscape is marked by a greater complexity; media globalization and the increased flows of media across national borders (Tomlinson 1999) driven by factors of both supply and demand make it dangerous to reduce all cultural patterns in media communication to those that can be characterized as national. Some patterns may be related more to deterritorialized entities that lie beyond the national context: for example, certain professional journalism cultures (Mancini 2007), transnational diasporas (Georgiou 2006) or other forms of deterritorialized media cultures (Hepp 2008). To be sure, the national context does not disappear altogether; it remains an important reference point for constructing meaning within media communication, and especially within political media communication. However, we cannot advance our understanding of broader questions of culture unless we adopt a new perspective for researching media cultures comparatively, a perspective we want to call "transcultural". It is within the context of this approach that we intend the term "media cultures" to be read.

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

In this chapter, we recall initially the older "container" model of national societies and cultures and the move beyond it to that already well established by theorists such as Beck, Giddens, and Urry, while noting that the resulting "intercultural" approach remains surprisingly prominent in media research. Then in the main part of the chapter we explore, in three stages, what such a move might concretely involve for the study of media cultures. First, we introduce the concept of "translocal cultures", and media cultures, "translocally" understood. Second, we explore in more detail what is needed to compare media cultures within a transcultural approach, focusing in particular on the dynamics that lead to the thickening of cultural processes in particular spatial configurations. This takes us to an earlier radical challenge to the notion of national culture by anthropologist Ulf Hannerz, which enables us to formulate in more detail the levels on which media cultures, transculturally understood, become distinct. That takes us, third, to consider the underlying economic and other needs that shape the emergence of different media cultures. From there we are able to propose certain priorities for critical media research of media cultures within a transcultural approach. The result is to suggest a wider spectrum for comparison and understanding of media cultures than has previously been grasped.

The Container Model of National Societies and Media Cultures

In recent years, a number of sociologists of globalization have developed a critique of the "container thinking" found in traditional sociology. According to Ulrich Beck, in most sociology (not only functionalist sociology) societies are by definition subordinated to states: "societies", he writes, are "*state* societies, of social order as state order" (Beck 2000, p. 23, italics original). Within this problematic container thinking, an American, German, or British society is thought of as bordered by a "state container" so it becomes a territorial entity. While such a way of thinking might be appropriate for theorizing modern states at their beginning, Beck argues it is not adequate for social forms shaped by globalization processes that cross national borders and construct transnational social spaces. Indeed, Anthony Giddens had already analyzed in *The Consequences of Modernity* the disembedding forces of modernity (of which mediated communications are among the most important), which help generate in processes of globalization. Giddens reminds us that with globalization all "societies are also interwoven with ties and interconnections which crosscut the sociopolitical system of the state and the cultural order of the 'nation'" (Giddens 1990, p. 14). It follows – a point that Giddens had noted even earlier – that what we call societies are best thought of not as "wholes", but only as levels of relative "systemness", which "'stand out' … from a background of … other systemic relationships within which they are embedded" (Giddens 1984, p. 164).

John Urry and Manuel Castells have taken this discussion further.[2] John Urry (2000) argued in his book *Sociology Beyond Societies* that sociology must research and theorize *social processes* beyond an assumed (territorially bound) national society. One way this can be undertaken is outlined in Urry's book *Global Complexity* (2003), where he tries to theorize transnational social forms using the concepts of "network" and "fluidity".

Manuel Castells' (1996, 2009) concept of the "network society" has a similar focus, attempting to describe social structures and their transformation beyond a national-territorial frame: network structures and spaces of flows are articulated *across* territorial borders and nation states. We leave aside here the question of whether the resulting account of the social is satisfactory, or too thin to explain what it is that is networked.[3]

Such critiques of "container thinking" within social theory involve three essential points. First, they offer a critique of the container concept of *the state* and a rejection of the idea that the state is something like the "reservoir of society", insisting that the state's relationship to its own social and to wider human, economic, and policy flows is much more complex than the "container" model allows. Saskia Sassen's subsequent work (Sassen 2007) has taken this rethinking of the state to an even more sophisticated and detailed level. Second, they reject assumptions that *the nation* is territorialized – the idea that there is something distinct about national ways of living that is unquestionably related to a defined territory, so undermining a key tenet of much nationalist thinking within politics: for a related discussion of the implications for political theory, see Benhabib (2002). Third, they offer a critique of theories of these nationally and territorially bound "container societies", which treat them as *functionally integrated* and so ignore all the disembedding, transgressive and dysfunctional processes of contemporary social life. In this sense the critique of "container thinking" within social theory has to be contextualized within a longer tradition of critiques of functionalist thinking in social research, including media research (Couldry 2003, 2005). That anti-functionalist argument remains, we believe, important to media research and should therefore be assumed to run in parallel to our explicit argument here.

Equally vulnerable to, and to some extent implicit within, these critiques is the notion of national media cultures; indeed, John Urry (2000) argues that *non*-national aspects of media flows are critical to the emergence of social processes "beyond societies". Yet until the 1990s the practical sealing-off of one broadcast territory from another meant that national media cultures could be the unproblematic reference point of Benedict Anderson's innovative and subtle account of the nation as an imagined community (Anderson 1983). Intensifying debates over media imperialism and cultural imperialism[4] challenged this automatic reference point, and Arjun Appadurai's concept of transborder "mediascapes" was an important attempt to rethink the global space of media flows (Appadurai 1990).

Barriers to some transborder media flows, however, continue – at least for many media consumers – notwithstanding digitalization's removal of the technological need for such barriers in the case of newspapers and radio, which are now largely available online from anywhere. Not surprisingly perhaps, container thinking is still found in subtle ways to influence the latest media research, even though, from the point of view of theory, the idea that a nation's media production, consumption, and distribution neatly converge in a single thing we can call its "media culture" is increasingly problematic. Even the most sophisticated model so far developed for comparing the media infrastructures of different societies (Hallin and Mancini's (2004) theory of "media systems") assumes something like this container model, when it goes on to make *cultural* conclusions from its comparison of media systems, claiming that a country's type of media system shows us something not only about how its media cover its political system but also about its



Figure 6.1 Intercultural approach to comparative media research.

wider society and culture. We do not rule out such cultural consequences of different media systems; our argument rather is that such consequences need to be argued on a stronger basis than mere assumption, and it is here – in the search for evidence – that problems begin.

Let us assume, however, as our starting point that much current media research still involves an implicit "territorial essentialism",[5] even as it tries to move toward rigorous international comparison (McMillin 2007; Thussu 2009). The state remains the principal reference point, on the basis of which media systems, media markets, and media cultures are theorized and then compared. This "intercultural approach" to comparative media research might be visualized as follows (see Figure 6.1).

The danger of this approach is that it essentializes the relation between state, (political) media system, media market, and media culture into a set of binary comparisons that reduce the complexity of what can usefully be compared with what. As a result, it obscures from view the contradictions and divergences that exist within the (nation-based) terms under comparison. As to *media culture*, this territorial essentialism is particularly problematic, since contemporary media cultures are not bound in such national containers and so are not available to be compared in this way. A move beyond this essentialism is necessary if contemporary relations between media and culture are to be illuminated.

Theorizing Media Culture Beyond the Container Model

From the beginnings of Hollywood film, it has been impossible to understand the flow of media products solely within national borders. Early in the twenty-first century we are compelled to recognize a complexity so great that it just cannot be contained within the two possibilities that previously dominated the analysis of media flows: either national media industries operating independently or such industries subverted by products from other dominant national industries, especially the United States (the well-known theses of media and cultural imperialism; see Tunstall 1977; Boyd-Barrett 1998; Schiller 1969). The growing maturity of a whole range of global and regional producers (Tunstall 2008) is now generating production/consumption flows that cross national borders in unpredictable ways: for example, the pan-regional audiences for the Arabic version of the *American Idol* format, *Star Academy* (Kraidy 2009). The ability to access online the broadcasting of *other* countries through file-sharing systems such as Bit-Torrent, whatever the legality of such access, has transformed forever the dynamics of media consumption in any *one* place.

Our particular concern here is with the implications of such infrastructural transformations for media culture: that is, for how media experience *feels* in different places. To understand this, we must start from broader theorizations of culture.

Translocal Cultures

We offer here a translocal approach to culture (cf. Hepp 2008). Some time ago, Jan Nederveen Pieterse (1995) distinguished "territorial" from "translocal" understandings of culture. Territorial concepts of culture are inward-looking, endogenous, focused on organicity, authenticity, and identity; translocal concepts of culture are outward-looking, exogenous, focused on hybridity, translation, and identification. Given the basis of media in *transmission*, media cultures are best understood from the outset in a translocal frame; all media cultures are more or less hybrid and have had to translate and transform their contents and overall features in response to translocal flows. It was appropriate therefore that early in the debate that followed Anderson's imagined community thesis, Philip Schlesinger asked what is "national" about the supposedly national media cultures that we routinely discuss (Schlesinger 1991, pp. 161–162). More helpful than such territorial theorizing is to acknowledge that media cultures – as the "sum" of the classificatory systems and discursive formations on which the production of meaning in everyday practices draws (Hall 1997, p. 222) – always transgress the "purely" local but without necessarily being focused on territoriality *at all* as their reference point. In this sense, media cultures are best understood as *thickenings* (a term to which we return; see Löfgren 2001) of *translocal* processes of meaning-making that are more or less locally specific.

This means that the borders of the "cultural thickenings" to which we belong do not necessarily correspond with territorial borders. Certainly national territories continue to be highly relevant for constructing community, due not least to the nation-building strategies of states, but also deterritorial thickenings (e.g., fan cultures, migrant media cultures, or political protest cultures) *gain* relevance with increasing global media connectivity. The outcome is that in media cultures today, we have two contrasting movements simultaneously: first, the sustaining of territorially focused thickenings of communicative connections (it still after all makes sense to talk of mediated regional or national communities as reference points for identities) and, second, communicative thickenings *across* territorial borders, which allow deterritorialized translocal communities to develop their identities.

A translocal approach to culture is, as already noted, particularly suitable for understanding media cultures, since media communication is inherently translocal. Rooted in processes of media communication, media cultures by definition transgress the local and articulate a translocal horizon. However, if the term "translocal" captures the communicative connectivity of the media, the ruling metaphor of "locality" emphasizes that – even in a time of media globalization – the local world does not cease to exist. However far the world's communicative connectivity intensifies, as physical human beings each of us continues to live her or his life primarily in a locale (Moores 2000; Hepp 2009b). "Trans" as a prefix shifts our attention from exclusive questions of locale to questions of connectivity between and across multiple locales. Being in a place, with and through media, remains important, but it has changed its meaning fundamentally (Morley 2000) and our basic descriptive language in media research needs to reflect this.

Media Cultures, Translocally Understood

What then is a media culture? If our starting point is no longer cultures that are naturally embedded within territorial boundaries, but rather cultures *formed* from flows across borders – and if media technologies are one key enabler of such flows (although as Appadurai reminds us, not the only one: Appadurai 1990) – then media cultures are best understood at the outset as the distinctive media-based "terrains"[6] for mutual comunication that emerge and stabilize from such flows.

More specifically, we would define a media culture as *any culture whose primary resources of meaning are provided by technologies of media communication*. Such a definition takes into account the fact that no culture is fully mediatized (Krotz 2009) in the sense that all of its resources are provided exclusively by the media. Nor, although we often talk of our cultures as "media saturated", are all members of those cultures "saturated" with media to the same degree (Bird 2003, p. 3). It is vital to emphasize this, since media discourses (particularly what one of us has called the "myth of the mediated centre": Couldry 2003, p. 2) obscure such complexity. Media present themselves as "the" media, our central access point to the "center" of society. Indeed, this mythical language is increasingly necessary to the media's attempts to retain their legitimacy as social institutions, and so have a secure claim on our attention (Couldry 2009). Put another way, it is particular media's claims to "centrality" that are crucial to a media culture emerging as a distinctive terrain within a much larger translocal media flow (Hepp 2012).

From here it follows that media cultures are not just cultures marked by an increasing quantitative saturation and qualitative shaping of culture through media communication (Hepp 2009a); in addition, media cultures are cultures in which "the media" succeed in constructing themselves as primary resources of meaning for members of that culture who need *not* be territorially defined. Media cultures – and the primary focus on a particular range of media that they imply – can therefore be seen as a site of cultural contestation in a world where the volume of *potentially* available media flows goes on increasing exponentially.

Having dislodged the notion of "media cultures" from any assumed territorial basis, we now need to explore the alternative (not necessarily territorial) ways in which media cultures are distinguished from each other.

A Transcultural Approach to Studying Media Cultures

The arguments we have developed concerning media cultures referred to both "territorialization" and "deterritorialization" – here understood as processes of meaning articulation with respectively more, or less close, relations to specific territories.[7]



Figure 6.2 Transcultural approach to comparative media research.

Territorialized "container thinking" is insufficient to understand media cultures, whether individually or comparatively. But where to start if we want to grasp what distinguishes media cultures from each other?

The answer is to develop what we want to call a *transcultural* approach to comparative media research, represented in Figure 6.2. In this approach, media cultures' causal relations to, and spatial distribution within, national media systems are not pre-judged in advance, but left open for further analysis.[8] The implications of this are unpacked below (see Figure 6.2).

First we must clarify the term "*trans*cultural", which builds on the insights of Nederveen Pieterse's translocal reading of culture. By the term "transcultural" we do not claim research should only focus on media forms that emerge "beyond" or "across" cultures. We use the term instead in Wolfgang Welsch's (1999) sense to mean that in the contemporary era important cultural phenomena cannot be broken down into features of cultures based in specific territories. Instead, contemporary cultural forms are increasingly generated *and* communicated across multiple territories.

Transcultural Comparison

A transcultural approach to comparison assumes as its starting point the existence of global media capitalism. Across different states global media capitalism drives the movement of media in markets (Herman and McChesney 1997; Hesmondhalgh 2007). Global media capitalism does not, however, standardize the articulation of meaning because its meanings are "over-determined" (Ang 1996). Quite often global media capitalism is a source of cultural fragmentation, contestation, and misunderstanding – not only *between* national cultures but also *within* them. Within global media capitalism political media systems are the most territorially related entities, because the legitimacy of political decision-making is still to a high degree focused on the state. Nevertheless, as soon as questions of media culture are considered, cultural thickenings can either be articulated with reference to a state and its territory or they can transgress state boundaries (as do diasporic cultures, popular cultures, social movements, or religious belief cultures) in communities linked across territorial boundaries.

This transcultural approach to comparing media cultures overcomes the limits of an "intercultural approach" by not *assuming* the nation state as its reference point, yet not excluding the state as a possible reference point either. A transcultural approach understands media cultures as the results of thickenings that occur within an increasingly global connectivity. Such a comparative semantic considers the *specificity* of such thickenings and the complex interrelations between them. To do so it must rid itself definitively of the methodological nationalism of "container-based" approaches to society, culture, and media.

We need, however, to be more specific about what is thickened (Löfgren 2001) and how exactly thickening works within a particular media culture. This will help us grasp better how various media cultures might be distinguished from each other. At the methodological level, the answer lies in looking for various types of pattern in media cultures, as we have argued elsewhere (Couldry and Hepp 2011; Hepp and Couldry 2010). Comparative research of media cultures should look for cultural patterns at the levels of thinking, discourse, and practices, while reflecting on their interrelation. The term "pattern" is misleading if it suggests something static; we are interested instead in patterned process, that is, typical "ways" of thought, discourse or action in a cultural context. A cultural pattern is a specific "form" or "type" highlighted in cultural analysis.

In this sense we see (media) cultures as a thickening of specific patterns of thought, discourse, and action, but many typical cultural patterns are not exclusive to the culture to be analyzed. It is precisely at this point where the hybridity of all cultures manifests itself (Kraidy 2005). However, within the context of certain patterned connectivities, each (media) culture has a certain specificity as a territorialized or deterritorialized thickening. The term "thickening" emphasizes how each culture's specificity is constituted, not just from the totality of its patterns but also, crucially, from its openness to external influences, that is, the nonexclusivity of many of those patterns.

As yet, however, this does not tell us much about the dynamics that make possible, and shape, various sorts of thickening. Here we can draw usefully on the work of another writer who was important in the move beyond a container model of cultural analysis, the anthropologist, Ulf Hannerz.

Hannerz on Cultural Complexity

"Complex societies" for Hannerz are distinctive in two ways (1992, p. 7). First, the meanings that exist in such societies do not just exist "in themselves" (as thoughts or ideas of specific people), but quite separately they are translated into *external forms* for public consumption. Thus royal ritual in Britain, Sweden, or Thailand is not just the meanings and ideas of those who participate in it directly, but also the externalized form that royal ritual takes for a whole society, particularly through the media forms in which it is publicly communicated. Second, those meanings (whether externalized or not) have to be *distributed* to the members of a complex society, who inevitably are dispersed across space. There is no reason to assume that the distribution is even. Hannerz goes on to analyze complex cultures in terms of three interrelated dimensions:

- *ideas and modes of thought*, … the entire array of concepts, propositions, values and the like which people within some social unit carry together, as well as their various ways of handling their ideas in characteristic modes of mental operation;
- *forms of externalization*, the different ways in which meaning is made accessible to the senses, made public; and
- *social distribution*, the ways in which the collective cultural inventory of meanings and meaningful external forms – that is, (1) and (2) together – is spread over a population and its social relationships (Hannerz 1992, p. 7; italics in original).

What was from the outset radical about Hannerz's work was its challenge to the container model of culture. While still using (as the focus for his critique) the reference point of national societies, Hannerz showed (ahead of Beck and others) that societies, especially modern mediated societies, are not natural cultural "wholes". The notion of national cultures was based, he argued, on a wholly implausible notion of "cultural sharing". As Hannerz wrote: "there is nothing automatic about cultural sharing. Its accomplishment must rather be seen as problematic" (1992, p. 44). Hannerz reinforces the point by bringing out how individuals' involvement in all aspects of culture is affected by factors that divide, rather than unite, them: taste, education, income, occupation, divisions in knowledge resources. "Contemporary complex societies", he concludes, "systematically build nonsharing into their cultures" (1992, p. 44).

The unsustainability of a holistic view of national cultures is shown by Hannerz in an argument that moves in the opposite direction to that of the social theorists considered earlier. Rather than showing that societal or culture overflows national boundaries, Hannerz demonstrates conclusively that national cultures have always been split *from the inside*. His argument is only reinforced when we consider the forms of spatial segregation that developed in the late twentieth century as levels of intrasocietal inequality have grown vastly: the "gated communities" of the United States, white urban South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina;[9] the high-security complexes that now comprise the offices and hotels of the global business elite (Sklair 2001). Yet until now, little or no work has been done to map the distinctive *media* cultures that accompany these new forms of segregation and their uneven "power-geometry" (Massey 1997, p. 234). If cultural order, even when it seems to be present, carries within it a hidden degree of differentiation and disorder, then we urgently need to know more about the corresponding variety (or perhaps, in some respects, of commonality) of media cultures and what drives them.

The Salience Criteria of Media Cultures

One apparent obstacle to developing Hannerz's insights on the divisions within even territorially based media cultures is that, writing back in 1992, he framed his critique in terms of the then dominant reference point, "national societies". As a result, his third dimension is expressed in terms of the social distribution of cultural goods *within* national "cultures", with Hannerz's emphasis being on the resulting *nonsharing* within that assumed territorial frame.

Now that we are starting out from a translocal understanding of culture, we do not need to put things so paradoxically; indeed, it is difficult to have a working concept of translocal culture (or anything else) if it is defined in terms of what people *don't* share! It is therefore necessary to translate the dynamic that Hannerz identifies in his third dimension of national "cultures" (social distribution) into a factor that might reliably distinguish translocal cultures (including media cultures) from each other, within and across national borders.

To do this we must introduce an alternative formulation of Hannerz's third dimension of cultures in complex societies, which we will call *salience criteria*. On this view, the thickness of each culture is distinguished not only by its contents (Hannerz's first dimension) and the way they are externalized in various forms, especially media (Hannerz's second dimension), but also by the criteria that members of this culture apply in selecting materials from translocal cultural flows *as relevant* for them and the criteria that those same members use in weighting the *relative importance* of those selected materials against each other. If we take "relevance" and "relative importance" together, we can talk of the *salience criteria* through which a media culture's materials are organized and that culture becomes recognizable *as* a distinct media culture.

A particular media culture's salience criteria are of more than internal importance. Because they modulate the types of external cultural inputs that together make up the particular sense of "centrality" distinctive to that culture – the relative weightings given to religious, political, social, entertainment, and other sources within that media culture – they affect the degree to which media cultures are porous to each other. One media culture will be porous to influences from another media culture to the extent that both treat at least as relevant (if not necessarily important) similar types of cultural material. That mutual porosity will, in turn, affect the degree to which membership of particular media cultures tends to be exclusive, or not.

Media Cultures and Underlying Human Needs

The salient criteria of media cultures are also interesting for a wider reason, which is that salience is shaped by needs. The once automatic background of integrated national cultures meant that early media consumption research was generally silent on questions of need, with the exception of some studies of class- and gender-related consumption.[10] However, now questions of need have become central to analysing media consumption. Not only has the complexity of the media "offer" changed dramatically with the arrival of the Internet, so that class background and education quickly become visible as a factor stratifying the uses of Internet resources (Livingstone and Bober 2004), but also, in the context of global media research, the range of populations whose media cultures are being compared is so diverse that the underlying needs that might shape different media cultures become an important potential factor in our analysis.

What do we mean here by "needs"? We understand needs in a broad sense, implying not a psychological model of individual needs (Maslow 1943) but a more open-ended spectrum of human needs that emerge when we consider general human "capabilities", rather than individual functioning in isolation.[11] This clarification is important since we are well aware that earlier phases of communications research have been diverted by attempts to correlate types of media use with discrete psychological needs, for example, in Uses and Gratifications research. The definitive critique of that approach was, in our view, delivered by David Morley nearly two decades ago (Morley 1992, pp. 52–6) and we have no wish to return to that approach. Instead, we see needs as socially constructed and shaped by the commonly faced pressures of material and historical conditions.

Our hypothesis is that the diversity of media cultures will be shaped by the full spectrum of human needs, as they translate into different demands made of the vast range of informational and entertainment resources now in principle available. We acknowledge right away that by no means all groups have equal access to the "media-manifold" (Couldry 2011a); the questions raised by the digital divide debate about whether the existing arrangements of global markets and political economy meet people's underlying communicative entitlements have not gone way, indeed they remain pressing (Couldry 2007). Particular needs (e.g., linked to poverty) may well be associated with distinctive limits to media access, although as Jack Qiu's work on the urban poor in China (considered further in a moment) brings out, it is dangerous to make assumptions in advance about this. We would not, however, in the United States expect the media cultures of, say, Mexican migrant workers and Washington beltway professionals to have much in common, most importantly because the salient criteria are likely to be very different, given the very different life-conditions of each group, but potentially also because of the impact of those different life-conditions on opportunities for media access. That is not to say that, were members of those groups to meet, conversations between them about media would be impossible. Different media cultures need not be incommensurable.

What might be the particular types of need that generate distinctive salient criteria, and so allow distinctive types of media culture to "thicken" and stabilize? An initial list might include:

Economic needs: that is, how the differential access of socio-economic groups to labor markets and other forms of economic opportunity generate distinctive needs for information and communication, and (in turn, as in the case of forced migration) distinctive conditions of socializing and leisure. Jack Qiu (2010) has recently portrayed the complex implications of major economic transformation for the highly mobile Chinese working class.

Ethnic and cultural needs: population movements (whether or not derived from underlying economic pressures) mean that particular populations need to keep in touch and to affirm ethnic and cultural commonality with each other. As has long been known, this significantly affects the demands made of media by minority groups and diasporas;[12] the digital media age enables increasingly complex forms of translocal media and communication exchange.[13] Also important are the ways in which the need to main cultural visibility of internal minorities such as indigenous peoples in Latin America require distinctive cultures of media production.[14]

Political needs: these can be looked at from more than one direction. *First*, from the perspective of states and other large political actors, political strategies may require the use of media industries in nation-building, which, if successful, can generate distinctive nationally focused media cultures (e.g., Britain in the 1950s). In the early twenty-first century, such strategies of concentration are more likely to be subsumed by pressures on governments to open up their territories to international media markets, which again, under particular conditions, may result in distinctive media cultures. *Second*, under conditions of contested modernity, media entertainment such as reality TV may be the focus of intense engagement as rival groups and nations compete in media platforms over different definitions of modernity and the state's relations to modernity, as Marwan Kraidy's eloquent study of reality TV in the contemporary Middle East demonstrates.[15] *Third*, we can look at political needs from the perspective of smaller or counter-political actors, whose overwhelming need is to be heard and politically may sometimes generate distinctive media cultures, for example, around deterritorialized social movements such as the anti-globalization and anti-capitalism movements.[16]

Recognition needs: distinct from political needs, although often intersecting with them in practice, are needs for social and moral recognition generated in large complex societies where roles and status are uncertain (Honneth 2007). Distinctive cultures of media production, particularly alternative and community media, may address recognition needs in profound ways, as the growing literature in this area demonstrates.[17]

Belief needs: if we take, as basic, the need to communicate about major beliefs and ritual practices, then different belief communities, which need not be territorially bound (e.g., the globalized new age movement),[18] may be associated with distinctive media cultures. The US Christian right is an important example of a movement that could usefully be understood as a distinctive media culture (Hoover 2004; Howard 2010; for further reflections on religion in a media age see Hoover 2006). As Daya Thussu notes, within internationalized media research, it is essential that the dimension of religion is integrated into our analytic frame rather than being added on as an afterthought (Thussu 2009, pp. 23–24).

Social needs: these shape media cultures when the need for social contact, or specifically the opportunity to socialize with one's peers of various sorts, requires distinctive forms of media production and consumption. Toshie Takahashi's research (2010) on Japanese audiences provides vivid examples of how media are enabling news forms of the mutual reciprocity (*uchi*) that is so valued in Japanese society. Media cultures may often be large enough to encourage exchanges between distinct demographic groups, but sometimes particular groups require distinctive communication terrains, for example, at times of acute generational conflict or when fast-changing media resources meet the interests of generational groups in distinct ways. Arguably the new social networking cultures provide an example of this.[19]

Leisure needs: although this may often be overridden by dire necessity, people need leisure and the chance to play. Many popular culture communities (often deterritorialized) have emerged – sports communities, gaming and fan networks, and so on – with distinctive media cultures that are already well discussed in contemporary research.[20]

It would be unhelpful, however, to fragment the "media culture" concept so much that we assume a different media culture for every group with distinctive needs. We assume, rather, that a media culture is large enough to allow within it for considerable variations of media consumption across ages, life-stage groups, and other demographic variables; otherwise, how could media cultures be the site for communication between those groups? We also assume that people may belong to more than one media culture and that, for them to do so, those media cultures need not be porous to each other (any more than the exclusivity of the multiple roles prevent urban dwellers from fulfilling them in different parts of their day) (Hannerz 1980).

The space of media cultures is large, but not infinitely large, since it is populated by cases where underlying needs *converge* with possibilities for media use and consumption, from which stable patterns result in what people think, say, and do in and through media (Couldry and Hepp 2011). Only after long periods of adjustment do such convergences stabilize for large groups in ways such that their members come to recognize them as distinguishing them from other groups. At that point, the flux of material pressures and media flows has thickened enough – on some scale, whether local, regional, national, or transnational, or (as with MMPORG) on no specific spatial scale at all – to become a media culture.

Resulting Priorities for the Critical Research of Media Cultures

We have shown that if we no longer take the state territory as a reified starting point, we can be more open to contemporary media cultures' complex dynamics, flows, and interrelations. Media cultures are by no means limited to "nation-state cultures", or indeed to *any* simple correlation with territory. We cannot know in advance how many media cultures are represented in the street where we live. Perhaps, under some conditions, "streets" or "apartment blocks" are not particularly interesting units for studying media culture, except negatively, as an index of the *deficit* of transcultural communication in these contexts of everyday living.

What is more important, from the point of view of understanding cultural complexity, is to grasp translocal media cultures in their specificity. Here we have discussed some of the types of specificity that are most likely to be significant in consolidating the transcultural study of media. Our own position on what counts as significant is not, of course, neutral but shaped by our own interest in critical media research, that is, media research oriented to better understanding the dynamics of power and inequality. Being sensitized to specificity means being attuned in advance to the factors that might generate specificity. In an age of fast-changing, interoperable digital media, which are developed and disseminated on a global scale, *national* location is an increasingly limited tool to identify the differences and specificities that matter. That is not to say, of course, that media cultures have no national associations, or that celebrity culture, for example, is the same everywhere; indeed only a little reflection will suggest that US celebrity culture is quite different from celebrity culture in Turkey, Iran, or China, although as yet there is no rigorous comparative analysis of why. These nation-related differences still matter, but they are not the only differences of media culture that matter, and if we operate as if they are, our grasp of the huge spectrum of media cultures will be poorer.

It is not enough to assume that media matter: we need to know why, how much, and for whom. Critical media research will be more adequate to the enlarged spectrum of comparison that the transnationalizing of media research make possible, if it becomes re-oriented to underlying questions of human need that generate distinctive media cultures and regulate their relations (if any) to each other. Such dynamics involve much more than the market circulation of media products and media interfaces: the politics of recognition are just as important, for example.

A serious commitment to grasping the underlying factors that make different (or indeed the same) aspects of the unstoppable torrent of media flows salient to different groups is as good a stimulus as any to internationalizing media research. Understanding such factors is an indispensable pre-condition to grasping the cultural complexity that the banal interchangeability of much of today's mediascapes tends to hide. By doing so, we may not only understand better the diverse ways in which media come to matter, but also acquire a better starting point for dialogue in an increasingly interconnected and uncertain world.

Notes

1. See, for example, Kellner (1995).
2. Compare the discussion in Moores (2007).
3. However, see Couldry's (2011b) review of Castells (2009).
4. See, for a useful review from one of the leaders of those debates, Boyd-Barrett (1998).
5. For a fuller argument on this point see Hepp and Couldry (2010, pp. 34–36).
6. Compare Bignell (2000, p. 5).
7. We leave to one side Deleuze and Guattari's extravagant elaboration of these concepts (Deleuze and Guattari 1988).
8. For a methodological discussion, see Couldry and Hepp (2011).
9. See McKenzie (1994) for an early history of the US case.
10. For example, Dyer (1992), Lembo (2000), Modleski (1986), Morley (1986), and Press (1991).
11. For background, see Sen (1992, pp. 109–112 and 1999, pp. 147–48, 153–154), but note that, since we are only concerned here to suggest a new way of thinking about the open-ended *diversity* of the media culture spectrum, we need not adopt a formal definition of "needs". On the contrary, an open-mindedness to whatever emerges as a need under particular conditions is more useful for grasping the dynamic and fast-changing ways in which media use is embedded in everyday life. An early inspiration for this approach is Roger Silverstone's work on television in the 1990s (Silverstone 1994).
12. See, for example, Gillespie (1995), Aksoy and Robins (2000), Tölölyan (1996), Cohen (1997), Dayan (1999), Naficy (2001), Silverstone and Georgiou (2005), Georgiou (2006), and Hepp, Bozdag, and Suna (2012).
13. Moores and Metykova (2009); Hepp (2009b).
14. Salazar (2009); Rodriguez (2003).
15. Kraidy (2010).
16. See, for example, Downing (2001), Della Porta, Kriesi, and Rucht (1999), Cohen and Rai (2000), Touraine (2002), Klein (2000), and Juris (2008).
17. See, for example, Rodriguez (2001) and Rodriguez, Kidd, and Stein (2010).
18. Cf. Knoblauch (2008), Hoover and Lundby (1997), Habermas (2005), Beyer (2006), Sumiala-Seppänen, Lundby, and Salokangas (2006).
19. Pilkington *et al.* (2002); Livingstone (2008); Amit-Talai and Wulff, (1995).
20. See, for example, During (1997), Hills (2002), and Storey (2003).

References

Aksoy, A. and Robins, K. (2000) Thinking across spaces: transnational television from Turkey, *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, **3** (3), 343–365.

Amit-Talai, V. and Wulff, H. (eds) (1995) *Youth Cultures. A Cross-Cultural Perspective*. London and New York: Routledge.

Anderson, B. (1983) *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso.

Ang, I. (1996) *Living Room Wars. Rethinking Media Audiences for a Postmodern World*. London and New York: Routledge.

Appadurai, A. (1990) Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy, in M. Featherstone (ed.), *Global Culture*. London: Sage, pp. 295–310.

Beck, U. (2000) *What Is Globalization?* London: Blackwell.

Benhabib, S. (2002) *The Claims of Culture*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Beyer, P. (2006) *Religions in Global Society*. London and New York: Routledge.

Bignell, J. (2000) *Postmodern Media Cultures*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Bird, S.E. (2003) *The Audience in Everyday Life. Living in a Media World*. New York and London: Routledge.

Boyd-Barrett, O. (1998) Media imperialism reformulated, in D. Thussu (ed.), *Electronic Empires: Global Media and Local Resistance*. London: Arnold, pp. 157–176.

Castells, M. (1996) *The Rise of the Network Society*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Castells, M. (2009) *Communication Power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cohen, R. (1997) *Global Diasporas. An Introduction*. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.

Cohen, R. and Rai, S.M. (2000) Global social movements. Towards a cosmopolitan politics, in R. Cohen and S.M. Rai (eds), *Global Social Movements*. London and New Brunswick: Athlone, pp. 1–17.

Couldry, N. (2003) *Media Rituals: A Critical Approach*. London and New York: Routledge.

Couldry, N. (2005) Media rituals: beyond functionalism, in E. Rothenbuhler and M. Coman (eds), *Media Anthropology*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 59–69.

Couldry, N. (2007) Communicative entitlements and democracy: the future of the digital divide debate, in R. Mansell *et al.* (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Information and Communication Technologies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 383–403.

Couldry, N. (2009) Does "the media" have a future?, *European Journal of Communication*, **24** (4), 437–450.

Couldry, N. (2011a) The necessary future of the audience, and how to research it, in V. Nightingale (ed.), *Handbook of Media Audiences*. Malden: Blackwell, pp. 213–229.

Couldry, N. (2011b) Communication power – by Manuel Castells, *British Journal of Sociology*, **62**, 372–374.

Couldry, N. and Hepp, A. (2011) Researching media cultures comparatively," in F. Esser and T. Hanitzsch (eds) *Handbook of Comparative Communications Research*. New York: Routledge.

Dayan, D. (1999) Media and diasporas, in J. Gripsrud (ed.), *Television and Common Knowledge*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 18–33.

Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1988) *A Thousand Plateaus*. London: Athlone Press.

Della Porta, D., Kriesi, H. and Rucht, D. (eds) (1999) *Social Movements in a Globalizing World*. London: Macmillan.

Downing, J. (2001) *Radical Media*, 2nd edn. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

During, S. (1997) Popular culture on a global scale: a challenge for cultural studies?, *Critical Inquiry*, **23** (4), 808–833.

Dyer, R. (1992) *Only Entertainment*. London: Routledge.
Georgiou, M. (2006) *Diaspora, Identity and the Media: Diasporic Transnationalism and Mediated Spatialities*. Cresskill: Hampton Press.
Giddens, A. (1984) *The Constitution of Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Giddens, A. (1990) *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Gillespie, M. (1995) *Television, Ethnicity and Cultural Change*. London: Routledge.
Habermas, J. (2005) *Religion in the Public Sphere*, accessed 03/08/2006, http://www.holbergprize.no/.
Hall, S. (1997) The centrality of culture: notes on the cultural revolutions of our time, in K. Thompson (ed.), *Media and Cultural Regulation*. London: Sage, pp. 207–238.
Hallin, D.C. and Mancini, P. (2004) *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hannerz, U. (1980) *Exploring the City*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Hannerz, U. (1992) *Cultural Complexity*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Hepp, A. (2008) Translocal media cultures: networks of the media and globalization, in A. Hepp, F. Krotz, S. Moores, and C. Winter (eds), *Connectivity, Networks and Flows. Conceptualizing Contemporary Communications*. Cresskill: Hampton Press, pp. 33–58.
Hepp, A. (2009a) Differentiation: mediatization and cultural change, in K. Lundby (ed.), *Mediatization: Concept, Changes, Consequences*. New York: Peter Lang, pp. 135–154.
Hepp, A. (2009b) Localities of diasporic communicative spaces: material aspects of translocal mediated networking, *Communication Review*, **12** (4), 327–348.
Hepp, A. (2012) *Cultures of Mediatization*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hepp, A. and Couldry, N. (2010) What should comparative media research be comparing? Towards a transcultural approach to "media cultures, in D.K. Thussu (ed.), *Transnationalising Media Studies*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 32–47.
Hepp, A., Bozdag, C. and Suna, L. (2012) Mediatized migrants: media cultures and communicative networking in the diaspora, in L. Fortunati, R. Pertierra, and J. Vincent (eds), *Migrations, Diaspora, and Information Technology in Global Societies*. London: Routledge, pp.172–188.
Herman, E. S. and McChesney, R.W. (1997) *The Global Media. The New Missionaries of Corporate Capitalism*. London: Cassell.
Hesmondhalgh, D. (2007) *The Cultural Industries*, 2nd edn. London: Sage.
Hills, M. (2002) *Fan Cultures*. London and New York: Routledge.
Honneth, A. (2007) *Disrespect*. Cambridge: Polity.
Hoover, S.M. (2004) The religious right and the media, Keynote Presentation to the Conference on *Religion on the Airwaves*, Texas, Freedom Network, August.
Hoover, S.M. (2006) *Religion in the Media Age*. London: Routledge.
Hoover, S.M. and Lundby, K. (eds) (1997) *Rethinking Media, Religion and Culture*. New Delhi: Sage.
Howard, R.G. (2010) Enacting a virtual "Ekklesia": online Christian fundamentalism as vernacular religion, *New Media Society*, **12** (5), 729–744.
Juris, J. (2008) *Networking Futures: The Movements against Corporate Globalization*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Kellner, D. (1995) *Media Culture. Cultural Studies, Identity and Politics between the Modern and the Postmodern*. London: Routledge.
Klein, N. (2000) *No Logo®. Taking Aim at the Brand Bullets*. London: Flamingo.
Knoblauch, H. (2008) Spirituality and popular religion in Europe, *Social Compass*, **55** (2), 141–154.
Kraidy, M. (2005) *Hybridity, or the Cultural Logic of Globalization*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Kraidy, M. (2009) *Arab Television and Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Krotz, F. (2009) Mediatization: a concept with which to grasp media and societal change, in K. Lundby (ed.), *Mediatization: Concept, Changes, Consequences*. New York: Peter Lang, pp. 19–38.

Lembo, R. (2000) *Thinking Through Television*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Livingstone, S. (2008) Taking risky opportunities in youthful content creation: teenagers' use of social networking sites for intimacy, privacy and self-expression, *New Media and Society*, **10** (3), 393–412.

Livingstone, S. and Bober, M. (2004) *UK Children Go Online: Surveying the Experiences of Young People and Their Parents*. London: London School of Economics and Political Science.

Löfgren, O. (2001) The nation as home or motel? Metaphors of media and belonging, *Sosiologisk Årbok*, **2001**, 1–34.

McKenzie, E. (1994) *Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Residential Private Government*. Yale, CN: Yale University Press.

McMillin, D. (2007) *International Media Studies*. London: Blackwell.

McQuail, D. (2005) Book Review: Comparing Media Systems: three models of media and politics, *European Journal of Communication*, **20** (2), 266–268.

Mancini, P. (2007) Journalism culture: a two-level proposal, Paper presented at the *ICA Annual Conference*, San Francisco, May.

Maslow, A.H. (1943) A theory of human motivation, *Psychological Review*, **50**, 370–396.

Massey, D. (1997) A global sense of place, in A. Gray, and J. McGuigan (eds), *Studying Culture: An Introductory Reader*. London: Arnold, pp. 42–54.

Modleski, T. (1986) *Studies in Entertainment*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Moores, S. (2000) *Media and Everyday Life in Modern Society*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Moores, S. (2007) Conceptualizing place in a world of flows, in A. Hepp, F. Krotz, S. Moores, and C. Winter (eds), *Connectivity, Networks and Flows. Conceptualising Contemporary Communications*. Creskill: Hampton Press, pp. 183–200.

Moores, S. and Metykova, M. (2009) Knowing how to get around: place, migration and communication, *Communication Review*, **12** (4), 313–326.

Morley, D. (1986) *Family Television*. London: Comedia.

Morley, D. (1992) *Television, Audiences and Cultural Studies*. London: Routledge.

Morley, D. (2000) *Home Territories*. London: Routledge.

Naficy, H. (2001) *An Accented Cinema: Exilic and Diasporic Filmmaking*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Nederveen Pieterse, J. (1995) Globalization as hybridization, in M. Featherstone, S. Lash, and R. Robertson (eds), *Global Modernities*. London, Thousand Oaks, and New Delhi: Sage, pp. 45–68.

Pilkington, H., Omel'chenko, E., Flynn, M., Starkova, E. and Bliudina, U. (2002) *Looking West? Cultural Globalization and Russian Youth Cultures*. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.

Press, A. (1991) *Women Watching Television*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Qiu, J. (2009) *Working Class Network Society*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Rodriguez, C. (2001) *Fissures in the Mediaspace*. Creskill: Hampton Press.

Rodriguez, C. (2003) The Bishop and his star: citizens' communication in Southern Chile, in N. Couldry,and J. Curran (eds), *Contesting Media Power*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 177–194.

Rodriguez, C., Kidd, D. and Stein, L. (eds) (2009) *Making Our Media: Global Initiatives Toward a Democratic Public Sphere,* three volumes. Creskill: Hampton Press.

Salazar, J. (2009) Making culture visible: the mediated construction of a Mapuche nation in Chile, in C. Rodriguez, D. Kidd and L. Stein (eds) *Making Our Media: Global Intiatives Toward a Democratic Public Sphere*, vol. **1**. Creskill: Hampton Press, pp. 29–46.

Sassen, S. (2007) *Territory, Authority, Rights*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Schiller, H. (1969) *Mass Communications and American Empire*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Schlesinger, P. (1991) *Media State and Nation*. London: Sage.

Sen, A. (1992) *Inequality Reexamined*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sen, A. (1999) *Development as Freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Silverstone, R. (1994) *Television and Everyday Life*. London: Routledge.

Silverstone, R. and Georgiou, M. (2005) Editorial Introduction: Media and minorities in multicultural Europe, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, **31** (3), 433–441.

Sklair, L. (2001) *The Transnational Capitalist Class*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Storey, J. (2003) *Inventing Popular Culture. From Folklore to Globalization*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Sumiala-Seppänen, J., Lundby, K. and Salokangas R. (eds) (2006) *Implications of the Sacred in (Post)modern Media*. Göteborg: Nordicom.

Takahashi, T. (2010) *Audience Studies: A Japanese Perspective*. London: Routledge.

Tölölyan, K. (1996) Rethinking diaspora(s): stateless power in the transnational moment, *Diaspora*, **5** (1), 3–36.

Tomlinson, J. (1999) *Globalization and Culture*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Touraine, A. (2002) The importance of social movements, *Social Movement Studies*, **1** (1), 89–95.

Thussu, D. (2009) Why internationalize media studies and how?, in D. Thussu (ed.), *Internationalizing Media Studies*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 13–31.

Tunstall, J. (1977) *The Media Are American*. London: Constable.

Tunstall, J. (2008) *The Media Were American*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Urry, J. (2000) *Sociology beyond Societies: Mobilities for the Next Century*. London and New York: Routledge.

Urry, J. (2003) *Global Complexity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Welsch, W. (1999) Transculturality – the changing forms of cultures today, in Bundesminister für Wissenschaft und Verkehr and Internationales Forschungszentrum für Kulturwissenschaften (eds), *The Contemporary Study of Culture*. Wien: Turia and Kant, pp. 217–244.

7

Deconstructing the "Methodological Paradox"

Comparative Research between National Centrality and Networked Spaces

Ingrid Volkmer

Communication can be considered as one of the key drivers of globalization. However, the ambiguity between a field that is, on one hand, characterized by increasing dense and entangled forms of transnational complexities, dynamic trajectories of supranational communicative structures, as well as networked public practices, and, on the other, conceptual approaches to the (modern) nation as the unit of analysis, seems to constitute a "methodological paradox".

There are several reasons for this paradox. However, I would argue that this paradox has to do with the relative lateness in the adoption of discussion of globalization processes in our discipline in comparison to, for example sociology and political science. Whereas the discussion of what might be called "relativistic" globalization, i.e. the debate of "time-space distanciation" (Giddens 1990) and local diversity of "globalized" forms, which Roland Robertson (1992) has described as "glocal" differentiated spheres of globalization, began in sociology already in the early 1990s, our discipline began the debate of globalizing processes relatively late. Emerging spaces of globalized communication has been mainly addressed through the lens of neo-liberalism, post-colonalism, and diasporic communication, which are important areas of research; however, the emphasis on these paradigms seems to have caused the overlooking of interdisciplinary approaches that would help to assess and conceptualize emerging transnational cultures of connectivity. It seems that – in consequence – the diverse *complexities* of different phases of globalization processes have "overwhelmed" our field before we were able to reflect on the theoretical implications of nonlinear, inter-, trans-, and post-national transborder "flows" on the core paradigms of our discipline.

The "methodological paradox" of a discipline whose core research field is one of the main drivers of not only large-scale processes of transnational development, societal, economic, and cultural transformation, on the one hand, and the practices of retaining established methodologies when approaching transnational communicative terrains,

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

occasionally surfaces in our own debates. For example, contours of this paradox appeared in the context of attempts to identify imbalances in North/South news flows (e.g., Boyd-Barrett and Thussu 1992) or to "de-Westernize" (Curran and Park 2000) media studies. These are frameworks that provided a much needed critical approach of the Western-led research traditions at a time when diversified globalized processes of communicative cultures already revealed limitations of the "cultural imperialism" approach (Schiller 1976). Curran and Park argued that it is important to assess the emerging terrain *between* society and the state by arguing that the "supra-national is also supporting the sub-national in a new global-local connexion that is eroding the national", but "that national states are influential in shaping media systems" (Curran and Park 2000). Only a few years later, Sonia Livingstone observed that "while the process of globalization appears to encourage cross-national research" it also "undermines the legitimacy of the nation-state" and, as Livingstone emphasizes, "not only for political, economic or cultural purposes but also as a unit of analysis" (Livingstone 2003, p. 480). Building on Curran and Park's approach, but also on earlier critical conceptions of the North/South divide debates, more recent approaches re-iterate the limitations of the Western model in non-Western regions and assess crucial areas of new emerging center–periphery dichotomies (e.g., Thussu 2010).

However, besides these various attempts to conceptually address transnational communication spheres, I agree with Rantanen (2010), who argues that our discipline is still today characterized by what she calls "methodological inter-nationalism", where transnational empirical research is conducted in the context of different conceptions of nations. Rantanen defines "methodological inter-nationalism" as "a kind of doubled nationalism, nationalism twice or multiplied over, which compares different nationalism and implies that true internationalism is presented by representatives of the nation, be these states, governments or media" (Rantanen 2010, p. 27). Rantanen has identified four phases of international research, such as international propaganda research, media and development, media imperialism, and globalization. In each of these phases, so she argues, the nation is positioned vis-à-vis transnational communication processes, in propaganda research as the ideological communicator, in media and development as the Westernizing agency, in media imperialism as the sovereignty, and in globalization as a form of ambiguous communication processes.

However, I would even draft my argument in stronger terms and suggest to divert from the modern dialectic of internationalization as the "inside"/"outside" dichotomy of the national and the "foreign" but also – this was the first phase of "relativistic" globalization – from "global" and "local" toward "space" and "place", where the fields of communication are deeply embedded in the sphere of rituals, lifeworlds, and diverse publics, reflecting on national and other forms of public discourse. The shifting terrains of globalization which – in large scales due to nonlinear, discursive transnational technologies – have intensified in the last decade are diverse and it is necessary not to consider "globalization" as a "universal" process but critically reflect on the diverse stages of vis-à-vis communicative forms. For example, Ulrich Beck suggests distinguishing between three phases of globalization in social sciences, which also seem to be similar in our discipline: "first, denial; second, conceptual refinement and empirical research; and, third, epistemological shift" (Beck 2007, p. 287). It could be argued that in our discipline the third phase of globalization debate, that is, the "epistemological" shift, is caused by networked communication, reaching deep into national territories and creating a new form of public connectivity, often sidelining traditional media systems. It is this phase of globalization debate that, however, has not led to new forms of empirical research as often the nation still serves as a core unit of analysis and deeply influences outcomes of national formations of transnational spheres and often limits empirical approaches in new transnational network terrains, where "messages", such as via Twitter, seamlessly transcend across national territories. This is a process that creates new "meanings" and that, as can be observed in recent political conflicts, such as in North Africa and elsewhere, relates back to negotiation and management of "local" activism.

Methodological Nationalism in Communication Research

Paul Lazarsfeld and Klaus Merton once remarked that comparative studies across societies that lack the US type of mass media would be "too crude to yield decisive results" (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1971, p. 558). Whereas in Lazarsfeld and Merton's time, mass media research identified relations between national "mass" media cultures, challenges of comparative research in a networked sphere of the twenty-first century consist in the investigation of emerging "densities" – of "relational" formations. To identify these new "dense" networked terrains constitutes today the "exciting" sphere of investigation of communication in a transnational context. The questions of *why* to compare which relates to the paradigmatic level, *what* to compare, the methodological level, and *how* to compare, the conceptual level, are not trivial as they constitute the key parameters of research. They reflect and, indeed, shape epistemological and ontological constructions of our discipline. However, these research parameters are often associated with the territorial national "boundedness" of communication of the (terrestrial) mass media age, which has not only become "porous" for some time but is being absorbed by the density of networked space and – as a consequence – calls for new approaches to comparative research. Despite increasing formations of not only "transborder," "inter-" or "trans"-national but complex deterritorialized "spatial" structures of communication, which began to transform national "terrestrial" communication spheres already in the early days of satellite communication, it is somewhat surprising that comparative communication research still mainly revolves around an assumed communicative territorial centrality of the nation-state as the core unit of comparative analysis.

One of the reasons for the persistence of the "territorial" principle as the core unit of comparative transnational research methodology, *in particular* in the sphere of political, that is, "public" communication, is the assumed congruence of "legitimacy" and "deliberation" within the boundaries of the modern nation-state. This modern conception of the public sphere, deeply embedded in the principle of national sovereignty over communicative "territoriality", has – this is my first point – laid the foundation for methodological approaches of international comparative media research. These paradigms of public communication are historically related to formations of mainly European nation-state building, where conceptions of national sovereignty over "territory" constituted a main domain of the public narrative of nation-ness. A conceptual congruence, based on the traditions of the "Westphalian" model – named after the treaty of Westphalia ending the Thirty Year War in 1648 – which assumes "sovereignty" over "territory", has laid the foundation of information sovereignty, for example, for policy frameworks and the management of national and international public discourse (i.e. regulating access to national spheres). The "Westphalian" model, as Fraser notes, means in larger contexts of public sphere debates that "democracy requires the generation, through territoriality bounded processes of public communication, conducted in the national language and relayed through the national media, of a body of national public opinion" (Fraser 2007, p. 11). It is this centrality of the "nation" as a complex territory of public communication that still today constitutes one of the core paradigms of transnational research. When reviewing comparative methodologies over the decades, it is quite interesting to note how such a national "centrality" as methodology of communicative "boundedness" is conceptualized in different paradigmatic "nuances" from early comparative studies in the 1950s to approaches in transnational research today.

One of the first comparative approaches, Daniel Lerner's study on the democratic transformation of "traditional" societies, was based on the "development" communication paradigm and aimed to compare particular democratic "mechanisms" of modern nation-states internationally in contexts of quite diverse non-Western state formations. It was in this sense not so much the "nation" itself that was under investigation, for example, in terms of an assessment and comparison of societal specific public traditions and practices of deliberation. Instead, comparative research in this study considered the centrality of the public model of the modern nation-state as a paradigm not only for the assessment and but also the comparison of democratic communication in non-Western societies. Lerner's study on *The Passing of Traditional Society* (1958), comparing media structures of internally highly diverse nonmodern state-society constellations, such as Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iran, is not only an interesting example for an early approach to comparative analysis of "development" communication but also exemplifies the way in which comparative research aimed to detect mainly spheres of modern communicative structures where media engagement relates to national democratic mobilization. Lerner's approach assumed a normative national centrality in two ways: the first assumption relates to the modern democratic public and constitutes a somewhat "universal" model and the second underlying conception proposes that the normative model of democratic engagement relates as a universal model to quite diverse "Western" nations as well. Lerner's assumption was that "the Western model of modernization, exhibits certain components and sequences whose relevance is global … urbanisation raises literacy, rising literacy to increase media exposure, increasing media exposure" raises "economic participation and … political participation" (Lerner 1958, p. 43).

Another paradigmatic nuance of the centrality of the nation is Stevenson and Shaw's (1984) comparative analysis of foreign news flows in 17, again societal diverse, countries. Stevenson and Shaw's study addressed not only the degree but also the scope of internationalization of national mainsteam media outlets. The study compares regional and thematic angles of foreign news within the boundedness of 17 countries, ranging from Latin and North America, Africa, Middle East, Asia, Western and Eastern Europe. Results reveal some commonalities of "foreign-ness" across these different public spheres. The authors conclude that "behind the local region in visibility in most media systems are the First World regions of Western Europe and North America" (Stevenson and Shaw 1984, p. 37) and note that "the two areas that are largely invisible in these media-made world maps are Eastern Europe and Third World Regions" (Stevenson and Shaw 1984, p. 38).

These methodologies of comparison of national public communication have been further refined in areas of journalism studies, where Esser and Pfetsch attempted to identify "functional equivalence" across nations (Esser and Pfetsch 2004) and the comparison of "media systems", which no longer assumes a normative homogeneity among "Western" regions but identifies diverse models of media "institutions" within regions of specific public cultures in Europe and the United States. Hallin and Mancini have identified comparative categories, for example, the "polarized pluralistic" models (examples for these models are Greece, Spain, and Italy), "democratic corporatist" models (examples are Scandinavia, Germany, and the Netherlands), and the "liberal" model (the United States, Canada, the United Kindom, and Ireland) (Hallin and Mancini 2004). More recent studies compare, for example, degrees of transnationalization within diverse national spheres. An example for this model is the study by Wessler *et al.*, who identify the "scope, trend, and level" of "Europeanization" as represented in major national newspapers in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Wessler *et al.* 2008). The authors adopt a methodology of multilevel transnationalization, which assumes that "public discourses might gradually extend into a European public sphere but remain bound to the "national constellation" in other areas (Wessler *et al.* 2008, p. 26). Another example for a transnational study, comparing national public discourse around a particular "thematic" sphere, is a comparative analysis of debates of "legitimacy" of two mainstream newspapers per country, in Switzerland, Germany, Britain, and the United States, with the outcome that public discourse supports national legitimacy: "Mechanisms that would allow situational criticism to turn into sustained challenges to core regime elements, thus possibly jeopardizing the overall stability of discursive support, do not seem to exist. Instead, we find that criticism usually remains at – or is diverted to – the level of specific policies or authorities; these, rather than the regime as a whole, tend to be held responsible for any perceived problems" (Schneider *et al.* 2010, p. 184).

Although the paradigmatic approach of national centrality has, as these studies reveal, been refined, for example, regarding institutional structures of media organizations and degrees of transnationalization in terms of news flows, the "nation" as the methodological frame of transnational comparative analysis also reveals its methodological limitations, in particular when assessing not only nationally bounded media outlets but transnational "flows". The limitations are also visible in other contexts of – often overlooked – "transnational" comparative research, which takes place within the boundedness of a "nation": comparative research of so-called "diasporic" media cultures. Research of these "hybrid" publics seamlessly stretch across diverse transnational public terrains. This "stretching" process across national public spheres reveals that the boundedness of the national paradigm often limits the assessment of new forms of transnational public connectivities. As "diasporic" spheres are situated within sets of networks of transnational public trajectories, for example, of the country of origin and the country of residence, the conceptualization of these forms of transnational communication within the territorial national boundedness has developed various forms of frameworks aiming to overcome this conceptual centrality. It is somewhat surprising – given the overarching assumption of a national public – that formations of "diaspora" are in our discipline often located in a dialectical (identity) space between "subnational", "displaced" minority cultures and hegemonic national identity. The term "diaspora" –actually a paradigmatic relict of the modern mass media culture of the nation-state – underlines the imbalance of socio-cultural identity politics within the modern state – minority relationship. Not only globalization and the positioning of "diaspora" as spheres of resistance between the "local" within the "global" but today's dynamic transnational networks of intersubjective loyalties and political agency, dynamically fluctuating within *and* beyond boundedness of nation-states, have created new forms of public spheres of migrant communities. These phenomena of compressed communicative spaces have been addressed in various theoretical contexts: in globalization theory as "time space distanciation" (Giddens 1990), in political theory as the "spatial reach" (Held and McGrew 2000), and – more recently – as "transborder" societies "living with one foot in two places" (Kivisto and Faist 2010, p. 142). However, in our discipline, diasporic debates are often conceptually located outside the national public sphere, within spaces of "translocal" formations, as public "sphericules" (Gitlin 1998), which, as Aksoy and Robins note: "put migrant viewers into one or the other national frame, rather than address the difference and distinctiveness of their transnational positioning" (Aksoy and Robins 2003, p. 369). The authors further note that "the nation-state and its logic of 'imagined community' clearly remain an imaginary institution of great power and resonance, and we should not underestimate the hold that it continues to have on hearts and minds" (Aksoy and Robins 2003, p. 371). Only recently have conceptual debates emerged that conceptually liberate "diasporic" and "migrant" frames in conceptions of transnational spheres, for example, in frameworks of "mediated spatialities" (Georgiou 2007), civic cultures (Slade 2010), and "re-territorialized" proximity (Volkmer 2011).

The assumed centrality of the nation-state – this is my second point – has led to a focus on mainly national media structures where transnational "de-territorialized" media formations are often sidelined. For example, it is surprising that satellite communication, which emerged as a key platform of transnational communication in the 1970s, and is today the main backbone of transnational (and national!) communication is rarely addressed in transnational research. Not only have satellite platforms multiplied over the last decade but also significantly reshaped communication in national settings as, due to advanced digital technologies, thousands of often highly specific channels are delivered across world regions. Satellite footprints also shape a particular form of transnational "connectivity" as they reach across vast landmasses and cover geographical territories beyond frames of national borders. The European satellite "footprint" overlaps with Northern Africa and areas of the Middle East overlap and create networks of thematic spaces as layers across European nation-states and at the same time across other state formations as well, for example, new democracies in regions of Northern Africa. Similar transnational structures reach across Asian and South American regions. Such a simultaneous form of transnational communication has implications for forms of public connectivity that is widely under-researched. Only a few conceptual debates address satellite communication at all, for example, in contexts of the political economy of specific transnational satellite configurations (Parks and Kumar 2003), regional 24-hour news channels (Cushion and Lewis 2010), in the Arab region (e.g., Sakr 2007), Al Jazeera (e.g., Samuel-Azran 2010), or CNN (e.g., Volkmer 1999).

Over the course of the history of our discipline, only relatively few studies engage in transnational comparative research overall in comparison to national media research. Transnational studies – this is my third point – rarely involve non-Western countries and – in particular – so called "developing" regions where media structures are not related to the modern public communication tradition. Not only is it important to conceptually incorporate these diverse public cultures into transnational network structures but it is increasingly relevant as new forms of, for example, youth engagement in urban centers of developing regions engage in societal transformation. The events of the "Arab Spring" have caught our discipline with some surprise as only a few debates have over the years – at least conceptually – addressed the particular media spheres of North Africa in contexts of transnational media structures (Sakr 2007; Hafez 2008; Kraidy 2010). This region has otherwise been ignored in comparative research that has mainly been conducted in traditional modern nation-state contexts of Europe and the United States.

It is surprising that not so much interdisciplinary debates of globalization but rather Kohn's (1989) model of a thread of cross-national research categories is often cited as a justification for identifying the nation as a unit in comparative research. Kohn's sociological model of cross-national research, deeply related to the modern tradition of social science theory paradigmatically embedded in the "first" modernity, proposes four types of comparison among nations and – related to our discipline – allows the reconstruction of core categories of analysis. Kohn's first "frame" consists in the "nation as unit of analysis" (Kohn 1989, p. 22). This approach allows an in-depth analysis of one national media culture based upon a comparative framework. As a result, research is often framed in national contexts without conceptions of comparative analysis.

Kohn's model of "nations as unit of analysis" can be defined as an approach in which, as Livingstone has noted, "diversity is sought but then, through application of a standardized methodology, integrated into a common theoretical framework, such as constructs of citizenship, power and identity theory being understood as transnational, even universal" (Livingstone 2003, p. 485). An example is Blumler and Gurevitch's (1975) approach to propose a model for international comparative research, identifying comparative dimension, such as "state control over mass media", "partisanship", "media-political elite integration". These were important areas within national media systems, deeply integrated into national policies, such as newspapers and national television and radio.

In addition to these two categories, Kohn (1989, p. 23) proposes to consider "nations as component of a larger international or transnational system". The key difference between this and previous models consists in the assumption that nations are placed in a larger global context. Chang *et al.* (2001) have analyzed comparative cross-national research between 1970 and 1997 and found that of 76 studies, the majority focused on the comparison of the United States with another country. The authors argue that the United States might be comparable to other Western countries, but doubt the juxtaposition of the United States "with Japan, India, the former Soviet Union, China or South Korea without some theoretical linkage between them" (Chang *et al.* 2001, p. 424). The authors resume their analysis with the critical remark that units of analysis are not comparable and comparative studies sometimes lack a theoretical background. In their view studies often compare "what occurred" and not "why": "specific comparisons were left to stand on their own in a "country A this and country B" juxtaposition, leaving reasonable conclusions at a more abstract level indeterminate" (Chang *et al.* 2001, p. 422). The authors also suggest carefully defining the quality of compared units.

Although Kohn's model might provide a rough guideline for distinguishing forms of transnational research, it is a problematic approach for various reasons. Often overlooked, the model (and other similar debates) relate to the "nation" as a unit of analysis. However, the "nation" does not equal in political theory with the "nation-state" as there exist nations without a state (e.g., Catalonia in Spain). This is not a trivial distinction in particular when comparing communication across national public spheres. Furthermore, transnational research also incorporates other state formations besides nation-states. For example, the particular communicative structures of authoritarian states and "failed" states (e.g., Somalia) need to be *fully* acknowledged in the context of transnational research. As the public densities of networked communication absorbs public spaces of a variety of state formations, these distinctions are necessary in a culturally reflective process of comparative research.

Transnational Research in De-territorialized Settings

However, as communication is the driver of diverse and complex processes of globalization, our discipline has gained a new responsibility in the networked globalization process of the twenty-first century. A profound debate about approaches to and critical reflection of transnational communication research is much needed as new spheres of "mediated" communication, delivered worldwide through satellite, Internet, digital television, and mobile devices, are challenging conventional theoretical concepts as they reveal limitations of traditional methodological approaches. Formations of structural "hybridity" in contexts of what Lash and Urry (1994) once called "economies of signs and spaces" as emerging cultures of communicative "fluidity" have already, in the early 1990s, identified the complex processes of the "emptying" out of the power of cultural politics of national spaces.

Today's communicative structures constantly criss-cross the nation as supra- and sub-national spheres. Digital platforms, for example, *YouTube*, *Twitter*, *Facebook*, smart phone applications, so-called "apps" that not only provide urban space navigation but also deliver national and local media content to any mobile access point transnationally, as well as new iptv "flows" deeply undermine and refine our established terminology and conceptual approaches, such as "gatekeeping", "agenda setting", "framing", and public "power" structures. However, these methodological refinements of traditional terminologies are only minor transformations in comparison to larger scales of de-territorialized communicative spheres, which not only have implications on "audiences" but emerge as drivers of complex fields of globalization by enhancing, magnifying, and accelerating larger sectors of diverse political, cultural, and economic globalization processes. From transnational economic crises where a Tweet can lead to turbulences on the stock market, to communicative spheres enhancing political protest and activism, an unprecedented role of communication as a new public "density" of networked space is revealed, which is deeply entangled with what Ulrich Beck calls global "risks" (Beck 2009) – and I would add, "loyalties" with implications for international relations and citizenship. In political theory, the "decline of the territorial state" and "in the process of the dichotomy between domestic and foreign arenas, so important in the development of Western political philosophy and international relations theory, is largely transcended. The answer to what is 'inside' and what is outside comes to depend on the issue at hand and the identity hierarchies in place" (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004, p. 22).

It is quite interesting to note that over the last years – less so in our discipline but rather in sociology and political science – the limitations of the centrality of the "nation" as the core unit of analysis of social research has been discussed in the context of processes of diverse forms of globalization. Ulrich Beck's remark about the failing of "methodological nationalism" has initiated a critical debate in social sciences that not only reviews the limitations but also the legitimacy of structural national "boundedness" of social research in a globalized world (Beck 2000, p. 22). In his attempt to construct a sociology of globalization, the term "methodological nationalism" serves as a framework for an overall critique of traditional methodologies of traditional modern social science research within the new setting of globalized interdependence. Beck's critique mainly relates to the formation of the nation-state in the conception of the "first" modernity, which is increasingly entangled with globalized forms of "domestic politics" that, so Beck argues,

> is a game in which boundaries, basic rules and basic distinctions are renegotiated – not only those between the national and the international spheres, but also those between global business and the state, transnational civil society movements, supra-national organizations and national governments and societies. No single player or opponent can ever win on their own; they all are dependent on alliances (Beck 2007, p. 288).

In Beck's view, methodological nationalism is unsuitable for capturing these arising interdependent spheres, not only of politics but also of "reflexive" morality and human rights and the complexity of global risk "trajectories" as they arise in a "global" public sphere. This reflexive form of modernity relates not so much to a conception of transborder or international but rather to the "reflexivity" of transnational formations, which, so Beck maintains, can only be assessed through "methodological cosmopolitanism" (Beck 2007). Whereas Beck's critique addresses the lack of the national unit of analysis for an investigation of such a cosmopolitan "outlook", other sociological debates center the critique of methodological nationalism on the nation itself. For example, Saskia Sassen argues that the national and the global are not "mutually exclusive" but that the nation itself is the site of globalization, "the multiple and specific structurations of the global within what has been constructed historically as the national" (Sassen 2007, p. 22) and the "connectivity" spheres of, for example, world cities cannot be explored through the lens of transnational research, which uses the nation as the core unit of analysis. The nation as a cultural and political territory is undergoing "denationalizing" processes due to multidiscoursive "transboundary spatialities" (Sassen 2007, p. 14). It is quite interesting to observe how the debate about these denationalizing processes has not only – over the last years – unfolded via diverse streams of critique in various fields of social sciences but has also identified different "disentangling logics" of the modern nation as a unit of analysis from globalized or, in Beck's term, "cosmopolitan" social sciences. Critical voices argue that Beck's approach oversimplifies "society" and that "as long as the canon" of social theory is understood as "methodologically nationalistic", a rejection of methodological nationalism will not be able to actually *transcend* it" (Chernilo 2006, p. 6). This approach claims that what is required is rather "a concept of society" replacing the nation as a core unit of social research. Chernilo concludes that the research agenda should identify a "tool" to "match the ways in which the social world itself is being transformed" (Chernilo 2006, p. 9).

Even though globalization debates have early on not only identified strata of globalized neoliberalism but also transnational formations of civil society, it is Beck's view that "the concept of the political" is not "associated with society" but "with the state". Societies are in this sense methodologically framed as a "space controlled by national states as in a container" (Beck 2000, p. 22). Beck's conception of methodological nationalism helps to situate this critique in the context of "cosmopolitanization" within late or second modernity – as the national "outlook" within a globalized "risk society". His critique is directed towards the *unreflected* equation of "society" with "the nation-state", an equation that positions "states and their governments" as the key sectors of social science research.

The conceptual disentangling of the modern nation as a unit of social research has, this should also be added here, been addressed in contexts of public policy and governmentality. This line of discourse emerged in political science through the angle of "legitimacy", traditionally situated in the "boundedness" of nation-states, but deeply confronted with the erosion of the nation-state through a nexus of global/local disjunctures. A debate that has opened up terrains of a post-national constellation is relevant not only to formations of global governance but also public accountability (Held and McGrew 2000), transnational civil society (Kaldor 2003), and what Sassen calls the "denationalizing of particular components of state authority" (Sassen 2007, p. 95). In particular, migration studies have not only critically debated methodological nationalism early on (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003) but substantially reflected the state society "frame" around social and political structures. Various arguments address not so much the relationship of society and state but – as a primary focus – the layer of "inclusion" and "exclusion" that, these debates argue, has been strategically utilized as a methodology for the "naturalization" of the nation-state in social sciences. In this sense, these debates highlight the role of nationalism in modern societies where the nation-state and its "territorial limitation" has a "taken for granted" unit of analysis (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003, 577–578).

It is not only this emerging "space" arising *between* society and the state *due to* globalization but the particular ways of relation between a (global) civil society and the state that positions not only the debate about methodological nationalism in a new context but allows this disentangling of the traditional state-society "frame" to be reflected in its relevance for conceptual approaches for media and communication research in an advanced globalization process. As Held and McGrew have recently argued: "by eroding the distinctions between the domestic and the international, endogenous and exogenous … the idea of globalization directly challenges the "methodological nationalism" (Held and McGrew 2007, p. 5).

The reshifting of the dialectical axis of globalization, from early conceptions of the "national"/ "foreign", "inside/outside" to relativistic processes of local/global, space/place and what might captures today's "epistemological" shift in globalization debate (Beck, 2007) to networks/locality relates to particular ways of this deconstruction process. Today's nonlinear communicative spheres situated between "networks" and "locality" open up new spaces for transnational research within a context of a global civil society, which – all things considered – could constitute the new methodological paradigm in order to conceptualize not only new forms of legitimacy and participation but also deliberation across the wide networked terrain of diverse globalized public spheres.

References

Aksoy, A. and Robins, K. (2003) The enlargement of meaning, *Gazette*, **65** (4–5), 365–388.

Beck, U. (2000) *What Is Globalization?* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Beck, U. (2007) The cosmopolitan condition: why methodological nationalism fails, *Theory, Culture and Society*, **24** (7–8), 286–90.

Beck, U. (2009) *World at Risk*. Cambridge: Polity.

Blumler, J. and Gurevitch, M. (1975) Towards a comparative framework for political communication research, in J. Blumler and M. Gurevitch (eds), *The Crisis of Public Communication*. London: Routledge, pp. 59–72.

Boyd-Barrett, O. and Thussu, D. (1992) *Contra-Flow in Global News International and Regional News Exchange Mechanisms*. London: John Libbey.

Chang, T.K., Berg, P., Fung, A., Kedl, K., Luther, C. and Szuba, J. (2001) Comparing nations in mass communication research, 1970–97, *Gazette: International Journal for Communication Studies*, **63** (5), 415–435.

Chernilo, D. (2006) Social theory's methodological nationalism: myth and reality, *European Journal of Social Theory*, **9** (1), 6–22.

Curran, J. and Park, M.-J. (2000) *De-Westernising Media Studies*. London: Routledge.

Cushion, S. and Lewis, J. (eds) (2010) *The Rise of 24-Hour News Television: Global Perspectives*. New York: Peter Lang.

Esser, F. and Pfetsch, B. (eds) (2004) *Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases and Challenges*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ferguson, Y.H. and Mansbach, R.W. (2004) *Remapping Global Politics: History's Revenge and Future Shock*. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Fraser, N. (2007) Transnationalizing the public sphere, *Theory, Culture and Society*, **24** (4), 7–30.

Georgiou, M. (2007) Transnational crossroads for media and diaspora: three challenges for research, in O. Bailey, M. Georgiou, and R. Harindranath (eds), *Transnational Lives and the Media: Re-imagining Diaspora*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Giddens, A. (1990) *Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Gitlin, T. (1998) Public sphere or public sphericules?, in T. Liebes and J. Curran (eds), *Media, Ritual and Identity*. London: Routledge, pp. 168–174.

Hafez, K. (ed.) (2008) *Arab Media: Power and Weakness*. New York: Continuum.

Hallin, D. and Mancini, P. (2004) *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Held, D. and McGrew, A. (eds) (2000) The great globalization debate, in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds), *The Global Transformation Reader*. Cambridge: Polity, pp. 1–50.

Held, D. and McGrew, A. (2007) Introduction: globalization at risk?, in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds), *Globalization Theory*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, pp. 1–14.

Kaldor, M. (2003) *Global Civil Society*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Kivisto, P. and Faist, T. (2010) *Beyond a Border: The Causes and Consequences of Contemporary Immigration*. Los Angeles, CA: Pine Forge Press.

Kohn, M.L. (1989) Introduction, in M.L. Kohn (ed.), *Cross-National Research in Sociology*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, pp.17–31.

Kraidy, M. (2010) *Reality Television and Arab Politics: Contention in Public Life*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lash, S. and Urry, J. (1994) *Economies of Signs and Space*. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Lazarsfeld, P.F. and Merton, R.K. (1971) Mass communication, popular taste, and organized social action, in W. Schramm and D.F. Roberts (eds), *The Process and Effects of Mass Communication*. Urbana, Chicago, and London: University of Illinois Press, pp. 554–578.

Lerner, D. (1958) *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Livingstone, S. (2003) On the challenges of cross-national comparative media research, *European Journal of Communication*, **18**, 477–500.

Parks, L. and Kumar, S. (eds) (2003) *Planet TV: A Global Television Reader*. New York and London: New York University Press.

Rantanen, T. (2010) Methodological inter-nationalism in comparative media research. Flow studies in international communication, in A. Rooscall and I. Salovaara-Moring (eds), *Communicating the Nation*. Gothenburgh: Nordicom, pp. 25–40.

Robertson, R. (1992) *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*. London: Sage.

Sakr, N. (2007) *Arab Media and Political Renewal: Community, Legitimacy and Public Life*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Samuel-Azran, T. (2010) *Al-Jazeera and the US War Coverage*. New York: Peter Lang.

Sassen, S. (2007) The places and spaces of the global: an expanded analytic terrain, in D. Held, and A. McGrew (eds), *Globalization Theory*. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 79–105.

Schiller, H. (1976) *Communication and Cultural Domination*. White Plains, NY: International Arts and Sciences Press.

Schneider, S., Hurrelmann, A., Krell-Laluhova, Z., and Wiesner, A. (2010) *Democracy's Deep Roots: Why the Nation-State Remains Legitimate*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Slade, C. (2010) Shifting landscapes of citizenship, in C. Slade and M. Moellering (eds), *From Migrant to Citizen: Testing Language, Testing Culture*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.3–23.

Slade, C. and Mollering, M. (eds) (2010) *From Migrant to Citizen: Testing Language, Testing Culture*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Stevenson, R.L. and Shaw, D.L. (eds) (1984) *Foreign News and the New Information Order*. Ames: Iowa State University Press.

Thussu, D. (ed.) (2010) *International Communication: A Reader*. London: Arnold.

Volkmer, I. (1999) *News in the Global Sphere: A Study of CNN and Its Impact on Global Communication*. Luton: University of Luton Press.

Volkmer, I. (2011) Reterritorialized proximity as a civic sphere, Paper presented on the Annual Convention of the International Communication Association (ICA), Boston, MA, May 28, 2011.

Wessler, H., Peters, B., Brueggemann, M., Kleinen-von-Koenigsloew, K. and Sifft, S. (2008) *Transnationalization of Public Spheres.* Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wimmer, A. and Glick Schiller, N. (2003) Methodological nationalism, the social sciences, and the study of migration: an essay in historical epistemology, *International Migration Review*, **37** (3), 576–610.

8

Footprints of the Global South

Venesat-1 and RascomQAF/1R as Counter-hegemonic Satellites

Lisa Parks

The word "footprint" surfaced in the English language as early as 1552 to refer to "the print or impression left by the foot", especially "a fossilized one." By 1971, more than two hundred years later, the word was used to convey "the area within which a broadcast signal from a particular source can be received", and by 1979 footprint was associated with ecology, signifying "an environmental consequence of human activity in terms of pollution, damage to ecosystems, and depletion of natural resources" (Oxford English Dictionary 1989). That the etymology of "footprint" is associated with inscription, transmission, and ecology positions it as an apt term for conceptualizing and analyzing the material effects of global communication satellites.

Few, if any, critical theorists have used the term footprint, but the word has been invoked in relation to Jacques Derrida's discussion of the *trace*. In her translator's preface to *Of Grammatology* Gayatri Spivak points out in relation to Derrida's use of the *trace* that "the French word carries strong implications of track, imprint, footprint" (Spivak 1976, p. xv). The trace is linked to the fundamental assumptions of Derrida's "metaphysics of erasure" – that everything is "always already inhabited by the track of something that is not itself" (Spivak 1976, p. lxix). For Derrida the trace is the footprint of *difference*. In this chapter the footprint is a concept for exploring the historical emergences and material effects of communication satellites. A satellite footprint not only marks the absence of the satellite's presence, it serves as a trace of a multitude of resources that the satellite relies upon for its development and operation, resources that are fundamental yet are invisible in the satellite's remote and seamless operation such as heavy metals, synthetic materials, clean rooms, labor, transport systems, pyrotechnics, risk scenarios, insurance policies, solar power, orbital slots, earth stations, geopolitical strategies, and so on. The footprint is a trace of the satellite's earthliness, a spectre of its deep embeddedness in the raw materials and matters of life on earth.

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

In addition to serving this conceptual function – as a trace of material relations essential to the satellite development and operations – the satellite footprint is implicated within geopolitical spheres of influence and the expansion of global and regional cultures and markets. Satellite footprints enable satellite operators, companies, and nation-states to forge new political alliances and trade relations, establish new forms of capital and exchange, and develop new forms of social control. During the past decade the world has witnessed major conglomeration in the communication satellite industry. In 2006 Intelsat acquired Pan-Amsat, garnering the company a total of 52 satellites, the largest fleet in the world. In 2008 Americom merged with New Skies to form SES World Skies, which now owns and operates a fleet of 49 satellites. Eutelsat, the world's third largest satellite operator, controls 29 satellites. These three companies alone control 130 geostationary satellites, representing an enormous concentration of ownership. As these satellite giants operate in and extend their footprints into almost every corner of the world, a handful of smaller satellite operators with strikingly different ambitions have emerged as well.

This chapter explores the satellite projects of two such operators – Venesat-1 in South America and RascomQAF/1R[1] in Africa. Both of these projects emerged as the result of historical regional initiatives that were recently financed by national leaders with patently anti-Western political agendas, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. Indeed, Chávez and Gaddafi have been strong allies in their struggle against US and European imperialism, and their eccentric and authoritarian political leadership has been the subject of comparison and critique (Dobson 2011; Childress 2011). Despite the problems with the Chávez and Gaddafi regimes, both leaders supported regional satellite projects as counter-hegemonic responses to Western commercial satellite operators that have dominated markets in South America and Africa for decades. Both leaders understood satellite development as vital to regional autonomy, integration, and modernization (Ospina 2011) and both leaders used the satellites to promote (and, in the case of Gaddafi, attempt to save) their national regimes. That these satellite projects represent such contradictory agendas makes them interesting and significant sites for global media studies.

While satellites can be studied from legal, economic, or technical perspectives, this chapter employs a cultural approach informed by critical media studies, post-structuralist theories of power, and post-colonial critiques of science and technology to consider how satellites "function in the everyday push and pull of local and global political, economic, social and cultural relations" (Harding 2011, p. 3). In it I analyze the satellite's technological capacity to generate footprints in relation to struggles for political, economic and cultural autonomy in the global south (Brandt 1980). In past research I have explored how satellite footprints have extended corporate claims to territory, fostered natural resource development, and spurred indigenous claims to spectrum (Parks 2005, 2009). In this chapter, I build upon spatially oriented research by other media and communication scholars to explore how satellite footprints function as counter-hegemonic projects.

Treating the footprints of Venesat-1 and RascomQAF-1R as a discursive terrain, I describe Venezuelan and Libyan participation in these regional satellite projects and analyze the discourses informing and surrounding them. In both cases, resource-rich, developing nations have financed satellites in an effort to bolster regional autonomy and economic development. While other countries such as Egypt, Nigeria, and Kazakhstan have similarly converted their oil wealth into satellites in recent years, I am interested in the parallel tracks of Hugo Chávez and Muammar Gaddafi and, in particular, in the ways their visions of satellite development contrast with those of commercial operators. Where commercial operators prioritize the sale of and profit from satellite capacity, Venesat-1 and RascomQAF/1R were used to proffer a model of satellite ownership that prioritizes social welfare, education, infrastructural development, and integration of rural and indigenous communities. Rather than dismiss these satellites as the projects of egomaniacal despots, it is important to recognize that both Venesat-1 and RascomQAF/1R emerged in part as the result of historical, collective, and regional struggles for economic independence, struggles that have become all the more viable and poignant in an age of neo-liberal globalization.

The chapter begins with a discussion of research on satellites and media space by communication and media scholars to situate the technology within ongoing critical dialogues in the field. It proceeds with a discussion of the significance of the footprint as a critical concept for imagining and analyzing the satellite's position within material and territorial relations, and culminates in a discussion of the historical emergence of the Venesat-1 and RascomQAF/1R footprints, detailing the ambitions of these satellite projects. Ultimately, I suggest that the Venesat-1 and Rascom-QAF/1R projects should be assessed not through the leaders that funded them but by virtue of the satellites' entrenchment within historical struggles and regional imaginaries and by their potential to serve the interests and needs of constituencies within the footprints who are not adequately served by commercial satellite operators or authoritarian leaders.

Satellites and Media Space

For decades media and communication scholars have been writing about the satellite's relationship to changing spatiality. In his classic book *Communication and Culture*, James Carey invokes the satellite in a discussion of Harold Innis' work, linking the technology to the patterns of extension and decentralization that define electronic communication. As Carey suggests, "through satellite communication there occurs a thrusting out of cultures into new regions of space. This movement is part of a system of national and regional rivalries, which find expression in satellite broadcasting" (Carey 1988, pp. 170–171). To be sure, the satellite's development was historically motivated by national and regional rivalries to communicate across time/space, to create zones of communication and coverage that exceeded the geographical boundaries of nation-states, while, at the same time, asserting "an indefinite expansion of the administrative mentality and imperial politics" (Carey 1988, p. 171). The satellite footprint is a visual manifestation, mapping, or trace of these historical contests and a sign of the satellite's involvement in global extensions and decentralizations.

While Carey emphasized the satellite's relation to the new frontiers and administered zones of electronic communication, Charlotte Brunsdon focuses on the satellite's relationship to urban space in her path-breaking essay "Satellite dishes and landscapes of taste". As satellite dishes began to appear scattered across apartment buildings in England during the late 1980s, people were perturbed by their sudden transformation of architectural aesthetics and by the outside signals they imported into the national mediascape. The public visibility of the satellite dish played a role in fracturing the idea of a national television culture and drew attention to transformations that were happening in the global media economy with the expansion of global satellite broadcasting services. As Brunsdon explains, "Dishes can be approached as conspicuous consumption … a dish is also historically specific, a particular act, a concrete and visible sign of a consumer who has bought into the supranational entertainment space, who will not necessarily be available for the ritual, citizen-making moments of national broadcasting" (Brunsdon 1991, p. 163). The satellite dish not only transformed everyday urban spaces in England and elsewhere but augured in a new era of television in Great Britain, one in which "quality", "national" public service broadcasting was often sidestepped in favor of "low-brow", "foreign" satellite television. In this way, the dish helped to generate a space of shifting taste hierarchies and hybridized media cultures.

Brunsdon first published her essay in 1991 and since then many other media and communication scholars have written about satellite television in a transnational context, commenting on the way it has been understood as infiltrating or, in some cases, "polluting" national cultures (Fair 2003; Kumar 2005). Other scholars have explored how diasporic or exilic communities use satellite television to remain in touch with homeland cultures (Hargreaves and Mahjoub 1997; Aksoy and Robins 2000; Volkmer 2008; also see Chapter 7 by Slade and Volkmer in this book). The satellite dish has also taken on new meanings with the proliferation of Arab satellite television services and in the context of the war on terror. In some European cities merely downlinking signals with a satellite dish or having the dish positioned in a certain direction can create suspicions or position a dish owner as "suspect". Thus the dish has shifted from symbolizing and producing "landscapes of taste" to "landscapes of terror" as it has been used in ethnic profiling in Europe and elsewhere (Parks 2012). In such cases, satellite footprints function not as new frontiers of communication but as zones of social monitoring and control.

Another spatially oriented approach to satellite communication can be found in the work of Monroe Price, who, in his essay "Satellite broadcasting as trade routes in the sky", compares communication satellites to eighteenth century shipping vessels (Price 2002). Where ships carried cargo to ports, satellites transmit signals into footprints. Both have generated new paths of commerce, geopolitical and economic alliances, and transnational cultures. Just as certain ports had better strategic positions, so do some orbital slots. As Price observes, "Particular orbital slots are often more important than others because of the particular territorial footprint a satellite can reach from those slots. A footprint that reaches a vast population or a wealthy population or a politically important one can be more valuable than one that does not" (Price 2002, p. 148). Significantly, Price is interested in the use of orbital slots by developing countries and disenfranchised communities to bolster their power and integration within the global economy, and discusses satellite initiatives by the island nation of Tonga, post-socialist Eastern European countries, and the Kurdish community as examples.

While Price explores how the satellite structures patterns of commerce and communication across space, Naomi Sakr has explored how the technology generates transnational electronic domains – "satellite realms" – that can temporarily exceed the sovereignty of authoritarian regimes. In her detailed study of satellite television in the Middle East, Sakr suggests that during the 1990s Arab satellite channels could be thought of as "off-shore democracies" in part because they "appeared to provide people outside government with a unique platform from which to communicate with policy-makers and the wider public. For the first time, commentators felt they could have their say 'without governments breathing over their shoulders'" (Sakr 2002, p. 4). Satellite channels were also articulated with the concepts of "offshore" and "democratic" because they could be used to "reunite communities scattered by war, exile and labour migration" (Sakr 2002, p. 6). Sakr's work is vital to understanding the media coverage of events such as the Arab Spring. News of uprisings and protests throughout North Africa and the Middle East were not reported accurately by state television services throughout the region, but were covered extensively by global satellite channels such as Al Jazeera and CNN. In this way, the satellite enabled a feedback loop that bypassed state agencies (Parks 2012). Protesters sent their audiovisual content either via cell phone or Internet to people outside their country so that it could be shared and relayed back into the country through global circuits via satellite or Internet. Such feedback loops also formed during the Iranian revolution in 2009 and in response to recent protests and conflicts in Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Media and communication research on satellites and media space prompts a consideration of the historical rivalries that motivated the emergence of new satellites, the landscapes of taste and terror that they generate, the diasporic and displaced communities that they serve, the trade routes that they introduce and support, and the political dialogues and cultures of dissent that they cultivate. While the current chapter does not address all of these issues, it is important that they remain alive and active in critical discussions of satellite technologies for each of them can be a springboard for further global media research. In the next section, I explore how the footprint can extend spatially oriented media and communication research on satellite technologies.

The Power of a Footprint

Building on the ideas that satellite technology can be understood as generating carefully administered frontiers of communication, landscapes of taste, diasporic communities, trade routes in the sky, and offshore democracies, I want to focus further on the satellite footprint – that area on earth in which a signal from a given satellite can be received, that trace of the satellite's embeddedness within material conditions on earth. The world is criss-crossed by satellite footprints. There are more satellite footprints on earth than there are sovereign nation-state boundaries. Different satellites have different footprints and the same satellite can have multiple footprints known as "beams" or "spot-beams". Beams enable satellite operators to carve up the footprint into more specialized geographies, markets, demographics, or geo-linguistic regions. Some footprints are transnational and some are sub-national, but footprints never coincide precisely with nation-state boundaries. As a result "signal spillovers" have become a common feature of the satellite age and have triggered concerns about sovereignty violations, as unencrypted free-to-air signals from one part of the world can be downlinked in another where there may be radically different cultural norms and regulations.

To understand the footprint it is helpful to examine footprint maps, which are available on the websites of satellite operators or online satellite databases such as satbeams.com or lyngsat.com. Within these maps, lines or shadings are used to designate the geographic boundary of a satellite's potential field of operations. Satellite footprints are much more than static maps, however. They are politically charged documents that intimate previous, existing, or desired political alliances, trade relations, and/or transcultural campaigns. They are symptoms of the power of the transnational corporation in the age of globalization in that they visualize the corporation's technological capacity to operate across nation-state boundaries, while providing little sense of limits on this power. They are visualizations of technical processes that are imperceptible and yet that increasingly set the conditions for politics, trade, and culture in our world.

While footprint maps illustrate how satellites transform world territories into vast zones of signal traffic, they can also become platforms for new critical imaginaries and forms of analysis. Footprint analysis is a critical practice that emphasizes the material and territorializing effects of satellite technologies. It involves examining footprint maps, recognizing and foregrounding the eclectic ways in which satellites are developed and used in different parts of the world, and studying the political implications of such uses. This approach requires not only describing satellites and the companies or nation-states that operate them but also considering their participation in the production of new regional signal territories, landscapes of taste, trade routes, diasporic formations, and audiovisual cultures. It also involves specifying how the satellite footprint is situated as part of an orbit-to-ground field of hegemonic relations. In short, footprint analysis is an attempt to develop a materialist critique of the satellite that considers how it came to make a mark on earth.

As a cartographic display, the footprint compels a particular way of thinking about satellite technology that blends issues of sovereignty, geopolitics, natural resources, security, trade, and culture, and invites critical analysis of satellite development and use in relation to these disparate issues. As such the footprint demands interdisciplinary, relational, and materialist forms of analysis that can account for the fact that the same satellite might be used to monitor oil pipelines and watch soap operas, transmit corporate reports and play games on mobile phones, eavesdrop on terror suspects, and purchase products on the world wide web. The satellite footprint, in other words, creates a space for imagining, specifying, and critiquing the changing practices of states, corporations, and people in the global information age.

Satellite footprints do not emerge over night; rather, they are the result of years of planning, fundraising, technical development, political negotiations, and regulatory approvals. In this sense, a footprint has temporal dimensions. It is symptomatic not only of a satellite's current operation, but also of the years of strategizing and planning that preceded it. While the footprint requires a look back in time, it can also be thought about as a blueprint of regional futures. Satellite operators can only gain approvals to develop, launch, and operate a satellite after conducting feasibility studies and risk analyses addressing the satellite's likelihood of generating income (to pay off investors and sustain the operation). In this way, the satellite's success is inextricably tied to the political and economic conditions of the countries, businesses, and societies within the footprint. With this in mind, I turn now to a discussion of the Venesat-1 and RascomQAF/1R footprints.

Venesat-1

Venezuela's Venesat-1 satellite (or Simón Bolívar, as it is also known) was made in China by the China Great Wall Industry Corporation in Beijing and launched from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center on October 29, 2008. It was installed in an orbital slot at 78 degrees west, a slot that the International Telecommunications Union had assigned to Uruguay. Uruguay ceded the slot to Venezuela in exchange for use of 10% of Venesat-1's capacity (Logan 2008). The satellite, which cost Venezuela $241 million, has 14 C-band, 12 Ku-band, and 2 Ka-band transponders, and is projected to have a lifespan of 15 years (Jiao 2009). To track and operate the satellite, Venezuela built earth stations at its military bases in El Sombrero and Luepa. Venezuelan technicians trained by the Chinese now manage and operate the earth stations.

Venesat-1's footprint is organized as four beams. The South American C-band beam provides coverage throughout Latin America and extends from New York to Antarctica and Mexico to Western Africa (see Figure 8.1). The South American Ku-band beam provides concentrated coverage over the interior portion of the continent covering Bolivia and Paraguay, and parts of Peru, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. Another Ku-band beam is focused on the north and stretches across Venezuela and the Caribbean islands, and a final Ka-band beam covers Venezuela.

The Venesat-1 project emerged after decades of regional aspirations, planning, and efforts among South American countries to build a satellite, efforts that began during



Figure 8.1 The footprint of Venesat-1 (image published with kind permission of SatStar Ltd. Map © 2011 Google and © 2011 www.satbeams.com).

the 1960s and intensified after Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela signed a landmark free trade treaty in the Colombian city of Cartagena in 1969. The Cartagena Accord intended to gradually reduce trade barriers between the nations and integrate them into a common market (Knauer and Pastor 1998). Part of the integration process involved forming the Association of State Telecommunications Entities of the Subregional Andean Agreement (ASETA), which focused on the development of a regional satellite system to serve the domestic and international communications needs of the five countries (Ospina 1988). During the 1970s and 1980s, multiple satellite initiatives emerged throughout the region, and ASETA contracted Canadian, US, and European agencies to conduct technical and feasibility studies, which led to different scenarios for the regional development or leasing of a satellite.

In 1977 ASETA members hired Canada Astronautics Limited/satTel Consultants to do a feasibility study, which became known as Project Condor. The plan called for the development of three 12-transponder satellites that would operate in the C-band, two of which would be launched by 1982 or 1983, and the other would be a replacement satellite. The satellites' cost of \$50 million was to be shared by ASETA members, and the terrestrial segment (development of earth stations throughout the region) would cost another \$50 million, which would be divided in proportion to the number of stations in each country (Ospina 1988, p. 3.23). Because there were problems in determining how to finance the satellites, the project was put on hold. In 1984 Intelsat tried to dissuade ASETA from building its own regional satellite given the high costs and limited technical expertise in the region, and proposed a shared lease agreement that would enable regional access to Intelsat transponders for \$831 000 per transponder per year (Ospina 1988, p. 3.36). One of the drawbacks to this proposal, according to Colombian space law expert Sylvia Ospina, was that the ASETA countries would "not be the owners or operators of their own dedicated satellite. For political and cultural reasons, it is especially important to believe and know that a country or group of countries has control over its communications" (Ospina 1988, p. 3.39). Indeed, regional satellite ownership and orbital access were contentious topics among developing nations during this period. In 1976 equatorial nations led by Colombia signed the Bogota Declaration and boldly asserted sovereignty over the geostationary orbit superjacent to their terrestrial borders (Collis 2012).

To be sure, the project of building a regional satellite in South America was a counter-hegemonic one, driven by a desire for regional autonomy and integration. Yet the South American countries involved repeatedly found themselves relying on "foreign experts" to conduct feasibility studies and provide technical consultation. While these experts presented a variety of scenarios, as Ospina argues in her detailed analysis of Project Condor, they failed to address a fundamental issue – the financing needed for the development of a regional satellite or for leasing transponder space on Intelsat satellites. The various satellite projects proposed by foreigners were "over-dimensioned" for the region's needs and failed to consider how ASETA members would structure political and legal administration of satellite access or how the regional satellite would be used (Ospina 1988, pp. 3.49–3.50).

While Project Condor itself never came to fruition, several Latin American countries have since launched satellites including Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela, and Bolivia currently has a satellite in development. Of these satellites, Venesat-1 has been most closely aligned with the historical ambition to launch a regional satellite for South America. Developed under the leadership of Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez, Venesat-1 has been heralded as a testament to the success of socialism in Venezuela and as a symbol of regional autonomy and independence from Western satellite operators who have long had a foothold over the region. While nations in the region have liberalized and privatized their telecom and media sectors, Venezuela administers the satellite within a nationalized system, and uses it to support its pan-Latin television network, Telesur, and film studio, Villa Del Cine, initiated by Chávez in 2005 and 2006 respectively (Zweig 2011).

Chávez has been an ardent advocate of the Venesat-1 satellite and has been outspoken about its purpose and potential. In a national news segment entitled "Satellite for Freedom" Chávez appears at a 2008 press conference in Caracas holding up a piece of paper that features Venesat-1's massive C-band footprint. As he moves the pen across it to outline the footprint he explains that the satellite is named after Simón Bolívar, the "Latin American independence hero", and describes the satellite as "part of a drive for the independence from the monopoly of satellite communication by the United States in the Caribbean and Latin America" (YouTube 2008). On other occasions Chávez has described Venesat-1 as a technology for combating constant US "media bombardment", as part of the "construction of socialism" and as "an act of liberation" designed to eliminate Venezuela's "technological illiteracy" (Agence France-Press 2008; Kozloff 2010). He has contrasted Venezuela's satellite with those of Western satellite operators declaring, "a satellite at the service of capitalism is launched to make money, but Simón Bolívar will benefit development and the integration of our people" (Kozloff 2010).

Indeed, Venesat-1 was slated to become part of an array of projects involving national and regional economic development, distance education and medicine, environmental conservation, and indigenous communities (Acevedo, Varela, and Orihuela 2010; Acevedo *et al.* 2011). During the first year of Venesat-1's use, Venezuela prioritized establishing satellite links to communities with 3000 or less inhabitants, schools, and facilities in the oil and financial sectors (Ministry of Communication and Information 2009). The satellite was to be used to connect indigenous communities such as the Warao Indians to the national telecommunication infrastructure and expand education and health care services in Warao communities (Venezuela Presidential Press Office 2009). In 2009 the Minister of Science, Technology and Medium Industries, Jesse Chacón, indicated that the new satellite network is scheduled to reach full capacity by 2012 and that 16 000 satellite dishes would be installed around the country by 2013 (Brown 2009). As members of Venezuela's national technical team suggest, "Venezuelan space policy has deep social roots aimed at promotion of economic progress and raising the living standards of citizens all over the country by developing its telecommunications, culture, education, film and TV industries. More communication infrastructure means higher incomes for people, better food, houses, safe drinking water, inoculations against diseases, as well as more schools and educational centers" (Acevedo, Varela, and Orihuela 2010, p. 191).

Despite these high ambitions, a year after its launch Venesat-1 was not being used to its full capacity and many of Venezuela's television channels were still carried by the

NSS-806 satellite owned by SES World Skies. As a result, rumors began to circulate alleging that Venesat-1 had malfunctioned (Brown 2009; Mirt 2009). One article indicated that the "socialist satellite" was a "no show" and insisted that Chávez was presenting his TV show *Alo Presidente!* as if it were being broadcast via Venesat-1, when it was actually being carried on NSS-806 (Fabregat 2009). The Chávez regime and Chinese, however, insisted that the satellite was fully operational (Venezuela Presidential Press Office 2009; NewsmaxWorld.com 2009; China Great Wall Industry Corporation 2010). As of late 2011 there were still conflicting reports about whether the satellite was in use.

Data on the satellite tracking website, LyngSat, indicated Venesat-1 was transmitting television and radio channels from Venezuela, Colombia, Cuba, Brazil, Chile, the United Kingdom, Spain, and the United States (SatelliteToday.com 2011). The South American C-band beam was carrying channels including Telesur, ANTV, Venezolana de TV, Colombeia, ViVe, TVes, Venezuelan national radio channels, and feeds. The northern Ku-band beam was transmitting channels including Telesur, SportPlus, TV Brazil, TV Chile, Cubavision International, ViVe, BBC World Americas, RT Español, Cartoon Network Latin America, TMC, TNT America Latina, Venezuela's national radio channels, and an informational channel about the Venezuelan petroleum company called PDVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela SA). The southern Ku-band beam was only carrying feeds.

Since the LyngSat updates for these channels were in 2009 or 2010, it is still unclear whether Venesat-1 is fully operational, particularly since many of these channels are also carried on World Skies' NSS-806 satellite, which has a very similar footprint. Suffice it to say, Venezuela's CANTV (Compañía Anónima Nacional Teléfonos de Venezuela) announced that its 48 channel direct to home satellite television service via Venesat-1 launched on November 28, 2011 (Digitaltvnews.net 2011). Thus it appears that Venesat-1 may be operating but perhaps not to full capacity or not according to commercially established standards. It is important to recognize that the uses, priorities, and structures of satellites operated by a socialist state may differ from those run by commercial operators.

In addition to fostering Latin American regionalism, Venesat-1's footprint is implicated within geopolitical and geo-economic relations. Venezuela's new Minister of Science and Technology, Mr. Ricardo, announced in 2010 "…the communications satellite project of Venezuela is a strategic decision of President Chávez, made from the geopolitical viewpoint…." (China Great Wall Industry Corporation 2010). During the past decade, Venezuela has forged strategic partnerships with China and Russia and has ambitions to become a "space leadership country" in the region (Acevedo *et al.* 2011, p. 179). After signing $4 billion in military contracts with Venezuela in 2005, Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to visit Chávez in 2010 to help plan the development of a new space industry in Venezuela, which would include a satellite launch site and manufacturing facility (Kozloff 2010). The same year Venezuela contracted Russia to build two nuclear reactors and a Russian–UK energy conglomerate TNK–BP invested in the nation's oil industry (BBC News 2010).

Venezuela has a similarly close economic partnership with China. In 2011 Venezuela agreed to spend $140 million on a second Chinese-built satellite called Venezuelan Remote Sensing Satellite-1 (Geospatialworld.net 2011). That the countries are collaborating on a second satellite is significant, given that the United States had asked China not to launch Venesat-1, which China ignored (Logan 2008). In addition to supporting Venezuela's satellite industry, China has invested in Venezuela's oil and natural gas industry, and has been identified as "Latin America's major strategic partner", investing in telecommunications, natural resources, agriculture, critical infrastructure (ports, railroads, airports), logistics, finance, and banking throughout the region, all of which are supported by satellites (SatelliteToday.com 2011; Ellis 2011). China is politically cautious about its relationship with Venezuela because of Chávez's (anti-US) political posturing, and thus engages in a delicate balancing act. Notably, China has extended its satellite business to other countries and has signed agreements with Bolivia and Brazil (EnglishNews.cn 2011).

The Venesat-1 footprint is the result of strategic Chinese–Venezuelan partnerships, a history of regional collaboration planning, and the national socialist project and contentious political leadership of Hugo Chávez. The satellite's footprint has played a role in reinforcing regional imaginaries and practices, which, as Cristina Venegas suggests, are acutely important in Latin America. As Venegas observes, the "regional" in Latin America is a complex term that "can refer to the integration of multi-national, multilingual, and multiethnic groupings across diverse territories of North, Central, and South America, and the Caribbean. It also describes subregional economic arrangements … counterhegemonic projects including micro-regional ethnic groupings … or language networks, individual geographic zones, and economic blocs" (Venegas 2009, p. 121). Venesat-1 was developed precisely to support such configurations, to integrate nations, languages, and ethnic communities, facilitate economic arrangements, and support counter-hegemonic projects across diverse territories. In this way, its footprint differs dramatically from those of commercial operators.

RascomQAF/1R

As Venesat-1 emerged in South America, a similar project was underway in Africa. RascomQAF-1R was manufactured by the French–Italian company Thales Alenia Space and launched into an orbital slot at 2.9 degrees east from Kourou, New Guinea, on April 8, 2010. The satellite is owned by RascomStar-QAF, self-described as the "Pan-African Satellite Operator", and is the replacement satellite for the company's first satellite, RascomQAF1, which malfunctioned shortly after its 2007 launch, dramatically reducing its capacity and shortening its lifespan. In 2010 RascomStar-QAF received a $230 million settlement for the failed satellite and moved it into a graveyard slot (de Selding 2010). Its replacement, RascomQAF-1R, has 8 Ku-band and 12 C-band transponders and its footprint is structured into three beams, two Ku-band beams, one that covers northern and western Africa and another that spans the southern half of the continent. The satellite's C-band beam covers the entire African continent and extends into southern Europe and western Asia as well (see Figure 8.2).

RascomStar-QAF's corporate headquarters are located in Port Luis, Mauritius, and the company has a "supervisory office" in Toulouse, France, and earth stations in Douala, Cameroon, and Gharyan, Libya. The company was first registered in 2002 and by 2007



Figure 8.2 The footprint of RascomQAF-1R (image published with kind permission of SatStar Ltd).

became a joint venture between the Regional African Satellite Communications Organisation (Rascom) (63%), representing a consortium of 45 African countries, Libyan African Investment Portfolio (LAP) (25%), and Thales Alenia Space (12%) (de Selding 2010). According to RascomStar-QAF's website, its satellite system "is the result of the strong will of all African states to join efforts and co-operate in making the Pan-African satellite telecom infrastructure a reality" (RascomStar-QAF "Mission").

Like Venesat-1, the RascomQAF satellites were developed to support regional autonomy and cooperation. As the company's CEO, Faraj Elamari, explains, "The RASCOM-QAF system represents an exceptional tool in the development and integration of Africa in the numerical society" (RascomStar-QAF "Successful"). Like Venesat-1, the RascomQAF satellites were the result of more than two decades of regional discussions, coordination, planning, and fundraising. In 1992 the Regional African Satellite

Communication Organisation (Rascom) formed to explore the possibility of developing a regional satellite that would provide Africa with sustainable telecommunications infrastructure and extend service to rural areas (Rascom "Background"). For decades African nations had been dependent on Western satellite operators for international and national telephony within the continent and beyond. Throughout the 1990s, African nations pooled together $500 million per year (with loans from the World Bank, the IMF, Europe, and the United States) to pay European and US satellite operators to support basic telephone services across Africa (often within the same country) since many areas lacked terrestrial infrastructure (Pougala 2011). Rather than continue to pay exorbitant fees to European and US satellite firms, Rascom decided it was more cost-effective to try to raise $400 million for the one-time cost of purchasing a Pan-African satellite, particularly since 80% of Africa's voice and data traffic was being carried by satellites (BalancingAct-Africa.com 2011a, 2011b). In 2006 Libya's leader, Muammar Gaddafi, offered $300 million to help fund the satellite, the African Development Bank put in $50 million, and the West African Development Bank contributed $27 million (Pougala 2011). Oil-rich Rascom member Nigeria also considered contributing $100 million to the project, but decided against it since the country was already developing its own satellite, Nigcomsat-1, which failed after launch in 2008 (BalancingAct-Africa.com 2007a, 2007b). Given Rascom's historical struggle to build a regional satellite, Gaddafi became somewhat of a hero in Africa after fronting most of the capital needed for RascomQAF1. Like Chávez in Latin America, then, Gaddafi used his state's resources to help realize aspirations for a regional satellite.

Since much of the African continent still lacked a terrestrial infrastructure to support satellite communication, in 2009 RascomStar-QAF signed a $53 million contract with a California-based company, ViaSat, to provide gateway Earth stations and an initial fleet of 15 000 Rascom VSAT terminals (Developingtelecoms.com 2009; ViaSat 2009). In response to the ViaSat contract, RascomStar CEO Faraj Elamari proclaimed, "These satellite-based systems will reach rural areas of Africa that no other telecommunications infrastructure can support on a cost-effective basis. Our goal is to establish a modern, African telecommunications standard that will rely on resources within Africa" (Developingtelecoms.com 2009). As this terrestrial infrastructure was being rolled out, Rascom and RascomStar-QAF signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the New Partnership for African Development's e-Africa Commission to use the RascomStar-QAF satellite system to implement its e-School Satellite Network and ICT Broadband Infrastructure Network, both of which were aimed at reducing the digital divide on the continent and "accelerating the development of African inter-country, intra-country and global connectivity and promoting conditions for Africa to be an equal and active participant in the Global Information society" (Rascom 2010).

While RascomStar-QAF has maneuvered to become a key player in the African satellite market, like Venesat-1, the RascomQAF-1R satellite has not been used to its full capacity. Anticipating this challenge, in 2009 Rascom's Executive Director, Jones A. Killimbe, appealed "to all the RASCOM member states, the African union, signatures, policy and regulatory authorities in Africa to continue providing the necessary support to RASCOM as we continue to fulfill the mission" (BalancingAct-Africa.com 2009). According to LyngSat, by late 2011 the continental beam carried the TV channels Afrique Media, Congo-Kinshasa Mux, RTNC, RTG@, RTNC3, TVS1, Tele50, Al-Watan, Libyan Satellite Channels, as well as twelve radio channels and the feeds of LBJC and Telemedia (LyngSat 2011). The northern beam was used exclusively for Libyan state television and radio channels – including Libya Satellite Channel and Radio Libya and Shababia FM radio.

During Libya's civil war in 2011 RascomQAF-1R continued to carry Libyan state television and radio channels. Services were temporarily disrupted on April 24–25 2011 when NATO forces bombed state TV stations in Tripoli as part of mission "Odyssey Dawn" (Sennitt 2011). Throughout the NATO campaign, Gaddafi used his Libya Satellite Channel to pledge "martyrdom or victory" and to encourage others to do the same. In July 2011 an Egyptian court ordered Egyptian satellite company Nilesat to remove 14 Libyan channels from its satellite after determining they were being used to incite violence against rebels (Associated Press 2011). Earlier in 2011 Libyan journalists had established a new Libyan satellite channel in Doha called Libya TV funded by expatriate Libyan businessmen (Broadbandtvnews.com 2011). The new channel, promoted as the "first independent satellite channel in the history of Libya", was first carried by Eutelsat's Atlantic Bird satellite and was later moved to Arabsat's BADR-5 (Libya TV 2011).

Given Gaddafi's key investments in RascomStar-QAF and Libya's exclusive use of the northern beam during the past several years, it is possible that Gaddafi's assassination and Libya's regime change will adversely impact the pan-African satellite operator. When conflict in Libya began in 2011, Libyan assets around the world were frozen or seized in 2011. The United States froze more than $30 billion of Libyan funds that had been deposited in US banks and the European Union froze $48 million euros (Myers and Donadio 2011; BlackListedNews.com 2011). Committed to a "United States of Africa", Gaddafi had heavily invested in more than 25 African countries including 22 sub-Saharan countries in recent years (Ourbusiness.com 2011). RascomStar-QAF declined to answer my questions about its relationship to Libya in light of the regime change. Suffice it to say, there have been no public reports of RascomStar-QAF property seizures and the satellite appears to be operating, albeit not to full capacity.

While RascomStar-QAF's future remains somewhat uncertain, satellite giant Intelsat has built a veritable armada over Africa to bolster its position in this emerging market. In 2011 the company installed its New Dawn satellite at 32.8 degrees east, which brought its African fleet to 22 satellites. New Dawn is part of a broader Intelsat strategy to offer "new capacity in the region", with other satellites such as Intelsat-17 at 66 degrees east and Intelsat-20 at 68.5 east (Intelsat 2011a). In 2012 the company plans to launch two more – Intelsat 22 and Intelsat 23 – giving it more capacity in the region that any other operator (Intelsat 2011b). Intelsat has long dominated the African market and has a solid customer base and terrestrial infrastructure as a result, making it difficult for newer operators such as RascomStar-QAF to compete. New Dawn also has double the capacity of RascomQAF-1R with 28 C-band and 24-Ku band transponders. During installation, however, New Dawn's C-band reflector failed to deploy, leaving it with only half of its transponders and shortening its lifespan as well (de Selding 2011).

While RascomStar has a unique obligation to the members of Rascom and the telecom operators and broadcasters of its African partners, Intelsat's targeted users are business clients and development partners in Africa. Promoted on Intelsat's website as "a satellite for Africa by Africa", New Dawn is the result of a partnership with South Africa entities who invested $250 million in the project (Intelsat 2011c). As Intelsat Managing Director for Africa, Jonathan Osler, claims, "Intelsat's commitment to the African business community is unparalleled. No other satellite operator can provide the coverage, restoration and depth of services that Intelsat offers. Nearly 200 companies on the continent, including virtually all of the region's wireless operators, trust our highly reliable network to provide the infrastructure they need to offer best-in-class services to their customers" (Intelsat 2011b). While RascomStar-QAF's intention has been to address digital divide issues, New Dawn has been articulated with Africa's privatization across a variety of sectors, especially the wireless telephony market. One of the satellite's transponders has also been offered to the US Defense Department (Intelsat 2011d).

Conclusion

As these discussions of Venesat-1 and RascomQAF/1R demonstrate, satellite footprints are zones of struggle, conflict, competition, strategy, and contradiction. They are traces of complex historical, political, economic, and cultural relations. While the footprints of Venesat-1 and RascomQAF/1R set out to challenge the hegemony of commercial satellite operators, they have been less than successful. There are several possible explanations for this. First, the operation of satellites requires specialized terrestrial infrastructures and technical knowledge that take time to establish and are costly to develop. It is possible that those involved in the ground segments of these satellite projects needed more extensive technical and financial support. Second, the national telecom operators and broadcasters in South America and Africa that could use Venesat-1 and RascomQAF-1R may have been tied up in long term leases or contracts related to use of commercial satellite transponders, and thus it may have been preferable to stay in these contracts rather than change over to a new satellite. Third, the privatization of telecom and broadcast sectors in South America and Africa during the past 20 years has resulted in foreign ownership by entities that may not be interested in or invested in the regional political and economic agendas associated with these satellites and thus are not inclined to use them. Finally, the involvement by Chávez and Gaddafi in both the Venesat-1 and RascomQAF/1R projects may have been perceived by some as a financial, political, or technical risk or liability. The Western hostility associated with their political leadership could have led potential clients to envision unreliable or unpredictable satellite service or alienation of Western allies or business partners.

Whatever the case, all satellite footprints are particular, and those of Venesat-1 and RascomQAF/1R might even be described as anomalies in that they represent efforts by national leaders – whose disposition toward and treatment of their own constituents has been scathingly critiqued – to develop regional satellites in the name of social welfare, education, indigenous rights, and economic development. In this sense, the satellites themselves might be understood as holding more promise for Venezuelan and Libyan citizens than their national leaders both of whom have been condemned for their authoritarian rule. Because Chávez and Gaddafi exerted rigid controls over communication, it is challenging to access accurate and detailed information about the current status of these satellite projects and thus to assess whether they are serving their intended goals. Gaddafi's assassination and the war in Libya further compounded the problem of accessing information about QAF-1R as RascomStar staff were reluctant to communicate in the midst of this volatile political climate. Within this scenario it is difficult not to perceive these satellites as symbols of Chávez and Gaddafi's obsessive quests for power and control.

It was just such a scenario that Sylvia Ospina warned of decades ago in her analysis of early efforts to develop a regional Andean satellite. Emphasizing the need to proceed carefully with satellite development in South America, Ospina cautioned, "The stakes involved in establishing a regional satellite system are very high, the consequences far-reaching. Hence, a decision to commit large quantities of resources (manhours, manpower and money) should be made on realistic grounds, rather than on ideological or political ones (e.g., to vindicate claims to sovereign or preferential rights over parts of the geostationary orbit; to 'show the flag' or become a member of the 'space club')" (Ospina 1988, pp. 9.6–9.7). She further warned, "idealism should be tempered with realism, so that … countries do not end up having an overdimensioned, under-utilized and nearly useless satellite system" (Ospina 1988, p. 9.12). Given the uncertain futures of Venesat-1 and RascomQAF-1R, Ospina's comments are all the more poignant. Nevertheless, these projects, I want to suggest, cannot be reduced to the political ideologies and flamboyant personas of Gaddafi and Chávez alone, for they represent historical and collective struggles to develop regional satellites that would challenge the hegemony of commercial satellite operators in South America and Africa. They also privilege a vision of satellite communication organized in relation to social welfare, education, indigenous communities, and regional self-sufficiency above and beyond the bottom line of profit. In this sense these satellite projects stand as vital footprints of the global South.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the following people for helping with sources and comments related to this essay: Sylvia Ospina, Jim Schwoch, Cristina Venegas, and Noah Zweig. Thank you also to Ingrid Volkmer for inspiring me with her work and for being a patient editor, and to Tanja Meyerhofer for helping to secure permissions for illustrations.

Note

1. I use RascomQAF/1R to refer to both the RascomQAF1 satellite and the RascomQAF-1R satellite. RascomQAF was launched in 2008 and malfunctioned after its installation, resulting in reduced capacity and a shortened lifespan. The satellite was replaced by RascomQAF-1R in 2010.

References

Acevedo, R., Varela, F. and Orihuela, N. (2010) The role of Venesat-1 satellite in promoting development in Venezuela and Latin America, *Space Policy*, **26**, 189–193.

Acevedo, R., Becerra, R., Orihuela, N. and Varela, F. (2011) Space activities in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, *Space Policy*, **27**, 174–179.

Agence France-Press (2008) *Venezuela Launches First Satellite With Chinese Technology*, accessed 12/12/2011, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hxki0JZy9g4ZvLf1CyQ0Yogp8qzQ.

Aksoy, A. and Robins, K. (2000) Thinking across spaces: transnational television from Turkey, *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, **3**(3), 345–367.

BalancingAct-Africa.com (2007a) *Nigeria's NASDRA Seeks $100 million to buy stakes in RASCOM*, Issue 360, accessed 7/12/2011, www.balancingact-africa.com/news/en/issue-no-360/money/nigerias-nasdra-seek/en.

BalancingAct-Africa.com (2007b) *African Satellite Prices Rise in the Wake of NSS8 Burn-out*, accessed 7/11/2011, www.balancingact-africa.com/news/en/issue-no-347/top-story/african-satellite-pr/en.

BalancingAct-Africa.com (2009) *Rascom Plans to Offer Rates Comparable to Fibre with Ka-band Capacity*, Issue 485, accessed 7/12/2011, www.balancingact-africa.com/news/en/issue-no-485/internet/rascom-plans-to-offe/en.

BalancingAct-Africa.com (2011a) *General Satellite Corporation Ready to Put Money on Table for DTH TV in Africa … Right Time, Right Place*, Issue 104, accessed 7/12/2011, www.balancingact-africa.com/news/broadcast/issue-no-104.

BalancingAct-Africa.com (2011b) *Intelsat, Panamsat Merger Set to Take Advantage as Barriers Tumble in African Telecoms Industry*, Issue 313, accessed 3/12/2011, www.balancingact-africa.com/news/en/issue-no-313/money/intelsat-panamsat-me/en.

BBC News (2010) *Russia and Venezuela Sign Nuclear Power and Oil Deals*, accessed 12/12/2011, www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11553239.

BlackListedNews.com (2011) *The Theft of the Libyan Sovereign Funds*, accessed 11/12/2011, www.blacklistednews.com/The_theft_of_the_Libyan_sovereign_funds/14126/0/38/38/Y/M.html.

Brandt, W. (1980) The Brandt Report (report from the Independent Commission on International Development Issues), accessed 12/12/2011, www.stwr.org/special-features/the-brandt-report.html.

Broadbandtvnews.com (2011) *Free Libyan Satellite TV Channel from Qatar*, accessed 12/12/2011, www.broadbandtvnews.com/2011/03/29/free-libyan-satellite-tv-channel-from-qatar/.

Brown, P.J. (2009) Chávez cherishes his Chinese-built satellite, *Asiatimes.com*, accessed 5/12/2011, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KH06Ad02.html.

Brunsdon, C. (1991) Satellite dishes and the landscapes of taste, *New Formations*, **15**, 24–42.

Carey, J. (1988) *Communication and Culture*. London: Unwin-Hyman.

Childress, S. (2011) Chávez rallies for Libya's Gaddafi, *globalpost.com*, accessed 12/12/2011, www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/que-pasa/chavez-rallies-libyan-leader.

China Great Wall Industry Corporation (2010) *Venesat-1 Completes Second Year in Orbit, Venezuela Praises Its Perfect Performance*, accessed 5/12/2011, www.cgwic.com/news/2010/1201_VeneSat-1_completes_second_year_in_orbit.html.

Collis, C. (2012) The geostationary orbit: a critical legal geography of space's most valuable real estate, in L. Parks and J. Schoch (eds), *Down to Earth: Satellite Technologies, Industries, and Cultures*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, pp. 61–81.

de Selding, P.B. (2010) Launch gives Africa's Rascom consortium new lease on life, *spacenews.com*, accessed 7/12/2011, www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/successful-launch-gives-rascom.html.

de Selding, P.B. (2011) Impaired New Dawn satellite also had trouble deploying Ku-band antenna, *Spacenews.com*, accessed 3/12/2011, www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/110603-intelsat-new-dawn.html.

Developingtelecoms.com (2009) *Viasat Signs US $53 Million Contracts for RascomStar-QAF African Infrastructure*, accessed 7/12/2011, http://developingtelecoms.com/viasat-signs-us53-million-contracts-for-rascomstar-qafs-new-african-infrastructure.html.

Digitaltvnews.net (2011) *CANTV Launches Satellite TV in Venezuela*, accessed 8/12/2011, www.digitaltvnews.net/content/?p=20505.

Dobson, W.J. (2011) Chavez and Gadaffi – best friends forever?, *Washington Post*, accessed 12/12/2011, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/post/chavez-and-gaddafi--best-friends-forever/2011/03/04/AFzGnh8B_blog.html.

Ellis, R.E. (2011) *China–Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position*. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

EnglishNews.cn (2011) *Bolivia Expects Benefits from Chinese-Made Satellite*, accessed 12/12/2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-11/10/c_131239090.htm.

Fabregat, A. (2009) The mystery of the Venezuelan satellite, *Americanthinker.com*, accessed 6/12/2011, www.americanthinker.com/2009/05/the_mystery_of_the_venezuelan.html.

Fair, J.E. (2003) *Francophonie* and the National Airwaves: a history of television in Senegal, in L. Parks,and S. Kumar (eds), *Planet TV: A Global Television Reader*. New York: New York University Press, pp. 189–201.

Geospatialworld.net (2011) *Venezuela, China Team Up to Develop EO Satellite*, accessed 12/12/2011, http://geospatialworld.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=22192%3Avenezuela-china-team-up-to-develop-eo-satellite&catid=46%3Aproduct-remote-sensing-satellite&Itemid=1.

Harding, S. (ed.) (2011) *The Postcolonial Science and Technology Studies Reader*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Hargreaves, A. and Mahjoub. D. (1997) Satellite television viewing among ethnic minorities in France, *European Journal of Communication*, **12** (4), 459–477.

Intelsat (2011a) *New Capacity in the Region*, accessed 3/12/2011, www.intelsat.com/_img/microsite/NewDawn/new-capacity-in-africa.jpg.

Intelsat (2011b) *Intelsat Customers Expand Businesses with Africa's Leading Satellite Network*, accessed 3/12/2011, www.intelsatnewdawn.com/press/news-releases/2011/20111108-1.asp.

Intelsat (2011c) *Intelsat New Dawn*, accessed 1/12/2011, www.intelsat.com/network/satellite/Intelsat-New-Dawn/.

Intelsat (2011d) *Intelsat New Dawn on Track for March 30 Launch as Customer Momentum Builds*, accessed 3/12/2011, www.intelsat.com/press/news-releases/2011/20110330-1.asp.

Jiao, S. (2009) China to hand over satellite Simon Bolivar to Venezuela, *Chinaview.cn*, accessed 8/12/2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/10/content_10634739.htm.

Knauer, L.T. and Pastor, M.V. (1998) Project Simon Bolivar: from dream to reality, *Latin America II*, accessed 5/12/2011, www.connect-world.com/~cwiml/index.php/magazine/latin-america/item/2076-project-simon-bolivar-from-dream-to-reality.

Kozloff, N. (2010) Hugo Chavez's geopolitical rivalry reaching soaring new heights, *huffington post.com*, accessed 1/12/2011, www.huffingtonpost.com/nikolas-kozloff/hugo-chvezs-geopolitical_b_609870.html.

Kumar, S. (2005) *Ghandi Meets Primetime: Globalization and Nationalism in Indian Television*. Urbana-Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Libya TV (2011) *About Libya TV*, accessed 15/12/2011, http://english.libya.tv/about/.

Logan, S. (2008) Venezuela's Space Escort, International Relations and Security Network Website, ISN-ETH (Zurich), November 7, accessed 5/12/2011, www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch-Archive/Detail/?lng=en&id=93564.

LyngSat (2011) *Rascom QAF 1R at 2.8 Degrees E.*, accessed 1/12/2011, www.lyngsat.com/ras1r.html.

Ministry of Communication and Information (MINCI) of Venezuela (2009) *Venesat-1: A Step Forward to the 22nd Century*, accessed 12/12/2011, http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_29383.shtml.

Mirt, J.J. (2009) *Simon Bolivar Satellite/Venesat-1: NO Technical Irregularities in Its Position*, accessed 14/12/2011, www.satcoms.org.uk/satellite/forum/venesat1-no-technical-technical-irregularities_topic934.html.

Myers, S.L. and Donadio, R. (2011) *U.S. Seeks to Aid Libyan Rebels with Seized Assets*, accessed 14/12/2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/world/africa/06diplo.html.

NewsmaxWorld.com (2009) *Chavez Celebrates Chinese Satellite Anniversary*, accessed 14/12/2011, www.newsmaxworld.com/headline_story/Chavez_China_satellite/2009/10/30/279426.html.

Ospina, S. (1988) *Project Condor: An Analysis of the Feasibility of a Regional Satellite System for the Andean Pact Countries*. Unpublished Dissertation. Montreal: McGill University.

Ospina, S. (2011) *The Digital Divide and Space Activities in the Southern Hemisphere(s): A General Overview of Africa and South America*. Paper presented at the International Astronomical Congress/IISL Colloquium in Cape Town, South Africa.

Ourbusiness.com (2011) *Libyan Assets in Africa Far-reaching, Little Known*, accessed 3/12/2011, http://ourbusinessnews.com/libyan-assets-in-africa-far-reaching-little-known.

Oxford English Dictionary (1989) *Footprint, n.*, 2nd edition (online version, September 2011), accessed 11/12/2011, www.oed.com.proxy.library.ucsb.edu:2048/view/Entry/72728.

Parks, L. (2005) *Cultures in Orbit: Satellites and the Televisual*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Parks, L. (2009) Signals and oil: satellite footprints and post-communist territories in Central Asia, *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, **12** (2), 137–156.

Parks, L. (2012) Technostruggles and the satellite dish: populist approaches to infrastructure, in G. Bolin (ed.), *Cultural Technologies*. London and New York: Routledge, pp.64–84.

Pougala, J.-P. (2011) The lies behind the West's war on Libya, *thelondoneveningpost.com*, accessed 1/12/2011, www.thelondoneveningpost.com/africa/the-lies-behind-the-wests-war-on-libya/.

Price, M. (2002) Satellite broadcasting as trade routes in the sky, in J.M. Chan and B.T. McIntyre (eds), *In Search of Boundaries: Communication, Nation States and Cultural Identities*. Westport, CT: Ablex Publishing, pp. 146–166.

Rascom (2010) *Memorandum of Understanding*. Signed by NEPAd e-Africa Commission, RascomStar-QAF and RASCOM in Ethiopia, accessed 11/12/2011, www.rascom.org/index.php?langue_id=2.

Rascom (undated) *Background*, accessed 12/12/2011, www.rascom.org/info_detail.php?langue_id=2&id_r=23&id_sr=0&id_gr=2.

RascomStar-QAF (undated) *Missions*, accessed 7/12/2011, www.rascomstar.com/missions.php.

RascomStar-QAF (undated) *Successful Launch for RascomQAF-1R Satellite*, accessed 7/12/2011, www.rascomstar.com/news.php?id=226.

Sakr, N. (2002) *Satellite Realms: Transnational Television, Globalization and the Middle East*. I.B. Tauris.

SatelliteToday.com (2011) *Venesat-1 Pact Expands Chinese Influence in the Latin American Satellite Market*, accessed 5/12/2011, www.satellitetoday.com/eletters/regional/2011-06-01/36867.html.

Sennitt, A. (2011) *Libya Blames "Crusader" Bombing for Cut in TV Signals*, accessed 12/12/2011, http://blogs.rnw.nl/medianetwork/libya-blames-crusader-bombing-for-cut-in-tv-signals.

Spivak, G. (1976) Translator's Preface, in J. Derrida (ed.), *Of Grammatology*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. ix–lxxxvii.

Venegas, C. (2009) Thinking regionally: singular in diversity and diverse in unity, in J. Holt and A. Perren (eds), *Media Industries: History, Theory, and Method*. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 120–131.

Venezuela Presidential Press Office (2009) *Venesat-1: A Step Forward to the 22nd Century*, accessed 6/12/2011, http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_29383.shtml.

Viasat (2009) *$53 Million in Contracts to Provide RascomStar-QAF with New Communication Infrastructure for Africa*, accessed 7/12/2011, www.viasat.com/news/viasat-signs-53-million-contracts-provide-rascomstar-qaf-new-communication-infrastructure-africa.

Volkmer, I. (2008) Satellite cultures in Europe, *Global Media and Communication*, **4** (3), 231–244.

Youtube video posted by cctvupload (2008) *Venezuela "Satellite for Freedom*", accessed 12/12/2011, www.youtube.com/watch?v=QInQqJyFLWU.

Zweig, N. (2011) Villa del Cine (Cinema City): constructing Bolivarian citizens for the twenty-first century, *Situations: Project of the Radical Imagination*, **4** (1), 133–149.

9

Securitization and Legitimacy in Global Media Governance

Spaces, Jurisdictions, and Tensions

Katharine Sarikakis

The concept of "governance" in the study of media policy does not enjoy a straightforward definition. Instead, it is a concept that does a better "job" at signifying, describing, and representing, rather than specifying. The meta-theoretical term of "governance" signifies the complexity and multilevel involvement of actors, institutions, and principles that shape a particular area – for our purposes, media and communications. In political sciences and particularly the study of European integration, "governance" studies emphasize the exercise of authority in the EU system and in particular a drift of authority away from government (Rosamond 2000, p. 109). Governance refers to a political *process*, through which decisions are made about the media and which is "located" in procedures, formal and informal structures, spatio-temporal dispersions and beyond the clearly defined spaces of "government". It is understood as the process and sum of institutional functions and the creation of policy regimes through regulation (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). Media governance describes a political direction as a matter of process, in which representations of interests – diffused or concentrated – located not only in the various mechanisms and institutions of the state and state-like formations, such as the EU, are central in the making of a regulatory regime. Armstrong and Bulmer (1998) see institutions as "normative vessels" in which ideas occupy a very important position in policy-making or, as Rosamond (2000, p. 119) proposes, as actors that "perform a guidance function" and construct social reality.

Media and communication scholars "came" to the study of governance relatively recently and, in particular, with the impetus from international communication policy moments, such as the World Summits on the Information Society (Geneva, 2003, and Tunis, 2005). Accompanied by global media transformations in the past 20 years, these international events have cemented scholarly interest, as well as political discourse, to a shift from a debate around media regulation to one of "governance". As a field, it is marked by studies on the interaction between systems, actors, ideas, and discourses.

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

Donges (2007) in his edited volume dedicated to the discussion of governance in communication locates the emergence of "governance" studies in the mid-2000s in politics and social sciences, but the term has appeared in studies of world politics much earlier than that. In 1999, the seminal work by Hewson and Sinclair, *Approaches to Global Governance Theory*, spoke systematically of the theoretical dimensions of global governance as inextricably linked to global change, at macro- and micro-levels. Their work placed emphasis on various facets of governance as a system of globally oriented policies and actors. In particular, they analysed the emergent high-level symbolic analysts of the information society and epistemic communities. Raboy (2004) and Sarikakis (2002, 2004) were among the early communication scholars to introduce the term systematically through their work in the field global and international communication policy, and specifically through studies of the World Summit on Information Society and research on supra-national decision-making. In these writings, governance was studied as a field of interaction on a multileveled constellation of power and actors involved in international policy-making. Not only governments and specified sub-authorities, but also the role of supra-national institutions, such as the European Parliament (Sarikakis 2002, 2004), or global actors, such as civil society (Raboy 2004), as well as ideological dispositions were explored in this work. Today, the field of media governance is a rich and productive interdisciplinary field with a variety of approaches to what constitutes governance, while taking into account its normative implications, especially in debates around "good governance" (Donges 2007; O Siochru and Girard 2002; Price 2002; Puppis 2008; Burch 2004).

Arguably, regulation is placed at the center of governance as goal and process. Changes at a global scale in the structural orientations of the media, and the ways in which institutional arrangements have tried to respond to global market integration, have also led to changes in the objects and areas of policy-making. The field of media policy has expanded from the "usual suspects" of television and radio and the role of national governments to a range of issues, objects, and actors shifting policy-making paradigms and policy studies in more and complex stratifications. Larger than national overarching policy, issues affecting media across the world lead our studies to the examination of policy processes in *de-nationalized* spaces that shape the function of communication and media corporations globally. Several developments at different points in time in the course of international relations have given rise to policies that affect media structures and media governance. With the technological integration of communications, previous boundaries have become more integrated, in terms of technology, usage and reach of media, jurisdiction over media, and role of actors. The technological aspect of the media is considered a core dimension of the makeup of changes in media policy, according to Braman (2004), who leads a thoughtful discussion as to the ways in which media policy can increasingly be seen as information policy. In this vein, Braman asked the question "where is media policy" and argued that the field of media policy as a study has expanded, as technology has resulted in intended and unintended consequences. Historically, the attention paid to media is due to their role in the exercise of democratic practice and freedoms. Historically, also, media technologies have developed to serve trading and financial purposes, as well as military and cultural dimensions. Yet, despite their role and also because of their multifarious roles, the ways in which media relate to everyday lives effectively determine the degree of democratic cultures. Hence, the ways in which they are controlled matters: seen from this perspective predominantly as opposed to one that selectively prioritizes their economic function, the media's expansion into public spheres across borders, indeed their facilitation and dominance over public sphere activities, demonstrate the need for a broader view of what is often considered as national affairs.

Increasingly, it is challenging to make definitional distinctions as to what counts for media policy, as the "traditional", easily identifiable media objects are no longer occupying single or central positions in the political terrain and in society. Apart from the fact that technologies are converging, evolving, being used in innovative or unexpected ways, the "place" of policy is less "fixed" and more complex to follow. Moreover, the "place" of media in policy is also harder to locate. For example, mobile phones integrate radio, camera, and Internet devices – any regulatory interference or action that impacts upon the conditions of availability and usage of telephones, even if not intended or designed or presented as media policy, is most likely to affect users' access to and imparting of information. This automatically "qualifies" such policies and practices that affect the media. Everyday "settings" of media technologies and policy dilemmas bring seemingly disparate issues to the intersection of citizenship and media governance. Examples are whether iPhones allow access to many forms of content and a wide range of websites on the Internet or whether the public service broadcasting content is available on mobile media, but also more "exciting" dimensions, such as social media applications that "betray" users' geo-location alongside with the availability of their personal data to social media publics. However, debates around media governance and technology have been "framed" technocratically, so that often the connections to citizenship can only be "revealed" if the analyst "enters" the citizen into the equation of policy (Sarikakis 2012). For example, seemingly technologically framed questions about technical standards or technological knowledge gain a different color once they are scrutinized for their impact on information and democratic praxis such as anonymity, privacy, freedom of expression, and association, to name a few.

Securitization of Governance and Public Speech

These complex and often invisible interconnections, between seemingly "neutral" policy objects and the praxis of citizenship, articulate in a cumulative way a form of governance of *public speech*. The regulation of conditions under which speech can be exercised constitute, in the era of new media and technologies, a realm of public speech for two reasons: first, all electronic communication leaves traces that are practically accessible by wider publics even when intended for "private" exchanges (consider the case of circulation of private images and videos through mobile phones) and, second, because the boundaries of the private realm are less clear than ever before (consider the case of Facebook). Moreover, the connections between established and new media and forms of cultural expression can also be seen as forms of public speech. Indeed, they produce speech forms through art, content, and word that are available in a public way. Public speech may be produced to be consumed by a public and in a public situation or in private contexts. Viewing media and cultural products predominantly as products of public speech[1] – whether informative, cultural, or other – allows us to grasp their role in society better as political and vital for citizens' involvement in democratic processes. As a form of public speech, social media and products deriving from remix or DIY cultures convey values, perceptions, and ideas about the world, representations and constructions of understanding the world. As such, public speech is governed by laws on the grounds of freedom of expression, deliberation, and association as the cornerstones of democracy. The governance of public speech is centered not only on the right to freedom of expression as an individual right to express opinions and impart information, but also in relation of the individual to the *means* of expression and communication. Public speech, therefore, mostly lies with the freedom to express ideas under the assumption that conflicting, contested, or unwanted ideas will be scrutinized and critiqued, *through the process* of the free expression of others. For this purpose, the space within which deliberations take place is directly linked to the possibility of articulation and voice in the process of interlocution. Its function is not only deliberative but also to serve as space for the *emergence* of speech, inasmuch as realities and experiences have remained "untold", unrecognized, and unarticulated. This is the case, for example, of public spheres of communities, social movements, and oppositional forces, and they are an inseparable part of democratic praxis. Mediatized spaces allow for the processing of ideas and constitute a "training" ground for the expression of ideas in other, often mainstream, public fora. In media content terms, this means governance for the capacity for the broadest possible functioning of media points of production and consumption that allow a dynamic and complex relation of communicative spheres of action to flourish. Not only is a variety of media outlets therefore governed but, by effect, also the representation of the voices of social groups in a minoritized locus. These are populations that historically have been marginalized from the production and presentation of public speech, through exclusion or processes of silencing by way of, for example, ridicule or trivialization.

The governance of public speech through that of public space is, again, often an invisible connection. Not only physical but also mediatized spaces are linked to the possibility or inability of interlocution. However, where do ownership patterns intersect with citizens' expression? There are two significant directions of public policy that are influential in the experience of media in everyday life in the twenty-first century: these are the securitization of communication and privatization of public spaces. The process of securitization of public spaces through policy and practice result in increased control of communicative spaces and the mediation of experience. Under the magnifying glass of monitoring and profiling (Lessig 2006), neither anonymity nor privacy is safe. At times of crisis, where the "break" from normal politics is legitimized as a temporary but *necessary* situation, governance of media concentrates on the limitation of the range of expression and practice of communicative democracy. Governance structures may remain "pluralistic" in that they would still include various actors, but the goal of governance is shaped by the process and discursive frame of "security", a dominant trend in media governance in the post 9/11 era. Some significant policy change has come about, because the ideas dominant in the governance of freedom of expression are based on specific assumptions about "security", including the concept itself.

"The war on terror" triggered a number of new Counter Terrorism and National security laws that threaten a range of related communications, such as freedom of expression, free access to public relevant information, and the protection of sources and material, and establish a certain legitimacy of the surveillance and wiretapping practiced by some journalists around the world. According to the OSCE, almost half of the 56 member states imposed legal liability for journalists who obtain classified information (OSCE 2007). Banisar (2009, p. 15) observed also "a significant trend in the use of state secret laws to penalise whistle-blowers and journalists who publish information of public interest". A more recent report by the OSCE expresses concerns about the restrictions imposed on online journalists due to increasing control over online content, such as through cybercrime and online hate speech. In the United States, the (in)famous *Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (or USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001* introduced the weakening of privacy protections, increased powers of surveillance to several governmental agencies, and permitted the intercepting, sharing, and using private telecommunications, especially electronic communications. According to Privacy International (2004), the "importance of the US policies is that they tend to influence policies and citizens of other countries". By September 2002, the Office of Management and Budget counted 58 new regulations responding to terrorism; by March 2003 the General Accounting Office counted nine new National Strategies; there have been innumerable laws passed at the federal and state levels; countless changes in administrative measures, including the Attorney General Investigative Guidelines; and some attention has been given to policies and projects from various departments, not limited to the *Terrorism Information Awareness Program (TIA)* and *Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening* (commonly referred to as CAPPS II) (Privacy International 2004). In March 2011, a US Court urged Twitter to hand over user data to the government. This concerns data from possible collaborators of whistleblowers.[2]

Among other changes, the UK government in its *Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2005–2006* proposed the extending of the *Official Secrets Act* to make it easier to prosecute whistleblowers. Even though there are no legal restrictions on photography in public spaces in the UK, the police have been challenging photographers' rights in public places and events, claiming terrorism restrictions (e.g., train and plane spotting, photographing of public demonstration, restrictions in shopping malls).

As a telling example, the European Union adopted the *2006 Directive on Data Retention*, which requires telecommunications providers to automatically collect and retain all information on all users' activities. Member states are required to implement the directive until 2007 and for Internet data until 2009. The directive goes against constitutional provisions of some member states, such as Germany and Sweden, who have not implemented it as such. In Germany, the 2007 new T*elecommunications Data Retention Law* requires telecommunications enterprises to store consumers' data (e.g. emails, text messages) for up to six months and make them available upon request (this also includes doctors, lawyers, and journalists). However, the Constitutional Court declared the law illegal in 2010, as the user data were not sufficiently protected from unauthorized access. Currently, the German government is working on a new law. In 2007, 17 journalists of *Der Spiegel, Die Welt, SZ*, who reported on allegations of misconduct by the German military invasion of Iraq, using excerpts from secret government documents, were accused of breaking article 353 B of the Criminal Code.

These profound shifts in the regulation of the communications spaces and processes in the post 9/11 era presents us with discursive and normative frameworks, as well as structural environments that clash directly with existing legislatures, internationally adopted legal principles, such as human rights, and create a new terrain of state and corporate activity in citizens' lives. Characteristically, both for its attention to the issues and weakness to speak with a strong voice, already in 2001 the United Nations Human Rights Commission issued a statement in which they express their concern on the negative effects security and anti-terrorism laws might have on the media and other laws.

Regulatory directions such as these above are not necessarily based on any "hard" media law. In fact, most legislation of the role of the media in society, in the political or cultural sense, remains largely unchanged. What has changed is the overall broader jurisprudential context within which state and market practices affect the media. This is the case of a heightened "security" environment, one of crisis, and the expectation, in other words the *normalization*, of restriction of communicative action beyond hitherto existing norms. The aforementioned examples show that a "global" affair results in national responses, which, however, vary in form and content. In crisis, whether political, economic, or social, accepted democratic decision-making procedures are challenged.

Space, Jurisdiction, and Illusive Media Governance

Media are not always and only regulated through media laws; careful attention reveals that there are effects on media and communication through policies in seemingly "irrelevant" areas. One of the core areas in this case has been the regularization of new sets of codes and principles in relation to ecommerce. A global drive to promote conditions favorable to ecommerce, whereby electronic communications occupy a central role, have put forth a set of "conditions" for the configuration and control of various aspects impeding the process. Users are of central importance and their habits are of commercial value. The protection of business has proven a powerful motivator behind policies included in ecommerce legal packages in various parts of the world. Together with the frame of a political crisis (terrorism as a primary projected reason and cause) supranational and global policies allowed questionable processes of monitoring of citizens' relations with the media through retention of usage data and the tracking of communication devices from mobile phones and computers to the "Internet of things".

At the same time, the privatization of public spaces is the other major issue for media governance, whether the object is the established media or telecommunications and infrastructure of the information society, or if it is about the privatization of public physical spaces, such as through advertising on objects, airports, and streets. Increasingly, the role of private entities occupies a larger part in the process of public governance too, as international relations are shaped in close proximity to transnational businesses and their alliance representations. Such examples influential in the governance of media are the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT), the Business Roundtable (BRT), Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), or the Global Business Dialogue on electronic commerce (GBDe), to name but a few. Their agendas can be found in public policy agendas and outputs on national and international levels, through a systematic involvement in the design of policy frameworks, especially those ring-fencing electronic commerce activities (Chakravartty and Sarikakis 2006). Most importantly, private interests are represented in public policy as they constitute integral elements of today's schemata of "governance", especially when it comes to supranational and international constellations of power. The format of the so-called "multistakeholder" approach, that is, the participation of a wide range of actors in the shaping of policy, gave the private sector an official seat at the negotiating table, granting *private* interests legitimacy in *public* policy-making next to elected governments in the process. The participation of multiple actors is a core characteristic of modern day governance: nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume from this that actors are equally involved in governance or that they are equal. Supra-national and global governance structures may manifest a wider range of representations in the policy process than national contexts, especially where dimensions such as public consultation are not institutionalized and encouraged. However, this does not equal greater input in the policy output, the outcome of which is a much more complicated process that depends on various factors, including whether there is a power vacuum in the specific policy "moment" – this is especially evident when the goal is social change (Sarikakis and Nguyen 2009).

Compound to the question of legitimacy of global media governance is that of jurisdiction. National sovereignty is all about clear-cut lines of jurisdiction in a specific geographical territory, and not others. This is the formality of international relations, which of course does not answer the question of pressure and influence through other means of interference in national affairs. Nevertheless, as far as the *procedural* dimension of governance is concerned, the national context provides the clearly defined jurisdictional lines. However, increasingly in the – especially expanded – field of media and communication, we find jurisdictions that are challenged by the course of developments "abroad". Intergovernmental organizations, organizations of questionable legitimacy, and unchecked transnational corporations that elude national checks and laws create an environment where public policy agendas are designed and directions are set.

In this mode of policy, the State is still powerful, yet democratic institutions and processes are challenged, as jurisdictional clarity is eroded in two ways: first through *policy transfer* and second through a *process of "laundering*". These two phenomena are often discussed interchangeably in the literature, but work exploring both dimensions is very limited. In the case of communication studies, it is almost nonexistent. What we have at our disposal are a few studies on aspects of the so-called information society that are largely pursued by political scientists. Policy "laundering" is an emerging concept that refers to the phenomenon of policy adoption without the necessary political and legal established procedures. Through this tactic, governments promote policy measures as part of larger agreements "packages" in the international scene or as responsibilities toward intergovernmental and other organizations. The process is hard to identify and research as, on the one hand, it follows to a great extent informal channels and, on the other, there is no official information and sources who are willing to speak about such cases (Privacy International 2004; Hosein 2009). The tactic of policy laundering is a severely under-researched area in media studies, but is increasingly of great importance, given the ways in which media policy "expands" definitively and in terms of objects, as well as in terms of the spaces within which it is shaped. These are the European Union spaces and procedures for example. The European Union is an international actor whose policies affect other "third" countries as well as member states, or regional organizations such as NAFTA and Mercosur, organizations such as WTO and World Bank, and other organizations. These policies, it is argued, lack legitimacy because they bypass the normal political praxis as defined by law and result in the delegation of power from representative institutions such as parliaments to nonvoting and nonrepresentative bodies. Moreover, as a problem presents itself the situation whereby different aspects of policy are discussed in different fora, for example, the case of data retention policies, is exemplary of the various different institutions and piecemeal approach evident in the policy. In this case, under the normative framework of "security" the data retention regulative framework was designed by the Council of Europe with the involvement of the G8 and was ratified even by countries that are not members of the Council of Europe (Hosein 2004). In policies connecting cybercrime and traffic data retention, we see that G8 countries have led discussions on legislation of high-tech crime since 1995 and the Council of Europe has discussed regulations of cybercrime since 1997. The result of these discussions has been that the Council of Europe produced the Convention on Cybercrime (ETS 185) for reasons of cybercrime, including hacking, child pornography, copyright circumvention, mutual legal assistance, and a set of surveillance capacities. The G8 countries conducted several meetings on the topic, until in May 2002 they included "a call for governments to decide which information is useful for public safety purposes" (Hosein 2004, p. 3.1). The document included a checklist for data preservation requests, procedures, and legal frameworks, and also addressed international treaties, such as the one by the Council of Europe. The United States was accused of pushing for the adoption of the Council of Europe Convention (Hosein 2004). In July 2001 Australia had referred to the Council of Europe as the basis for their bill on computer crime, which requires users to provide encryption keys.

More often studied than the case of policy laundering is the influence of supra-national policies on national legislation, especially in the European Union. The way supra-national governance works is to develop Directives that set broad principles for the change of law and with the aim of "harmonization". For example, on a global scale, US a global audiovisual strategy promoted the liberalization of EU audio-visual policies. After the implementation of the TWFD efforts were transferred on the WTO level (Williams 2004). Spread through international agreements are aims at implementation on national, regional, and international levels that are based on an understanding of regulation policies as being laissez-faire oriented and on the understanding of FTAS as expansion, rather than diversification. After the closure of GATS, the Doha Rounds served as policy fora.

Another example of policy transfer is the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMS), which regulates digital technologies and on-demand media services. Viviane Reding, at the time European Commissioner for Information Society and Media, stated in Lisbon in July 2007: "I encourage Member States, when they will transpose the Directive in the next few months, to keep the light touch approach reflected by the text of the Directive, and – as far as possible – not to add many additional national rules" (ACT). By June 2011, 24 of 27 Member States had implemented the Directive.

The EU legislative framework (Framework Directive on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services) leaves space for national diversity. However, the promotion of a *preferred* model of implementation within the European Union and strong (de)regulatory pressures between member states ensure a less diverse or autonomous reading of the Directive. However, traditional policy styles, especially in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, were not easily assimilated.

At the same time, the US Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), another major piece of regulation with worldwide implications, sets new Intellectual Property standards and raises new issues apart from those existing in national countries, who then adopt them as a network of countries involved in the agreement, such as retention of usage data, and the active involvement of ISPs in taking down copyrighted, unauthorized content from the Internet and servers.[3]

On a truly global scale, in the European Union, the legal evolution of digital policy initiatives started in 1995 and since then a number of directives have cemented the "highway" with laws such as the Data Protection Directive, the Distance Selling Directive, E-signatures, E-money, E-commerce, Copyright, E-invoicing D, E-privacy D, Enforcement D (DLA Piper 2007). They were discussed by the *eEurope programmes* which were launched firstly in 1999 and most recently brought up to the Digital Agenda programme. This approach is clearly reflected in the 2008 launched Digital Mercosur Programme (2008) (E-commerce, E-literacy), which is in its majority financed by the Europe Aid programme (Digital Mercosur).

In Spain, the so-called Ley Sinde (Ley de Economia Sostenible 2011) is a set of measures that aims to "improve competitiveness or stability of the public finances" (article II). The law is a package that extends from new norms of contracting public workers and advertising public posts to policies related to the internationalization of firms and companies, and from the environmental measures (planning of the uses of ecologic energy) to the regulation of the gas emissions. However, Ley Sinde was named after the Minister of Culture, Angeles González-Sinde, because in the 42nd/43rd disposition (p. 25222) there are provisions to the changes affecting the law of intellectual property, where there is the incorporation of a new item "e) to save and protect the rights of intellectual property", and with the modification was the creation of the "Commission for the Intellectual Property" (p. 25223). The Commission is authorized to *interrupt* the service of the information society that violates the rights of intellectual property or to take down the contents that violate such rights, in the case where the person responsible acts with lucrative intentions directly or indirectly or has caused or might have caused a certain property harm. The responsible (ISP) will be required to voluntarily "unpublish" content in not more than 48 hours. On December 3, 2010, El País published an article stating that 35 cablegrams were sent from the US Embassy to the Spanish Government as pressure to pass the law. The source was the so-called Cablegate by Wikileaks (Elola 2010).

In another case, French Law HADOPI 2 (Haute Autorité pour la Diffusion des Oeuvres et la Protection des droits sur Internet 2009) set up the HADOPI Agency to police Internet users with a mandate to ensure that Internet subscribers "screen their internet connections in order to prevent the exchange of copyrighted material without prior agreement from the copyright holders" (Article L. 336-3 of the bill). Again, Wikileaks unveiled the fact that there was lobbying for the creation of the HADOPI law in France (in December 2010) by the American MPAA, RIAA, and BSA (Associations of Recording, Business Software, and Motion Pictures) through the US Embassy in Paris.[4]

In the United Kingdom, right after the general election, clause 17 (sections 17 and 18) was introduced to the Digital Economy Act (2010), which grants power for injunctions preventing access to locations on the Internet (Martin 2009). The Secretary of State may by law make provisions about the granting by a court of a blocking injunction in respect of a location on the Internet that the court is satisfied has been, is being or is likely to be used for or in connection with an activity that infringes copyright. A "blocking injunction" means an injunction that requires a service provider to prevent its service being used to gain access to the location.

The adoption of these policies in very different national contexts reveals the two important issues in global media governance today: first, that the process of governance is complex and opaque and, second, that governance is not inherently good, democratic, or open. They also demonstrate the ways in which global media policy is dangerously close to the private sector of media, culture, and electronics industries in ways that the private sector is rather the stronger partner in the public–private partnership schema. The opportunity cost of the adoption of policies that are "exported" to other countries is unchartered: an enquiry into the impact of these policies for citizens' place in democracy, in governance, in media use, and ultimately in their country's governance scores negatively in political economic and social terms. Although political deliberation and state mediation do not always transform political demands for a better life for justice and democracy into public policy, public policy is transformed by private interests presented as generalizable interests, as are the specific cases of copyright or digital policies.

Towards a Media Governance Research Agenda

The highly remote processes of governance, despite their openings and declarations to the opposite, often exclude a meaningful mediation for affecting policy on behalf of citizens. They also present themselves as democratic processes, indeed aiming at replacing, instead, the mediation between private and public interests by – originally the state and now – the dispersed actors of governance structures that diffuse and even obscure the process that lacks legitimacy. Communication scholars must engage more intensively with the question, "How is media governance used as mediator in this space between capital and private interests and the public interest?" Policy as a set of values and regulatory practices is circulated, distributed, and recycled, and is a path-dependent process that means long term consequences for the citizenry and the structural constitution of their media.

Longitudinal research is needed into cases, conditions, and actors as they are involved in policy transfer globally. The study of policy transfer should shed light on the institutional roles in governance and the cultural and social dimensions of the process, as policy transfer takes place not only in spaces designed specifically for that, such as the European Union, but also through other, less explored, avenues whereby (a) the cultural impetus is very strong, as in the case of the United Kingdom and its relation to the commonwealth countries, (b) the object of policy occupies a paradigmatic position in the field, as is the case of the BBC for PSBs in Europe or US copyright provisions, and (c) the national context occupies the largest resource and sources related to the object (Internet and United States).

Furthermore, it is important to start connecting more systematically, and with multidisciplinary tools, the functions and areas of influence of public diplomacy as media governance through policy transfer and support for "development" or the "exportation" of models and principles of governance in a densely networked world. At the same time, we need to know more about the detailed ways in which models of governance overall are translated into modes of governance in the specific section of media and communication, as is the case of the German and French states and market governance, whose global activity and also state institutional organization affect the conditions under which political decisions about media structures can be shaped. This is part of a greater enquiry into the ways in which institutions are transformed, in organizational terms and in terms of their function, as well as their relation to democratic and legal procedures in the process of decision-making.

Finally, more attention should be paid into the ways in which institutional and other influences have an impact for everyday lives of citizens across the world. The histories of regulatory regimes must be examined on two levels to reveal the structural and discursive constructions of "normalcy": one is the national level, whereby distinct areas are developed within national regulatory contexts. Here the role of the nation state is an important object of study for the policy scholar because of the structural changes in the bodies involved in policy making. States differ in that they apply different degrees of involvement in the media, have different levels of resources, and are unequal in the global arena. At the same time, socio-cultural environments play an important role in defining the principles and levels of tolerance for regulatory reform in given societies. On a second level, governance scholars must pay close attention to conditions of emerging regimes in relation to the regional and international systems. As not all states are "equal" in the kinds of decisions they can or are willing to make, detailed connections must be made to the broader context of political economy and the impact of global change in the institutional and democratic processes for decision making. On a macro-level we therefore need to watch closely processes of *regularization* (Chakravarty and Sarikakis 2006) and develop methodologies that enable holistic, macro-level approaches for the study of nontransparent, structural, discursive, and historical developments. How is power, and in particular constellations of decision-making powers, organized in jurisdictional space and how are media economies organized in geo-political space? "Space" is a primary factor in the organization of the functions of the global economic system and its crisis. Communication studies must become more involved in three areas that will significantly occupy the world of politics, law, and civil society this decade. It is time for communication and especially governance scholars to return to new forms of connected, socially relevant, "grand" theories.

Acknowledgment

This work benefited from research assistantship by Sarah Ganter and Dr Joan Ramon Rodriguez-Amat, both at the University of Vienna.

Notes

1. Although there is considerable debate as to whether certain forms of content can be considered "speech" in the US legislative debates, examples are the pornographic content and hate speech.
2. See *Reporters without Borders*, www.rsf.org.
3. See http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/11/policy-laundering/.
4. See http://www.zeropaid.com/news/91621/wikileaks-mpaa-riaa-and-bsa-lobbied-for-hadopi/.

References

ACT (Association des Télévisions Commerciales européennes) *Audiovisual Media Services Directive*, accessed 25/11/2011, http://www.acte.be/EPUB/easnet.dll/execreq/page?eas:dat_im=025B3F&eas:template_im=025AE9.

Armstrong, K.A. and Bulmer, J. (1998) *The Governance of the Single European Market*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Banisar, D. (2009) Speaking of terror: a survey of the effects of counter-terrorism legislation on freedom of the media in Europe, *International Journal of Civil Society Law*, **7** (3), accessed 25/11/2011, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1717749.

Braman, S. (2004) Where has media policy gone? Defining the field in the twenty-first century, *Communication Law and Policy*, **9** (2), 153–182.

Burch, S. (2004) Global media governance: reflections from the WSIS experience, *Media Development*, **1**, 3–8.

Chakravartty, P. and Sarikakis, K. (2006) *Media Policy and Globalization*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Commission of the European Communities (2003) *COM(2003) 541 final: Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. On the Transition from Analogue to Digital Broadcasting (From Digital 'Switchover' to Analogue 'Switch-off')*, accessed 17/09/2010, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0541:FIN:EN:PDF.

Commission of the European Communities (2005) *COM(2005) 204 final: Communication on Accelerating the Transition from Analogue to Digital Broadcasting*, accessed 14/11/2011, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0204:FIN:EN:PDF.

Digital Mercosur *El Proyecto*, accessed 25/11/11, http://www.mercosurdigital.org/proyecto/.

DLA Piper (2007) *European PPP Report, 2007*, accessed 25/11/2011, http://www.irfnet.ch/files-upload/knowledges/DLAPiper_European-PPP-Report2007.pdf.

Donges, P. (ed.) (2007) *Von der Medienpolitik zur Media Governance?* Köln: Herbert von Halem Verlag.

Elola, J. (2010) EE UU ejecutó un plan para conseguir una ley antidescargas, El Pais, accessed 25/11/2011, http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/EE/UU/ejecuto/plan/conseguir/ley/antidescargas/elpepuesp/20101203elpepunac_52/Tes.

European Commission (2010a) *COM(2010) 245: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A Digital Agenda for Europe*, accessed 05/06/2011, http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/digital-agenda/documents/digital-agenda-communication-en.pdf.

European Commission (2010b) *COM(2010) 245 final/2: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A Digital Agenda for Europe*, accessed 17/03/2011, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010DC0245R(01):EN:NOT.

European Parliament (1997) *COM(97) 623: Green Paper on the Convergence of Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology Sectors and the Implications for Regulation*, accessed 12/09/2011, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/4_7_7_en.htm?textMode=on.

European Union (1995) Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, *Official Journal L281*, accessed 23/11/2011, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML.

Hewson, M. and Sinclair, T.J. (eds) (1999) *Approaches to Global Governance*. New York: SUNY Press.

Hosein, I.R. (2004) The sources of laws: policy dynamics in a digital and terrorized world. *The Information Society*, **20** (3), 187–199.

Hosein, I. (2009) International relations theories and the regulation of international dataflows: policy laundering and other international policy dynamics, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 17, 2004, accessed 26/05/2009, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p73882_index.html.

Lessig, L. (2006) *Code V2.0*. Cambridge, MA: Basic Books.

Ley de Economía Sostenible (2011) (LES: 2/2011, March 4, 2011) *Sustainable Economy Bill* (BOE, March 5, 2011), pp. 25033–25233.

Martin, D. (2009) Mandelson goes to war on teenagers downloading their music and movies … just days after dining with anti-piracy billionaire, *Daily Mail*, accessed 17/08/2009, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1206901/Mandelson-launches-crackdown-file-sharing--just-days-meeting-record-producer.html.

O Siochru, S. and Girard, B. (2002) *Global Media Governance*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

OSCE (2007) *Access to Information by the Media in the OSCE Region*, accessed 25/11/2011, http://www.osce.org/fom/24893.

Price, M.E. (2002) *Media and Sovereignty: The Global Information Revolution and its Challenge to State Power*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Privacy International (2004) *Threats to Privacy*, accessed 20/10/2011, https://www.privacyinternational.org/article/phr2004-threats-privacy.

Puppis, M. (2008) National media regulation in the era of free trade: the role of global, *European Journal of Communication*, **23** (4), 405–424.

Raboy, M. (2004) The World Summit on the information society and its legacy for global governance, *Gazette: The International Journal of Communication Studies*, **66** (3–4), 203–224.

Rosamond, B. (2000) *Theories of European Integration*. New York: Macmillan.

Sandholtz, W. and Stone Sweet, A. (1998) *European Integration and Supranational Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sarikakis, K. (2002) Supranational governance and the shifting paradigm in communications policy-making: the case of the European parliament, in M. Raboy (ed.), *Global Media Policy in the New Millennium*. Luton: University of Luton Press, pp. 77–91.

Sarikakis, K. (2004) *Powers in Media Policy: The Challenge of the European Parliament*. Bern: Peter Lang.

Sarikakis, K. (2012) Stepping out of the comfort zone: unfolding gender conscious research for communication and cultural policy theory, in N. Just and M. Puppis (eds), *Trends in Communication Policy Research: New Theories, Methods and Subjects. Perspectives from Europe*. Bristol: Intellect Books.

Sarikakis, K. and Nguyen, E., T. (2009) The trouble with gender: media policy and gender mainstreaming in the European Union, *Journal of European Integration*, **31** (2), 201–216.

Williams, G. (2004) *US Government Global Audiovisual Strategy Document Leaked*, accessed 17/03/2011, http://www.spinwatch.org/-articles-by-category-mainmenu-8/48-lobbying/14-us-government-global-audio-visual-strategy-document-leaked.

10

Emerging Transnational News Spheres in Global Crisis Reporting
A Research Agenda

Maria Hellman and Kristina Riegert

Fifteen years ago Martin Shaw argued that post-Cold War crises might be seen as global crises as a result of processes of mediation. Not only should we think about global crises as constituted by conflicts of interest between great powers, as had been the case during the Cold War, he argued, but they should also be seen as a result of "a world-wide *perception* of large-scale violation of human life and globally legitimate principles that is largely dependent on media coverage obtained" (Shaw 1996, p. 4). This approach leads us to adopt a broad understanding of global crises as mediatized events demanding responses disregarding national borders, like disasters, famine, financial meltdowns, rising poverty, energy shortages, refugee movements, armed conflicts, and terror attacks (Cottle 2009a, p. 2).[1] In keeping with Shaw's argument, and considering the increasingly globalized world we live in, a greater number of crises are likely to be recognized by citizens across the world as global crises, due to large-scale loss of human life, affecting citizens far away from their home locations and generating pressure for intervention to alleviate the situation (Hellman and Riegert 2009, p. 127).

Perhaps the very concept of global crisis is dependent on the increase in transnational news flows, giving more people around the world the ability to learn about a crisis quicker than ever before. The increased access to news via new forms of media technology in a post-modern condition of time-space compression (Harvey 2000) would appear to encourage the perception of a crisis-prone and interconnected world. On the other hand, crises are not merely mediated, they exist and are related to external events, which, in turn, influence and connect to the media in myriad ways. Whether or not the number of global crises in the world has actually increased, as Cottle (2009b) has argued, we who live in mediatized societies are encouraged to think it has.

How are these increasing news flows of global crises portrayed in local, national, or transnational media? Hypothetically speaking, a global crisis can be reported: (a) similarly

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

in all these media, sharing essentially the same features and discourse; (b) according to varying national contexts, where some nations, some aspects, and some citizens are more important than others; (c) various national/local media could transnationalize their discourses, extending attention beyond territorial borders to its nationals or drawing parallels between people and events in national and transnational contexts; or (d) transnational news platforms could represent a crisis event through national or regional perspectives of their hosts or owners (Riegert *et al.* 2010). Much research on media globalization has focused on the first two perspectives, but we argue below that it is the latter two perspectives that have greater possibilities to become key paradigms for the empirical study of emerging transnational news spheres.

The notion that a global crisis would be seen and depicted in similar terms with an integrative and consensual discourse in both transnational and national media could perhaps be a position shared by both the "global dominance" or "global public sphere" theorists (Cottle 2009a). While they disagree as to the causes of these similarities, both argue for the increase in transnational news and information flows. The former may point to neo-liberal deregulation and the increasing domination of the Anglo-Saxon media as market leaders, whereas the latter are likely to cite, for example, Dayan and Katz's (1992) notion of media events – where audiences around the world are riveted by a televised tragedy of transnational relevance.

Proponents of the second perspective, the domestication of the foreign, point to the importance of national political and cultural interests, to journalist cultures, indeed to the very ritual paradigm of journalism in their explanations for why global crises often receive varying coverage in different media (Hellman 2006; Riegert 1998; Cohen *et al.* 1996; Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2004).

The notion that the national media would increasingly transnationalize their discourses on global crises is based on the impact of global media processes on the infrastructures and formats of national newsrooms. Some have seen this as creating "hybrid media forms" and content whereby global media become "indigenized" in various local contexts (Rantanen 2005, pp. 99–100; McMillin 2007). The notion of mediatization is relevant here because it points to the increasing autonomy of journalists from national authorities and to the impact of increased competition from various media outlets. News of a global crisis in this perspective would demonstrate its local effects and, conversely, if we include national or regional satellite channels that broadcast mainly national fare to diaspora/expatriates, we could see this also as an attempt to stretch the national imaginary beyond territorial boundaries.

Regarding the final perspective, that a global crisis as reported by one of the numerous "transnational" news platforms may reflect regional or national particularistic interpretations reflecting the priorities and cultures of their host countries despite claims to the contrary, is not new. There is much anecdotal evidence but only a few comparative studies to support this. What is interesting about this perspective is the extent to which these regional and global platforms have an agenda-setting effect on national/local media and how this would play out together with the notions of global dominance theorists in the first-mentioned category. Drawing on these four perspectives we will discuss what processes involved in global crisis reporting should figure as most central to research on emerging transnational news spheres.

Conceptualizing Transnational News Spheres

We conceive of transnational news spheres as arenas, networks, and platforms formed by a community of producers/users that deal with issues, people, or places transcending national boundaries. Such spheres can be produced by media structures, mediated content, journalistic norms and practices, or in the perceptions of users and audiences in different parts of the world. Some have conceived of them as a multidiscursive and multimodal series of networks, companies, and organizations of different sizes, which function on different levels (Castells 1996, 2007) or as "micro-public spheres", each with their own agendas and remits, which undoubtedly can act together when galvanized by certain issues (Volkmer 2001).

What needs to be studied more closely is how a given transnational news sphere is intertwined in complex ways with national/local structures, contents, and networks. A transnational broadcaster, for example, targets governments, businesses, and individuals and can be thought to have varying relationships with each. Conversely, the impact of transnational processes on national and local media, changing them from within, should also be highlighted (Hannerz 2005). Just how the two types of processes interact is an empirical question in need of research according to the time period, actors, and the issue at hand (Riegert *et al.* 2010, p. 10). Most of what we focus on is based on national and transnational television research since most people still turn to the television and radio media for crisis – although significantly, translocal communication is important when considering digital networks and social media.

The World Imposing Itself on National Audiences

Those who highlight the integrative consensual aspects of global crisis often do this by highlighting the immediacy and ubiquity of transnational news in this day and age. Simon Cottle (2009b) identified three ways that media enact or stage wars, major disasters, and climate change – as global surveillance events, global focusing events, and global spectacles. Here we are mainly concerned with the first and third types of media staging of global crisis. Global surveillance events have to do with the expectation that the media should bear witness to human suffering, whether due to wars or disasters, because of the increase in technological potential to do this (Cottle 2009b, p. 501). This observation is embraced by those who would highlight the game-changing aspect of a world with ubiquitous media: the ability of anyone with a mobile phone to document, distribute, and store information about what is going on in the world. Cottle's third category "global spectacles" focuses rather on how the media depict events: such as "spectacular visualisation" of climate change through "dramatic and symbolic scenes used to illustrate the globe (the world as one place) or satellite images increasingly common in news narratives to track disasters, dark pictures of wasted landscape, or endangered species in various stories" (Cottle 2009b, pp. 506–508).

Frosh and Pinchevski (2009, pp. 300–301) argue that ubiquitous media promote a generalized condition of persistent crisis-readiness through media-witnessing and that this ultimately contributes to the creation of "a supra-national sentiment, an affirmation of a common human vulnerability … a special kind of cosmopolitan empathy, potentially loosening exclusive allegiances to nation of denomination, fostering world-wide crisis-readiness in the face of impending threats" (Frosh and Pinchevski 2009, p. 302; see also Beck 2006).

There are certainly precedents for theorizing about a rapturous enchantment of global media audiences, whether they be celebratory media events or "disaster marathons" (Hepp and Couldry 2009). However, it would be difficult to devise an empirical study demonstrating that media ubiquity alone or even increased attention from different parts of the world to the same global crises are accompanied by increases in cosmopolitan consciousness among media users. Indeed, this critique was leveled in the 1990s when Dayan and Katz (1992) launched their media events concept, although their concern was on a national consciousness focusing on events such as ceremonies, coronations, and contests. Since then, and in tandem with globalization, the concept of media events has been stretched to include other types of events than those pre-planned and scripted, such as crises and conflicts, and it has been argued that the affirmation of the national community, which was claimed in the original media events study of 1992, can no longer be taken for granted (Couldry, Hepp, and Krotz 2010). According to Hepp and Couldry, the way forward is to stop assuming that media events have an integrative role for the nation-state and, instead, "investigate them as 'media rituals' (Couldry 2003) in a different sense; that is, as forms of media communication that *construct* a 'myth of the mediated centre'" (Hepp and Couldry 2010, p. 5). This opens up the opportunity for various types of cultural communities to be constructed (local, national, and transnational), and also those that are not necessarily tied to a specific territory.

Adopting the idea of the media (rather than the nation) as society's centre in global crisis reporting takes us to the very interface between this revised media events theory and mediatization theory. Whereas the ritual performance stands at the center of media events theory, it is the omnipresence of the media globally and its workings under late modernity that is in focus in mediatization. Mediatization is most commonly defined as a meta-process on a par with "individualization" and "globalization" (Krotz 2008, 2009) that involves the general integration of the media into other social spaces. There are in particular two simultaneous processes of the media that are discussed and debated: the influence of the media on social and cultural change in the sense of the interpenetration of media logics with all other social institutions and the growing autonomy of media institutions themselves (Hjarvard 2008). Mediatization theory argues that nonmedia institutions are losing control over the circulation and sense-making of their own symbols, ideas, and values. Stewart Hoover writes that

> it is this fact that has most fundamentally confronted traditional, neo-Durkheimian, "whole culture" views of media events. We simply can no longer assume that the circulation of media events is technologically limited to their cultures and locations of origin. All of them potentially become the property of cultural contexts outside their "home" contexts (Hoover 2010, p. 290).

Television, writes Hartley (1999, p. 158), "gathers populations which may otherwise display few connections among themselves and positions them as its audience 'indifferently', according to all viewers the same 'rights' and promoting among them a sense of common identity as television audiences". While the dynamics of such identity work have been explored in regards to the national community less has been written about the transnational level. Andreas Hepp, however, drawing on Anderson (1983), Thompson (1995), Morley (2000), and Löfgren (2001), sets up a model within the mediatization framework consisting of three dimensions: the social dimension, the spatial dimension, and the temporal dimension. Hepp argues that:

> On the social level they [the media] addressed the "mass audience" of a national population from a "centre" (and by this helped to construct this "centre"); on the spatial level, they reached a national territory (and by this helped to create an understanding of state borders as borders of the national community); and on the temporal level, they allowed a more and more speeded-up communication (and by this an addressing of "the people" virtually in real time) (Hepp 2009, p. 144).

While these former cultivation processes resulted in so-called "national-territorial media cultures", today's processes, characterized by individualization, deterritorialization, and intermediacy[2] replacing a "speeded up communication" led instead to a multiplicity of communicative spaces (Hepp 2009, p. 146). The nation-centeredness of the media can thus no longer be taken for granted, but neither it seems can a "world-centeredness". The global audience is a multiplicity of audiences.

Viewing the debate on media events in the context of mediatization focuses attention on what forces are at play within national and transnational media, uniting and disintegrating audiences as global crises happen and presenting to them a similar or a differentiated news discourse. The argument is not that we should dismiss global crises as media events but that we need to keep the notion about global media events distinct from the assumption of global sense-making and allow for these to hold difference and conflict as well as cohesion and loyalty. Most importantly, there is a need for empirical questions asking whether the media during global crises form "centers" of the kind that Couldry (2003) discusses within his framework and more importantly what kind of communities gather around these centers.

One view of such centers of power is that these are based around a handful of Western media conglomerates that influence transnational media structures of power, in collaboration with local media institutions and elites (Thussu 2007; Herman and McChesney 1997; Harindranath 2003). That the Western media would give some crises saturation coverage while ignoring others is in this reading due to the Western bias of international news agencies, which in turn influence the norms and values of journalists in local and national contexts. Included in this is also the heavy dependence of Internet-native platforms on a limited news diet supplied by the major news agencies (Paterson 2001), shrinking budgets for global news, and the increasing commercialization of news outlets where entertainment and drama are used extensively in order to attract viewers (Thussu 2007). In this light, the increasing focus on human interest in conflict and crisis coverage to increase audience size allows for only superficial coverage, with a universal appeal, focusing on human suffering rather than on its causes or consequences. Such narratives make suffering from global crises seem inevitable and therefore a generic feature of the developing world, rather than something that could be stopped.

National Rootedness in Crisis

It is well known from previous research that global crises and conflict reporting tends to be nationally framed – in particular if individuals or policies from the reporting country are affected or involved. This has been explained by linguistic, political, and cultural factors (Hafez 2007), which make coverage produced by national broadcasters more easily and readily comprehended, and therefore easier for viewers to relate to in comparison with that of transnational broadcasters. Another well-established factor in the case of war and conflict reporting is that the national news media tend to reflect the foreign and security policy orientation of the reporting country (Riegert 1998; Dimitrova and Strömbäck 2005; Norris, Kern, and Just 2003), hindering the emergence of transnational news discourses despite the global dissemination of images and stories from crises (Eide, Kunelius, and Philips 2008).

However, national variations in the reporting of global crises might also be explained by the fact that people turn to their own national and local broadcasters not merely to learn of the unfolding of events but to feel a part of a community (Perez-Lugo 2004; Aufderheide 2002). This can be related to various public needs that arise in a crisis situation, and which national or local media are thought to meet more satisfactorily than their transnational counterparts.

While the transnational news channels are often first to go live, thus gathering audiences globally, these are soon diversified into national audiences whose broadcasters have more cultural capital to install between themselves and their viewers a sense of togetherness in times of crises. So despite the fact that transnational channels are set up and adapted to global crises – that is, being first on the scene, broadcasting continuously with large teams of journalists devoted to the story – they might actually be less successful in catering for audiences' needs (Hellman and Riegert 2009). Ullamaja Kivikuru (2006, p. 512) attributes the low viewership of transnational news channels by Finnish viewers during the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2005 to the sense of personal security and trust conveyed by news organizations speaking in one's own mother tongue.

We have previously argued that news organizations appear increasingly to be taking on the role of a crisis manager through routines such as staying in live television mode despite the lack of new information, opening up channels of communication for those affected, participating in mourning processes (Hellman and Riegert 2009, p. 130; Hellman 2006; see also Robertson 2010, pp. 78, 81–82). The presence and the therapeutic role that is seen in talking that surrounds the repetitive coverage is thus more important than continuously providing new information:

> In times of crises, fulfilling psychological needs such as comfort and "working through" seem to be important journalistic objectives (Riegert and Olsson 2007, p. 155).

Crises situations might thus represent those occasions when viewers expect media performances of a ritual kind, when journalists as a result of their experiences on site become engaged narrators and where the coverage tends to invite viewers to feel compassion for sufferers. Pantti and Wieten write in reference to James Carey that:

> It is not so much their informative value that produces the necessity for television to provide them, but the fact that such events allow shared beliefs to be invoked in order to bring people together … as well as to intensify emotional identification with the polity (Pantti and Wieten 2005, p. 305).

So against those who argue for the perspective in the previous section, that live broadcasting of crisis creates identification and engagement in audiences far away to those who suffer (Keane 1996), it appears that the line between live coverage and compassion seems to be far from such a straight path. Other features of the reporting might be of equal importance or play a more significant role in creating identification with the afflicted in a crisis: such as the substance of the images, the narrative forms, and the geographical or cultural proximity between the victims and the viewers (Riegert *et al.* 2010). Research demonstrates significant differences between local and national news organizations regarding use of media platforms, news narratives, varying source use, and in the promulgation of disaster myths (Quarantelli 1996).

Chouliaraki (2006) argues that a sense of community is dependent on how people on the screen are positioned in relation to the events and to the audience. She distinguishes between zones of safety and danger that broadcasters construe as they separate the scene of suffering from the place where the audience and the newsroom are located. Using this notion of safe and danger zones Riegert *et al.* (2010) found in their study on the Indian Ocean tsunami that identification with the afflicted was more strongly felt by focus groups in the national news coverage (Swedish TV4) than in transnational live news coverage (CNNI), partly as a result of the danger zone being brought home, in part, through blurring the distinctions between safe and danger zones. CNNI's emphasis on its continuous media presence in the affected region and the dialogues between the anchor in the studio and the reporters on site tended to mark the distinction between the danger zone and the safe zone, making the screen between viewers and victims appear thicker and through this separating victims from viewers rather than connecting them (Morley 2000).

In another of her studies on audiences' engagement with distant others, Chouliaraki (2009, p. 217) discusses how depictions of suffering in war and conflict reporting are managed by certain "ethical orientations" – certain moral values – that have an influence on "what is legitimate and fair to feel and do towards such imagery". It is a "moralizing power of a particular way of seeing", she argues, which bans images of atrocities in order to protect audiences against death and sufferings of wars and conflicts, and discriminates against images that promote Western suffering over non-Western, but which more importantly "renders the scene of suffering an object of aesthetic appreciation" (Chouliaraki 2009, p. 217, with reference to Boltanski 1999, pp. 46–48). In other words, televisions' projection of suffering invites and prohibits different types of connections, and this can be understood in the light of a prioritization of some communities and connections over others. Since this means that they form quite different imagined communities with different moral ambitions, this ultimately raises the question of who we share our experiences of a crisis with – "… war and conflict reporting strategically selects … certain instances of suffering and death as causes for Western action while annihilating others" (Chouliaraki 2009, p. 225).

Transnationalizing from Within

As we noted at the outset, several scholars would look to the impact of globalizing processes on national media to find transnational news spheres (Rantanen 2005; Hannerz 2005). In terms of structures, formats, and technology there is little doubt that news organizations have been impacted heavily by globalization and commercialization (Holm 2001). Broadcasters complain that in place of editorial concerns, accounts and budget restrictions now determine what foreign events and global crises correspondents will cover.[3] This is exacerbated as national television news outlets try to compete by emulating the formats of the 24-hour news channels. Perhaps the most obvious change for the face of national newsrooms has to do with the inclusion of more live footage in daily news programs and the fact that national news channels often have niche 24-hour broadcasts television channels – at least accessible through the Internet – which are drawn upon in crises situations. In many cases, journalists are also expected to produce news for different media platforms – radio, web, and television – covering both domestic and international news, and are sometimes even responsible for producing images.

This points to national broadcasters adopting the structures of transnational news channels. The question is how such structural changes affect national broadcasters and more importantly how it will influence news content in the long run. Focusing on the journalistic genre more than the structural processes behind it, Berglez (2008) talks about the necessity for a "global journalism" centering on relations between people, regions, and events, and which is not constrained to either national or transnational news channels per se.

Berglez's idea is based on the notion of a journalism that depicts spatial, power, and identity relations as mutually dependent over national boundaries, such as stories where global climate change is related to a local crop failure, which in turn is reported as part of broader global processes. He argues that stories that are multispatial should demonstrate how events, peoples, times, and crises are interconnected over territorial boundaries to the point where territory ceases to have meaning, as might be the case in coverage of epidemics, natural disasters, and terrorism (Berglez 2008, p. 852). Furthermore, a global journalism seeks to represent identities as transnational. Today, he argues, news media tend to present such identities mostly when they produce spectacles or violent acts; instead, a global journalism unites people with similar identifications across national boundaries (class, sub-culture, language, etc.), thereby identifying a global public with common human rights or interests. While Berglez acknowledges that these types of stories are today in the minority – one could argue that due to the aforementioned processes of mediatization and increased autonomy from national powerbrokers – these types of stories could become more common.

Robertson (2010, pp. 85–86, 100) found in several cases, among them the Indian Ocean tsunami, that national television news displayed a type of cosmopolitan consciousness greater than that of transnational news platforms such as Euronews, BBC World, and Deutsche Welle. Not limiting her analysis to crisis and conflicts, she explores what narrative structures invite engagement with the distant other in foreign news coverage. Journalists who stand in front of the camera, blocking the view to the events going on behind them, create a sense of distance in what Robertson calls the "realist narrative". In contrast, the "naturalist narrative" places viewers next to the people in the story, in the backseat of a car or entering someone's house. Such audience positionings serve to explain the crisis and define accountability: viewers positioned at a distance and as onlookers are asked to become aware of the distant other and to pity the afflicted, but not to get engaged. While the realist narrative assigns the problems to elites and signals to the viewers not to worry, the naturalist narrative calls on viewers to see themselves as participants (Robertson 2010, pp. 27–29, 47–49; see also Graddol 1994). Robertson finds that there are national differences in the usage of the naturalist and the realist narratives, with the Swedish public broadcaster SVT representing the former narrative while its British counterpart, the BBC, the latter. The Swedish coverage might thus have a greater propensity for a transnational discourse, enabling viewers to connect with distant others. If this applies to other national news discourses in other countries, then domestic broadcasters may be more likely to promote what Höijer (2004) called a "global discourse of compassion" than the transnational broadcasters.

Yet another possible origin of transnationalization of national discourse can be found in the regional satellite television channels with multinational markets. We are in what Cushion (2010) called "the third phase" of 24-hour television news: this is the recognition that despite Western dominance in ownership of multinational media conglomerates, strong regional and national cultures have forced market leaders to become sensitive to local markets. Originally stemming from influential Arabic, Chinese, Indian, and Brazilian media companies, many of these satellite channels link members of a diaspora with one another or the media organisation's home country through a common language or shared culture. They make up "geocultural spaces" or "transnational cultural linguistic spaces", according to Straubhaar (2007, p. 7). The audiences for such television channels dwarf the bilingual audiences of the English-language channels launched by monied or government interests (see the next section). They are part of what has been called "counterflows", which reflect diversity, hybridity, and the significance of non-Western media cultures on a global level (Chalaby 2005; Kraidy and Khalil 2009; McMillin 2007; Sinclair, Jacka, and Cunningham 1996). More research is needed to determine how regional and national television channels draw on each other, how these are perceived by viewers, and whether they are routinely accessed by national audiences in a crisis situation.

At the very least, there appears to be an increased awareness of how media outside one's nation are viewing one's own country. Shani Orgad's (2008) study of the media debates in Spain following the 2004 terrorist bombings and in France following the 2005 banlieues riots outside Paris are cases in point:

> The analysis demonstrates how transnational networks' coverage of these events generated estrangement, de-familiarized and cast doubt on national narratives and commonsensical discourses of us/them, thereby offering viewers an alternative distance from their national unit and encouraging a self-reflexive process of introspection and critical discussion (Orgad 2008, p. 301).

In this case, it mattered little that mass audiences do not watch Anglo-Saxon transnational news channels since these narratives came in through the back door via the national media's coverage about what "outsiders" are saying about "us" in times of crisis. This was clearly the case during the Arab Uprisings in 2011, where the national and local media were deeply distrusted and where transnational media (and its collaboration with social media) played a significant role in the formation of an international opinion in support of the protestors. Transnational media could also be argued to have set up platforms (on Twitter, Google, television news organizations' blogs) abroad, aimed at supporting North African publics (Robertson 2011).

National/Regional Perspectives on Global News Platforms

If by a transnational news sphere we mean media that can claim audiences' attention in different countries and if such spaces deal with problems shared and allow the participation of various voices across the national borders they claim to cater to, then clearly the transnational television news channels and some Internet-native sources should be among these. We argue that transnational news channels are not as global as they claim, that many target an international elite, but that they could have agenda-setting effects for national news. To a certain extent, those who hold the view that Anglo-American media conglomerates and media structures dominate global news and crisis would ascribe to this view, however these scholars seldom account for the existence of discourses challenging Western interests.

The rolling transnational news channels are suppliers of breaking news and packaged international and political news with either a global or a regional reach. CNN blazed the way with its breaking news, 24-hour news format, and its global news mission, although it is notable that CNN has later had to regionalize (in the case of India, go into partnership) to different local/linguistic versions (Cushion 2010). Chalaby (2009, p. 173) regards CNN, BBC World, and Al Jazeera English as "The Big Three" market leaders among the transnational news channels, with the less influential "public diplomacy" channels – Euronews, Deutsche Welle, France 24, China's CCTV9, Iran's Press TV, and Russia Today – more preoccupied with the cultural/linguistic spheres they represent. He says:

> The "Big Three" report the world to the world and although they sometimes articulate different regional perspectives, they do not follow a national agenda. Newsrooms might well reflect some of the assumptions and traditions common to the culture in which their networks are headquartered, but their staffing is purposely multinational and their journalists operate under strict – and public – guidelines (Chalaby 2009, p. 186).

On the other hand, Küng-Shankleman (2003) concludes that national culture does play a key role in both CNN and BBC after an indepth study of them both. American values such as: "frontier spirit, individualism and proactivity" contribute to CNN's self-image as a global "news missionary" aspiring to make "a difference to the course of history," says Küng-Shankleman (2003, pp. 95–96). The BBC, whose high-mindedness was rather due to its "unique national responsibility", saw itself as the "best in the business", "custodians of a unique and important public service broadcasting heritage"

(Küng-Shankleman 2003, p. 95). Ironically, despite CNN's attempts to the contrary, its format and journalistic style, if not its reporting, is perceived by audiences as an American perspective on international news. This is in contrast to the BBC, which has succeeded in creating an image of itself in which notions of impartiality, truth, and integrity overshadow its other goals (such as "bringing Britain to the world, and the world to Britain" – as one of its mandates puts it). In a recent study, Widholm (2011) found that Euronews and BBC World coverage of two cases – one media event and one crisis – distinctly reflected each channels' mandate: the promotion of a common European identity in the former case and a peculiar combination of British and global news identity in the latter case.

This peculiar combination of national/regional/global also appears to hold true for Al Jazeera, which prioritizes news stories on the global South, has a regional pan-Arab identity and staff, yet, at the same time, it is a public diplomacy tool to promote and defend the Qatari government. In contrast to the Western models of public diplomacy by transnational news, public diplomacy is accomplished by keeping Qatar out of the news (Figenschou 2010, pp. 131–133). Regarding global news, Figenschou (2010, pp. 177–199) found that Al Jazeera English represents a "contra-flow" to the extent that it gives more attention, resources, and in-depth treatment to stories from the global South than the North and it includes more independent elites than government sources – although it does not include more civilians than authoritative voices. In certain crises, however, it sets out to "give a voice to the voiceless" by clear visualising strategies of the impact of crisis and war on civilians, and giving a voice to "underdog" counter-elites such as the Palestinians (Figenschou 2010; see also Iskandar 2006; Sakr 2007).

In its regional Arab context, Al Jazeera was early branded as the channel that revolutionalized Arab satellite television stations, through its criticism of Arab regimes, its unprecedented editorial freedom, and its early interactivity (Zayani 2005; Iskandar 2006). Its appearance on the pan-Arabic satellite television scene set in motion a series of power struggles that played out between powerful players and governments in the regional media industry (Kraidy and Khalil 2009). Although transnational Arab satellite channels have stopped short of creating a transnational public sphere, scholars put forward the contribution they make to (a) a new feeling of Arab regional identity (Rinnawi 2006); (b) a broadening of the range of topics debated publicly in the Arab world (Lynch 2006); and (c) the interactive and participatory aspects of television programming, which draw in audiences through mobile and Internet technologies (Kraidy 2007). Certainly the events of the Arab Uprisings appear to confirm a number of Figenschou's observations, Al Jazeera English's focus on civilian sources and counter-elites in crises, and the increasing use of social media for a more interactive and participatory news coverage.

Factors that Might Impact on Emerging Transnational News Sphere(s)

By drawing on the four perspectives of global crisis reporting in reference to national and transnational orientations, we find in each one of them transformation processes that speak in favor of emerging transnational news spheres. Yet, there appears to be a gap in the literature between signs of emerging transnational news spheres on the structural level and empirical research on actual crisis reporting and the perceptions of the users on other levels (Riegert *et al.* 2010; Olsson 2008; Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2005, Pantti and Wahl-Jorgensen 2007; Quarentelli 1996). Nevertheless, we have argued that shifting geo-political realities, the increased accessibility of different news sources, changing industry demands, and the resurgence of a ritual paradigm of journalism make the emergence of transnational news spheres likely. In what follows, we present each of these processes and why we think they matter.

Shifting Geo-political Realities

Aside from the triumph of neo-liberalism in the form of national deregulation and growth in cross-border trade, the demise of the Cold War allowed for the growth of what international relationists call the human security paradigm. This paradigm entails a focus on individuals' human and civil rights, on norms and values rather than on the sovereignty of states, and the protection of territorial borders. This is in part due to what Mary Kaldor (2006) characterized as "new wars", which involve the notion that security threats and global risks are asymmetric, and more volatile and unpredictable than ever before. Seemingly weak states, governments, and social movements, when set on defending and pursuing their own security interests, pose serious threats to major powers in the world, as was illustrated with utmost clarity in the 9/11 attacks. The changing nature of warfare and of the conceptualization of sovereignty from a territorial focus to one of securing human rights seem likely to work in parallel with what we suggest is an increasing emphasis on the ritual paradigm within crisis journalism. It is a kind of reporting that employs news narratives that invite viewers to identify with victims of disasters or sympathize with and raise support for political activists in other parts of the world.

Changing Industry Demands

The transnational news media landscape of today is characterized by diversity – indeed fragmentation – but interestingly enough very little work has been done on who is watching these channels. Chalaby (2009) says that the majority watching pan-European channels are more upmarket than their terrestrial compatriots, which is why the leading survey group European Media and Marketing Survey (EMS) only interviews people from the top 20% of the European population. Only those with an income of €50 000 per annum in 19 countries across Europe are included. Such audiences attract a certain type of corporate advertising, but this leaves questions as to how the other 80% of Europeans utilize pan-European news channels (Chalaby 2009, pp. 89–92). Judging by the availability of these channels in journalist newsrooms, hotel rooms, and travel hubs, it seems clear that these channels target a cosmopolitan elite consisting of business people, decision-makers, vacationers, journalists, and academics. This brings up issues of whether these channels should be studied according to a class dimension – in terms of the information haves and have-nots – as well as the extent to which viewers of various global news channels are accessing competing views of the world or an Anglo-American one.

A second type of change brought up by Chalaby (2009, pp. 195–200) in his survey of the vast array of "cross-border TV networks" in Europe is the "migrant channels", which target audiences with a common cultural/linguistic background and consist largely of recycled content taken from domestic programming. The largest of these markets in Europe are the Turkish market, the "South-Asian" market, "the East European" market, the Chinese market, and the Arabic-speaking market. Chalaby attests to the necessity of local market relevance and how quite significant variations in linguistic audiences, national laws, the strength of public service, and cultural norms have forced these channels to "adopt a more radical localization strategy" whereby content, personnel, language, and advertising blend with local market conditions while attempting to retain a distinct brand identity (Chalaby 2009, p. 200–206).

One could also see the structural changes of the media industries from the point of view of claims by mediatization scholars that media institutions are becoming both increasingly autonomous and increasingly "integrated into the operation of other social institutions (family, work, politics, etc.)" (Hjarvard 2008, p. 113). As a result of the political economy of the global news media market, nationally based media institutions (including public service broadcasters) are forced to act on commercial markets that are not necessarily only national. This tends to loosen ties to national authorities as they struggle to remain relevant. When news organizations are turned into autonomous profit-seeking enterprises – including the traditionally nationally rooted public service broadcasting institutions – and when cultivating community between viewers and the news channels becomes an economic strategy, we can also expect changes in journalistic ideals from the aim to inform viewers to the aim of engaging them (at least to keep them watching).

Ritual Paradigm of Journalism

We have argued above that most research in regards to the ritual paradigm of crisis journalism lends support to a continued national rootedness of global crisis reporting. However, such a paradigm also holds potentials for transnational discourses. The ritual paradigm of crisis journalism involves news coverage in which the reporting journalist and the newsroom are represented as actively involved in the crisis and its management in various ways. Journalism could become a type of activism in which television channels promote consensus and pity rather than conflict and questions of accountability and justice or one in which journalists actively take sides with one party in a conflict – lending support to the citizens, but taking a stand against its leadership for instance. The attempts by the news media in crises to assist people and societies moves the journalistic ethos from one dominated by detachment and impartiality to an increasing degree of engagement and attachment. It could be seen as a move of crisis journalism away from a liberal foundation based on the transmission model where journalists' tasks are to serve citizens' rights to know (and understand) into one where journalists are moral guardians who cover crises with the primary aim to do good. One could also see this as depoliticizing crisis, by healing the wounds, comforting the bereaved, pitying the victims, and defending the vulnerable, rather than promoting politically contested values of justice and equality or identifying enemies and reflecting national self-images.

We must ask if this is a trend that should be connected to the global commercialization of television news production and if it points to a transnational news discourse stressing universal values (saving children in disasters) rather than national frames ("our" Western tourists trapped in Thailand). We need to learn more about how journalistic norms regarding global crisis reporting are changing and how these impact on the cultivation of these communities.

Accessibility of Different News Sources

Digital media convergence has allowed existing press, radio, and television news organizations to become easily available over the Internet, but these are now accompanied by Internet-native challengers, bloggers, and social media platforms. The growing diversification of news sources adds support to emerging transnational news spheres through the increase in web-based alternative news sources including user-generated content – presenting perspectives that might create transnational understanding irrespective of national government differences. The development of mobile telephony together with web-based media mean that new information actors such as activists and eye-witnesses can shape crisis reporting. The depth of this challenge to news organizations can be judged by how the powerful news organizations are becoming increasingly adept at using these social media technologies themselves (Hoskins and O'Loughlin 2010). In other words, the supply of information or the flows of what *could* turn into international news has grown tremendously with the number of new sources able to publish what is going on in the world.

It is apparent that social media and the global news media market appeared to work in tandem regarding the use of sources during the Arab uprisings of 2011. This in turn is likely to affect both the relationship between journalists and political elites, as well as crisis journalism itself and its potential for transnational interconnectivities. The stories about the uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia were told from the point of view of activists and protestors, both indirectly through international journalists and directly through videos posted on YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook. Where journalists were denied accreditation or Internet services were turned off by the regimes, images and videos were moved to international news outlets (Cottle 2011, p. 653).

One of the new transnational news actors challenging both established authorities and traditional media outlets is Wikileaks. Wikileaks can be thought of as an information actor and a transnational platform that builds on computer hackers and whistleblowers in various countries who champion information transparency. For traditional media outlets, Wikileaks is a source.

Flew and Liu (2011), writing on the reactions to the Wikileaks disclosure of several hundred thousand diplomatic cables in the Australian press, note three aspects of this challenge of "radical transparency": its impact on international diplomacy; the implications of WikiLeaks for journalism; and WikiLeaks and democracy, including debates about the organization itself and its autocratic leader. They surmise that the challenge of radical transparency would have happened sooner or later by some organization intent on exposing uncomfortable truths about unpopular decisions – given the amount of government workers privy to this information in the United States. Second, Wikileaks was forced to ally itself with major newspapers like *The Guardian, The New York Times*, and *Der Spiegel* in order to get attention for its leaks and thus could not, on its own, make a dent in the global news flow. Third, they note that several Australian news organizations have not changed their self-conceptions as gatekeepers with the right to withhold information until such time as they deem fit. Furthermore, when the organization Wikileaks itself became the subject of news reporting, its own ideals were put to the test and found wanting.

Conclusions

In times of crisis, the media and television in particular have an important role to play as the glue holding societies together, to satisfy individual needs, and to cultivate community. Previous research on crisis coverage has shown that audiences tend to be addressed as local and nationals, and that it is within these communities that television networks situate viewers for identification with the afflicted or one of the conflicting parties. However, with the prospect of a future that holds many more global crises than before, we should note the implications of the revised versions of media events theories, the ubiquity of media in time and space, and, in particular, of transnational news channels that are constructed to address such an audience. Yet, we must question whether these media events generate cosmopolitan outlooks. Transnational news channels have regional or national bases that provide a certain perspective in their reporting, but there are few global political and crisis management institutions to contribute to a transnational platform for the expression of shared understandings and debates. The global journalism that Berglez (2008) speaks of is still more the exception than the rule – also in global crisis situations – although admittedly exceptions that call for empirical analysis will further our understanding of its qualities.

More studies are needed of the content of regional satellite channels and, whether "migrant" or not, do they have regional narratives and what is the relationship between these and national perspectives? Furthermore, more work needs to be done on the ways domestic broadcasters differ from transnational ones (either the "Big Three" or regional channels) in major global crisis coverage, particularly in relation to what kinds of communities the two see themselves as addressing and how audiences understand them.

With regards to global media events we know that people across the world turn to television and to transnational channels as major crises happen, but we need much more research on how people in different parts of the world make sense of their participation as global audiences, their media use, and what they experience in these moments. Although we have suggested here that there is a growing emphasis on the ritual paradigm of journalism, little is known about whether the ritual paradigm will lead to a more transnational news discourse. Research has been done on interconnectivities between spectators and distant sufferers, but more needs to be done in the field of war and conflict reporting where the ritual paradigm might pose problematic questions about news media as political agents.

We have argued in this chapter that the role of transnational news channels for emerging transnational mediated spheres are to be found in the impact they have on national and local media structures and institutions. The WikiLeaks phenomenon is a good example of how a transnational news platform, or news source, is employed (or not) by national news organizations. Contrary to what some might have expected, it has not yet diminished the role of journalism nor revolutionized transnational news discourses. However, WikiLeaks along with the spread of sources used in crisis reporting generally highlight developments in journalism that are in need of more systematic research.

Finally, we must not forget to keep on asking about the conceptualizations of global crises events and empirically analyze when and why different crises are defined as global by various media – and why some obviously global problems are defined as regionally and nationally important.

Notes

1. In general, crisis can be understood to follow when a process reaches a breaking point or when an unexpected event creates high levels of uncertainty, perceived threats to basic values, or to the very existence of communities, organizations, or individuals. In this sense, a crisis is the fall-out from an event or a series of events when they exceed "normal" resources and foreseeable consequences.
2. This term comes from Tomlinson (2007, p. 74) and relates to "culture of instantaneity", "ubiquitous availability", and "a sense of directness, of cultural proximity".
3. The author's personal interviews with 33 foreign news journalists at Swedish TV4, British ITN, and American CBS in 1999–2000 found this to be an overriding concern, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom.

References

Anderson, B. (1983) *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso.

Aufderheide, P. (2002) All-too-reality TV: challenges for television journalists after September 11, *Journalism*, **3** (1), 7–36.

Bauman, Z. (2011) *Culture in a Liquid Modern World*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Beck, U. (2006) *The Cosmopolitan Vision*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Berglez, P. (2008) What is global journalism?, *Journalism Studies*, **9** (6), 845–858.

Boltanski, L. (1999) *Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Castells, M. (1996) *The Rise of the Network Society*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Castells, M. (2007) Communication, power and counter-power in the network society, *International Journal of Communication*, **1**, 238–266.

Chalaby, J. (ed.) (2005) *Transnational Television Worldwide: Towards a New Media Order*. London: Tauris and Co.

Chalaby, J. (2009) *Transnational Television in Europe:. Reconfiguring Global Communications Networks*. London: Tauris and Co.

Chouliaraki, L. (2006) *The Spectatorship of Suffering*. London: Sage.

Chouliaraki, L. (2009) Witnessing war: economies of regulation in reporting war and conflict, *The Communication Review*, **12**, 215–226.

Cohen, A., Levy, M., Roeh, I. and Gurevitch, M (1996) *Global Newsrooms, Local Audiences*. London: J. Libbey.

Cottle, S. (2009a) Global crises in the news: staging new wars, disasters, and climate change, *International Journal of Communication*, **3**, 494–516.
Cottle, S. (2009b) *Global Crisis Reporting: Journalism in the Global Age*. Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press.
Cottle, S. (2011) Media and the Arab uprisings of 2011: Research Notes, *Journalism*, **12** (5), 647–659.
Couldry, N. (2003) *Media Rituals: A Critical Approach*. London: Routledge.
Couldry, N., Hepp, A. and Krotz, F. (eds) (2010) *Media Events in a Global Age*. London: Routledge.
Cushion, S. (2010) Three phases of 24-hour news television, in S. Cushion and J. Lewis (eds), *The Rise of 24-Hour News Television*. New York: Peter Lang, pp. 15–30.
Dayan, D. and Katz, E. (1992) *Media Events. The Live Broadcasting of History*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Dimitrova, D.V. and Strömbäck, J. (2005) Mission accomplished? Framing of the Iraq War in the elite newspapers in Sweden and the United States, *Gazette*, **67** (5), 399–417.
Eide, E., Kunelius, R. and Philips, A.(eds) (2008) *Transnational Media Events. The Mohammed Cartoons and the Imagined Clash of Civilizations*. Göteborg: Nordicom.
Figenschou, T.U. (2010) *The South is Talking Back: Al Jazeera English as a Strategic Contra-Flow*. Oslo: University of Oslo.
Flew, T. and Liu, B.R. (2011) Globally networked public spheres? The Australian media reaction to WikiLeaks, *Global Media Journal: Australian Edition*, **5** (1), 1–13.
Frosh, P. and Pinchevski, A. (2009) Crisis-readiness and media witnessing, *The Communication Review*, **12**, 295–304.
Graddol, D. (1994) The visual accomplishment of factuality, in D. Graddol and O. Boyd-Barrett (eds), *Media Texts: Authors and Readers*. Cleavedon: Multilingual Matters in association with the Open University, pp. 136–157.
Hafez, K. (2007) *The Myth of Globalization*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hannerz, U. (2005) *Foreign News: Exploring the World of Foreign Correspondents*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Harindranath, R. (2003) Reviving "Cultural imperialism": international audiences, global capitalism, and the transnational elite, in L. Park and S. Kumar (eds), *Planet TV: A Global Television Reader*. New York: New York University Press, pp. 155–168.
Harvey, D. (2000) Time-space compression and the postmodern condition, in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds), *The Global Transformation Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate*. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 82–91.
Hellman, M. (2006) *Televisual Representations of France and the UK under Globalization*. Stockholm: Stockholms Universitet.
Hellman, M. and Riegert, K. (2009) Transnational news and crisis reporting: the Indian Ocean Tsunami on CNN and Swedish TV4, in U. Kivikuru and L. Nord (eds) *After the Tsunami: Crisis Communication in Finland and Sweden*. Göteborg: Nordicom.
Hepp, A. (2008) Translocal media cultures: networks of the media and globalisation, in A. Hepp, F. Krotz, S. Moores, and C. Winter (eds), *Connectivity, Networks and Flows: Conceptualising Contemporary Communications*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, pp. 33–58.
Hepp, A. (2009) Differentiation: mediatization and cultural change, in K. Lundby (ed.), *Mediatization. Concept, Changes, Consequences*. New York: Peter Lang, pp. 139–158.
Hepp, A. and Couldry, N. (2010) Introduction: media events in globalized media cultures, in N. Couldry, A. Hepp, and F. Krotz (eds), *Media Events in a Global Age*. London: Routledge, pp. 1–21.

Herman, E. and McChesney, R. (1997) *The Rise of the Global Media: The New Missionaries of Corporate Capitalism*. London: Cassell.

Hjarvard, S. (2001) News media and the globalization of the public sphere, in S. Hjarvard (ed.), *News in a Globalized Society*. Gothenburg: Nordicom, pp. 17–40.

Hjarvard, S. (2008) The mediatization of society: a theory of the media as agents of social and cultural change, *Nordicom Review*, **29** (2), 105–134.

Höijer, B. (2004) The discourse of global compassion: the audience and media reporting of human suffering, *Media*, *Culture and Society*, **26** (4), 513–531.

Holm, H.-H. (2001) The effect of globalization on media structures and norms: globalization and the choice of foreign news, in S. Hjarvard (ed.), *News in a Globalized Society*. Göteborg: Nordicom, pp. 113–128.

Hoover, S.M. (2010) Conclusion. The media events debate: moving to the next stage, in N. Couldry, A. Hepp, and F. Krotz (eds), *Media Events in a Global Age*. London: Routledge, pp. 283–300.

Hoskins, A. and O'Loughlin, B. (2010) *War and Media: The Emergence of Diffused War*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Iskandar, A. (2006) Is Al Jazeera alternative? Maintaining alternity and assmiliating discourses of dissent, *Transnational Broadcasting Journal*, **15**, accessed 10/10/2011, http://www.tbsjournal.com/Iskandar.html.

Kaldor, M. (2006) *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Keane, J. (1996) *Reflections on Violence*. London: Verso.

Kivikuru, U.M. (2006) Tsunami communication in Finland: revealing tensions in the sender–receiver relationship, *European Journal of Communication*, **21** (4), 499–520.

Kraidy, M. (2007) Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and the changing Arab information order, *International Journal of Communication*, **1** (1), 139–156.

Kraidy, M. and Khalil, J.F. (2009) *Arab Television Industries*. London: BFI Publishing.

Krotz, F. (2008) Media connectivity: concepts, conditions, and consequences, in A. Hepp, F. Krotz, S. Moores, and C. Winter (eds), *Network, Connectivity and Flow: Conceptualising Contemporary Communications*. New York: Hampton Press, pp. 13–31.

Krotz, F. (2009) Mediatization: a concept with which to grasp media and societal change, in N. Couldry, and A. Hepp (eds), *Media Events in a Global Age*. London: Routledge, pp. 21–40.

Küng-Shankleman, L. (2003) Organisational culture inside the BBC and CNN, in S. Cottle (ed.), *Media Organization and Production*. London: Sage, pp. 77–96.

Löfgren, O. (2001) The nation as home or motel? Metaphors of media and belonging, *Sociologisk Årsbok*, **1**, 1–34.

Lynch, M. (2006) *Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera and Middle East Politics Today*. New York: Columbia University Press.

McMillin, D. (2007) *International Media Studies*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Morley, D. (2000) *Home, Territories: Media, Mobility and Identity*. London: Routledge.

Nohrstedt, S.-A. and Ottosen, R. (eds) (2004) *US and the Others: Global Media Images on "The War on Terror"*. Göteborg: Nordicom.

Nohrstedt, S.-A. and Ottosen, R. (eds) (2005) *Global War – Local Views, Media Images of the Iraq War*. Göteborg: Nordicom.

Norris, P., Kern, M. and Just, M. (eds) (2003) *Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government and the Public*. London: Routledge.

Olsson, E.-K. (2008) *Media Crisis Decision Making: A Case Study of SR (Swedish Radio), SVT (Swedish Television) and TV4*. Stockholm: Stockholm University.

Orgad, S. (2008) “Have you seen Bloomberg?” Satellite channels as agents of the new visibility, *Global Media and Communication*, **4** (3), 301–327.

Pantti, M. and Wieten, J. (2005) Mourning becomes the nation: television coverage of the murder of Pim Fortuyn,” *Journalism Studies*, **6** (3): 301–13.

Pantti, M. and Wahl-Jorgensen, K. (2007) On the political possibilities of therapy news: media responsibility and the limits of objectivity in disaster coverage, *Estuods em Communicaçao*, **1**, 3–25.

Paterson, C. (2001) Media imperialism revisited. The global public sphere and the news agency agenda, in S. Hjarvard (ed.), *News in a Globalized Society*. Göteborg: Nordicom, pp. 77–92.

Perez-Lugo, M. (2004) Media uses in disaster situations: a new focus on the impact phase, *Sociological Inquiry*, **74** (2), 210–225.

Quarantelli, E.L. (1996) Local mass media operations in disasters in the USA, *Disaster Prevention and Management*, **5** (5), 5–10.

Rantanen, T. (2005) *The Media and Globalization*. London: Sage.

Riegert, K. (1998) *Nationalising Foreign Conflict: Foreign Policy Orientation as a Factor in Television News Reporting*. Edsbruk: Akademitryck.

Riegert, K. and Olsson, E.-K. (2007) The importance of ritual in crisis journalism, *Journalism Practice*, **1** (2), 143–158.

Riegert, K., Robertson, A., Hellman, M. and Mral, B. (2010) *Transnational and National Media in Global Crisis: The Indian Ocean Tsunami*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Rinnawi, K. (2006) *Instant Nationalism: McArabism, al-Jazeera and Transnational Media in the Arab World*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Robertson, A. (2010) *Mediated Cosmopolitanism: The World of Television News*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Robertson, A. (2011) Connecting in crisis: new and old media and the “Arab Awakening”, Paper presented at IAMCR, Istanbul, July 16, 2011.

Sakr, N. (2007) *Arab Media and Political Renewal: Community, Legitimacy and Public Life*. New York: IB Tauris.

Shaw, M. (1996) *Civil Society and Media in Global Crisis: Representing Distant Violence*. London: Pinter.

Sinclair, J., Jacka, E. and Cunningham, S.(eds) (1996) *New Patterns in Global Television: Peripheral Vision*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Straubhaar, J. (2007) *World Television: From Global to Local*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Thompson, J.B. (1995) *The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thussu, D.K. (2007) *News as Entertainment: The Rise of Global Infotainment*. London: Sage.

Tomlinson, J. (2007) *The Culture of Speed: The Coming of Immediacy*. New Delhi: Sage.

Volkmer, I. (2001) International communication theory in transition: parameters of the new global sphere of mediation, in S. Hjarvard (ed.), *News in a Globalized Society*. Göteborg: Nordicom, pp. 65–76.

Widholm, A. (2011) *Europe in Transition: Transnational Television News and European Identity*. Doctoral Thesis, Department of Journalism, Media and Communication. Stockholm: Stockholm University.

Zayani, M. (ed.) (2005) *The Al Jazeera Phenomenon: Critical Perspective on New Arab Media*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publisher.

11

The "Global Public Sphere"

A Critical Reappraisal[1]

Kai Hafez

A clear theoretical model is vital if we are to take stock of the international and intercultural effect of media and forms of reporting of such different types as television, radio, print media, Internet, direct broadcasting by satellite, international broadcasting, and international reporting. In the literature on globalization dealing with international communication, models of any kind are thin on the ground. Manuel Castells's famous three-volume work *The Information Age* does without almost any schematic models (Castells 1996/1997). The same goes for multiauthored volumes in this field (Sreberny-Mohammadi *et al.* 1997; Held and McGrew 2003; Hepp and Löffelholz 2002).

The present work draws on systems theory to describe the globalization of mass communication. We may divide the key characteristics and conceptual tools deployed here into three fields: system connectivity, system change, and system interdependence.

Before discussing more closely the core concepts of "connectivity", "change", and "interdependence" linked with the concept of system, it is vital to shed light on the frequently ambiguous concept of system itself. Cross-border communication is defined very unsystematically in the globalization literature, sometimes as inter- and trans*national* and sometimes as inter- and trans*cultural* communication. "Cross-border" thus describes those processes of information exchange in the course of which system borders, of the nation-state *or* culture, are transversed. Almost all contemporary attempts to grapple with globalization theoretically that tackle issues of communication emphasize the nation-state or culture. The focus tends to be on the state, but sometimes it is on cultural areas, at times also labeled "civilizations". The idea of "networking" is anchored in the assumption that the world features a number of poles that can be networked; a web is ultimately nothing without its nodal points.

The notion of network-like communication between actors who can be ascribed to states or cultures is problematic. This is apparent when one considers that these poles of the system are in principle equal. They can be regarded as subsets of one another

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

depending on the situation. States may be parts of cultures – and vice versa. The resulting web of communication appears to resemble the kind of optical illusion whose content changes as one changes one's perspective. When the Uighurs, a Muslim minority in western China of Turkmen origin and thus related to the peoples of Central Asia, use media from beyond the national borders, should we regard them as actors practicing inter*national* or inter*cultural* communication?

Quite obviously, it depends on which aspect of the analysis we wish to focus. A web emerges consisting of several dimensions. These complications are rooted in the fact that "state" and "culture" involve differing implications for communication, each of which has its own justification. In one case, communication between actors describable in terms of constitutional law or sociology (governments, NGOs, etc.) takes center stage. In the other, the focus is on exchanges between subjects and groups in their capacity as bearers of linguistically and historically imbued norms, ways of life, and traditions. Both perspectives may be important, as is apparent wherever state and cultural borders are not identical and cultural identity rivals the power of the state. Tribal cultures in Africa, for example, often extend across state borders, which highlights the advantages of scrutinizing both the international and intercultural dimensions of cross-border communication processes.

The existence of cultural areas such as the "West", the "Islamic world", the Indian subcontinent, and Latin or German-speaking Europe is an additional factor making analysis more difficult. Such areas gain cohesion across state borders only with the help of mass media, adding a third dimension of regionality to the theoretical model. A debate on globalization restricted to the "local" and the "global" while neglecting the "regional" would lack complexity. The immigrant cultures that we hear so much about, which communicate across borders and form "virtual communities", provide further evidence of the value of examining international and intercultural communication as a unity. The division into the spatial levels "global", "regional", and "local", intended as a heuristic and relevant to both dimensions of state and culture, is not contradicted by migration. Immigrants also communicate either locally, regionally, or globally, even if the spatial parameters are the reverse of those of settled populations, as their local culture (their home country) is, so to speak, located in global space and they can develop a second locality only slowly.

System Connectivity

Phenomena of system connectivity, sometimes called *interconnectedness* in the literature, describe the extent, speed, and intensity of the international or intercultural exchange of information. Connectivity may be generated between entities, however defined, through various means of communication. Alongside mediated interpersonal communication (telephone, email, letter, fax, etc.) we can distinguish the following fields of communication that depend on mass media:

- direct access to the range of communicative services produced by another country/culture (Internet; direct broadcasts by satellite; international broadcasting including special TV and radio services in foreign languages broadcast to other countries; imports/export of media);

- access to information and contexts in another country/cultural area conveyed by journalism (international reporting on television, radio, the press; corresponding media services on the Internet).

While this list makes no claim to completeness, it is clear that direct routes of access to cross-border communication are in the majority. One of the key factors shaping the globalization debate over the last decade was thus the fact that the number of means of transmission and the exchange of information beyond borders has increased dramatically. The "new media" have set the overall tone of the debate since the 1990s, effectively distorting it, as the "old media" have largely been ignored. In particular, the role of international reporting in the process of globalization has suffered a complete lack of systematic treatment. The technologically possible direct interleaving of national media areas, which people could previously experience only through the information conveyed by international journalism, has proven a fascinating and bothersome phenomenon for researchers.

However, it is far from certain that the new media, regardless of their many new forms, characterize the processes of globalization more than national journalism and international reporting. We therefore have to take both fields into account when designing our theories. Despite the rise of the new media and the mounting flood of information available on the Internet, the significance of journalism as intermediary has by no means diminished. Foreign media accessible via satellites and cables also represent a form of journalism, though one that arises outside one's own media system. This means that the media user receives direct access to foreign journalistic cultures. Not only this, but the Internet has failed to oust even domestic journalism: journalistic mediation is in fact ever more significant to how people organize their lives at a time when the quantity of information is growing. If at all, online information services can replace the international reporting provided by national media only among small informational elites. The concrete form of connectivity via the new media depends on a range of technological, socio-economic and cultural parameters:

- *Technological reach and socio-economic implications of media technology.* The nation-states and cultural areas of this planet are characterized by very different technological capacities for transmission and reception in the field of satellite broadcasting, depending on the prevailing political and financial parameters. The same goes for the Internet. Regardless of the strong increase in the number of connections, a "digital divide" exists, above all between industrialized and developing countries, which restricts connectivity substantially.
- *User reach.* The debate on the globalization of the media all too often fails to distinguish between technological reach and user reach. The number of those who use a technology per se lies below the technologically possible use – and cross-border use is of course only one variant of the use to which the new media may be put. We cannot simply assume that it is the primary form. Our eagerness to wed globalization to a normative agenda should not blind us to the fact that the Internet may be a misjudged medium that is contributing far more to intensifying local connections (e-commerce, etc.) than to creating cross-border networks.

- *Linguistic and cultural competence.* To communicate with people in other states and cultural areas or to use their media generally requires linguistic competence, which only minorities in any population enjoy. To avoid dismissing cross-border connectivity as marginal from the outset, it is vital to distinguish between various user groups – globalization elites and peripheries. Connectivity is without doubt partly dependent on the nature of the message communicated. Music, image, text – behind this sequence hides a kind of magic formula of globalization. Music surely enjoys the largest global spread and images surely occupy a middle position (e.g., press photographs or the images of CNN, also accessible to users who understand no English), while most texts create only meager international resonance because of language barriers. This issue is central to the evaluation of global connectivity as a more or less "contextualized" globalization. Images in themselves do not speak. They require explanatory text to transport authentic messages – and it is questionable to what extent such messages can overcome borders.

Connectivity in the field of international reporting also depends on the international department's printing or broadcasting capacities, the quality and quantity of technical equipment, and correspondent networks. All these resources have an influence on the presence of other countries and cultures in the media of one's own country. Foreign reporting has always been a struggle because of lack of resources, particularly in terms of staff and funding. Even the largest Western media have, for example, no more than one or two permanent correspondents in Africa, a continent with more than 50 states. CNN, seemingly the exemplary global broadcaster, has no more than a few dozen permanent correspondents.

International journalism should be seen as a virtual odyssey. More than domestic journalism, it struggles daily to reduce the mass of newsworthy stories from the two hundred or so states of the world to a manageable form. In principle, the notion of a world linked globally through the media assumes that different media systems increasingly deal with the same topics. Moreover, the lines of reasoning deployed in this process would also have to "cross borders". Homogenous national discourses, with their quite unique ways of looking at international issues, would increasingly have to open up to the topics and frames of other national discourses (which does not mean standardization of opinion, as this would involve a more advanced form of cultural change and the development of a global "superculture", which is another issue) (Hafez 2002, p. 35).

To increase the connectivity of the journalistic systems of this world, the resources available to the media are just as important as the linguistic and cultural competence of the journalists (Hafez 2002, pp. 72, 88). In some ways, the issue of the connectivity of journalism appears in a new light under conditions of globalization. While media may compete in a destructive fashion, as described above, multimedia collaboration may help improve the quality of each individual medium. The Internet as a source for journalism is surely the perfect example. Yet here too it is crucial to distinguish theoretically between *technologically possible* and *actually practiced* use.

Connectivity may ultimately occur within global communication not only between producers and consumers in various nation-states and cultural areas – that is, *inter*nationally and *inter*culturally – but also via a *trans*national (or cultural) media system. Here, media and media businesses would no longer have a clear-cut national base, but would emerge as "global players". The idea of a world linked through communication is anchored in the assumption that globalization is more than the sum of the links between its components. The structure of the system underlying the global media landscape would change if new super-systems similar to the United Nations or large NGOs such as *Greenpeace* developed in the media field. The media are in principle also capable of transnationalization, so that, alongside national systems networked with one another, a second global system might also arise.

Contemporary notions of what such a transnational media system consists of are, however, still very nebulous. Apart from a few global agreements brought into being by the major transnational trade organizations, such as the *World Trade Organization* (WTO) (in the copyright protection field for instance), there are only a few transnationally active corporations that can be called "global players". Regardless of the existence of such businesses, transnational media, that is, programs and formats, are extremely rare. CNN, frequently mentioned as the perfect example of a leading global medium that encourages exchange of political opinion worldwide, by concentrating on transnational programs, seems to come closest to fitting this vision. Yet even this case is problematic, for CNN is no uniform program, but consists of numerous continental "windows". There are many "CNNs", but no complete global program. Through the proliferation of satellite programs in the last decade, CNN has lost its elevated position and is now merely a decentralized variant of an American TV program, whose country of origin remains easily recognizable in its agenda and framing. CNN tends to be a mixture of characteristics of the American system and the target system of the specific window; it is thus at best a multinational but not a global program.

For want of concrete role models, a transnational media system remains largely a utopia. Individual large national media systems such as the American or binational services such as the Franco-German broadcaster *Arte* can supplement but by no means replace their national counterparts. The transnational media field is still largely devoid of formal diversity.

In the first theoretical field, that of international and transnational connectivity, a number of counter-tendencies characteristic of global communication are having such disastrous effects that the necessity for cross-border communication is more apparent than ever, particularly after the events of September 11, 2001. When all is said and done, transnational media, which might in theory constitute supranational global institutions and the key media within a "global public sphere" liberated from specific national and cultural influences, are as yet nonexistent. This applies even to the American TV network that claims to be the global opinion leader, CNN. Even today, national media agendas are in synch with the world only in a very superficial way. A small number of major international events are reported all over the world. Such reports should not, however, be mistaken for a profound knowledge of developments across the world. Moreover, even in the modern "media age", such events can be "domesticated" by national interest groups almost at will.

The worldwide coverage of the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the Iraq War of 2003 have revealed the paucity of evidence of a communicative integration that supposedly helps alleviate conflicts and liberates the media from the traditionally strong influence of belligerent governments and patriotic cultural influences. Through one-sided coverage in wartime and highly fragmentary discourses, it is still possible to literally seal peoples and entire world regions off from one another and mobilize them for war. We have little reason to assume that a global media network has significantly reduced the susceptibility of societies, even democratic ones, to war propaganda.

Quite the opposite happens. The technology of direct broadcasting by satellite became widely established at around the same time as the techniques of war propaganda reached the peak of perfection – during the Second Gulf War of 1991. Since then, as the unremittingly critical literature produced by the time of the Third Gulf War of 2003 lays bare, while changes have taken place, there has been only minor progress in making wartime communication truly global. Despite increasing the global exchange of images, even the televisual revolutions in the "South" – in the Arab world for example – were unable to prevent September 11 from becoming the defining event for highly insulated and conflictual media discourses on Middle Eastern and world politics. Only in cases where, as in the case of British war coverage in 2003, the state is already in retreat as a result of multinational integration (the European Union in this case) is there any sign of a slow turning away from particularistic national war coverage (Hafez 2004). In general, however, at a time when the nation-state is poised to set the tone for generations to come, the notion that the wholesome influence of the media is ridding us of wartime deception as it opens up to the world is a truly out-of-touch aspect of the myth of globalization. We should have nothing more to do with it.

Cross-border media use by large numbers of people is largely limited to specific linguistic regions. Foreign language media use, meanwhile, remains the privilege of small knowledge elites or special groups such as immigrants. Alongside the still dominant production and use of media within national media areas, contemporary developments in the media are marked by a regionalism of a geo-linguistic hue. At present, it is impossible to state with confidence whether this is open to globalization or not. Major language areas such as those of the Spanish, Chinese, Indian, and Arab are currently experiencing a boom in native language media. When national borders get in the way, satellites and other types of small-scale border traffic ensure that there is no escape. Under such circumstances, there is a danger that major cultural regions may act as a kind of "insulation" against global influences. This is the media policy substance of the "Clash of Civilizations". Samuel Huntington, who came up with the slogan, failed to ponder this issue, although it is at least as significant as the essentialist differences that he claims typify the major cultures and religions of the world (Huntington 1993, 1996).

The Internet has introduced a new subtlety to the global array of information, but cross-border linkage is obviously growing more slowly than local and national interactions in many areas. The new uncertainties of the information flow are generating an often "virtual" knowledge of the world, which is almost impossible to harmonize with verifiable reality. This is "virtual cosmopolitanism", which has little in common with the attitude of the "true" cosmopolitan, who has got to know the world and knows the global ropes. The increasing linguistic diversity of the Internet is creating new Babelesque dividing lines. The potential of some political campaigns to mobilize people on a global scale may be impressive, but this occurs only when very specific conditions and alliances are in place. The "digital divide" between industrialized and developing countries raises doubts about whether the comparative political advantages of a global civil society are making themselves felt to any real extent and are managing to change policies when faced with the power of governments.

System Change

In the second theoretical field, the focus is no longer on grasping the extent and type of cross-border communication through mass media. The point here is to ascertain whether these processes of border crossing are significant enough to bring about changes in the political, social, and cultural systems of the countries involved. Is the nature of these interactions such that they are not simply "domesticated" by the receiving systems but influence and change them substantially?

For both the major realms of connectivity – direct communication through new media and mediated communication by means of journalism – we need to clarify

- whether receiving cultures are changed by transmitting cultures in the process of cross-border communication through the Internet, satellite broadcasting, international broadcasting, or through media imports and exports;
- whether the media content of foreign coverage passed on by national journalism systems to their domestic populations is up to the task of changing the world-views and attitudes of the receiving cultures.

From whatever theoretical angle we look at changes that are the results of global communication – the Global Knowledge Society, Global Governance, or Cosmopolitanism – all these effect theories are based on the assumption of internal cultural changes through external influences (and vice versa) (Hafez 2011).

Three forms of cultural change are mentioned again and again in the globalization debate:

- the adoption of the "other" culture (above all in the form of "Westernized" globalization);
- the emergence of "glocalized" hybrid cultures (Robertson 1994a, 1994b; Kraidy 2003), which are influenced both by global and local elements;
- the revitalization of traditional and other local cultures as a reaction to globalization.

Theoretical concepts that lack a functional explanatory system and thus fail utterly to explain their own core concepts of "global", "glocal", and "local" inevitably hinder rather than advance theoretical progress. Yet the tripartite division has taken hold as a kind of minimal consensus in the globalization debate, because it attempts to grasp the role played by external influences in internal change. The biggest problem consists not in determining (a) external global or (c) internal traditional character, but in determining the content and dynamics of the hybrid category (b) "glocalization". How are hybrid cultures "measured"? How do we determine the significance of internal and external influences? Is Far Eastern pop music really evidence of a national or regional culture increasingly able to connect to the wider world? Or is it an example of local modernization, certainly with recognizable global influences, but nonetheless primarily deployable at the local level and hardly "re-exportable"?

It is crucial at this point to take temporal dynamics into account. We must bear in mind that all societies and cultures pass through different epochs, characterized either by willingness to accept external influences or a tendency to seal oneself off from them. David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton have, for example, quite rightly distinguished between forms of transparent and hermetic regionalization (Held *et al.* 2000, p. 68). Global influences may be adopted by nation-states or regional cultures and then develop new forms of locality in processes of largely self-steered modernization. The resulting cultural forms often resemble global models to a certain extent, but in reality follow a logic of modernization present in all cultures, which is by no means inevitably compatible with globalization (Asian pop music, for example, may be the product of "glocalization", but its acceptance levels are definitely higher in Asia than the United States or Europe). In other words, glocalization may promote the local culture in the long term and is not necessarily a step on the path towards a global "superculture" (Lull 2002).

It thus makes little sense to subscribe to concentric notions according to which the national and the regional are merely constitutive subsets of the global. Popular political slogans such as "Think global, act local" or "Europe of the regions" are an expression of a myth of globalization that imposes a downright artificial order upon the processes of change worldwide. This ignores the fact that the local systems of this planet are engaged in competitive modernization, which *may be a long-term phenomenon*. It also fails to notice the conflicts between these systems. Yet these factors are as important if not more important than alleged globalization.

From a theoretical point of view, we must remember that it is as yet totally unclear to what extent cross-border mass communication is capable of representing societies and systems comprehensively in the first place. We can work from the assumption that each form of media communication represents only a limited slice of social developments and that special "virtual" cultures are being created that may not be significant outside the media. Other subsystems such as science, art, literature, and "everyday culture" as a whole, meanwhile, appear in the media to a much lesser degree. It is thus clear that change is occurring beyond the world of the media and, potentially, with quite different global or local implications. The cultural contact facilitated by mass media is based on a desideratum filtered and imagined through the media, whose significance can be elucidated only through a large-scale contextual analysis of globalization.

Yet media do have the potential to change systems, and here the individual media differ, sometimes significantly. The areas in which the Internet can work to change systems are diverse, because its form is untypical of the mass media. It represents individual and mass culture, science, art, business, entertainment, and political information. The Internet features a high degree of cultural storage capacity and flexibility. It is fast, yet stores cultural knowledge long term, unlike the fleeting medium of television. Highly complex knowledge cultures can cross borders in this way.

The Internet can generate alternative publics. It can unite political actors and oppositional landscapes worldwide to form a "global civil society". The CIA report "Global

Trends 2015" (National Intelligence Council 2000) predicted new challenges for national and international politics. The report assumes that while the nation state will remain the most important political actor, its efficiency will be measured on the basis of how it masters globalization and how it comes to terms with an increasingly articulate and well-organized civil society worldwide. On this view, civil societies are often better able to solve problems than are governments and they will therefore take on more and more societal tasks. The report predicts that a growing number of international and national nonprofit organizations in the educational, health, and social sectors will increasingly break down the classical division of labor between the state, which sets the parameters of policy making and represents the citizens, and society, which is restricted to a process of shaping public opinion without direct impact on political decision making and to constituent elections (Global Trends 2015).

This prognosis by the American secret service, with its downright communitarian tone, experienced a setback as a result of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Not least because of the failures of the secret services themselves, which failed to notice that the attacks were being planned despite available information, across the world the state again interfered more vigorously in citizens' private lives (*Patriot Act* in the United States, etc.). The Internet, it could be argued, is becoming all the more significant as a platform capable of articulating and shaping the will of the citizenry, creating civil networks, and even mobilizing people politically (Sikkink and Keck 1998). There is a certain absurdity in the fact that perhaps the most significant *transnational* movement identified with the Internet is none other than the so-called "anti-globalization movement" (such as *Attac*).

In view of the structures underlying television and radio worldwide, which tend to be commercial, government run, or public, direct broadcasting by satellite is a downright elite medium in comparison to the Internet. It features formidable barriers to access, making it difficult to use it to articulate one's views, and highly developed journalistic selection mechanisms. Nonetheless, the comparative advantage of satellite broadcasting is that large publics can form rapidly, including cross-border ones. The Internet is fragmenting into countless sub-publics; in everyday life, these can be fused only by political organizations and networks. The international and intercultural use of television programs, meanwhile, represents a genuine challenge to national publics. The structural transformation of the public sphere in the nineteenth century has been outlined by Jürgen Habermas (1990). He describes this as the formation of the bourgeois reasoning of developing democracies. It contains further – multinational, transnational, global – levels and may be growing beyond the narrow boundaries of the nation-state.

Is the media forming a "global public sphere", as this popular and central concept in the globalization debate suggests (Volkmer 1999)? The classic medium to which commentators so often refer to back up this thesis is CNN. As we have seen, however, with its strong links to the American system and to the target system of the regional window, CNN resembles a bi- or multilateral rather than a truly global discursive platform. How do things stand with the thousands of other programs now receivable via satellite? Are they capable of functioning globally? What kind of user behavior is associated with such services?

US scholars in particular have claimed that we are dealing here not just with a philanthropic utopia but with a development anchored in real-world politics. The catch phrase "media diplomacy" captures the capacity of media to act almost as representatives of the public and the peoples of the Earth, and to intervene in the traditional diplomacy between states, which is often stuck in a rut and conflictual in nature. Broadcasters that are clearly nationally based may perform such a function. Ideally, however, it should be taken over by formats of a transnational character. Media diplomacy has thus often been referred to as the "CNN effect", joined in recent years by other models such as the "Al-Jazeera effect". In all cases, the suggestion is that the media have global resonance and centrality; that is, within their specific spheres – Western or Arab – they enjoy a privileged position and thus have excellent prospects of changing the politics of international conflicts.

A concept of truly visionary force, the CNN effect suggests that there may at last be a way to respond to the old cliché that it is politicians rather than peoples that make war, by promoting the politics of peace through the media. An increasing number of NGOs, which engage in parallel diplomacy involving the organized public and lobbyists, are supplementing classic state diplomacy. What is more, the silent majority, represented by a journalism oriented towards public opinion and with a democratic conscience, could even intervene directly in conflicts. Yet the fact that the number of violent conflicts worldwide shows no sustained decrease casts doubt on the reality of this notion.

The entire academic world, more or less, has raved about this phenomenon for more than a decade. Where has it become a reality? The methodological problems involved in measuring media effects throw up numerous questions. The parallel and increasing tendency for the state to engage in public diplomacy does so as well. This has taken new forms since the Second Gulf War of 1991 and the establishment of American and British information pools, up to and including the "embedded journalism" seen during the Third Gulf War of 2003. One wonders who will come out on top: television striving for independence and political influence or the state asserting itself through the media and integrating every medium – the Internet as well as satellite television – into its propagandistic concepts. Will the media succeed in ending the era of reporting that separates political systems, in which every opponent is imbued with hostile imagery, which has accompanied every war, especially the world wars of the last century?

International broadcasting appears, at first sight, a typical vestige of pre-global mass communication centered on nation-states. Regardless of their often propagandistic character, radio and television messages intended for foreign countries, composed by many states in numerous languages, nonetheless have an undeniable charm. This makes them attractive even to a normatively laden globalization debate. They overcome the linguistic and cultural chasm that still marks direct satellite broadcasting. Classics of the Second World War and the Cold War such as *Radio Free Europe* were predicted to die away rapidly after the end of the East–West conflict. Reports of its death were exaggerated. International broadcasting is currently more vital than ever, though how it will develop in future is far from clear. In most countries, state support structures are still highly developed, so that international broadcasting is generally becoming a medium transferring *public diplomacy* to crisis regions.

Theoretically, however, the medium also lends itself to "feedback loops" and dialogic forms of journalism (Groebel 2000). Information on political developments in authoritarian states can, for example, be conveyed back to a particular public via the indirect route of international broadcasting produced by another state. International broadcasting may thus make up, to some extent, for the shortcomings of other media systems. Because it has strong linguistic capacities and is tailored to foreign broadcasting areas, it is in fact far better at reaching a mass audience than many new media. Dialogues may be established between the source and receiving country, though this requires some form of public broadcasting and a transformation of the model of state ownership.

Whether the international coverage of nationally based media can be part of a global public sphere is subject to dispute. Existing interpretations can be grouped very roughly under "conversion theory" and "domestication theory". The *locus classicus* of conversion theory is Marshall McLuhan's "global village" approach, according to which the mass media in particular are such a perfected form of the technological extension of the human sensory apparatus that a collective global consciousness is predicted to emerge in the twenty-first century (McLuhan 1967). McLuhan's work has left traces of conversion theory in late modernization theory. This assumes, for example, that as global communicative relations develop quantitatively, the level of information in the media increases, particularistic conceptions of foreign countries and the world as a whole are dismantled, and international conflicts minimized (de Sola Pool 1990).

Critics of conversion theory have assailed it for overstating the globalizing tendencies of mass communication, by equating increasing technological networking and economic transnationalization with the universalization of media content. It also underestimates, critics suggest, the particularistic political, ideological, and cultural influences affecting the international coverage produced by local, national, and international media.[2] The assumption that international reporting undergoes "domestication" has crystallized as the ideal typical alternative to globalization. There is plenty of empirical evidence that the same event, reconstructed on the basis of the same information sources, can end up being presented in highly divergent and sometimes even contradictory ways in different national media systems. This indicates that parochial political, social, organizational, and religious–cultural influences on international reporting may be a profound stumbling block to the kind of homogenization of worldviews that conversion theory has in mind (Gurevitch, Levy and Roeh 1993). From the perspective of conversion theory, the mediating role played by international reporting leads to conceptions of foreign lands that merge aspects of the country of origin and target country. From the perspective of domestication theory, meanwhile, international reporting reflects the influence of the journalists, media system, and social system for which it is produced.

A global public sphere worthy of the name, which involved more than simply "peering through the keyhole" at foreign programs via satellite and included the *domestic media of specific countries* and their worldviews, would have to unite a diverse range of national discourses. The technological prerequisites for bringing national discourses together in international coverage certainly exist. Media across the world are generally present on the Internet and it would thus be feasible for both media and perspectives to converge. Such projects, however, can easily come to grief as a result of linguistic barriers and lack of awareness and for want of the key resources of "money" and "time".

It is crucial to take the resource base of mass communication into account as the third factor influencing system change. Here, the theoretical foundations include not only the actors of "global civil society" and the nature of their discourse ("global public sphere") but also the structural basis on which discourses can develop. Mass communication does not occur in a vacuum, but is anchored in the realities of market and political integration. For want of a more appropriate term and because the global media economy approach is overly economistic and thus best avoided, we may refer to the third dimension simply as the "global media system".

Film imports and exports, that is, trading links between national media systems, are the object of a global media system and form part of this system, which also applies to the activities of transnationally investing media companies such as *Time Warner* or *News Corporation* (Rupert Murdoch). The "global players" of the media industry, rather like the creators of the Internet or the multiple, often national owners of satellite TV, are at the center of the globalization debate, in sharp contrast to another category of actors, which appears only on the margins: media policy makers. This imbalance, which crops up again and again, is underpinned by an implicit assumption that while the state is the main pillar of the old media, the transnational economy and the "market" form the foundation of the new media. There is no theoretical justification whatsoever for refocusing the energies of media system research in this way. Alongside the media, such research has always taken the state into account and conceived the economy and society/public as influential factors (Hafez 2002, p. 123). Why should the economy alone emit cross-border impulses for system or cultural change rather than the state and its media policies? It is quite true that global regulatory policies created by nation-states have so far been rudimentary in the field of the media, while transnational firms undoubtedly have a major impact. Yet such arguments are skewed. Are transnational business cultures really having an impact and changing culture equally in all fields of connectivity? Are there in fact any major, irreversible interdependencies between media markets? If so, are they equally strong in all areas of content – in political news, entertainment products, cinema, and radio?

In the light of the above sobering appraisal of connectivity, we clearly have to assess the influence of cross-border mass communication on system change with much care. Today, every political and social change, from the fall of the Berlin Wall through the political upheavals in Ukraine, Lebanon, and Kyrgyzstan to the Pope's funeral is thought to be molded by the global media. Yet we are clearly getting ahead of ourselves. Mass gatherings following the death of a Pope have been common throughout history, long before the modern mass media, and political revolutions and uprisings are nothing new either. Quite the opposite. During the era of the information revolution, with all appearances to the contrary, the number of free social and media systems has by no means increased. It has in fact decreased or at least stagnated. The information revolution has been left untouched by the "Third Wave of Democratization", which basically finished with the upheavals in Eastern Europe before the New Media of the Internet and direct broadcasting by satellite had become established. So-called "demonstration effects" are claimed to promote social change, cross borders by means of the mass media, serve as models of political action for people in other countries, and help democracy, supposedly the best political order, to break through across the globe. Yet they have a latent influence and are in any case difficult to measure. The political impact of the media can be proven to exist, if at all, only during phases of political transition, that is, when long-term processes of transformation enter brief periods of radical change.

Ultimately, as far as cultural change is concerned, the globalization debate has produced an internally inconsistent dual myth. This is the notion that culturally imperialist "Americanization" or "Westernization" may be accompanied by the "glocalization" or "hybridization" of cultures. The European film market as well as much of the pop music listened to worldwide are surely examples of Americanization. These individual pieces of evidence, alluded to again and again, do not, however, allow us to generalize. They permit no overall conclusions about cultural globalization. In many countries and in most world regions, American film imports are in the minority, not to mention TV films, produced in the vast majority of countries by national or regional industries. Even in Europe, a cultural stock-taking of film, music, the arts, and science would by no means necessarily endorse the thesis of Americanization, which retains coherence only against the background of an inadmissibly narrow analytical focus on popular culture.

The second variant of the myth of globalization asserts not only that American and Western cultural hegemony is expanding, but takes possible counter-arguments into account by conceding that non-European cultures are capable of making local adaptations in response to globalization. Indian rap, for example, is claimed to be a typical hybrid culture. How very true. Many of these cultural fusions could not, however, be re-exported to Western markets. This points to the way the globalization debate confuses globalization and modernization. External stimuli may serve to spark off cultural change. What follows, however, is autonomous development on the basis of a universal logic of rationalization and renovation characteristic of all great literate cultures. Even today, without borrowing constantly from other countries, the most modern cultural productions in the non-Western world may trigger a sense of "strangeness". The world evolves – as it always has done – through cultural developments, with a momentum of their own within language areas and nation-states. Neither "Westernization" nor the simple notion of an all-embracing process of fusion can do anything to change this.

In light of globalization, the challenge for scholars is to describe the cultural fusions that are in fact its main sphere of action, to analyze their extent and growth, and to adequately grasp their role in a superculture taking in all of humanity. They ought, however, to refrain from exaggerating the nature of the alleged "transculture". In this regard, it would be highly valuable to work out the very different global logics and rates of linkage typical of music, images, and text. It is music and images that characterize entertainment culture as the core area of globalization – and it is text, news, and interpretations of the world that are proving to be the basis of local resistance and independence.

Are we seeing resistance "in our midst" as well? In the 1990s, for a brief period, the notion of "virtual communities" of immigrants, linking up with each other and with their country of origin across the world on the basis of a common language, was identified as a characteristic feature of communicative globalization. This interpretative trend then quickly abated. It was recognized that while they are indeed equipped with the instruments of technological globalization, such communities may ultimately encourage conservative, nation-based, even chauvinistic cultures. The Islamic fundamentalist Net-based International is but the tip of the iceberg. Yet the debate's rapid change of direction, away from multiculturalism to the negative features of a parallel society, is also rash and poorly thought out. There is no causal relationship between integration and media use. The recent assumption that the local is simply relocated through migration and globalization is just as misleading as the old one that crossing borders works to open up cultures. A refined typology and enhanced theoretical work are urgent necessities.

System Interdependence

The ability of mass media to change societies across state and cultural borders depends on a range of influencing factors that both *affect the media* and interact with them. A systems theory notion of international and intercultural communication would have to include the nation-state and its media system as a basic unit. Depending on the nature of the political system, there are differing relations of dependency with other societal subsystems such as politics, economy, and society. In liberal-democratic media systems the mass media enjoy a high degree of autonomy as long as they continue to play their essential role within society, that is, identifying and debating issues and refusing to be dictated to by other subsystems in this regard. The other systems, however, form part of system environments. These do not exist separately from media systems and force them to adapt to some extent. Media and other social subsystems oscillate between autonomy and system survival, sometimes leaning towards internal system complexity, at others adapting to the external environment.

The notion of a world linked by communication extends and changes this model. It becomes increasingly difficult to demarcate the societal system within which the media operate. Publics can act transnationally, as can politics and the media itself. Alongside each national media system, there thus arises a second global system. To the extent that it becomes a component of the flow of information, it has great and growing influence. Interestingly, the emergence of this second global system not only has the potential to change the content of national media landscapes but transnational developments may also occur, and, indeed, on all levels: transnational political systems (EU, UN) may come into being as well as transnational media (*Arte*, CNN, etc.).

Do these changes, however, allow us to speak of a communicative world system, as Emanuel Richter for instance has done (Richter 1992)? More important than the mere existence of other entities beyond national media systems is a deeper understanding of their fundamental relations. Are foreign political systems really as influential as domestic ones? Do journalists feel as keen a sense of duty towards their foreign public as they do to their domestic one and does this lead to changes in the journalistic product? Are global, market, and capital interconnections as strong as national and regional ones?

Cultural and societal change in a global system is not produced by *connectivity* alone, but is based on *interdependence* (Keohane and Nye 1977). In an interdependent global system, autonomous national systems change into partly autonomous subsystems of a global macrosystem. One system can no longer exist without the other. The question is whether the global media and communication system has already become interdependent and whether international and intercultural communication processes have become so extensive and important that the individual (generally national) subsystems change each other and – this would be a further step – a new transnational media system is taking shape.

There are a number of key issues central to answering such questions:

- How important are foreign markets to national TV broadcasters whose reach extends to other countries via satellite? Who is winning the media policy battle over the opening or protection of markets – global capital or national media policy? The thesis that the state's regulatory powers are waning in the age of globalization must be proven before it can be deployed as the basis for theory building.
- Which political restrictions does the nation-state impose on new media such as the Internet or satellite television and how successful is it in this? Is civil society really succeeding, by means of international linkages, in enhancing the status of society–society relations, making them a component of international relations?
- Which policy approaches are concealed behind international broadcasting? Which interactions, mutual dynamics, and feedback exist between national foreign policy, *public diplomacy*, and international broadcasting, on the one hand, and the political and cultural target system of international broadcasting, on the other? Are trust in and acceptance of the system becoming factors that change formats dialogically and that can thus influence both the system of origin and target system through new information policies?
- How can international reporting globalize as long as it is solely dependent on the home market and entirely detached from international markets, which represent the reporting countries without targeting them? What is the future of emerging transnational media use of the kind apparent in the Iraq War of 2003, when cross-border media use increased (Americans reading British newspapers on the Internet for example)? Are new forms of interdependence of global or at least regional scope developing here?

To explain the system- and culture-changing effect of the media, or their respective deficits, the key step is to analyze the political and economic interdependence of media at national, regional, and global level and thus shed light on the true strength of global media policy and media economy vis-à-vis their local counterparts. The weakness of the interdependence approach, however, is that it is too focused on dependencies and fails to take into account accidental developments. System change, on the basis of cross-border mass communication, may also occur where interdependence does not yet run very deep. Here, the world functions as one big "demonstration effect", a gigantic "template" communicated by the media, sometimes featuring dysfunctional and anachronistic "modes" extending around the world. It is chaos theory rather than functional systems theory that captures this best.

Nonetheless, the strength of systems theory lies in its comprehensive analysis, anchored in basic patterns of social behavior such as the tendency to seek autonomy and adapt to the environment. To establish how realistic and significant the overall concept of media globalization is, it is vital to understand it better as a *process*, getting to grips with its dynamics and anachronisms. Ultimately, the key point is to lay bare the temporal disjunctions, variable pace, and internal contradictions of the technological, economic, political, and cultural developments characteristic of globalization; these have shaped all epochal paradigms from the Reformation through the Enlightenment to modernity.

In striving to understand why cross-border processes of communication have palpably failed to generate connectivity and system change, it is essential to look at the fundamental relations between the transmitters and receivers of mass communication. When all is said and done, how interdependent are states or regional and national cultures when viewed from the perspective of communication? What would a theory of international relations spawned by communication science look like? The world media system undeniably features structural shortcomings that it will be no easy task to remedy. There is as yet no global communication system. Despite the extensive exchange of information and news, media systems are firmly in the grip of nation-states. National owners, investors, and publics dominate; transnational media (such as the German–French TV network Arte) are hardly used; the transnationalization of media capital mostly ends at sub-regional borders. Entertainment may have a global hue in many respects. News and information, however, can be domesticated almost at will, because they are created for a very limited, usually national group of consumers typified by national interests, reservations, stereotypes, and cultural expectations. The media have to respond to these. While doing so, they are constantly reproducing them. Who could expect global media diplomacy from such provincial systems?

Nonetheless, there are signs of increasing structural interconnection. Large networks such as CNN are developing foreign language spin-offs in other parts of the world or, like the Arab TV channel Al-Jazeera, an English homepage. Such measures may gradually free relations of interdependence from a one-sided attachment to the home base, though the implications for media content are unclear. It remains to be seen whether one and the same product – such as news – can catch on universally in the foreseeable future. American consumers, confronted with unrelenting criticism of US policy on the Middle East? Japanese putting up with Chinese reproaches regarding the Second World War? Ultimately, even supposedly transnational projects risk the fate that befell the music channel MTV years ago. Its programming has broken down into a decentralized form and remains linked with the parent company solely in an economic sense. In terms of content, it has long consisted of a patchwork of different audience interests. The transnationalization of the press, which found expression, for instance, in a growing interest among American consumers in European online newspapers during the Iraq War of 2003, is also at a very early stage. Will the commercial and capitalist form of globalization that currently dominates the media system show the way here? Given how the big Western media companies such as News Corporation (owned by Rupert Murdoch), whose global influence is in any case vastly overrated, have conformed to political realities in the past, this seems very doubtful.

What, though, are the alternatives? Do we need a new privileging of politics within global media communication, a new drive for global media governance? Why not? British coverage of the Iraq War of 2003 proves that the logic of closed mass communication, geared toward national borders and cultural boundaries, can be relativized when states move toward one another or grow closer together. At present, however, global media policy remains largely restricted to areas in which commercial interests demand regulation (such as copyright protection), leaving little prospect of a new approach.

It is no accident that many commentators have evoked civil society as a third force alongside companies and governments. Many hoped that a "global civil society" would spring into life – but here too there is no question of there being mature interdependence. Perceptual distortions and informational uncertainties typify global exchanges via the Internet as much as they do classical journalism. Societies' enhanced ability to present themselves to the world has helped generate a flood of information, making the Internet surfer an isolated "laptop anthropologist" and facilitating manipulation of every kind (up to and including cyber war). Here, too, there is a dearth of binding and stable processes of informational feedback. Moreover, Net-based political alliances, typically casual in nature and characterized by arbitrary selection and random events, lag far behind "offline politics", in other words the quotidian actions of national governments, which tend to feature binding and structured elements. It says something about the structure of the globalization of the mass media that one of the few media that is interdependent to some extent, international broadcasting produced for other countries, features a lack of interdependence in relation to civil society in the home country. No one there knows about or uses international broadcasting, leaving it at the mercy of the national government and making it susceptible to propaganda.

Notes

1. An edited version of the text derived from Hafez (2007), all translated by Alex Skinner.
2. On the link between international reporting and globalization, see also Hafez 1999.

References

Castells, M. (1996/1997) *The Information Age*, three vols. Oxford: Blackwell.

de Sola Pool, I. (1990) *Technologies without Boundaries. On Telecommunications in a Global Age*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Groebel, J. (2000) *Die Rolle des Auslandsrundfunks. Eine vergleichende Analyse der Erfahrungen und Trends in fünf Ländern*. Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Gurevitch, M., Levy, M. R. and Roeh, I. (1993) The global newsroom: convergences and diversities in the globalization of television news, in P. Dahlgren and C. Sparks (eds), *Communication and Citizenship: Journalism and the Public Sphere*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 195–216.

Habermas, J. (1990, original 1962) *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Hafez, K. (1999) International news coverage and the problems of media globalization. In search of a "new global-local nexus", *Innovation. The European Journal of Social Sciences*, **12** (1), 4–62.

Hafez, K. (2002) *Die politische Dimension der Auslandsberichterstattung*, vol. **2**. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Hafez, K. (2004) The Iraq War 2003 in Western media and public opinion: a case study of the effects of military (non-) involvement on conflict perception, *Global Media Journal*, **3** (5), accessed 26/09/2011, http://lass.calumet.purdue.edu/cca/gmj/fa04/gmj-fa04-hafez.htm.

Hafez, K. (2007) *The Myth of Media Globalization*. Cambridge: Polity.

Hafez, K. (2011) Global journalism for global governance? Theoretical visions, practical constraints, *Journalism*, **12** (4), 483–496.

Held, D. and McGrew A. (eds (2003) *The Global Transformation Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate*. Cambridge: Polity.

Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D. and Perraton, J. (2000) Rethinking globalization, in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds), *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate*. Cambridge: Polity, pp. 67–74.

Hepp, A. and Löffelholz, M. (eds) (2002) *Grundlagentexte zur Transkulturellen Kommunikation*. Constance: UTB.

Huntington, S.P. (1993) The clash of civilization?, *Foreign Affairs*, **72** (3), 22–49.

Huntington, S.P. (1996) *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Keohane, R.O. and Nye, J.S. (1977) *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown.

Kraidy, M.M. (2003) Glocalisation: an international communication framework?, *Journal of International Communication*, **9** (2), 29–49.

Lull, J. (2002) Superkultur, in A. Hepp and M. Löffelholz (eds), *Grundlagentexte zur transkulturellen Kommunikation*. Constance: UTB, pp. 750–773.

McLuhan, M. (1967) *Understanding Media*. London: Sphere.

National Intelligence Council (NIC) (2000) *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts*, accessed 26/09/2011, http://infowar.net/cia/publications/globaltrends2015/.

Richter, E. (1992) *Der Zerfall der Welteinheit. Vernunft und Globalisierung in der Moderne*. Frankfurt and New York: Campus.

Robertson, R. (1994a) Globalization or glocalization?, *Journal of International Communication*, **1** (1), 33–52.

Robertson, R. (1994b) Mapping the global condition: globalization as the central concept, in M. Featherstone (ed.), *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*. London and Newbury Park: Sage, pp. 15–30.

Sikkink, K. and Keck, M.E. (1998) *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Sreberny-Mohammadi, A., Winseck, D., McKenna, J. and Boyd-Barrett, O. (eds) (1997) *Media in Global Context: A Reader*. London: Arnold.

Volkmer, I. (1999) *News in the Global Sphere: A Study of CNN and Its Impact on Global Communication*. Luton: University of Luton Press.

Part III

Supra- and Sub-national Spheres: Researching Transnational Spaces

12

Middle East Media Research
Problems and Approaches

Dina Matar and Ehab Bessaiso

Public and academic interest in the media of and about the Middle East has grown dramatically since the events of September 11, 2001, resulting in an explosion in the number of analyses and critiques addressing different aspects of media institutions and communication processes in and of the Middle East, the political economy of media, media and democratization, media and development, the localization of Western-style media professionalism, popular culture, along with studies of media control, resistance, location of power, and the emergence of public spheres and civil societies. While this expanding scholarship has provided fresh and valuable insights into the structures, implications, consequences, and effects of the changing Middle East media landscape in societies, as well as cultural practices and power relations, it continues to lurk in the shadow of Western theoretical frameworks and methodological traditions. Indeed, much of the analysis, particularly in the field of media studies, remains largely shaped by the same "political" agendas, restrictions, and assumptions of the dominant analytical paradigms prominent in the 1970s – modernization, dependency, and globalization – which had little recognition of pre-existing forms of cross-cultural contact, most particularly through processes of imperialism and colonialism (Sreberny 2008), and that often resulted in unified and uncritical constructions of the Middle East as a homogenous space structured by a monolithic "Islamic" culture. Furthermore, the analytical treatment of media discourse, content, policies, and consumption, among other concerns, and their relationship to politics and societies remains largely defined by how particular regions are perceived and imagined, excluding alternative narratives or preventing them from forming and emerging, a phenomenon that constitutes, as Edward Said has argued, a key connection between culture and imperialism (Said 1994, p. xiii).

Drawing on, rather than detailing, this burgeoning scholarship, and building on critiques of and suggestions for the field, such as those offered by Annabelle Sreberny, Gholam Khiabany, and Tarik Sabry, this chapter outlines the main trends and problems

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

in research on the Middle East, and its media and its conceptual underpinnings. We then use this exploration to rehearse the potential for broadening and deepening comparative media research that not only takes into account the complex nature of the Middle East and its constituent historical and contingent differences but also allows for thinking imaginatively, and critically, about the diverse ways in which the Middle East and its media can be conceived intellectually, and studied empirically, without imposing a fixed or rigid way of seeing and understanding or risk falling in to the trap of cultural essentialism and Orientalism.

Comparative Regional Analysis

The challenges of comparative analysis in any discipline are significant, for the simple reason that such work needs to consider specific "geneologies" (the political and social histories of nation-states, if not their histories of development, of government, of culture, as well as the histories of encounters with others) that have helped shape contemporary cultural, social, and political landscapes. These challenges seem more daunting and complex when studying the visible mushrooming of media systems and forms in the Middle East, a diverse and complex region of 22-odd nation-states, many of them post-colonies with a long history of encounters with the West and all witnessing a rapid convergence of media firms, functions and technologies, capitalist expansion, new and diverse spaces for cultural and political expression, the emergence of different and contested identities, including religious, gendered and ethnic ones, as well as de-territorialized communities and new geographies. While there is little doubt that the visible transformations in the region's media and cultural landscapes are products of interconnected regional, global, and local imperatives, driven as much by economic considerations and competition for funds, by governments and private capital, as by shifting local, regional, and international political contexts and ideologies, these changes throw up a host of questions as to which methodologies, and which conceptual frameworks, are best suited to critically address the fluid relationship between communication, culture, state, and society, the coexistence of repressive state practices and media regulations with highly imaginative forms of mediated cultural resistance, the role of the state in cultural productions, as well as diverse articulations of culture, within and outside the region.

Broadly speaking, scholars have considered media systems in the various countries making up the region labeled "the Middle East" as some of the most closed and tightly controlled in the world, giving rise to comparisons with other authoritarian regimes, like that of China, where such systems are tightly controlled and freedom of speech curtailed (Hafez 2001), or to arguments suggesting the cultural specificity and particularity of the Middle Eastern state. In much of this scholarship, the state has often been taken to mean a fixed entity, and classified as either authoritarian or democratizing, moderate or radical, powerful or weak, paying little attention to the complexity of state structures and institutions, the nature of the state's repressive dynamics, the role of the state as an instrument of the ruling classes and capital and vice versa, and its relationship to and role in cultural practices, a relationship that also changes according to contexts

(Matar 2011). Notwithstanding its potential and usefulness, much of this scholarship starts with Eurocentric assumptions about the relationship between the state and society, as well as technologically deterministic arguments about the role of media in society – both assumptions are based on liberal models of Western democracy and remain underpinned by the normative and policy aims of the development and modernization paradigm that was popular in the 1970s. In addition, as others have also argued, many of these studies begin with pre-suppositions about Middle Eastern "political culture" (often talked of in the singular), resulting in vague generalizations and imaginations of the Middle East as a coherent, self-sealed, and self-explanatory space, with (yet again) a singular culture (Islam) named as the main obstacle on the road to "modernity" (Khiabany and Sreberny 2007). In the field of media studies, discussions often start with deep-seated convictions about the power of media without sufficiently problematizing contemporary socio-cultural and socio-political activity, or addressing the ways in which power, understood in the Foucauldian sense as fluid or as the outcome of a complex, ambivalent, and perpetual "war of struggle" between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces over culture, is negotiated.

A recent intellectual drive, emanating from within the broader field of international communication, towards "de-Westernizing" or "internationalizing" media theory and research (Curran and Park 2000; McMillin 2007; Thussu 2009) has gained considerable momentum and credibility as an academic endeavor and research method in its own right, particularly given its normative aim of broadening the discourse on the globalization of media and communication beyond "Anglobization" (Thussu 2009, p. 1) and its potential for moving beyond media-centric and media-deterministic approaches. Within this drive, communication scholars from different regions of the world other than the United States and Western Europe have started to provide critical comparative analyses on media and society that raise new and different concerns about modernity, culture, identity, and power in diverse "geographical" contexts. However, as Annabelle Sreberny and Gholam Khiabany (2010) argue, internationalizing media theory needs to be more than a collection of articles on the state of the media and communication in diverse parts of the world. While moving into new geographical contexts is definitely important, this approach alone "is not adequate or de-Westernizing as much. What is being de-Westernized, on what basis and why, remain significant questions that need scrutiny and critical examination …While media theory is in desperate need to renew itself and break out of its geographical confines of the 'West', it also needs to move away from the culturalist assumptions that have entrapped much of the debate about international communication, including modernization theory" (Sreberny and Khiabany 2010, p. 6). Middle Eastern scholars have also attempted to broaden approaches and theory in international communication by proposing the conceptual framework of "Islamic communication" as alternative theorization to addressing the modern condition in Islamic and Middle Eastern societies. In independent scholarship, Mohammed Ayish (2003) and Basyouni Hamada (2001) both attempt to re-articulate Arab and Islamic media and communication by making use of a theoretical framework that draws on what they call cultural particularities in the Arab and Muslim worlds. While this re-articulation offers a valuable contribution towards de-Westernizing media and communication scholarship, it, too, repeats taken-for-granted assumptions about the nature of Islamic culture in its tendency to "pre-frame" potential analysis, therefore leaving little space for bottom-up "thick" analysis of the struggle over the interpretation of "culture" in diverse spaces and contexts and, crucially, in everyday practices. For example, Hamada's point of reference is the Koran, a text that he sees as satisfying and meetings the prerequisites recommended by the author for a democratic public sphere. Likewise, recent writings on the subject of "media culture" (Eickleman and Anderson 2003; Bunt 2000) continue to suggest Islam as the vital, and, in many cases, essential, ingredient in understanding the contemporary Middle East. Indeed, many such commentators continue to claim that "religion has remained a central and defining feature of the Islamic world; that there is a unified identity and history of Islamic culture; that the study of this 'history' and 'culture' demonstrates, beyond doubt, the incompatibility of Islam and Muslims with modernity; and that for all these reasons the Muslim world (and Iran, in particular) remains an 'exceptional' case" (Khiabany 2009, p. 2). In pointing to the potential problems in such articulations, we do not suggest relegating Islam, or any other religion, to the realm of the untouchable. On the contrary, "religion must be allowed to shape culture, to be part of its fabric; but culture, any culture, must not be defined or determined solely through religiosity … In their many attempts to re-contextualize Western communication theory within an Islamic context, Arab scholars have ignored a very important intellectual task; that of de-centering or troubling meanings of "Islamic" culture from within … By failing to do so, we risk building a cultural repertoire that is erected on binary differentiations between 'us', the Muslims, and the West" (Sabry 2008, p. 246). It is worth noting here that essentialist claims about Islam and the Middle East are symptomatic of the much broader studies of the Arabs and Islam, whereas Edward Said has argued "the principal dogmas of Orientalism exist in their purest form today …" (Said 2003, p. 200). Theorization often starts within the contexts of cultural differences and specificity, serving to reduce wider issues of power struggles (including at the national, regional, and global levels) into cultural misunderstandings and contests (for example, Huntington 2002), while abstracting communication and other practices from global, regional, and local contexts, both historical and contemporary.

These contexts, we argue, cannot be ignored. At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Middle East remains one of the most volatile regions in the world and continues to be perceived as crucial to global security: the 2011 Arab uprisings aimed at removing age-old repressive regimes provided some of the most evocative moments in recent history; their outcome is not clear. post-invasion Iraq continues to struggle with national unity problems, Lebanon with domestic and regional political turmoil, and Syria with state repression of opponents. The long-standing Palestinian–Israeli conflict is still unresolved, while new and potentially divisive local and external threats are emerging in the Gulf Arab states. Meanwhile, Islamist groups, such as the Lebanese political party Hizbullah and the Palestinian Hamas movement, are gaining more support locally and regionally; other Islamic parties and candidates are contesting elections in many countries, including in Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood was banned until the uprising of January 2011 and the fall of the former President Hosni Mubarak. In secular Turkey, the dominant party (AKP) has Islamist roots and Iran has re-emerged as a regional power as well as a source of global concern. These imperatives, not to mention other multiple complex internal (national) divisions along ethnic, religious, gender, political, structural, and socio-economic lines, not only invite a multidisciplinary approach in media research in the region, but also suggest that developing a substantial and credible academic field of inquiry, which might be called "Middle East Media Studies", requires sustained and systematic inquiry and critique.

This endeavor, however, cannot develop outside history, meaning the historical, political, and socio-economic contexts and formations that help shape contemporary communication processes, or without grounded empirical evidence that provides detailed contextualization of transformations while situating these developments within broader advances in new technologies worldwide, too. Such a direction can help raise new questions about the relationship between cultural production, use, and power. At the same time, a grounded contextualization will reveal much about the "universalist assumptions to be found in much of the literature on the subject …" (Sreberny and Khiabany 2010, p. xi). With this in mind, we now turn to key trends in media research in the Middle East, particularly the Arab World – its approaches, constraints, and limitations. As noted at the beginning, we do not offer an exhaustive list of all research – this is not possible here – but use the material to rehearse different ways of imagining and articulating without repeating Orientalist claims or media deterministic arguments.

Comparing Media Systems

In the Arab world, which we are most familiar with, a cursive, though not expansive, exploration of the plethora of studies on media and society show these are largely based on Western methodologies of research. Comparisons of different media systems have been either based on models offered by Hallin and Mancini (1996) or have taken the form of typologies of the press and other systems. Among this body of scholarship, William Rugh's study (2004) of the Arab mass media remains the most widely cited work to date. In this study, Rugh adapted the Siebert–Peterson–Shramm models of the press to the Arab World, highlighting the significant impact of the nation-state on the structure of Arab press and media. Notwithstanding the relevance of this work, it has been subject to intense criticism for a variety of reasons, including Rugh's over-reliance on typologies associated with Western context with only some minor modifications (see Iskander 2007; Hafez 2001) as well as the overuse of Western sources, rather than local ones. Volumes that offer similar surveys of the cross-national media in the region include Kamalipour and Mowlana's (1993) edited handbook of mass media in the Middle East, which provides a general justification and necessity for the engagement of and subsequently the publication of research on media organizations in the area, as well as more recent edited collections on the state of media, culture, and society in the Middle East.

Even well before this body of work, scattered studies detailed, if mostly descriptively, the emergence of national media systems in the 1950s and 1960s when post-colonial states in the Middle East began to implement nation-building strategies that included the development of national media systems and that aimed at strengthening nationalist sentiments. One of the earliest examples was Boyd's study of broadcasting in the Arab world (1975), particularly of the Egyptian-based pan-Arab radio station *Sawt al-Arab* "Voice of the Arabs". Boyd later published a volume on the media environment in

Arab countries, providing perhaps one of the first substantial comparative accounts of that period and in which he focused on sociological and topical criteria rather than structural or institutional ones. Since then, numerous analyses have discussed the expansion of transnational satellite broadcasting and its impact on the construction of identities and politics (Armbrust 2000; Iskandar and El-Nawawy 2002; Kraidy 2006; Lynch 2006; Iskandar 2007; Khatib 2007), while some others examined how film and other cultural productions can break boundaries and taboos despite the regulatory arm of the state. Within the key paradigm of political economy, significant and original scholarship, by Naomi Sakr and Marwan Kraidy on satellite broadcasting, in particular (Sakr 2001, 2007; Kraidy 2009), provided ground-breaking accounts of the relationship between structure and ownership, complicating state–media relations and drawing attention to growing economic alliances, increasing regionalization, ownership structures, stagnant media laws, and censorship and regulation, among other issues. Such work set the stage for a more holistic application of critical political economy as a conceptual framework and method for comparative media research in the region.

In terms of methods of research, a large number of studies continued to use survey research and descriptive/historical accounts of media institutions and events rather than qualitative approaches, which are time-consuming, expensive, and demanding. For instance, media content research, which remains the most popular method of research among scholars working on the Arab media landscape, remains confined to largely uncritical descriptions of various themes that come up in cultural texts and media systems, particularly in national broadcasting. Some of the themes discussed in this type of work include the national development of broadcasting, the effects of cultural globalization on societies, the dilemmas of modernity, state censorship, representation of women and children in mass media, military conflict, journalistic professionalism, media performance, and gatekeeping practices (Ayish 2008). The intense scholarly focus on television, the mass medium par excellence, is not surprising considering it had been positioned at the apex of modernity in post-colonial Middle Eastern governments. Under the rubric of national integration, television was used by elites and various governments as a mobilization tool to drum up public support for state policies at national and regional levels in the early days of independence. Early broadcasts debated farming, health, nutrition, women's development, and other development schemes, driven to a large extent by the meta-narrative of development, which had taken hold in many countries of the periphery and which national elites employed to enforce a sense of national identity (for a rehearsal of argument about the relationship between media and identity see Morley and Robbins 1995).

These themes continued to form the basis of more recent research on Arab satellite television and new media, with scholars suggesting links between media discourses and the construction and/or maintenance of national, as well as other, identities, be these gendered, Islamic, sectarian, or sexual. Khalil Rinnawi, in his study of Arab transnational television, went as far as to argue that *McArabism*, a "unique kind of regionalization", is emerging in the Arab world, spurred on by the emergence of new media technologies that are "reinvigorating regional imagined communities, in a communicative environment where borders and the state's ability to exert control over media content have become obsolete" (Rinnawi 2006, p. xiv). What's more, Rinnawi notes, "the penetration of new media technologies into the Arab world and their expansion via the transnational media has created a confrontation between the localism and tribalism of Jihad and the globalization forces of McWorld. The outcome of this confrontation in the Arab world is McArabism: a kind of regionalism quite different from the pan-Arabism(s) formulated during the 1950s and 1960s in the Arab world" (Rinnawi 2006, p. xv), fusing a new nationalism of [an] "imagined community, principally composed of Arabs inside the Arab world, but also Arabs in diasporas and indigenous Arab minorities in other Middle Eastern countries" (Rinnawi 2006, p. 7). However, much of this work was based on top-down analysis of content. A notable exception was Lila Abu-Lughod's (2005) *Dramas of Nationhood: The Politics of Television in Egypt*, in which she explores social inequalities that bedevil nations and the cultural forms that inform them.

Other scholars explored the relationship between formats and hybrid programs in relation to state-affiliated economic, cultural, and social projects (see Ayish 2008 for a thorough discussion) or in relation to globalization processes and cultural imperialism. The obsession with television increased with the advent and rapid take-off of pan-Arab satellite television in the 1990s, which was seen as forming a real challenge to national televisions and to state control (El Oifi 2005), whetting appetites that political reforms, democratization, and liberalization would soon follow suit and that the public(s) (audiences) would be empowered on a scale not seen before. Tight government control on media operations began to loosen in several countries of the Middle East, as some regimes liberalized, but also in response to economic and political globalization trends, with economic privatization spilling over to the communications, and particularly the telecommunication sectors, but reforms in media laws in most countries were slow to materialize or even failed to materialize in some others. Furthermore, while there is no doubt that most governments still exercise substantial control, albeit obliquely over their diverse national media, including satellite television, they are notably permissive when media are critical of other regimes they are at odds with, effectively using media as a weapon of public diplomacy and geo-political struggles (for a critique of mediated geo-politics and public diplomacy, see *The Middle East Journal for Culture and Communication*, **2** (1)).

More recent and growing numbers of studies of the Internet and the spaces it offers for individual participation, such as blogging and social networking, tended to examine whether these spaces challenge regimes, tradition, and rigid constructions of class, gender, and sexual binaries. Yet, while many new communication technologies are effective tools for political and social mobilization, the central issue around the development of new media, as Sreberny and Khiabany (2010) note, cannot remain the obvious crude divide between a traditional state and modern technology, considering that even many individual clergymen have also adapted to the use of information technologies as they have other technologies.

The Public Sphere

Underpinning many of the conceptual debates on media developments and cultural transformations in the Middle East is the normative concept of the public sphere, discussed as a space for political contestations, counter-hegemonic struggles, and/or performance of politics and identities. These debates relate, consciously or unconsciously, to the wider scholarly concern (in Western academe) with the relationship between media and democracy, which structured much of the discourse emerging along with or after liberalization reforms that swept many countries in the tri-continent – Africa, Asia, and Latin America – in the 1980s. Across disciplines, but specifically in the field of political science, the democratization of the remaining authoritarian regimes in southern Europe and ongoing processes in Latin America, regime openings in East and Southeast Asia and, to a lesser extent, Africa, and the dramatic transformation of former communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe sustained an explosion of new scholarship on the so-called "third wave" of global democratization (Brynen, Korany, and Noble 1995).

Much effort was spent and many papers written debating whether the modern Middle East state is compatible with the modern "Western" nation-state or whether the Middle East state could be democratic, the normative assumptions used here being Euro-centric and neo-liberal models of democracy that rose out of specific historical formations in the West, ignoring the fact that genealogies – particular histories of nation-states, religion(s), capitalist class formations, national, regional, and international politics, provide nonteleological, nonuniversalist, and nontotalizing ways of understanding the world (Matar 2011). Furthermore, many of these studies continued to assess the relationship between state and society in terms of binaries, such as state/society, public/private, and formal/informal, leading to simplistic assumptions about how these binaries interact, particularly in modernizing and largely networked societies. With respect to the Middle East, what emerged was a body or work that conceptualized the Middle Eastern state as "exceptional", not paying attention to the fact that this state, formed out of former colonies in many instances, did not differ much from its Western counterpart that constituted what Sami Zubaida (1989/2009) has called the "compulsory model" and that eventually spurred the establishment of new political units outside Europe. Furthermore, many of these studies used a constricted view of politics, as limited to formal politics and such practices as voting and elections, while ignoring popular culture as a crucial terrain for struggles over the political.

Crucially, scholars tended to focus on the "now" and the "here", largely ignoring the historical formations and processes that spurred the emergence of various media forms and formats, and instead obsessing with their potential in bringing about mainly political change. In this respect, some analysts working on the Arab World were more assertive than others about the potential and perceived role of satellite television, Al-Jazeera specifically, in confronting the state's hegemony, providing room for debate and revolutionizing politics, and several suggested that satellite television in the Arab world was becoming the motor of change insofar as it helped shape people's ideas of what was possible and often inspired them to protest in order to vent their frustration (Lynch 2006). Numerous arguments suggested this new and promising landscape emancipated public opinion and facilitated the emergence of a public sphere akin in some ways to the philosophical category Jürgen Habermas posited in the context of modern European bourgeois society (Zayani 2008), affording its participants new spaces for expression in what has been a closed media environment marked by control and censorship. Such tendencies in research continued to find space in the more recent work on the Internet and new media in the region, where discussions examined whether and how new media are producing differentiated public spheres where new forms of identity-based politics were performed and experienced (see Lynch 2006) and where the marginalized and the voiceless could finally speak out, re-affirming "media exceptionalism" discourses that take media experiences and practices out of their broader contexts. In this type of work, recurring and often empirically deficient studies made assumptions about the emergence of new "publics" (in other words, engaged and/or empowered audiences), suggesting that a radical transformation of the "political culture" was afoot in the region. It is not possible within this space to detail all the arguments and research on whether new public spheres have been created, where these are located, geographically and discursively, what gets discussed, whose voice is heard, and so on. As Mohamed Zayani (2008) notes, it is also not logical to make solid remarks about the impact of media on formal politics, meaning government and elections, because public opinion research and audience studies remain scanty. While there are more varied programs, including talk shows and reality television formats, which allow participation of the "audience" at different levels, from different strata in society and with diverse ideological views, the important question of why people participate in or withdraw from the public and who does so – so central to the Habermasian principle – remains little studied or understood (Zayani 2008).

In sum, everyone was looking for the "public sphere", or spheres, in the singular and in the plural, and in diversity of forms – formal/informal, official/unofficial, hegemonic/counter-hegemonic, private/public, male/female, secular/religious – irrespective of whether such a concept can be transposed from its specific historical formations to other contexts tout court or posing questions as to whether and how its analytical purchase can vary from place to place. As Sreberny and Khiabany (2010) suggest in their work on the Iranian blogosphere, such a space can be the locus of an emerging public sphere as well as a site of government repression; the locus of both public and "private" political discourses and the space where both religious and secular voices are articulated, problematizing arguments that suggests the dominance of one side of these pairings while also raising questions on how to address "the balance between a 'virtual public sphere' and actual public sphere in Iran" (Sreberny and Khiabany 2010, p. xiii) or how a virtual public speech can sometimes be more real than everyday life, particularly in spaces where public spaces are controlled by restrictive forces (Sreberny and Khiabany 2010).

What About the People?

These issues aside, there are growing claims that new political cultures – shaped by contests over meanings, symbols, and language as well as competition over power – are emerging in the Middle East. These diverse and multiple cultures are said to be mediated by a variety of local, global, and transnational new media, physical and imagined spaces, and visual and written cultural products. There are televised discussions of gender and family issues; songwriters and musicians whose material and modes of expression challenge received traditions; bloggers who use the Internet to criticize governments and generally extend the remit of public debate; talk shows that encourage diverse opinions and practice the fine art of live agonistic debate; performance artists developing new hybrid forms of political art; diaspora activists who develop de-territorialized modes of political engagement with old and new homes; and, indeed, increasingly mediated election campaigns. At the same time, there is an increasing colonization of public space where diverse forms of visual culture, most notably in billboards and posters, interpellating their audiences in varied ways. It is also generally recognized that more open and diverse forms of communication are playing a significant role in contesting political authority and the Middle East states' traditional control of monopoly over the flow of information, rendering obsolete ministries of information and the oppressive state censorship that had smothered public discourse and political culture well into the 1990s. Some academics (Lynch 2006; Eickleman and Anderson 2003) have argued that we are witnessing interaction, public arguments, and mobilization of individuals, groups, and factions in unprecedented and revolutionary ways.

There is little doubt that the confluence of media institutions and discourses, local and global, liberal and extremist, populist and elitist, are all jostling for the attention of Middle Eastern audiences, but this substantial change in the media landscape has not been matched by substantial scholarship, based on empirical material. This deficit can be traced to the fact that scholars in the region have been very slow in accepting the study of media as a scientific subject of enquiry. When it began to be accepted as a credible field, much of the work occupied "a large epistemic void with uncritical facile empiricism imported, just like media technology, from 'uncritical regions' of Western academe" (Sabry 2009, p. 199). In fact, the few studies available on what media scholars call the "audience" have mainly relied on quantitative methods of research favored by US-trained mass communication scholars, for example, Amr's study of the impact of the content of religious programs on changing family values in urban areas (1981, cited in Amin 2008), and Sayyid's work on the role of national television in increasing political awareness among youth in Egypt (1999, cited in Amin 2008). Several attempts were made to understand what audiences thought of Al-Jazeera or how satellite channels contributed to the emergence of public opinion, reflecting the widespread interest in satellite broadcasting that emerged after CNN's coverage of the first Gulf War and widespread belief that rapid developments in technologies had started to challenge state control of information. Apart from a few scattered studies in the region and the diaspora, reception studies using qualitative research methods remain scarce, also partly because such research has been hampered by inadequate funding and insufficient resources in universities, the lack of well-trained researchers, and fear of working in politically repressive atmospheres that has pushed research into media and its uses into narrow channels (see Amin 2008 for a thorough discussion). Others lament the fact that the few studies available have both a low theoretical content and continue to test a range of mainly US communication theories – such as the uses and gratification theory, agenda setting, and framing analysis within a Middle Eastern setting using media-centric and media-deterministic frameworks that ignore the fact that larger processes of communication and cultural practices are formed within history, rather than outside it. The problem has been compounded by what Sabry (2007) rightly argues is the lack of a grounded cultural studies research and study program in the region, contributing to an incoherent field of work that is largely commercially driven and has nothing to do with how audiences or publics interact or make sense of media text and output.

While studies of the everyday or marginal spaces of culture (for example, hip-hop, street art, cartoons, satire, soaps, literature, poetry, and cultural blogs) are fast emerging, there is, we argue, a lack of conceptual tools and imaginative methodologies that would help address the crucial question of how ideologies are constructed, by whom, and in which contexts. Perhaps, too, some of the questions we ask are the wrong ones. Perhaps we need to find out what people are talking about in coffee houses, *majlises*, and *dowrehs*; how women are negotiating dominance and patriarchy in traditionally male-dominated societies; and what ordinary people are concerned about and talk about most. In other words, we might need to ask questions about "home and street politics" and the relationship between the two, rather than continue to latch on to easy terms, such as the "Arab street" or the Middle East masses. Not only do these concepts homogenize audiences and publics, but they also provide further proof "of a major lack of understanding how complex and stratified audiences are" (Sabry 2007, p. 159) as well as evidence of the absence of critical research on when collectives and public opinion are formed and why it would matter. Finally, while the expansion of media spaces and the convergence of form and format have undoubtedly blurred the boundaries between people as citizens to people as consumers as they brought with them greater viewing and product choices, and given them a sense of empowerment just by virtue of the presence of diverse alternatives to government programs and goods, the social effects of such choices, the uneven development, and short-term benefits from these choices as opposed to the economic profits for transnational and regional media giants also need to be critically examined.

Old Paradigms: Restricted Visions

Middle East, and notably Arab, media burst on to the global landscape when Al-Jazeera scooped the world's media with its coverage of the US attack on Afghanistan in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Until then, with the exception of counted academic experts and a few articles and opinion pieces in the leading national newspapers, the Arab mass media had not received much attention in American public discourse. Al-Jazeera became the most frequently searched for item on the Internet and researched satellite television channel. A year before that date, interest in the Middle East in general was declining as academics in the United States, in particular, turned their attention to Asia and Africa.

This said, media research in the Middle East goes back to the 1950s and 1960s when scattered studies examined national media systems and state-building processes in the newly independent states of the Middle East. However, these studies were largely eclipsed by the most powerful model of modernization, the paradigm of "communications and development" that emerged out of empirical research conducted in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran in the late 1950s by Daniel Lerner, published in his contentious volume *The Passing of Traditional Society* (1958). This was a model that suggested the region "lacked" politics and democracy, which was understood, then, as now, as reduced to and limited by the formal rituals of voting in elections, blind to actual politics on the streets, in cafés and dowrehs, in informal organizations and informal circles, and in the dissident media and literary voices of the region (Sreberny 2008). It was a model that assumed mass media are a neutral force in the process of development, ignoring how the media are themselves products of social, political, economic, and cultural conditions. In his comparative survey, Lerner proposed that media helped the process of transition from "traditional" to a "modernized" state, characterizing the mass media as a "mobility multiplier", therefore enabling individuals to experience events in far-off places and forcing them to reassess their traditional ways of life (Thussu 2000).

The communications and development (or developmentalist) paradigm arose out of Western, particularly American, attempts to incorporate communication into broader explanatory accounts on development that are congenial to dominant academic and political interests (Mosco 2009):

> The developmentalist thesis held that the media were resources which would, along with urbanization, education, and other social forces mutually stimulate economic, social, and cultural modernization in the less developed world. As a result, media growth was viewed as an index of development (Mosco 2009, p. 73).

This model failed to address wider social and cultural conditions and variations, since, as Daya Thussu argues, it emerged in the context of the Cold War and a time when it was expedient for the West to use the notion of modernization to bring the newly independent nations of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa into the sphere of capitalism (Thussu 2000, p. 58) and the mass media was seen as the main tool for projecting these aims:

> In many developing countries economic and political power was and remains restricted to a tiny, often unrepresentative, elite, and the mass media play a key role in legitimizing the political establishment. Since the media had, and continue to have, close proximity to the ruling elites, they tend to reflect this view of development in the news (Thussu 2000, p. 58).

Significantly, some aspects of Lerner's research found their way into foreign policy decisions, particularly in the United States. In fact, as Zachary Lockman argues, some of the research produced during the Cold War period was motivated by urgent policy-related concerns. Spurious, though widely read, scholarship, such as that by Orientalist Bernard Lewis on the relationship between communism and Islam, was, in fact, initially presented in 1953 as a lecture on "Communism and Islam" at Chatham House, the London headquarters of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and was published afterwards as an article in the Institute's journal (cited in Lockman 2010). In assessing the competition between the West and the Soviet Union for the support of the Islamic world, Lockman asserts that Lewis's analysis ignored local contexts and histories as well as "the very different ways in which contemporary Muslims might perceive the world and act in it" (Lockman 2010, p. 132). Lewis, therefore, considered that it was possible "to compare an allegedly monolithic communism to an equally monolithic Islam whose essential characteristics could be deduced from medieval texts and presumed to govern minds of all Muslims everywhere and all the time" (Lockman 2010, p. 132).

Though not falling in with the Orientalist tradition, studies on the Middle East and the Arab world were predominantly shaped by similar essentialist and fixed paradigms, originating in the much-maligned modernization theory. In fact, as Lockman notes, "from the early 1950s into the 1970s, modernization theory was the dominant paradigm in US area studies in general and Middle East studies in particular, informing a mass research and writing on political change, economic development and social transformation, and interacting with Orientalism in complex ways," (Lockman 2010, p. 134). Though largely discredited, such analyses are worth revisiting if only to unravel the ill-founded conceptions of much theorization and conceptualization of the Middle East, and reveal the importance of ideological, cultural, and political perceptions about the *other*, which later laid the foundation for much of the contemporary work on media cultures.

Indeed, a critique of the older research on media, culture, and politics, particularly in the context of the Cold War, might help us find how particular discourses were generated and normalized, becoming dominant and replicated in studies from within the Middle East. Edward Said, in his preface to the 2003 edition of *Orientalism*, goes so far as to suggest a dubious motive behind the renewed interest in Middle East studies in noting a link between the triumvirate of government, media, and academe in the United States: "There is of course a Middle East Studies establishment, a pool of interests, 'old boy' or 'expert' networks linking corporate business, the foundations, the oil companies, the missions, the military, the foreign service, the intelligence community together with the academic world. There are grants and other rewards, there are organizations, there are hierarchies, there are institutes, centres, faculties, departments, all devoted to legitimizing and maintaining the authority of a handful of basic, basically unchanging ideas about Islam, the Orient and the Arabs" (Said 2003, pp. 301–302).

A historical re-contextualization of these discourses at the global, regional, and local levels can provide a good basis for "internationalizing" Middle East media research and developing a credible Middle East Media Studies field. A critical understanding of how these processes came into being as well as of their cultural and political implications can be useful in identifying motivating patterns and ideologies that helped constitute the "other", resulting in a generalized, if not distorted, perception of political, socio-economic, and cultural diversities within a selected region or even within particular nation-states, evident most clearly in Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations*, which provided a constricted perception of the West and Islam that abstracted cultural differences to religion and region, ignoring the abundant, complicated, and interdependent nature of social, cultural, and economic transformations and internal distinctions of cultural and national identities. As Amartya Sen (2006) has argued, aside from the conceptual flaw of seeing human beings in terms of only one affiliation and the historical mistake of overlooking the critically important interrelations between what are assumed to be largely detached and discrete civilizations, these civilizational theories also suffer from having to overlook the heterogeneity of religious affiliations that characterize most countries and, even more, most civilizations, since people of the same religion are frequently spread over many different countries and several distinct continents (Sen 2006, pp. 59–60). Furthermore, this religio-centric analysis of "the people of the world" does not provide a helpful approach to understand humanity, as it makes the same mistake "of attempting to see human beings in terms of only one affiliation, viz. religion" (Sen 2006, p. 60).

Recent events, particularly the attacks of September 11, 2001, also served as the legitimizing backdrop to discourses regarding the Middle East, including Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, while the ongoing US-led "war on terror" campaign reproduced the *other* in different and new conflicts, focusing on Islam as an opposing ideology to the West.

In all these discourses, there was little mention of the diversity of Islam or the possibility that "political Islam" may not necessarily be an anti-national force, but that Islamist groups may operate in a "nationalist" fashion interpellating audiences in diverse ways. Some scholarship helped generate an Islamophobic discourse, which, to a certain extent, muddled up historical, social, and political factors and led to further distortions and confusions about religion, culture, and society, as well as fear of the "other." This was evident in some studies of the Arabic channels Al-Jazeera or Al-Manar and their coverage of the Palestinian uprising in 2000, the war in Afghanistan in 2001, the 2003 Iraq War, the Israeli War on Lebanon in 2006, or the 2008–2009 Israeli War on Gaza. As Jayyusi (2007) argues, the terms of the "war on terror" have been globally reproduced and incorporated by multiple regimes "into their agenda of practical policy, legislation and discourse, both for their own ends, and in response to the imperial centre which launched and coordinating this 'war'" (Jayyusi 2007, p. 252), bringing about a major discursive shift, focused on its practical momentum, specifically on the Arab/Islamic world:

> … the discourse of the "war on terror" and its mediations … operates to produce and induce an inversion, displacement and radical mutation of some of the categories through which this region, and its peoples and concerns, are apprehended. It is so much that stereotyping and hostility have become common – they have been around for a long time – rather it is generic, wholesale and systematic exclusions are effected within this discourse and its practical trajectories (Jayyusi 2007, p. 252).

The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 gave additional ground for examining the West/East relationships once again with a greater emphasis on Islamism within an international context, framed by the "war on terror". Political Islam became a key topic of research and debate, including media and cultural studies. However, the context where political Islam has been positioned, as part of the critique produced post-9/11, still failed to be adequately contextualized. It was not long ago when Edward Said addressed the issue of representation of Islam in his book *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World* (1997). Although the book initially appeared in 1981 – Said was focusing on the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 – much of the issues raised in this book regarding terrorism, fundamentalism, and others are still valid in today's discussions. Clearly, we cannot ignore that the evolution of the media in the Middle East, particularly since the emergence of satellite channels in 1991, is in itself part of a wider development in the region – the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the US campaign to lead an international coalition against former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to liberate Kuwait. Equally clearly, we also cannot ignore the fact that the expansion of satellite channels broadcasting from and to the Middle East and the rapid take-up of new media technologies has opened the door to new and different articulations and interpretations of power, culture, and socio-political factors.

Concluding Remarks

No doubt the legacy of the Eurocentric conceptualization of the modern nation-state and the corresponding positivist paradigm of development communication in international media studies has led to the construction of a world of dichotomies: North–South, East–West, Occident–Orient, Islam–the rest, and so on (McMillin 2007). The challenge for media and cultural scholars of the Middle East is to keep in mind that cultural landscapes are fluid and open and provide the site for transactions and flows, for expression and imagination, and for repression and resistance, but the more serious challenge is to remain conscious that these transformations are also tempered by structures, and contestations, of power.

The credibility of a solid Middle East Media Studies field depends on its ability to ground itself in fresh nonrigid ways of thinking and imagining, grounded in history and empirical material. As Stuart Hall has argued: "the media are not the end products of a simple technological revolution. They come at the end of a complex historical and social process; they are active agents in a new phase in the life-history of industrial society … Inside these forms and languages, the society is articulating new social experiences for the first time" (Hall and Whannel 1964, p. 45, cited in Sabry 2008). Complex historical and social processes are not only formed from within but are also informed by the global. Indeed, any theorization needs to involve a "dual process of re-contextualization, one that deals with the task of reconceptualization and reappropriation" (Sabry 2008, p. 247), but also one that engages with the inside and the outside, the local and the global, the particular and the universal, and the elitist and the popular.

References

Abu-Lughod, L. (2005) *Dramas of Nationhood: The Politics of Television in Egypt*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Amin, H. (2008) Arab media audience research: developments and constraints, in K. Hafez (ed.), *Arab Media: Power and Weakness*. New York and London: Continuum, pp. 69–91.

Armbrust, W. (eds) (2000) *Mass Mediations: New Approaches to Popular Culture in the Middle East and Beyond*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Ayish, M. (2003) Beyond Western-oriented communication theories: a normative Arab–Islamic perspective, *Javnost/The Public*, **10** (2), 79–92.

Ayish, M. (2008) Arab world media content studies: a meta-analysis of a changing research agenda, in K. Hafez (ed.), *Arab Media, Power and Weakness*. New York and London: Continuum, pp.105–124.

Boyd, D.A. (1975) Development of Egypt's radio: voice of the Arabs under Nasser, *Journalism Quarterly*, **52** (4), 645–653.

Brynen, R., Korany, B. and Noble, P. (eds) (1995) *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World*, vol. **1**. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Publishers.

Bunt, G. (2000) *Virtually Islamic*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Curran, J. and Park, M.-J.(eds) (2000). *De-Westernizing Media Studies*. London: Routledge.

Eickleman, D. and Anderson, J. (eds) (2003) *New Media in the Muslim World*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

El Oifi, M. (2005) Influence without power: Al-Jazzera and the Arab public sphere, in M. Zayani (ed.), *The Al-Jazeera Phenomenon: Critical Perspectives on New Arab Media*. London: Pluto Press, pp. 66–79.

Hafez, K. (ed.) (2001) *Mass Media, Politics and Society in the Middle East*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Hall, S. and Whannel, P. (1964) *The Popular Arts*. London: Hutchinson Educational.

Hallin, D. and Mancini, P. (1996) *Comparing Media Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hamada, B. (2001) Islamic cultural theory, Arab media performance and public opinion, in S. Splichal (ed.), *Public Opinion and Democracy*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, pp. 215–239.

Huntington, S. (2002) *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. London: Free Press.

Iskander, A. (2007) Lines in the sand: problematizing Arab media in the post-taxonomic era, *Arab Media and Society*, **2** (Spring), 1–47.

Iskander, A. and El-Nawawy, M. (2002) Al Jazeera and the Intifada, in E. Casey and P. Hilder (eds), *Peace Fire: Fragments from the Israel-Palestine Story*. London: Free Association Books, pp. 161–166.

Jayyusi, L. (2007) Internationalizing media studies: a view from the Arab World, *Global Media and Communication*, **3** (3), 251–255.

Kamalipour, Y.R. and Mowlana, H. (eds) (1994) *Mass Media in the Middle East: A Comprehensive Handbook*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Khatib, L. (2007) Television and public action in the Beirut Spring, in N. Sakr (ed.), *Arab Media and Political Renewal: Community, Legitimacy and Public Life*. London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 28–41.

Khiabany, G. (2009) *Iranian Media: The Paradox of Modernity*. London: Routledge.

Khiabany, G. and Sreberny, A. (2007) Introduction: mediated politics in the Middle East, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, **27** (3), 509–512.

Kraidy, M.M. (2006) Reality television and politics in the Arab World: preliminary observations, *Transnational Broadcasting Studies*, accessed 01/09/2010, http://www.tbsjournal.com/Archives/Fall05/Kraidy.html.

Kraidy, M.M. (2009) *Reality Television and Arab Politics: Contention in Public Life*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lerner, D. (1958) *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*. New York: The Free Press.

Lewis, B. (1993) Islam and liberal democracy, *Atlantic Monthly*, **271** (2), 89–98.

Lockman, Z. (2010) *Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lynch, M. (2006) *Voices of the New Arab Public*. New York: Columbia University Press.

McMillin, D. (2007) *International Media Studies*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.

Matar, D. (2011) Rethinking the Arab state and culture: preliminary thoughts, in T. Sabry (ed.), *Arab Cultural Studies: Mapping the Field*. London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 123–137.

Morley, D., and Robins, K. (1995) *Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries*. London: Routledge.

Mosco, V. (2009) *The Political Economy of Communication*. London: Sage Publications.

Mowlana, H. (1993) The new global order and cultural ecology, *Media, Culture and Society*, **15** (1), 9–27.

Rinnawi, K. (2006) *Instant Nationalism: McArabism, Al-Jazeera and Transnational Media in the Arab World*. Boulder, New York, and Toronto: University Press of America.

Rugh, W. (2004) *Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio and Television in Arab Politics*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Sabry, T. (2007) In search of the present Arab cultural tense, in N. Sakr (ed.), *Arab Media and Political Renewal: Community, Legitimacy and Public Life*. London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 154–168.

Sabry, T. (2008) Arab media and cultural studies: rehearsing new questions, in K. Hafez (ed.), *Arab Media, Power and Weakenss*. New York and London: Continuum, pp. 237–251.

Sabry, T. (2009) Media and cultural studies in the Arab World: making bridges to local discourses of modernity, in D. Thussu (ed.), *Internationalizing Media Studies*. London: Routledge, pp. 175–196.

Said, E. (1994) *Culture and Imperialism*. London: Vintage.

Said, E. (1997) *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*. London: Vintage.

Said, E. (2003) *Orientalism*. London: Penguin.

Sakr, N. (2001) *Satellite Realms*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Sakr, N. (2007) *Arab Television Today*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Sen, A. (2006) *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny*. London: Penguin Books.

Sreberny, A. (2008) The analytic challenges of studying the Middle East and its evolving media environment, *The Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication*, **1** (1), 8–23.

Sreberny, A. and Khiabany, G. (2010) *Blogistan: The Internet and Politics in Iran*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Thussu, D. (2000) *International Communication: Continuity and Change*. New York: Arnold.

Thussu, D. (ed.) (2009) *Internationalizing Media Studies*. London: Routledge.

Zayani, M. (2008) The challenges and limits of universalist concepts: problematizing public opinion and a mediated Arab public sphere, *The Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication*, **1** (1), 60–79.

Zubaida, S. (1989/2009) *Islam, the People and the State: Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle East*. London: I.B. Tauris.

13

Media Industries and Policy in Digital Times

A Latin American Perspective of Notes and Methods

Rodrigo Gómez García

Introduction

This chapter sets some preliminary concepts and principles oriented towards understanding the role of global media industries in digital times. The chapter is divided into two parts: the first focuses on two central issues to understand the global media industries context, referring particularly to the concepts of "world system" and "global capitalism"; the second part explores how media industries and media policies interact and how they should be addressed.

It is important to note that the theoretical and methodological approach that I am using looks to establish the link between complex systems and dialectic systems.

> The main point is, actually, the interdisciplinary in rigorous sense not only is there in all its fullness when it is identified with complex systems, but when analysing the everything (totality) organized and unorganized of them and studying their social systems, includes mutual and interactive definitions, relations of exploitation and exclusion, of oppression and deprivation, as well as the struggles against exploitation or by building relationships and networks of liberation and democratic mediation with less unequal distribution of power and wealth, the means of production and the surplus produced (González Casanova 2004, p. 81).

The aim of the chapter is to establish this approach with reference to global media industries and media policies. Furthermore, it is important to note that it is hoped this will set a general map to addressing, give growth to the changes in the age of digitalization, and provide those with the scope to give inputs to social theory.

These days the cultural sector has an important part to play in the growth of national economies (Yúdice 2002; Doyle 2002; García-Canclini and Piedras 2006). In fact its growth outstrips that of traditional sectors of the global economy (UNESCO

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

2005; UNCTAD 2008). The way in which cultural products circulate around the world is more intense than ever. The cultural (media) industries – as private and public organizations – are one of the main vectors of these dynamics and are essential to thinking about how our imaginaries, ideologies, and identities are constructed in the context of global capitalism. In that context cultural and communication policies are emerging as one of the big debates in the nation-states and in international organizations in terms of how to address economic growth. Since the end of the 1970s, these polices were set and designed from a neo-liberal perspective. Since the 1990s, UNESCO, in their declarations, conventions, and world reports, has suggested to the *semi-peripheral* countries that these kinds of policies could promote social and economic development.

At the same time, the ICT convergence has important implications for the dynamics of the cultural industries, mainly in the international division of labor, through the re-shaping of creative jobs, skill structures, the organization of work, the *design of policies*, and in different types of consumption.

During the first decades of the twenty-first century, digitalization has transformed and impacted in many ways on the dynamics of the cultural industries. In this research we are very interested in analyzing, in general, these distinctions and specific characteristics in both economic and cultural terms.

World System and Global Capitalism

Any debate about globalization requires first of all a clarification about what is understood by "globalization". In this chapter, I define the concept of "globalization" from a long-term (*longue durée*) structural historical perspective, meaning that globalization here is understood as an economic, political, social, and cultural process framed and shaped by the capitalist system. This perspective, in the main argued based on the ideas of the world economy and world systems given by Immanuel Wallerstein (Wallerstein and Hopkins 1982) and Fernand Braudel (1989), understands globalization as part of a historical course of internationalization and homogenization of the world economy (Saxe-Fernández 1999). Wallerstein in particular understands the world-economy capitalism as a social-political construction, understanding globalization in terms of geographically set interstate systems shaped by several processes of production and deeply rooted in the international division of labor (Wallerstein 1990, p. 35). As the author argues, "the accumulation of capital requires not only goods and capital to circulate but manpower as well. It requires in addition a constant evolution in the organization of production in terms of both natures of the leading sectors and of the sites of the production" (Wallerstein 1990, p. 37).

Wallerstein suggests analysing the world system based on its totality, on its wider geographic dimension, as a "planetary" phenomenon. Such a phenomenon has been studied from three main theoretical perspectives: (a) the analysis of different phenomenon, contradictions, struggles, events, and processes of capitalism; (b) the internal hierarchical structure by which capitalism is sustained; and (c) the transformations and innovative dynamics/curves that shaped the historical course of the capitalist system.

Based on the definitions described above, global capitalism is understood here as the *contemporary* period of capitalism in the world economy, which is characterized by the hegemonic role of the United States as a political–economic–military power, and the role of Japan and the European Union (such as Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy) as economic powers. The triad US–Japan–EU represents in global capitalism the group of dominant countries (the *core*) responsible for controlling and setting the directives of the world's economy market. Countries not included in this triad occupy a peripheral position due to limited economic and political power to control and set directives to redistribute resources from the *periphery* to the *core*. There are nevertheless some *semi-periphery* nations (characterized by advanced stages of industrialization, growth, and currency stability as well as good humanitarian development indexes) who despite relatively developed and diversified economies are not hegemonic in international trade.

Such abstract typology as *core*, *semi-periphery*, and *periphery* countries should not be understood free of internal conflicts, since cities located in *core* countries such as New York, London, Paris, Los Angeles, Vancouver, or Berlin have different zones of globalization in their composition (e.g., suburbs, neighborhoods, or city centers, which in several cases account for similar low levels of social and economic conditions).

Despite that, it should also be considered that *semi-periphery* countries, such as Singapore, Malaysia, China, India, South Korea, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey, have the most evident contradictions of globalization, and that the main cities located in these countries, such as Sao Paulo, Mexico City, Santiago, Cape Town, and Shanghai, are characterized by even sharper unequal characteristics of globalization, but at the same time they offer all the services, commodities, and goods that you could find in *core* cities.

An indicator used to observe differences between *core* and *periphery* income distribution is distribution of Gross World Product (GWP), which is highly concentrated among the Group of Seven, G7, formed by the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada. In 2009, G7 countries accounted for 52% of GWP (or the equivalent of US$30.8 trillion).[1] In contrast, all the countries of sub-Saharan Africa (which accounts for 38 countries, including South Africa) represented only 2% of GWP (World Bank 2010). In the case of Latin American and Caribbean countries, the same record refers to 4% of GWP, or the equivalent of US$2.4 trillion. Even so, it is noteworthy that Brazil and Mexico alone accounted for 64% of this total in the region (World Bank 2010).

It is important to establish that in the last ten years China, India, and Brazil have been growing constantly in economic terms. In the case of China the change is remarkable, from a GDP of US$1266 billion in 2002 (Economics and Development Resource Center Asian Development Bank 2003, pp. 102–103) to a GDP of US$4984 billion in 2009, becoming the third largest world economy (World Bank 2010). Thus we are clearly observing the rise of China as an emerging economy that is starting to change the counterbalances of the world economy.

The GWP extreme inequality illustrates gaps in economic and human development in times of global capitalism. While the United States, Japan, and China, for example, according to the Human Development Index are ranked at the 4, 12, and 89 positions, Mexico and Brazil are ranked at the 56 and 73 positions, respectively (UNDP 2010).

As we know, G7 meets every year to discuss the main world economy issues and to set political action guidelines for future changes in the world economy and international financial system. Such meetings are nevertheless mediated not only by country representatives but also by those associated with business and transnational enterprises (Dieterich 1995, pp. 66–68). Guidelines set during such meetings are then driven and operated by institutions such as the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), who will then promote their own political and economic agenda in international forums such as the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).[2] Parallel to such multicountry organizations, economic and political decisions are also geopolitically addressed by regional economic blocs, such as the European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Southern Common Market (Mercosur), and others.

As a consequence of this centripetal dynamics and organization of global capitalism (which is heavily focused on addressing economic issues rather than social needs), the asymmetry status of countries located in the *core*, *semi-periphery*, and *periphery* regions are constantly reinforced. Nonetheless, recent decades witnessed the emergence of a wide range of civil society organizations and alternative forums of debate, which have the common aim to conceptualize globalization and international order in opposition to the concepts suggested by global capitalist organizations.

Such a movement aims to lessen the inequality between rich and poor societies, and is based on a six-point agenda: (a) respect for diversity of cultural traditions among different towns, communities, and other regions, aiming to protect cultural products and heritage from the logic of capitalism and at the same time preserving diversity and indigenous cultures; (b) promotion of civil society as a government activity watchdog; (c) promotion of human development indexes from a social justice perspective, including the need to combat extreme poverty and imbalances between rich and poor countries; (d) respect, promote, and implement the second and third generation of human rights based on economic, social, and cultural rights; (e) protection of the environment and natural resources, with a particular emphasis on water resources and climate change; and (f) promotion of fair trade alternative economies and stock transaction taxes, such as the Tobin tax (Ramonet, Chao, and Wozniak 2004).

In order to implement such an agenda and protest, forums such as the World Social Forums have gradually been institutionalized, and movements related to such forums are commonly defined as "other-globalization" (*altermundialization*) or referred to by the pejorative terminology of "anti-globalization". The first meeting of the World Social Forum was held in Porto Alegre, Brazil, which was a consequence of continental meetings held during the early 2000s in the American, Asian, and European continents. This so-called organized civil society (which in some cases is actually not as organized as it should be) is currently playing a role in watchdog public policies promoted not only by national governments but also by supranational institutions such as those related to G7, and such groups are gradually acting as key social actors, in recent years making transformations in terms of citizenship and political culture.

During meetings such as the ones promoted by the World Trade Organization, the World Economic Forum, the G8 and G20 summits, such groups promote different forms of parallel protest, ranging from forums of discussion to radical demonstrations of the so-called "black block anarchists". Such protests acquired a global effect for the first time during the WTO summit held in the US northwestern city of Seattle in 1999.[3]

From a historical point of view, global capitalism involves the analysis of multiple dimensions (e.g., political, economic, social, and cultural), all of them highly complex, dynamic, and co-interacting with each other. This analysis is marked by contradictions; to name just a few, we have: (a) the flux of immigrants from *peripheral* and *semi-peripheral* countries to *core* countries, which on the one hand is motivated by lack of work and minimum conditions of human development in their countries of origin while on the other hand it raises earnings in their countries of origin; (b) the flux of transnational corporations in search of better production conditions, which on the one hand exploit cheap labor, low taxes, and lack of environment regulation, while on the other hand raises the conditions in the country chosen to be exploited; (c) increased inequality in terms of access, ownership, and generation of knowledge that leverage new technologies between rich and poor societies, as well as access to cultural and knowledge production.

At the same time, we see some positive developments: (a) the increasing levels of horizontal communication thanks to information and communication technology (ICT), which increasingly connects different groups of civil society; (b) the possibility to middle class individuals to travel to different countries due to low costs of air tickets, expanding cultural exchanges and interaction with others; (c) the lower costs of information to manage organizational business globally; and (d) the consolidation of scientific groups and lines of research, networking, and enabling continuous feedback work 24/7.

It is important to emphasize the central role of technology in the global capitalist, particularly in terms of finance, investment, and industrial organizational capacity. New technology represents a key element to explain the leverage large corporations have in reacting to changes, accumulation and processing of information, and establishing branches in several countries (Castells 1998).

The importance of technology is also significant to understand the role of advertising industry in global capitalism. Most of the media industry (in particular those related to television, radio, and press) revenue comes from advertising income, which in turn help to spread cultural industry services and goods and build a consumption culture in society (Smythe 1983, p. 73). As De Miguel argues, "the advertising market plays a key role in the economy of the audiovisual and conditions the emergence of new channels, while they influence it" (De Miguel 1993, p. 71). In the same direction, Robert McChesney points out that neo-liberal globalization (as we know it today) could not indeed exist without advertising, since "The commercial media system is the necessary transmission belt for businesses to market their wares across the world. … A whopping three-quarters of global spending on advertising ends up in the pockets of a mere twenty media companies" (McChesney 2001, p. 7).

As a final remark in this section, I want to emphasize the fact that the main media industries are characterized by a capacity to operate globally, but at the same time such industries are enterprises hosted and promoted by *core* countries. In fact, if we analyze the origin of the 50 largest income and revenue generating companies among the audiovisual media industry, we notice that 48 of them are from *core* countries while only two of them are hosted in *semi-periphery* countries, referring here in particular to the *Grupo Televisa* (27) in Mexico and *Rede Globo* (43), in Brazil (European Audiovisual Observatory 2009). We could argue that the main explanation for such phenomena when referring to *Grupo Televisa* and *Rede Globo* is not necessarily a consequence of better quality, creativity, or lower prices of audiovisual products, but particularly a consequence of the dominant position of their respective geo-linguistic markets as well as the monopolistic practices and market concentration in their countries (Mastrini and Becerra 2009). Moreover, such leverage gives to those companies finance and economic muscle to compete and promote their products also in other international markets (Sinclair 1999; Sánchez Ruiz 2005).

Starting Points to Addressing the Global Media Industries

This section conceptualizes the theoretical framework by which global media industries should be addressed and in the sequence discusses concepts and key dimensions to understand media policy in the context of global capitalism and digital convergence. First of all, I should clarify that I consider media industries from the point of view of cultural industries. Cultural industries[4] are part of the social institutions that are directly related to the social production of meanings, such as those related to the circulation, renovation, and building process appropriation of cultural and symbolic capital (Bourdieu 2002). Cultural industries are based on an industrial capitalist logic (Garnham 2000), highly spread on contemporary societies, oriented to manage, produce, operate, and distribute symbolic products (Hesmondhalgh 2007) in accordance with ideologies, imaginaries, and identities characteristics of each context. Due to the link between symbolic symbols and the spread of ideology, scholars dedicate a considerable share of attention to analyze and understand how media policy is shaped by social power relations (Mosco 1996; Garnham 1998; Murdock 1998).

Understanding global media industries from a historical-structural perspective (Sánchez Ruiz 2001; Golding and Murdock 2000) means that I observe the economic, political, and socio-cultural processes in order to understand the transformation of a complex and dynamics process based on similar trends that can be found over a certain period of time. It is the analysis of historical observation as a combination of continuity and change (Hesmondhalgh 2007) that gives rational thought to understand the relationship between social agency and *structuration* (Murdock 1990; Mosco 1996) and to establish the dialect systems (González Casanova 2004).

Media (Cultural) Industries

From this perspective, it is remarkable to underline the importance of media industries in terms of economics like other industrial sectors, but, at the same time, to identify it as a cultural vector that their texts produce and have more symbolic specificity than any other industry. In this sense, I understand the media industries to be cultural rather than creative, entertainment, or copyright industries.[5]

Following the tradition of cultural industries (Hesmondhalgh 2007), I propose to analyze media industries by considering four dimensions, which to some extent are interconnected, at the same time describing particular dynamics of the capitalist world system. It is important to establish that, according to the particular issue relating to the global media industries that need to be analyzed and problematized, a general frame has to be considered for these four dimensions.

Those dimensions are:

- The logics and organization of the enterprises, markets, value chains, and their role as cultural producers and consumers of a creative labor force in economic terms.
- The dynamics of legal framework and democratic contexts, understanding how political systems are built and social relationships of power established among different organizations dealing with communications and culture.
- The dynamics of consumers, practices, and the appropriation of different symbolic goods and services that sustain cultural and social communication systems, which should be addressed based on geographical arena interactions (i.e., local, national, regional, and global), and the contradictions and environments supporting cultural and creative workers.
- The process of innovation and the role of technology as analytic elements to track cultural industries mutations (Miège 2006).[6]

If we look in depth at the first point, it is important to establish that the economic and industrial dimensions have to be seen through seven main subsectors, which have diffuse borderlines, because with technological convergence[7] they became more interrelated: cinema, broadcasting, video, music, video games, newspaper press, and multimedia content in the Internet and mobile devices. At the moment, this cataloging helps to classify and analyze the differences and similarities between their markets, circulation, value chain, and logics of production. At the same time, we have to think about the differences and interactions between private and public media enterprises and independent producers.

Another aspect, which has to be set in the economic dimension, is that the digital convergence in the cultural industries is generating a reticular or direct economy (De Miguel 2007).[8] At the same time, we have to establish that in the orbit of this *core* cultural industries are the community and grassroots media, which do not operate in industrial terms but interact in a wider way, thanks to ICT, with their contents and creativity as part of the social communication and cultural systems. The global grassroots media have to be seen as other ways to understand how to produce and disseminate information and the approach to creative work.

The political dimension has to be framed within the limits that are set by the different acts that are made by local, national, or supranational governments and institutions with the idea to accomplish goals and objectives related to democratic, economic, and social development, and furthermore to encourage cultural diversity and promote democratic pluralism – in terms to promote and guarantee cultural and communications rights. How the State intervenes and participates as a counterbalance to private imperatives of the media and telecom corporations should be to guarantee the public interest.

The socio-cultural dimension deals with the singularity of its symbolic products, which are understood as dynamic texts that reproduce and generate imaginaries, ideologies, and identities (Ortiz 1998). These have to be established with the connections and interactions within the role of the creative workers and its labor conditions when these texts are produced (Hesmondhalgh 2007), where the texts themselves and the different consumptions by their audiences have to be addressed in terms of social class, ethnic group, gender (Mosco 1996), age, exclusion–inclusion, cultural and informational capital, and the track of their multimediations (Orozco 1996), but at the same time do not underestimate the structure where they are set (Murdock 1990).

The technological sub-dimension, which is important to emphasize, as I understand it, is a tool that plays a central role with the others, but not at the same level of analysis, and could be seen as a vector that is driven by other dimensions. This sub-dimension could be seen as the tool that produces, circulates, and consumes information and cultural goods and services in different digital platforms and supports in an easier way, thanks to digital convergence, and accelerates other convergences where "the old Media collude with New Media" (Jenkins 2006, p. 2). To clarify these points, we need to remember, as Raymond Williams proposes, not to become a *technological determinist*, "the technology would be seen, as being looked for and developed with certain purposes and practices already in mind" (Williams 2005, p. 7).

Communications (Media) Policy

Media policies have to be understood in a wider frame that belongs to the field of communications policy (Van Cuilenburg and McQuail 2003) and to cultural policies (García-Canclini 2000; Martín-Barbero 2008). In a practical way, I characterized – with the purpose of observation – the communication public policies as the set of acts, rules, programs, agreements, actions, or omissions that shape, protect, establish, and drive the social communications systems by political power.

The Catalan researcher Joseph Grifreu defines the communications policies as "the established set of principles and norms that drives the behaviour of the communications systems. Its orientation is essential in a long-term view, unless it could have operative consequences in a short-term" (Gifreu 1986, p. 106).

What has to be completed with this characterization of the communication policies is that they have to be studied through their *economic* – rules of competence, support for production, funding, generation of cultural works, and the role or weight of the cultural industries in the economy at local, national, and global levels – *political* – democratic context, set, and design logics of the policies, which means from what position they were set, implemented, evaluated, and for what purpose (Garnham 1998) – *socio-cultural* – access, uses, appropriations, and struggles of the communication goods, services, and devices – and *technological* – innovation and infrastructure – dimensions.

It is important to consider that the communications policies emerged when negotiations and links existed between the pursuit of a national state's interest and the industrial and commercial operations of the private media enterprises (Van Cuilenburg and McQuail 2003).

At the international level, the communication policies, we have to remember, were the discussions, concerns, and participations that were set by UNESCO during the 1970s and 1980s to encourage the design of national communication policies in the *periphery* and *semi-periphery* countries – in those days, they were known as third world countries and nonaligned nations. Their main objectives of these initiatives were to help and accomplish democratic, economic, and social development benefits and, of course, we need to read these under the historical context of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) debate and the McBride Commission, where the main concern was with regard to the unbalanced international flow of cultural and information goods (McBride *et al.* 1980; Murciano 1992).

These suggestions and discussions concerned with national communication policies by UNESCO resulted from the historical experience of the impetus and benefits that were obtained by advanced Western democracies, mainly by Europe and Canada, with their normative media policy after the Second World War up to the 1980s (Van Cuilenburg and McQuail 2003), but at the same with a perspective of communication for development with a strong diffusion theory view (Melkote and Steeves 2001).

Nowadays, the media policies are set from two dominant positions. On the one hand, we observe the liberal neo-classical economic position that is founded mainly on four imperatives: free market, free competence, free flow of ideas, and market place of ideas, and, on the other hand, it is oriented towards a normative tradition related to the central role of the United States, which has the right to intervention under the logic of public interest, heritage protection, public sphere, and national sovereignty.[9]

The free market position promotes, in its neo-liberal version, the policy of no intervention of governments in the communications markets (Schiller 1990). From this position, the state and their government offices are thought to be just like referees and promoters of the markets, given effective competence and adequate infrastructure.

From the neo-liberal point of view, private enterprises, through "the logic of the free market and competence" – offer and demand – will develop and guarantee the conditions that generate political pluralism and cultural diversity, in a wide market place of ideas and, of course, competitive and better prices for the consumers of communication goods and services. Furthermore, their guideline is the postulation that they give to the public–consumers–audiences what they want under the context of free choice (Qualter 1994; Curran and Seaton 1997; Croteau and Hoynes 2001).

This perspective does not see differences between the cultural and communication goods with the rest of the goods, such as shoes or automobiles. Thus, every government intervention addresses the following: (a) to protect the communication and cultural goods or services or (b) to regulate the leeway of the private enterprises in terms of concentration and capital structures. However, it could be accused of undermining freedom of expression or press and free economic competence or of generating market distortions.

From a critical analysis according to Murdock, the shifts have driven these processes by neo-liberal logic of public policies in general, but in our case, the communication and cultural policies are established as *marketization* – their four main aspects, which could be clearly observed, are: liberalization, privatization, corporatization, and the re-orientation of regulation regimes to give corporations increased scope for maneuvre (Murdock 2002, pp. 19–20).

In contrast, the normative tradition of public service has objectives and values articulated by socio-cultural, political, and economic welfare. It seeks to guarantee: freedom of expression, cultural diversity, universal access, building of public sphere and citizenship, quality in information, news, and all kinds of contents and social responsibility, through legitimate public intervention and participation of the nation-states and civil society in its social communication system with socio-cultural, educative, and economic purposes (Curran and Seaton 1997; McQuail 1998; Pasquali 2007). From the free market view, this kind of normative position is seen as protectionist, paternalistic, and/or statist (Picard 2002).

The normative policies have been focused, following the international experience, mainly, on nine aspects: (a) universal access; (b) monitoring the performing of the media in terms of socio-cultural responsibilities and functions linked with press freedom, cultural diversity, education, democratic pluralism, building of citizenship, and public interest; (c) screen quotas for domestic production; (d) new and renewal licensing, not only in the shape of tenders or economic criteria; (e) intervention in the economic and financial structures; (f) control to foreign, vertical, horizontal, and cross-ownership; (g) advertising quotas; (h) public subsidies and finance to national independent media production; and (i) promotion and advancement of independent media and communication circuits (Curran and Seaton 1997; Golding 1998; McQuail 1998).

According to other researches, the establishment of a change in the balance that makes up the political, economic, and social values that delineate the definition of public interest should be cultural industries (McQuail 1998; Sierra 2006), as well as a public service, as the discussion becomes more and more dislocated from economic performance related to efficiency and growth (Picard 2002), and does not necessarily meet the objectives related to the public interest or economic development.

In contrast, the neo-liberal approach sets aside the question of the relevance of implementing protectionist policies and public service, based on the need to ensure cultural diversity and national identities, in order to preserve the public sphere, the promotion of democratic pluralism, and the initiative to correct any distortions that generate “free competition” and the various failures that are incurred by markets within national economies (Frau-Meigs 2002, p. 3).

In this regard, Garcia Canclini notes that “as transnational cultural industries appropriate the strategic areas of public life, culture is privatized and undergoes a process of de-accountability for the corporate interests and inequality” (Gracía-Canclini 2000, p. 4). In fact, the free market position is that so far it is presented as hegemonic in supranational bodies. The most intense discussions are happening within the rounds of the World Trade Organization (WTO), where it will introduce media products in mercantile business logic. So far, these negotiations have stalled, but are pro-free market (Frau-Meigs 2002; Torrent 2002; Pauwels and Loisen 2003).

At the same time, it is important to establish that, in the last five years, Latin American countries such as Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Brazil are commencing different processes of *de-marketization* of their public policies according to their democratic contexts. For example, on the one hand, Venezuela is reforming, in a very progressive way, its Communications Act (García 2008), while, on the other hand, there is an open ideological fight between the Chavez government and private media corporations, as well as any others who do not agree with the government's general public policies. Chavez occupies many hours of national and community broadcasting channels to express his opinions and achievements.

In the case of Argentina, the Media Act reform (*Ley de servicios de Comunicación Audiovisual*) allowed community and not-for-profit media as well as public services each to reserve a third of the airwaves (Seminara and Bicerré 2009).

Regarding Brazil and Uruguay, public hearings and discussions were started in 2010 to mould communication policies in a normative frame and, at the same time, given the same allocation space, in digital times, to community and public service media. In the global context that we have established, these examples have to be seen as possible changes and have to be viewed as proposals from the *semi-periphery* and *periphery* countries that could re-shape their communications and cultural systems.

Final Remarks

In this chapter I have been establishing some coordinates and notes to address and study global media industries and media policies in digital times. The historical-structural approach gives a sense, grounding, and overview of processes related with media and policy and their interactions in the dynamics of the world system.

Complex systems approaches, on the one hand, provide the knowledge to understand, in an interdisciplinary way, the different elements or subsystems that interact and mutually define global media industries in the world system. The behavior of their variables, characteristics, functions, and relations do not allow generalizations about one component without taking into account the others. On the other hand, a dialectical systems approach offers the spectacle to observe and reflect upon the contradictory characteristics of global capitalism, particularly in our case regarding global media industries and media policies, the elements of which cannot be explained without reference to their opposites.

As a final remark, the route that I trace to understand global media industries could be useful in giving the necessary scope to account for a series of elements and subsystems that make sense of various complex issues and that analyze the different interactions of media and society.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Diego Mendez and Fabro Steibel for comments and suggestions that shaped this chapter and, at the same time, to thank David Hesmondhalgh who encouraged him to write this chapter during his research visit at the University of Leeds.

Notes

1. The United States concentrated by itself US$14.1 trillion, which is 28% of GWP (World Bank 2010).

2. It is important to notice, as we do, that the supranational organization par excellence in terms of international politics to resolve the different viewpoints and conflicts between nations is the United Nations.
3. What was new about these demonstrations is that compositions of these groups are organizations and individuals from different countries. This situation is explained by modern communication systems that allow greater mobility and migration, both due to the dynamics of global capitalism. Another point to note was that after these events the alternative media began to have an important role globally, including Indymedia, which then became a source to provide some counterbalance to traditional media and start an example of horizontal communications related to civic journalism. I understand that the rise of movements of global alternative media and civic and community media, according to Hesmondhalgh, are in the peripheral of the core cultural (media) industries, because they work in the production of texts – in this case news – and its reproduction uses semi-industrial or nonindustrial methods (Hesmondhalgh 2007, pp. 12–13).
4. As David Hesmondhalgh has established and distinguished, the core cultural industries are film, broadcasting, the different contents of the Internet industry, music – recording, publishing, and live performance – print and electronic publishing, video and computer games, advertising, and marketing (Hesmondhalgh 2007, p. 13).
5. I follow the discussion and arguments that have been set by David Hesmondhalgh (2005, 2008), Andy Pratt (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt 2005), Nicholas Garnham (2005), and Enrique Bustamante (2009). The main concerns and differences between the implications of using cultural or creative industries, I contend, is that the former gives sustenance to the differentiation with other industries in terms of cultural work, products, and consumables and the importance to maintain and think of them in the field of culture, with the object that their policies have to be driven by considering the articulation between socio-cultural and economic goals. The latter has been designed from the logic of British think tanks (Schlesinger 2009) with the main purpose of reorganizing different related industries, which were related because they have one major input that generates profits – creativity – with the task to stimulate the British economy following the imperatives of global capitalism. I recommend reviewing the positive views of the creative industries to have a complete debate on the discussion and the different arguments (Flew and Cunningham 2010; Hartley 2008).
6. Miegè traces six mutations: financial mutations; technical innovations and their socio-technical mutations; mutations in the conception of the cultural and informative products; mutations in the distribution and spread of the cultural and informational products; mutations in consumable practices; mutations in the cultural and information technological supports; and mutations related to art, culture, and communications (Miège, 2006, pp. 164).
7. By media convergence I understand the condition to offer jointly goods, services, and the process of communications and information (Watson and Hill 2000, pp. 67–68). The technology accomplishes in effect the ability to provide one device for all the goods and services of the media industries (video games, press, magazines, movies, videos, radio, live programmes, etc.).
8. The Basque researcher Juan Carlos de Miguel (2007) defines this kind of economy from the perspective of demand, giving more weight to the production rather than the offer. “This direct economy is defined by six factors that are interrelated: (a) inclusion to the consumer in the value of chain; (b) new technological intermediation; (c) new financial models; (d) the characteristics of the cultural products that are developing in the Internet; (e) new price models; (f) new strategies of the Media groups.”
9. It is important to say that in the middle are a lot of nuances, but in general those are the main tensions in the debates on communication and cultural policies.

References

Bourdieu, P. (2002) *La Distinción. Criterio y Bases Sociales del Gusto.* México City: Taurus.

Braudel, F. (1989) *La Historia y las Ciencias Sociales.* México City: Ariel.

Bustamante, E. (2009) De la cultura a la creatividad y la innovación. Un fantasma recorre Europa y se expande por el mundo, in M. Cebrian (ed.), *Sociedad de la Información y del Conocimiento en los Países Nordicos: Semejanzas y Divergencias con el Caso Español.* Barcelona: Gedisa, pp. 147–195.

Castells, M. (1998) *End of the Millenium. The Information Age. Economy, Society and Culture.* Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.

Croteau, D. and Hoynes, W. (2001) *The Business of the Media: Corporate Media and the Public Interest.* Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press.

Curran, J. and Seaton, J. (1997) *Power without Responsibility.* London: Routledge.

De Miguel, J.C. (1993) *Los Grupos Multimedia.* Barcelona: Bosch.

De Miguel, J.C. (2007) Cambios institucionales en las industrias culturales. Hacia una economía directa oreticular. Portal de la Comunicación, Barcelona, http://www.portalcomunicacion.com/esp/n_aab_lec_pdf.asp?id_llico=27.

Dieterich, H. (1995) Globalización, educación y democracia en América Latina, in H. Dieterich and N. Chomsky (eds), *La Sociedad Global.* México City: Joaquín Mortiz, pp. 49–182.

Doyle, G. (2002) *Understanding Media Economics.* London: Sage.

Economics and Development Resource Center Asian Development Bank (2003) *Asian Development Outlook 2003.* New York: Oxford University Press.

European Audiovisual Observatory (2009) *Statistics Yearbook.* Strasbourg, Conseil de l'Europe.

Flew, T. and Cunningham, S. (2010) Creative industries after the first decade of debate, *The Information Society*, **26** (2), 1–11.

Frau-Meigs, D. (2002) Excepción cultural, políticas nacionales y mundialización: factores de democratización y de promoción de lo contemporáneo, *Quaderns del CAC*, **14**, 3–18.

García, J. (2008) Marco de regulación para los medios comunitarios en Venezuela, in J. García, J. Calvi, F. Tucho and M. Meda (eds), *Políticas de comunicación en España y Latinoamérica. Medios Convencionales, Tercer Sector Audiovisual y Alfabetización Digital.* Madrid: Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, pp. 179–189.

García-Canclini, N. (2000) Políticas culturales en tiempos de globalización, *Revista de Estudios Sociales*, **5**, 52–62.

García-Canclini, N. and Piedras, E. (2006) *Las Industrias Culturales y el Desarrollo de México.* México City: Siglo XXI-Flacso.

Garnham, N. (1998) Media policy, in A. Briggs and P. Cobey (eds), *The Media: An Introduction.* Hong Kong: Longman, pp. 210–233.

Garnham, N. (2000) *Emancipation, the Media, and Modernity. Arguments about the Media and Social Theory.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Garnham, N. (2005) From cultural to creative industries: an analysis of the implications of the "creative industries" approach to arts and media policy making in the United Kingdom, *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, **11** (1), 15–30.

Gifreu, J. (1986) *El debate internacional de la comunicación.* Barcelona: Ariel.

Golding, P. (1998) New technologies and old problems: evaluating and regulating media performance in the information age, in K. Brants, J. Hermes, and L. Van Zoonen (eds), *Media in Question. Popular Cultures and Public Interests.* London: Sage, pp. 7–17.

Golding, P. and Murdock, G. (2000) Culture, communications and political economy, in J. Curran and M. Gurevitch (eds), *Mass Media and Society*, 3rd edn. London: Arnold, pp. 70–92.

González Casanova, P. (2004) *Las Nuevas Ciencias y las Humanidades. De la Academia a la Política*. Barcelona: Anthropos-UNAM-IIS.

Hartley, J. (2008) *Creative Industries*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Hesmondhalgh, D. (2005) Media and cultural policy as public policy: the case of the British Labour Government, *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, **11** (1), 95–109.

Hesmondhalgh, D. (2007) *Cultural Industries*. London: Sage.

Hesmondhalgh, D. (2008) Cultural and creative industries, in T. Bennett and J. Frow (eds), *The Sage Handbook of Cultural Analysis*. London and Los Angeles: Sage, pp. 552–569.

Hesmondhalgh, D. and Pratt, A.C. (2005) Cultural industries and cultural policy, *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, **11** (1), 1–13.

Jenkins, H. (2006) *Convergence Culture. Where Old and New Media Collide*. New York: New York University Press.

McChesney, R. (2001) Global media, neoliberalism and imperialism, *Monthly Review*, **52** (10), 1–19.

McBride, S. *et.al.* (1980) *Communication and Society Today and Tomorrow. Many Voices One World. Towards a New More Just and More Efficient World Information and Communication Order*. Paris: UNESCO.

McQuali, D. (1998) *La Acción de los Medios. Los Medios de Comunicación y el Interés Público*. Buenos Aires: Amorrortu.

Martín-Barbero, J. (2008) Políticas de la comunicación y la cultura. Claves de la investigación, *Documentos CIDOB. Dinámicas Interculturales*, **11**, 5–20.

Mastrini, G. and Becerra, M. (2009) *Los Dueños de la Palabra: Acceso, Estructura y Concentración de los Medios en la América Latina del Siglo XXI*. Buenos Aires: Prometeo.

Melkote, S. and Steeves, L. (2001) *Communication for Development in the Third World. Theory and Practice for Empowerment*. New Delhi, Thousand Oaks, and London: Sage.

Miège, B. (2006) La concentración de la industrias culturales mediáticas (ICM) y los cambios en los contenidos, *Cuadernos de Información y Comunicación (CIC)*, **11**, 155–166.

Mosco, V. (1996) *Political Economy of Communication*. London: Sage.

Murciano, M. (1992) *Estructura y Dinámica de la Comunicación Internacional*. Barcelona: Bosch.

Murdock, G. (1998) Comentarios de base: las condiciones de la práctica cultural, in Y.H. Ferguson and P. Golding (eds), *Economía Política y Estudios Culturales*. Barcelona: Bosch, pp. 161–184.

Murdock, G. (1990) La investigación crítica y las audiencias activas, *Estudios Sobre las Culturas Contemporáneas*, **4** (10), 187–223.

Murdock, G. (2002) Back to work. Cultural labor in altered times, in A. Beck (ed.), *Cultural Work. Understanding*. London: Routledge, pp. 15–36.

Orozco, G. (1996) *Televisión y Audiencias. Un Enfoque Cualitativo*. Madrid: Ediciones de la Torre.

Ortiz, R. (1998) *Otro Territorio*. Bogotá: Ediciones convenio Andrés Bello.

Pasquali, A. (2007) *Comprender la Comunicación*. Barcelona: Gedisa.

Pauwels, C. and Loisen, J. (2003) The WTO and the audivisual sector. Economic free trade vs cultural horse trading?, *European Journal of Comunication*, **18** (3), 291–313.

Picard, R. (2002) *The Economics and Financing of Media Companies*. US: Fordham University Press.

Qualter, T. (1994) *Publicidad y Deomcracia*. Barcelona: Paidós.

Ramonet, I., Chao, R. and Wozniak, J. (2004) *Abecedario (Subjetivo) de la Globalización*. Barcelona: Seix Barral.

Sánchez Ruiz, E. (2001) Globalization, cultural industries and free trade: the Mexican audiovisual sector in the NAFTA age, in V. Mosco and D. Schiller (eds), *Continental Order? Integrating North American for Cybercapitalism*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 86–119.

Sánchez Ruiz, E. (2005) El audiovisual Mexicano: ¿Concentrar para competir?, *Global Media Journal en Español*, **1** (2), 20–42.

Saxe-Fernández, J. (1999) *Globalización:Crítica a un Paradigma*. México: Plaza y Janes-UNAM.

Schiller, D. (1990) Las comunicaciones en el Mercado Único Europeo. Una visión desde los Estados Unidos, *Revista Telos*, **23**, 79–87.

Schlesinger, P. (2009) Creativity and the experts: New Labour, think tanks, and the policy process, *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, January 2009 (14), 3–20.

Seminara, E. and Bicerré, F. (2009) Ley de servicios de comunicación audiovisual: escencial para el fortalecimiento de la democracia, *Hologramática*, **2** (11), 53–71.

Sierra, F. (2006) *Políticas de Comunicación y Educación: Crítica y Desarrollo de la Sociedad del Conocimiento*. Barcelona: Gedisa.

Sinclair, J. (1999) *Latin American Television. A Global View*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smythe, D. (1983) *Dependency Road: Communication, Capitalism, Counsciousness and Canada*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Torrent, R. (2002) La excepción cultural en la Organización Mundial de Comercio (OMC): la base de la política audiovisual en Cataluña," *Quaderns del CAC*, **14**, 19–27.

UNCTAD (2008) *Creative Economy Report 2008. The Challenge of Assesing the Creative Economy: Towards Informed Policy-Making*. Geneva: UNCTAD.

UNDP (2010) *Human Development Report 2010. The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development*. New York: UNDP.

UNESCO (2005) *International Flows of Selected Cultural Goods and Services, 1994–2003*. Paris: UNESCO.

Van Cuilenburg, J. and McQuail, D. (2003) Media policy paradigm, *European Journal of Communication*, **18** (2), 181–207.

Wallerstein, I. (1990) Culture as the ideological battleground of the modern world-system, *Theory, Culture and Society*, **7** (2), 31–55.

Wallerstein, I. and Hopkins, T. (1982) *World-System Analysis: Theory and Metodology*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Watson, J. and Hill, A. (2000) *Dictionary of Media and Communication Studies*. London: Arnold.

Williams, R. (2005) *Television*. London: Routledge.

World Bank (2010) *World Development Indicators Database*, accessed 20/10/2010, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD.

Yúdice, G. (2002) *El recurso de la cultura*. Barcelona: Gedisa.

14

Methodological Pluralism
Interrogating Ethnic Identity and Diaspora Issues in Southeast Asia

Umi Khattab

Introduction

In an increasingly mediatized world, diasporas, from a media and cultural studies perspective, seem to have been examined primarily in their situatedness in the developed world, in old nation-states. Studies on the "West and the Rest" (Hall 1996) in Australia (Cunningham and Sinclair 2000; Jakubowicz 2000; Kolar-Panov 2003; Ang 2001; Ray 2003), Britain (Gillespie 1995; Ross 2001; Downing and Husband 2005; Husband 2000, Sreberny 2000) Israel, America, and Japan (Liebes and Katz 1993), and North America (Jhally and Lewis 1992) have effectively challenged the cultural imperialism thesis and invited global, interdisciplinary debates on the creative and inventive engagement of ethnic minorities with media forms in neatly carved-out third spaces. Studies have also included the Caribbean, such as Trinidad (Miller and Slater 2000). In the context of the Muslim diasporas and the rise of the *ummah* in the era of new media technology (cf. Mandaville 2001; Sardar 1993; Naficy 1993; Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi 1997; Karim 2003), focus has been in the Middle East and on the Middle-Eastern (Arab-Muslim) diasporas in Western Europe and the United States.

While Benedict Anderson (1991) paid particular attention to the consequences of European colonialism and print media capitalism on Southeast Asian modernity and ethnicity, and local Southeast Asian thinkers such as Munshi Abdullah and Eunos Abdullah, among others, romanticized the "Malay", a lacunae seems to prevail in the historicizing and the problematizing of the "East and the Rest", as though diasporas are "Western". As Massey (in Storey 2003) explains, much of the discussion on globalization tends to be relatively elitist. "To see the penetration of 'local' boundaries as something of recent origin is to read history from the perspective of a colonising First World" (Massey in Storey 2003, p. 160). For example, in explaining the notion of diaspora,

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

Sinclair and Cunningham (2000, p. 2) note the "… mass migration of people from the developing world to the developed world such as from Latin America to the United States of America, Caribbean and South Asia to Britain, Turkey and North Africa to Europe …" and in their book pay particular attention to the diasporas from the developing world in Australia. Generally, diasporas and their media use and representation within Southeast Asia and within the periphery has been a neglected field of study. In fact, the notion "diaspora" has hardly been deployed by local Southeast Asian researchers to describe ethnic communities such as Indians, Chinese, and Malays in Peninsula Malaysia, including the diverse ethnic communities such as Brunei Malays, Chinese, Sino-Kadazan, Suluk, etc., in Malaysia's half of Borneo. It is ironic that in a nation made up of diverse ethnic groups where race and ethnicity dominate public discourse and shape political formations (Mandal 2007), the notions of hybridity and diaspora and the influence of globalization on Malay cultural and political identity have hardly surfaced. This is despite the common assumption and the banalized discourse that Indians and Chinese, unlike the Peninsula Malays, are the colonial migrants. With little or no knowledge of their ancestral Indian and Chinese history and culture, third and fourth generation ethnic minorities seem to be labeled *pendatang* (immigrants), *keturunan pendatang* (descendants of immigrants), and *orang asing* (foreigners) in everyday talk, including being singled out as unpatriotic by power-holding political individuals (cf. Malaysiakini, November 29, 2010, http://www.malaysianini.com/).

Historians have argued that Indian and Indonesian empires have had the greatest impact on the culture of the Peninsula Malay. Gilroy (1993, p. 127), in the context of Euro-American modernity, argues that "modernity is inevitably a transcultural, international, diasporic, and hybrid formation". Clifford (in Sinclair and Cunningham, 2000, p. 14) notes that the concept of diaspora should be historicized to affirm the distinctiveness of particular diasporas. Bhabha (1993, p. 191) contends that "the creation and use of culture as a means of survival is both transnational as a result of contemporary postcolonial discourses being rooted in specific histories of cultural displacement … and translational due to such spatial histories of displacement rendering the issue of how culture signifies – or what is signified by culture – a complex one". Thus, to understand the construction of ethnicity and the cultural work of Malaysian media today, it is necessary to be informed by the work of history and the prior narratives and mythologies of the Peninsula Malay society.

During the historical and colonial process (cf. Shamsul 2004) of defining Malay identity and territory (Who is Malay? Who belongs?), while labor migration of Indians and Chinese in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries seemed to threaten the Malay cultural space and numerical superiority, language (*Bahasa Melayu*), religion (Islam), and kingship (*kerajaan*) became entangled with nationalism and race, contributing to the definition of Malayness and inevitably to the process of "othering". Not enough has been said about how the "diasporic othering" of Indians and Chinese for over a hundred years and how the conflicting, dialectic process of inclusion and exclusion of arriving Indonesians tended to contribute to the ideological architecturing of the identity of the Peninsula Malay race as an indigenous, pure, sovereign, non-diasporic, *bumiputera* community. Little documentation prevails on the role of the national media in the ideological engineering of the identity of the Peninsula Malay as an indigenous group in Malaysia. In this chapter I endeavor to sketch a multidisciplinary understanding of ethnic identity issues in Malaysia and, through methodological pluralism, I argue that the process of alterity seems triggered by Malay "ontological insecurity" (Giddens 1990) intensified by "de-traditionalisation" (Giddens 1990) and fostered by the hegemonic construction of Malay(sian) identity.

Malay Diaspora Identity

Rapidly intensifying flows of people, not to mention trade, capital, and information, between porous borders appears to have diminished the gap between local and global (Friedman 2000; Ohmae 1995) and engendered the formation and spread of diaspora communities, often said to be experiencing "displacement" and "disjuncture" (Appadurai 1996), dislocation and de-territorialization (Tomlinson 1999), glocalization and hybridization (Robertson 1995; Neverdeen Pieterse 1995) and disembeddedness (Giddens 1990). The discourse on diaspora largely speaks of the painful experience of people trapped between cultures, real and imagined, trying to adjust in real and imagined alien host cultures, having moved from one (or more) location/s as exiles, slaves, refugees, asylum seekers, migrant workers, political victims, traders, imperialists, etc. (Sinclair and Cunningham 2000). Their perceived inferior status, politically, and their difference, culturally, it is argued, tend to isolate them from the mainstream of society.

However, while "displacement" and "disjuncture" may be inevitable experiences for diasporas who arrive with racial, linguistic, and religious differences, like the Indians and Chinese who arrived as indentured labor in Malaysia over a hundred years ago, it may be a contrary experience for several diaspora communities, like Indian-Muslims and Indonesians who seem pleasurably re-territorialized and instantly hybridized in host nations such as Malaysia because of threads of cultural similarity and the fluid nature of the receiving Malay culture, which is itself being reconstructed and reconstituted on a day-to-day basis as it recruits all those who speak the Malay language (*Bahasa Melayu)* and embrace Islam into the Malay world. Hall (1990, p. 235) notes, "Diaspora identities are those which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference". Brah (1996, p. 196) expands on this idea by his explanation that "diaspora identities are at once local and global. They are networks of transnational identifications encompassing 'imagined' and 'encountered' communities.

Social anthropologist Shamsul (2004, p. 137) contends that the construct "Malay" is largely the work of the orientalist–colonialist, having taken shape during the period of British colonization of the Straits Settlements, Malay States, Sarawak, and Sabah. While "Malayness" argues Shamsul (2004), was given a new socio-economic definition in the early 1970s under the umbrella of *bumiputera*, it has since been de-constructed at various developmental stages in post-colonial Malaysia. In fact, the notions of "Malay identity" "Malaysianness" and *bumiputera* have been redefined under nation-building projects such as *Bangsa Malaysia (Mahathir Mohamad's regime)*, *Islam Hadari (Abdullah Badawi's era)*, and *1Malaysia (Najib Tun Razak's current leadership)*. The construct "Malay" thus appears fluid and translucent and continues to take new meaning in modernizing Malaysia. Nash (1989, p. 25) explains: "… Malay as it is now constituted is a category built up over time from groups in interaction, and the current definition took its major contours during colonial days and even more so during the political processes of post-independence. …" Differences within the "Malay" as, for example, between Kelantanese and Johoreans or Brunei Malays and Peninsula Malays are as deep as within Indian and Chinese communities. Ethnic categories or blocs are used as national references in a framework of contrast (Nash 1989, pp. 24–25) and nationally mediatized in a multiracial society. The Malaysian Article 160 constitutional definition of Malay offers almost any citizen, through conversion to Islam, conversance in *Bahasa Melayu*, and adherence to Malay customs, the status "Malay" (*masuk Melayu*) and in an Islamic revivalistic atmosphere where Malay-Muslims tend to see themselves as Muslim-Malay, it has become *masuk Islam* (to become Muslim). The Malay community therefore appears hybrid and as diasporic in this sense as the minority Indian or Chinese colonial migrants. As Edward Said (1993, p. 407) aptly observed, "No one today is purely one thing." Much earlier, Judith Nagata (1979, p. 252) contended "… ethnic communities are far from being enduring, immutable and ancient" …, stressing that "… even within the relatively small territory that is the Malay Peninsula and within the short space of approximately one hundred years, the 'ethnic' variations are impressive".

Spivak (1999) maintains that the processes of globalization problematize the dialectic of self by preventing the distinction of an "essentializing moralism". Culture and cultural identities seem no longer possible to be constructed through unquestioned theoretical assumptions of difference, rather a new politics of cultural identity, one of continual conjunctures and disjunctures that defy essentialized categories and descriptions, needs to be considered (Appadurai 1996). According to Bhabha (1993), to suggest a world of increasingly hybrid identities living in spaces between cultures is not to suggest that identity as a category is disappearing. Despite notions of hybridity and fluidity individuals still organize themselves around a sentiment that their identity has an essence. Identity becomes a site of contestation – of how it is forged, articulated, and rearticulated. For Appadurai (1996) increased migratory flows create multiple points of connection between media images and actual immigrant lives, which result in new patterns of collective imagination.

While Indian-Muslims at large seem to have unproblematically assimilated into local Malay-Muslim culture, many remain opportunist diasporas or *chameleon* diasporas delighted to "*masuk Melayu*" shedding Indian skin, whenever necessary, to celebrate the privileges of being *Melayu* and, therefore, *Bumiputera*. Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia's 22 year former Prime Minister, politically essentialized as Malay, is believed to be the son of an Indian-Muslim migrant from Kerala, India, and an exemplary of a hybrid diaspora in Malaysia. On the contrary, the Anglicized Indian British subject described by Anderson (1991) as English in thought and worldview, but not in colour and blood, no matter how hard she/he tries, is unable to be essentialized as English, let alone "*masuk British*". Likewise, in the case of the European Union, van der Veer (1995) argues that race and culture have displaced language as identity markers. German immigrants in England, he maintains, are easily absorbed into mainstream English culture as opposed to English-speaking Indian British subjects. Van der Veer (1995, p. 7) thus maintains that "processes of globalisation tend to create new bounded entities, celebrating relations with older constructions of territoriality".

Significant numbers of Indian-Muslims, though, have refused to assimilate with peninsula Malays culturally (e.g., first names continue with "son of" or "daughter of" instead of "bin" or "binti" or neither) and politically (e.g., abstaining from participation in the ruling Malay elite political party UMNO and forming Indian-Muslim associations instead), and thus do not seem to identify themselves with official icons and images of "Muslim" and "Malay". In endeavoring to preserve the perceived purity of their Indian heritage and identity, they maintain close nostalgic ties with and longing for an older imagined motherland – India. They are, along with other Indians and Chinese, and indigenous communities, constantly negotiating and re-negotiating their identities in conjunction with and in opposition to nationally manufactured media images and as such continue to seem displaced and disoriented in a modernizing Muslim home.

For Clifford (1997) diaspora is a social and cultural form of "travelling cultures" that is in an "entangled tension" with the nation-state and indigenous claims by "tribal" peoples. "… Diaspora discourse articulates, or bends together, both roots and routes to construct … forms of community consciousness and solidarity that maintain identifications outside the national time/space in order to live inside, with a difference" (Clifford 1997, pp. 250–251). Diasporic communities undergo a continual process of negotiation between symbolic resources, experiences of cultural identities, and cultural proficiencies – all of which are in a constant state of change. As such the notion of diaspora celebrates the hybrid potential of the self in transcending essentialist notions of national or cultural identity and subjectivity. Hybridity is described as "a cultural mixture where the Diasporised meets the host in the scene of migration" (Hutnyk 2005, p. 79). For Hutnyk, hybridity is a productive process that conceptualizes the emergent forms of cultural identity from the process of cultural interaction between migrants and the majority culture of the hostland. Ang (2001, p. 3) stresses "the importance of hybridity as a basis for cultural politics in a world in which we no longer have the secure capacity to draw the line between 'us' and 'them', between the different and the same, here and there". However, the notion of hybridity constructs the hegemony of a commercialized diversity. As Hutnyk (2005, p. 99) notes, "pluralism is the ideology that conscripts various political movements as mere social interests into an alliance that serves the status quo". To recognize cultural differences and minoritarian rights within the borders of a nation such as Malaysia, where the majority seem "ontologically insecure", is complex. Thus multiculturalism becomes mere tokenism to be showcased for tourism. The ideologically constructed and hybrid nature of the Malay (Milner 1998) is evident, as explained in the following sections of this chapter, by the extent to which pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial migration from neighboring Indonesia, India, China, and the Middle East, and distant Europe, helped to genealogically mutate the Peninsula Malay.

Pre-European Migrants Are "Us"

History tells us that travelling culture is an old phenomenon. The history of the human travelling species is a process of *longue duree* globalization, suggests Appiah (2003, p. 192), who contends that "… in our historical myopia we more normally use the term to speak of recent events". Milne and Mauzy (1986) contend that Southeast Asia was settled over thousands of years ago by a wave of Negrito migration from Melanesia and Polynesia, whose descendants in Malaysia are called *Orang Asli*, followed by migrants from Mongolia and China. The Proto-Malays, descendants of tribal communities in Sabah and Sarawak, migrated to the Malaysian region between 2500 and 1500 BC – making them the earliest to arrive – followed by the ancestors of the present day coastal peninsula Malays – the Deutero-Malays – who had early contacts with both Chinese and Indians (Milne and Mauzy 1986, p. 9). Nash (1989) notes that Malays belong to a melange of cultures and languages such as Bugis, Minangkabau, and Javanese, among others.

It has also been noted that, as a result of the movement of South Indians since pre-Christian times, the Indic civilization has had a great impact on the Malay people and culture of Southeast Asia (van der Veer 1995, p. 4). If not for Hindu exiles, led by Prince Sri Parameswara Dewa Shah, the Melaka sultanate would not have emerged. It has been alleged that following a coup against Sri Parameswara Dewa Shah, who was slain in 1445, and the succession of his Muslim half-brother, Sultan Mudzaffar Shah, Islam became firmly entrenched (Milne and Mauzy 1986, p. 11). Islam is believed to have been introduced primarily by Indian traders and missionaries and had become the dominant religion of Aceh and Melaka. Contact with seafaring traders from India and influence from the powerful Indianized empires of Java and Sumatra (Indonesia) led to a considerable infusion of Hindu socio-political culture into indigenous Malay culture (Sandhu 1993). Malaya was believed to be under the dominance of powerful Indonesia prior to the arrival of Europeans in the sixteenth century. In the days before Portugal, Holland, and Britain, migration from the Indonesian islands to the Malay Peninsula was common (Ongkili 1985, p. 1). The rise of the Melaka sultanate, the epicenter of Malay cultural hybridity, Ongkili (1985) notes, escalated migration from neighboring Indonesian islands. Indonesian migrants were easily absorbed or assimilated into the existing Malay population of the peninsula. Their linguistic and religious affinities in particular fostered cultural adaptation and the process was accentuated from the nineteenth century onwards as their common rural pattern of life contrasted more and more with that of the Indian and Chinese British colonial labor migrants (Ongkili 1985).

European Colonial Migrants Are "Them"

The first wave of Indians, as pointed out earlier, who arrived via the Indianized Indonesian empire and sea trade routes, were the powerful bourgeois, who mingled among the Malay aristocrats and reportedly were the best teachers of Islam (Sandhu 1993; Milne and Mauzy 1986). However, in sharp contrast, the second wave, arriving as British capitalist slaves, were powerless proletariats and petty traders. Most proletariats were Tamil Hindus. Substantial numbers of English educated Indians arrived on their own accord and prominent among them were the Hindu and Muslim traders from the Coromandel and Malabar coasts. Their emigration numbers increased in the late 1930s and again after the partition of the Indian subcontinent.

Khoo (1993), a renowned Malaysian historian, notes that Indian-Muslims arriving in the second wave assimilated with the locals, especially in the Straits Settlements (Penang, Singapore, and Melaka), and became known as *Jawi Peranakan* and emerged as important leaders of the Malay-Muslim community by the early decades of the twentieth century. They produced the first Malay newspaper, *Jawi Peranakan*, first published in Singapore in 1878, thus contributing to Malay literary development (Khoo 1993). However, during this juncture, with increasing demands from the Indians for greater privileges including citizenship rights, Malay attitudes towards Indians changed, contends Khoo (1993), who maintains that it was in Singapore, the birth center of the Malay political identity struggle, that Malay distrust and suspicion of the Indian-Muslims was first observed. In 1926, the Malays of Singapore founded the Singapore Malay Union, admitting only persons considered Malay, excluding local Arab-Muslims and Indian-Muslims. Khoo (1993) notes how Malays in the early twentieth century had vehemently objected to claims made by historians, such as that by R.O. Winstedt, that Malay culture had its origin in India and that Islam came to the peninsula via India. Khoo (1993) explains in a letter to *Pengasuh* (organ of the religious council, Kelantan) that Mohammad al-Johori denied the claim by R.O. Winstedt and alleged instead that it was more likely that the Arabs from Hadramaut brought Islam to Peninsula Malaya. "This seemed the beginning of conscious attempts by peninsula Malays to deny that Malay culture had borrowed heavily from Indian culture" (Khoo 1993, p. 271).

Together with Winstedt (1961), Sandhu (1993, p. 151) and Milne and Mauzy (1986) maintain that the first culture to have an impact on the Malays came from India. Assimilation took place steadily in Melaka. One of the products of this union was Munshi Abdullah whose close association with important officials of the English East India Company helped to perpetuate his reputation as the leading literati of his time. However, Munshi's views, as an Arab/Indian diaspora, perceived to be influenced by the ruling British, were criticized by Malay nationalists such as Yunos Abdullah via the *Utusan Melayu* – first published in Singapore in 1939 and remains to date the mouthpiece of Peninsula Malay nationalism. Since the late 1930s *Jawi Peranakan* (Indian-Muslims) and *Arab Peranakan* (Arab-Muslims) have been pejoratively referred to by Malays as DKK (*Darah keturunan Kling* or of Kling descent) and DKA (*Darah Keturunan Arab* or of Arab descent) (Khoo 1993, p. 285). Indian-Muslims are also commonly referred to as "mamak", quite often leveled at Mahathir Mohamad whenever his bluntness offends the Malays.

While the tug-of-war continued between Peninsula Malays and Indian-Muslims in determining the contours of Malay identity and establishing political power, and following British acquisition of Penang in 1786 (Sandhu 1993), as in other British colonies lacking indigenous or local proletariat, South Indian laborers were imported to work for the colonial states and in the British owned capitalist plantation sector (Sundaram 1993). Indians were the main labor group from the very inception of the rubber and oil palm industries (Muzaffar 1993; Sundaram 1993). The British indentured system of labor and the improvised kangany system (Muzaffar 1993) "… was reminiscent of the caste system, with the lowest group being treated like animals. Few other groups in the country had experienced such a total annihilation of human integrity and social dignity" (Muzaffar 1993, p. 215). Low literacy rate and addiction to toddy and temples somewhat characterized the estate Indian. Conditions on the rubber and then oil palm plantations least improved following independence from British rule as Indian labor continued to be commodified by new masters. Oorjitham (2001) points out that 54% of Malaysia's Indians work on plantations or as suburban laborers on low wages with limited access to social amenities. Conditions appeared to worsen from the 1970s following juggernaut modernization projects when both legal and illegal Indonesian foreign unskilled labor replaced the local Indian. Seabrook (1996, p. 24) notes that as young Indian men were increasingly leaving the estates for factory work in the cities including Singapore, their place was taken over by Indonesians and Bangladeshis willing to work for less wages. Owners of estates, for example, in Jerai, he contends, have been evicting Indian workers to construct golf courses mainly for tourists (Seabrook 1996).

Post-Colonial Migrants Are "Others"

Kassim (1998, 2000) contends that throughout the 1970s, the Malaysian government turned a blind eye to the inflow of "illegal" Indonesians, enabling them to proliferate in Peninsula and East Malaysia. Many sought accommodation (illegitimately) in government low-cost housing (reserved for low-income, working class Malaysians) and formed settlements in Kuala Lumpur and Selangor in Malay reserve lands and land belonging to the state and semi-government agencies (Kassim 2000). In 1997, more than 30 000 mostly Indonesian "alien" squatters were identified living in over 5000 housing units in Selangor and Kuala Lumpur, among Indonesian migrants who had arrived a century or so earlier (Kassim 2000). Apparently, state authorities did not seem to regulate the early inflow of Indonesian migrants or their illegal squatter settlements because to do so would have disturbed projected Malay population growth and undermined pro-Malay urbanization policy (Debrah 2002; Chin 1998). Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine breaking the time-honored migration pattern of Indonesians who have travelled and settled in the Malay Peninsula long before the existence of entities known as Malaysia or Indonesia (Fuller 2005).

Thus, labor migration in Malaysia seems entangled with the complex relationship between ethnic pluralism and the struggle for Malay-Muslim political hegemony (Vatikiotis in Debrah 2002). Critics point out that the political importance of immigration from Indonesia was perhaps the real reason for encouraging the entry of workers from Indonesia (Vatikiotis in Debrah 2002). Some contend this was part of the 70 million population visionary design of former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad to ensure that the Malay population outnumbered the non-Malay via assimilation with Indonesians, as had begun during the pre-European colonial times. To date, there has been no state-led strategic design to encourage assimilation within the multiracial Malaysian society such as between Malays and Indians or Chinese, or even more between Malaysians and foreign-born Indians, Chinese, or Bangladeshi. Local films and dramas do not on the whole depict interethnic assimilation, with the exception of independent films such as *Spinning Gasing and Sepet*, depicting a Malay–Chinese love affair that attempts to represent contemporary Malaysian culture as hybrid. Free-to-air television, radio, and print media continue to be segregated along ethnic lines to serve a differentiated and deeply wedged Malay–non-Malay national audience. Private stations such as TV3, NTV7, and channel 9 dedicate primetime belts for mostly Chinese audiences. Advertisers target Malay and Chinese audiences who are seen to have large disposable incomes and through market segmentation influence the cultural landscape of Malaysia's mostly privatized (political party owned) mainstream media.

Significant to this is the New Economic Policy (NEP) designed to economically uplift the Malay and culturally bolster Malay identity and hegemony. It may be instructive to point out that Article 153 of the constitution of Malaysia specifies the protection of Malay interest and privileges as an indigenous and sovereign group (*Ketuanan Melayu*) and thus justifies the implementation of affirmative policies such as the NEP. It is crucial to note likewise how the post-election May 13, 1969 interethnic riot contributed to the 20 year development policy, NEP (1971–1990), implemented to eradicate (Malay) rural poverty and restructure society through urbanization and the dismantling of (Malay) identification with economic function. The emphasis on industrialization coupled with the expansion of education, with special quotas for Malays, led to a massive population drift to urban areas and the creation of a *Bumiputera* business and educated middle class (Embong 2002; Sundaram 1993). At the end of 20 years, the NEP continued in the form of the National Development Policy (NDP) underpinned by Mahathir's vision 2020, which has failed to address low-waged, low-skilled occupations leading to reliance on foreign migrant labor (Sundaram 1993). Massive construction projects of the Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA) and the 88 storey 451.9 m tall Petronas Twin Towers were both completed in the late 1990s primarily by low-wage workers from neighboring Indonesia. The construction sector expanded with mammoth projects for a knowledge-based economy such as the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) linked to the High-tech Putrajaya government administration center. These monuments, managed by Bumiputera industry captains with close ties to the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) – a dominant party of the ruling Barisan Nasional – symbolize Malaysia's vision to be a fully developed country by 2020 translating into national slogans such as "*Malaysia Boleh*" or "Malaysia can do".

Chin (2002, p. 20) states that in the midst of the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998, there were approximately 2 million mostly Indonesian migrants (1.2 million documented and 800 000–1 million undocumented). Amarjit Kaur (2008) offers a more recent account, pointing out that migrant workers in 2007 comprised 2.8 million of the 12 million workforce, an estimated quarter of the labor force as noted earlier by P. Ramasamy (in Fuller 2005) and concurs with Chin (2002) that 800 000 to over 1 million of the migrant workers continue to remain undocumented with over 100 000 within this category being refugees and asylum seekers (Kaur 2008). Officials, notes Kassim (1998), were reluctant to release information on statistics of migrants and their countries of origin until June 1992. Kassim (1998) explains that records in the Sabah (East Malaysian state in Borneo's half) labor department show that the number of registered foreign workers as of the end of 1995 was 61.3% of the total number of registered manpower in the State. Despite the high numbers of worker migration utilized in the main for the manufacturing, service, and construction industries, there were no policies pertaining to their regulation. Policies that developed eventually in the 1980s assumed a temporary reliance on migrant workers, again suspicious that the Peninsula Malay space may be re-occupied by new waves of immigrants, as had happened under British colonial rule. To prevent history repeating itself and to avoid the fate of Western countries, namely France, Britain, and Australia, where migrant workers continue to stay, perceived as a barrier to nation-building and a threat to Malay hegemony, policies were developed to make it extremely difficult for foreign-migrant workers to settle permanently in Malaysia. It was in 1991 (Kassim 1998) that a policy was finally put in place, sustained by an amnesty program for undocumented workers and security operations, *Operasi Nyah I and II* (Operation Shoo I and II), continuing with a police crackdown called *Operasi Tegas* (Firm Operation) with the backing of an amended and gazetted immigration law, which imposes heavy fines, jail sentences, and whipping on those arrested. Thousands of illegal immigrants, including asylum seekers such as Rohingyas and Acehnese, have been "rounded up", among them over 18 000 have been whipped (Fuller 2005). Foreign workers are also prevented from coming to Malaysia with their families and foreign men, in particular Indian and Bangladeshi, are denied marriage to local women. Riots between police and factory workers and other incidents of violence led for a while to the banning of Indonesian foreign worker recruits and to the intake of foreign workers from other countries in the ASEAN region (Head 2002, *BBC Asia Pacific News*, January 26, 2002). Why, one may ask, has the cultural pendulum shifted from legitimatizing to illegitimatizing the Indonesian? Do Indonesian migrants not contribute to Malay cultural capital anymore? In the following section, I discuss the role of the news media in the calculated shift towards the construction of Malay middle class identity and hegemony.

Media and Migrants

Torn between race and nationality, policing the undocumented Indonesian seems paradoxical. On the one hand is the inability to control the inflow, on the other is the alleged intent to assimilate them into the Malay community (Chin 2002). In response to and hand in hand with institutions such as the Police and Immigration, the media appear to aid the State in regulating the inflow of undocumented immigrant workers. Based on an observation over 140 days between April and August 2002 of *The Star* (an English language daily) and *Utusan Malaysia* (a *Bahasa Melayu* daily), it was found that the Malay daily was more interested in covering Indonesians with 224 stories as opposed to only 86 stories in the English daily (Khattab and Sri Nilawati, 2004). This reflects the cultural affinity between *Utusan Malaysia* and its readers, among who are Indonesian immigrants. Clearly both dailies almost half the time had crime and violence as a recurring theme in stories about Indonesians (see Table 14.1).

While *The Star* had the tendency to refer to Indonesians merely as workers (50%), the *Utusan Malaysia* often labeled most of them as *pendatang* 25% (immigrants), *pendatang tanpaizin* 10% (unauthorized/illegal immigrants), *pendatang Indonesia* 10% (Indonesian

Table 14.1 Story themes in The Utusan Malaysia and The Star.

	Utusan Malaysia		*The Star*	
Themes	*F*	*%*	*F*	*%*
Politics	87	34.5	25	23.8
Economy	11	4.4	14	13.3
Social/cultural	29	11.4	11	10.4
Crime/ violence	114	45.3	46	44.0
Religion	9	3.6	1	0.9
Entertainment	–	–	4	3.8
Sport	2	0.8	4	3.8
Total	252	100	105	100

Table 14.2 Labeling of Indonesians in The Utusan Malaysia and The Star.

Utusan Malaysia			*The Star*		
Label	*F*	*%*	*Label*	*F*	*%*
Pendatang	5	25	Workers	4	50
Pendatang tanpa izin	2	10	Illegal immigrants	1	12.5
Pendatang Indonesia	2	10	Indon illegals	1	12.5
Pendatang asing	1	5	Migrant workers	1	12.5
Warga asing	2	10	Indon workers	1	12.5
Pekerja	2	10			
Pekerja asing	1	5			
Pekerja Indonesia	2	10			
Warga Indonesia	3	15			
Total	20	100		8	100

immigrants), *pendatang asing* 5% (foreign immigrants), and *warga asing* 10% (foreign citizen). Only twice was the Indonesian in the Malay daily referred merely as a *pekerja* (worker) (see Table 14.2).

Migration News (November 1996) points out how the foreign migrant is blamed for a range of social ills in Malaysia when in fact …

> … of the 10,623 serious crimes committed in Malaysia in 1995, 628 were committed by foreign workers. Of the 70,798 minor crimes, 2,197 involved foreigners (*Migration News* 1996).[1]

Editors have played *imams* delivering sermons that culturally castrate the bad Indonesian boy. An editorial in the *New Straits Times* of June 9, 2004, following spates of violence within the Indonesian community in Malaysia, reads in the intro, with the headlines "senseless savagery" as follows:

> Behind Sunday's brutal hacking of three Indonesians is a sadder tale. Sadder than one of those cruelly slain being a mere child … It is sadder than these killers having no qualms about behaving so badly in a host country so kind to allow them to live and work here. Truly, saddest of all is that their savagery may be depriving many of their people the opportunity to genuinely pull their families out of poverty. The livelihoods of these people may be jeopardised by these lowlifes who think nothing of carting their tribal trouble to wherever they set home.

The above editorial appears to frame the Indonesian migrant as socially dangerous and politically disruptive. It does not represent the viewpoint of the Indonesian nor offer a deeper and fairer account of how and why such violence occurred. Instead of exposing and questioning irregularities in the police and immigration system (cf. Kaur 2008), the editorial appears to be what Ward (2002), in the context of the Australian mainstream media's uncritical reportage of the Howard government's decision to refuse permission to the *Tampa* to enter Australian waters in an election climate, refers to as succumbing to wedge politics via "dog whistle journalism". The *New Straits Times* editorial reference to Indonesian migrant workers as "killers", "tribal", "savage", "lowlifes", seems no less than a form of "savage journalism".

Having invited Indonesians to slave in construction sites and having strategically deployed them for Malay urbanization and population expansion, as outlined earlier in this chapter, the editorial smells of self-centered nationalism. The editorial appears to speak of how the media attempts to represent a normal Malay, middle class culture as civilized, affluent, and philanthropic, unable to include bad blood into a refined urban community of Malay(sian) people. The cement of race and religion that once upon a time glued Malays and Indonesians appears to have eroded. Class appears to have created a division between brothers. When they were both rural and agricultural, they were a happy family. They intermarried and had more children together than one can imagine, and their creolized offsprings from romantic unions since the days of Sri Parameswara Dewa Shah are today making claims to cultural purity and are fencing borders to deliberately keep the working class "other" out since she/he is lowlife for a highlife urban Malay of the twenty-first century.

Malaysian authorities have been quoted in the Internet media expressing views towards migrant workers as follows:

> Foreign workers who marry Malaysians, thinking it is their passport to citizenship, had better think twice. They not only risk their jobs but would be sent home, warned Home Ministry Parliamentary Secretary Datuk Paduka Abdul Rahman Ibrahim (*The Star Online*, 2006).[2]
>
> The government decided that foreigners wishing to work legally in Malaysia will have to undergo medical tests in their home countries by Malaysia-sanctioned doctors. The requirement was imposed after it was reported that up to 30 percent of the foreign workers in the country have health problems, and that doctors in some countries were falsely certifying the workers to be in good health (*Migration News* 1994).[3]

> As the number of Indonesians attempting entry into Malaysia continues to increase … Mahathir Mohamad has termed them "the new boat people." Indonesians deported from Malaysia often remain in staging points such as Nunukan Timur on the Indonesian part of Borneo, where up to half of the women who have been deported are reportedly prostitutes attempting to earn enough to try re-entry (*Migration News*, 1998).[4]

While national and international media texts clearly reflect the official position of Malaysians towards legal and illegal migrant workers, Malaysia's ethnically diverse audiences offer (somewhat uncritical) readings of these texts as follows:

> … kebanyakan berita tentang warga negara Indonesia yang di baca adalah tenaga kerja (pembantu rumah/ Indon maid) yang menyebabkan seorang bernama May Lan mati. Apa yang dilaporkan akhbar tentang warga Indonesia yang bekerja di Malaysia membawa negatif. Meskipun ada juga membantu pembangunan. Tetapi kadang-kadang negatif. Banyaknya kes-kes jenayah yang melibatkan orang Indon, tak kira kerja sebagai buruh ataupun maid keh (Chinese respondent in Khattab and Sri Nilawati, 2004).[5]
>
> Rakyat Indonesia lebih pada jenayah dan masalah-masalah pergolakan politik yang menyebabkan pemikiran saya tentang warga Indonesia negatif. Jenayah dan poergolakan politik menggambarkan seolah rakyat Indonesia tidak mempunyai matlamat untuk berdamai. Setiap kali dilakukan proses perdamaian selalu muncul kumpulan pemberontak (Malay respondent in Khattab and Sri Nilawati 2004).[6]

Media discourses tend to blame Indonesian migrants for a myriad of social problems, from motorbike snatch thefts to murders. Migrants are portrayed by print media reports as *pendatang asing* who pose substantial threats to the welfare of Malaysia. Negative media framing tend to reinforce and amplify the need to *Nyah* (shoo) the migrants and to police and barbarically whip them. The rise of crime, social, and health problems in Malaysia has been constantly blamed on Indonesian foreign workers and illegal immigrants. It appears that media demonizing of the Indonesian migrant becomes necessary to keep the spirits of Malay nationalism up and to awaken the middle class urban Malay to the reality of their rootedness to the soil *(bumiputera*) in order to prevent "outsiders" from hacking their privileged roots and cluttering their cultural identity. The first wave of aristocratic Indians and Indonesians until the early nineteenth century seemed easily assimilated into an agrarian Peninsula Malay society. The second wave of proletariat Indians, in particular following British rule, appear denied cultural association and were replaced by the proletariat Indonesians in post-independent times. As the peasant Malay became a de-traditionalized capitalist, there emerged, as the headline of the June 9, 2004 editorial reads, "Senseless Savagery" – the need to *nyah*, whip, and bury the proletariat "other" (Editorial 2004).

Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued, through methodological pluralism, that large numbers of Peninsula Malays may themselves be a community of migrants, creolized by a host of cross-cultural encounters. I have attempted to explain why the Malay is being essentialized and differentiated from the Indian in particular and why Indonesian cultural elements were included and/or excluded at various historical moments in the essentializing of *identiti Melayu* (Malay identity) and how "othering" in particular of Indian-ness strengthened Malay-ness. Milne in 1981 contended that a dialectical tension existed between the Malay political objective of wanting to be the majority and the need to keep Malay privileges inaccessible to those regarded as outsiders, arguing thus that the definition of "Malay" varied according to political need and the movement of time. The process of "de-traditionalization" of the Malay via the NEP and NDP has apparently created a deep class division within the Peninsula Malay/Indonesian communities and between majority Malays and minority non-Malays. Likewise, state-led national identity and ethnic integration projects like *Bangsa Malaysia* and *1Malaysia*, (re)ignite debates on "who belongs?" and "who is Malay(sian)?". Gladney (1998, pp. 1–6) argues that the emphasis on "majorities/minorities appears based on a series of uncritically accepted notions of purity, numerical supremacy, and social harmony…" and contends that "extensive discussions of the various categories and forms of the words "nation" and "ethnicity" have contributed significantly to the ways in which national and cultural identities are constructed and represented in most of Asia today". Kellner (1995), underscoring the role of the media, points out that media increasingly shape … our sense of nationality … and of "us" and "them" and Thompson (1995, p. 34) aptly describes this as "mediated worldliness". National culture and identity has been described as a form of "imaginative identification" (Barker 1999, p. 64) as an idea that is simultaneously one of inclusion that provides a boundary around "us" and one of exclusion that distinguishes "us" from "them", where race (the Malay) is symbolically expressed as national and territorial, constructed differently and distinctively (Schlesinger 1991; Hall 1991). It is evident that Malay cultural hybridity seems historically challenged, perpetually denied, and redefined within the national sphere by re-born Muslim-Malay elites and this process of "identity purification" appears to have led, from time to time, to "burying the other" in multicultural Malaysia.

Notes

1. Malaysia: Recruitment Ban Continues, *Migration News*, **3** (11), November 1996, accessed 26/01/2011, http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=1083_0_3_0.
2. Foreign Workers Cannot Marry Malaysian Women, *The Star Online* (19/02/2006), accessed 26/01/2010, http://www/thestar.com.my/.
3. Housing Foreign Workers in Malaysia, *Migration News*, **1** (7), August 1994, accessed 26/01/2011, http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=405_0_3_0.
4. Malaysia: Deportations, *Migration News*, **5** (5), May 1998, accessed 26/01/2011, http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=1534_0_3_0.
5. Translation. Most of the news reported about Indonesian citizens concern the workforce (domestic maids/Indon maids) and how a domestic maid caused the death of someone named May Lan. What is reported in the news about Indonesian citizens working in Malaysia is mostly negative, although some have contributed to the country's development. But sometimes this is negative too. There are far too many crime cases involving Indonesian labourers and maids reported (Chinese respondent in Khattab and Sri Nilawati 2004).

6. Translation. Indonesians are more inclined to crime and political conflicts, which has led me to think rather negatively of Indonesians. Crime and political conflict seems to reflect Indonesians as not having peace as an aim to achieve. Each time the peace process is initiated, there will always be a group that will act violently against it (Malay respondent in Khattab and Sri Nilawati 2004).

References

Anderson, B. (1991) *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso.

Ang, I. (2001) *On Not Speaking Chinese: Living Between Asia and the West*. London: Routledge.

Appadurai, A. (1996) *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Appiah, K.A. (2003) Citizens of the world, in M.J. Gibney (ed.), *Globalizing Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 189–232.

Barker, C. (1999) *Television, Globalization and Cultural Identities*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Bhabha, H.K. (1993) The postcolonial and the postmodern, in S. During (ed.), *The Cultural Studies Reader*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 189–208.

Brah, A. (1996) *Cartographies of Diaspora: Contesting Identities*. London: Routledge.

Chin, C.B.N. (2002) The "host" state and the "guest worker" in Malaysia: public management of migrant labour in times of economic prosperity and crisis, in Y.A. Debrah (ed.), *Migrant Workers in Pacific Asia*. London and Portland. OR: Frank Cass, pp. 19–40.

Clifford, J. (1997) *Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century*. London: Harvard University Press.

Cunningham, S. and Sinclair, J. (eds) (2000) *Floating Lives: The Media and Asian Diasporas*. St Lucia, Queensland: The University of Queensland Press.

Debrah, Y.A. (2002) Introduction: migrant workers in Pacific Asia, in Y.A. Debrah (ed.), *Migrant Workers in Pacific Asia*. London and Portland. OR: Frank Cass, pp. 1–18.

Downing, J. and Husband, C. (2005) *Representing "Race": Racism, Ethnicities and Media*. London, Thousand Oaks, and New Delhi: Sage.

Editorial (2004) Senseless Savagery, *The New Straits Times*, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, June 9, 2004.

Embong, A.R. (2002) *State-Led Modernization and the New Middle Class in Malaysia*. Hampshire, NY: Palgrave.

Friedman, T. (2000) *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. New York: Anchor.

Fuller, T. (2005) Malaysia Shoos away a Key Business Asset, *Malaysia Today*, April 5, 2005.

Giddens, A. (1990) *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Gillespie, M. (1995) *Television, Ethnicity and Cultural Change*. London: Routledge.

Gilroy, P. (1993) *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Gladney, D.C. (1998) Introduction: making and marking majorities, in D.C. Gladney (ed.), *Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, and the United States*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 1–12.

Hall, S. (1990) Cultural identity and diaspora, in J. Rutherford (ed.), *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference*. London: Lawrence and Wishart, pp. 222–237.

Hall, S. (1991) The local and the global: globalisation and ethnicities, in A.D. King (ed.), *Culture, Globalisation and the World System*. London: Macmillan, pp. 19–39.

Hall, S. (1996) The West and the Rest: discourse and power, in S. Hall *et al.* (eds), *Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 184–227.

Head, J. (2002) Malaysia to Expel Illegal Immigrant, *BBC Asia Pacific News*, January 26, 2002, accessed 26/01/2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1783779.stm.

Husband, C. (2000) Media and the public sphere in multi-ethnic societies, in S. Cottle (ed.), *Ethnic Minorities and the Media*. Buckingham and Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press, pp. 199–214.

Hutnyk, J. (2005) Hybridity, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, **28** (1), 79–102.

Jakubowicz, A. (2000) Accent-uate the positive: implications and possibilities raised by the taxi driver, the cook and the greengrocer, in S. Bertone, C. Keating, and J. Mullaly (eds), *The Taxi Driver, the Cook and the Greengrocer: The Representation of Non-English Speaking Background People in Theatre, Film and Television*. Surrey Hills, NSW: Australia Council, pp. 66–70.

Jhally, S. and Lewis, J. (1992) *Enlightened Racism: The Cosby Show, Audiences, and the Myth of the American Dream*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Karim, K.H. (ed.) (2003) *The Media of Diaspora*. London: Routledge.

Kassim, A. (1998) International migration and alien labour employment: the Malaysian experience, in T.S. Toh (ed.), *Megacities, Labour, and Communications*. Singapore: ISEAS, pp. 67–102.

Kassim, A. (2000) Indonesian immigration settlements in Peninsular Malaysia, *SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia*, April, **15** (1), 100–124.

Kaur, A. (2008) International migration and governance in Malaysia: policy and performance, UNEAC Asia Papers No. 22, pp. 1–18.

Kellner, D. (1995) *Media Culture*. London: Routledge.

Khattab, U. and Sri Nilawati (2004) Unkind to kin? How Malaysian audiences make sense of Indonesia – a text and reception study, Paper presented at the *IAMCR Conference*, July 2004, Porto Alegre, Brazil.

Khoo, K.K. (1993) Malay attitudes towards Indians, in K.S. Sandhu and S. Mani (eds), *Indian Communities in Southeast Asia*. ISEAS Singapore: Times Academic Press, pp. 266–287.

Kolar-Panov, D. (2003) "Video and the Macedonians in Australia, in K.H. Karim (ed.), *The Media of Diaspora*. London: Routledge, pp. 105–118.

Liebes, T. and Katz, E. (1993) *The Export of Meaning: Cross-Cultural Readings of Dallas*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Mandal, S (2007) Indianness in Malaysia: between racialised representations and the cultural politics of popular music, *Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies*, **22** (2), 46–57.

Mandaville, P. (2001) Reimagining Islam in diaspora: the politics of mediated community, *Gazette*, **63** (2–3), 169–186.

Miller, D. and Slater, D. (2000) *The Internet: An Ethnographic Approach*. Oxford: Berg.

Milne, R.S. and Mauzy, D.K. (1986) *Malaysia: Tradition, Modernity and Islam*. Boulder and London: Westview Press, pp. 9–11.

Milner, A.C. (1998) Ideological work in constructing the Malay majority, in D.C. Gladney (ed.), *Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fuji, Turkey and the United States*. Stanford:Stanford University Press, pp. 151–172.

Muzaffar, C. (1993) Political marginalisation in Malaysia, in K.S. Sandhu and S. Mani (eds), *Indian Communities in Southeast Asia*. ISEAS Singapore: Times Academic Press, pp. 211–236.

Naficy, H. (1993) *The Making of Exile Cultures: Iranian Television in Los Angeles*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Nagata, J. (1979) *Malaysian Mosaic: Perspectives from a Poly-ethnic Society*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

Nash, M. (1989) Ethnicity in Peninsula Malaysia: the idiom of communalism confrontation, and cooperation, in *The Cauldron of Ethnicity in the Modern World*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 21–60.

Nederveen Pieterse, J. (1995) Globalisation as hybridisation, *International Sociology*, **9** (2), 161–184.

Ohmae, K. (1995) *The End of the Nation State*. New York: Free Press.

Ongkili, J.P. (1985) *Nation-Building in Malaysia*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.

Orjitham, S. (2001) Forgotten community: many of Malaysia's poor are Indians, *Asiaweek*, **27** (3), January 26, 25.

Ray, M. (2003) Nation, nostalgia and Bollywood: in the tracks of a twice-displaced community, in H.K. Karim (ed.), *The Media of Diaspora*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 21–35.

Robertson, R. (1995) Globalisation: time space and homogeneity–heterogeneity, in M. Featherson, S. Lash, and R. Robertson (eds), *Global Modernities*. London: Sage, pp. 25–44.

Ross, K. (2001) White media, black audience: diversity and dissonance on British television, in K. Ross and P. Playdon (eds), *Black Marks: Minority Ethnic Audiences and Media*. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 3–14.

Said, E. (1993) *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Vintage Books.

Sandhu, K.S. (1993) The coming of the Indians to Malaysia, in K.S. Sandhu and S. Mani (eds), *Indian Communities in Southeast Asia*. ISEAS Singapore: Times Academic Press, pp. 151–189.

Sardar, Z. (1993) Paper, printing and compact disks: the making and unmaking of Islamic culture, *Media, Culture and Society*, **15** (1), 43–59.

Schlesinger, P. (1991) *Media, State and Nation*. London: Sage.

Seabrook, J. (1996) Urbanization: the making of a transnational working class, *The Cities of the South: Scenes from a Developing World*. London and New York: Verso, pp. 17–24.

Shamsul, A.B. (2004) A history of an identity, an identity of a history: the idea and practice of Malayness in Malaysia reconsidered, in T.B. Barnard (ed.), *Contesting Malayness: Malay Identity Across Boundaries*. Singapore: Singapore University Press, pp.135–148.

Sinclair, J. and S. Cunningham (2000) Diasporas and the media, in S. Cunningham and J. Sinclair (eds), *Floating Lives: The Media and Asian Diasporas*. Lanham, Boulder, New York, and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 1–26.

Spivak, G. (1999) *Critique of Postcolonial Reason*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Sreberny, A. (2000) Media and diasporic consciousness: an exploration among Iranians in London, in S. Cottle (ed.), *Ethnic Minorities and the Media*. Buckingham and Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press, pp. 179–196.

Sreberny-Mohammadi, A. and Mohammadi, A. (1997) Small media and revolutionary change: a new model, in A. Sreberny-Mohammadi *et al.* (eds), *Media in Global Context: A Reader*. London: Arnold, pp. 220–235.

Storey, J. (2003) *Cultural Studies and the Study of Popular Culture*. Athens: The University of Georgia Press.

Sundaram, J.K. (1993) Plantation capital and Indian labour in colonial Malaya, in K.S. Sandhu and S. Mani (eds), *Indian Communities in Southeast Asia*. ISEAS Singapore: Times Academic Press, pp. 288–311.

Thompson, J.B. (1995) *The Media and Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Tomlinson, J. (1999) *Globalization and Culture*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

van der Veer, P. (1995) Introduction: the diasporic imagination, in P. van der Veer (ed.), *Nation and Migration: The Politics of Space in the South Asian Diaspora*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 1–16.

Ward, I. (2002) The tampa, wedge politics and a lesson for political journalism, *Australian Journalism Review*, **24** (1), 21–39.

Winstedt, R.O. (1961) *The Malays: A Cultural History*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

15

"Citizen Access to Information"
Capturing the Evidence across Zambia, Ghana, and Kenya

Gerry Power, Samia Khatun, and Klara Debeljak

> When the crucial information and communication needs of the poor go unmet, quality of life may significantly degrade, resulting in social exclusion, marginalization, isolation, alienation and humiliation. (World Bank 2003, p. 36).

In this chapter, we argue that citizen access to information is a catalyst to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a set of country-based targets to be reached by 2015. They include reducing extreme poverty and child mortality rates, fighting epidemics such as AIDS, and developing a global partnership for development. We examine how "citizen access to information" (Khatun, Debeljak, and Power 2010) varies across a range of population sub-groups, different countries, and across a variety of topics and the extent to which access to information is related to people's health, finance, livestock, and agricultural practices. We draw on data from the *AudienceScapes* Research Initiative, gathered in three countries: Zambia, Ghana, and Kenya.

The "citizen access to information" framework and data analysis afford a rich discussion of the methodological challenges of comparing data across three countries. What access exists to information resources and mass media? How much exposure is there to the information that is available? How do people relate to or evaluate the content? How specific is the information to the needs of citizens? How do citizens attribute what they know to what they have seen or heard? In the next section, we review the barriers to conducting valid and reliable comparative research.

Comparative research is not without its challenges, which is why many scholars believe its use should be limited. Comparative research has become even more difficult as it is no longer possible to consider nations as a single unit due to the heterogeneity of societies within a specific region. With globalization and increasing movement across national borders, cultures are no longer separate or autonomous. This is why thinkers such as

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

Chisholm (1995) and Steier (1991), among others, believe that it is impossible to compare nations as they are too diverse. Livingstone (2003) argues that cross-national research can produce measurements out of context, while focusing on universal theories and methodologies at the cost of cultural specificities (see also Power 2011). Comparative research is believed to work better with quantitative research as this type of data can be easily collected and coded according to universal guiding practices. Qualitative data are more dependent on the cultural context, making comparisons more complex.

There are many different approaches to comparative studies. Kohn (1989) identifies four approaches. The first uses the nation as an object of study. The second employs the nation as a context of the study. The third uses the nation as a unit of analysis and the fourth approach considers the nation as a component of a larger international or transnational entity. When conducting research it is important to be aware that research projects across continents, while capturing grand differences, may miss the finer distinctions. On the other hand, research on similar countries may miss the bigger picture. When carrying out comparative research, it is essential to get the balance between similarities and differences right, which raises the question of methodological standardization. In the next section, we review the challenges of conducting comparative research in Africa.

Comparative Research in Africa

Conducting multicountry national studies across Africa is extremely challenging for various reasons, including low literacy rates, gender issues, weak infrastructure, and population diversity. First, to address challenges related to illiteracy, data enumerators have to be native speakers of the local languages and in areas with high levels of illiteracy the questions have to be read out at a slower pace. The latter negatively affects the maximum length of the questionnaire, which needs to be considerably shorter than in countries with higher literacy levels.

Second, gender issues also play a very important role in most African societies and often special care is needed, particularly when interviewing women, as not all subjects are deemed appropriate for discussion, especially with strangers. Certain questions, particularly those related to political issues, income, or religion can be especially sensitive and may cause suspicion and therefore need to be given additional attention. Further, researchers often need to obtain permissions from national and local authorities prior to the start of the fieldwork. This can be a long process, and in some cases the authorities may decide to ban certain questions of a more sensitive nature. Security risks in certain areas represent another challenge and often individual regions need to be excluded from the sampling plan due to the instability of the security situation. Close cooperation with the local elders is therefore often crucial to ensure the safety of the researchers in the field as well as to successfully complete the fieldwork.

Third, the road infrastructure and flight connections in many African countries are extremely limited, making transport costs and logistics very expensive. In some countries, such as Sudan, the use of road transport is not always recommended due to high levels of banditry, forcing researchers to rely on flight connections. These are frequently subject to delays and cancellations, which may create a large number of layovers and overnights and therefore further inflate the overall cost of transport. Poor transport infrastructure may also negatively affect the time in the field and result in unexpected delays. Due to low penetration of landline phones, it is often necessary to conduct national surveys face-to-face.

Lastly, many of the 53 countries in Africa (see www.moibrahimfoundation.org) have diverse populations comprising multiple tribal, ethnic, religious, and linguistic subgroups. Population proportionate representative samples can be extremely difficult, time consuming, and costly to achieve. Finally, census data for many countries in Africa are extremely out of date and the construction of reliable samples are further complicated in areas where there are significant transient populations.[1]

Access to Information

In the North, information seeking increases during periods of instability and uncertainty (Valentino *et al.* 2008). People tend to seek out information on current events when there are heated political issues such as elections, public protests, referenda, or high profile court cases. Public conflicts and crises, in particular, attract large audiences in search of news and security information (Spence, Lachlan, and Burke 2008). Other types of events, such as public health crises, can also influence information-seeking behavior (Albright 2003). In the South, uncertainty and ambiguity can often revolve around daily food and water supplies as well as security.

Our approach to citizen access to information is influenced by the Communication Infrastructure Theory work of Ball-Rokeach and her colleagues (see Matsaganis, Katz, and Ball-Rokeach 2010). This theoretical approach is particularly relevant as it takes a communication ecology perspective, recognizing the larger context in which information is shared; it is multilevel and focuses attention on media resources that serve the interests of ethnic populations, a phenomenon that is common in many developing countries that are multiethnic, religious, and linguistic. The work of Twaweza ("we can make it happen" in Swahili), a three country (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania) initiative focused on strengthening citizen agency regarding accountability in the areas of health, education, and water, is also relevant to our approach (Twaweza n.a.). One of the key facilitators in Twaweza's methodology is to enhance citizen agency by increasing access to information:

> First, we seek to enhance "citizen agency", by which we mean the ability of men, women and young people to get better information more quickly, cheaply and reliably; monitor and discuss what's going on; speak out; and act to make a difference (www.twaweza.org).

We also draw on the work of Mody *et al.* (2010), who advocate for a return to the study of state media, since state radio and, sometimes, television are the only mass media sources available to large portions of rural populations in developing countries. We employ the term ICM (Information, Communication, and Media) resources to acknowledge the significance of the interplay between information sharing, communication patterns, and media consumption or exposure (Chatterjee *et al.* 2009). Further, a focus on ICM embraces the potential of social media to facilitate information sharing between citizens. Finally, our work is informed by the key principles of the Panos Network, where citizen access to information is at the heart of development and central to change (Panos n.a.).

There are various definitions of access to information. The bulk of the theoretical and empirical analysis that has been undertaken, particularly in developing countries, has focused on connectivity, which is the narrowest form of the definition. Most would argue that access to information is more than just connectivity. We reject the limited focus on connectivity and define access to information as a composite measure of access to source/s or platform, exposure, evaluation, content, and self-reported differences in citizens' reporting of their relationship with their ICM resources. Below we elaborate on each of these dimensions in more detail. In the next section, we draw on the World Health Organization's Demographic Health Surveys (DHS), the most extensive citizen-level data-gathering program across developing countries.

Demographic Health Surveys

The main aim of Demographic Health Surveys is to provide the latest information for researchers and policymakers to lead health policy initiatives. These surveys collect data using household questionnaires, individual questionnaires, and optional questionnaire modules. Individual questionnaires discuss a wide range of topics from HIV and AIDS, child health and reproductive health, among others. The optional questionnaire modules are produced to address any country specific information not addressed in the main questionnaire. The household questionnaire covers general household information, such as the age, sex, and educational attainment of each household member as well as household assets, sources of drinking water, and sanitation amenities.

Measuring access to mass media in DHS surveys is limited to asking respondents how often they read a newspaper, watch television, and listen to the radio. The DHS surveys use a standard questionnaire so that the data are comparable across countries (Measure DHS n.a.). The observations in these various studies raise important questions about the access to information that citizens have about issues directly relevant to their health and wellbeing. The following are the media questions and related health questions taken from the 2008 DHS Model Woman's Questionnaire:

- Do you read a newspaper or magazine almost every day, at least once a week, less than once a week or nor at all?
- Do you listen to the radio almost every day, at least once a week, less than once a week or not at all?
- Do you watch television almost every day, at least once a week, less than once a week or not at all?
- In the last few months have you:
  - Heard about family planning on the radio?
  - Seen anything about family planning on the television
  - Read about family planning in a newspaper or magazine?

- In the last 12 months, were you visited by a fieldworker who talked to you about family planning?
- In the last 12 months, have you visited a health facility for care for yourself (or your children)?
- Did any staff member at the health facility speak to you about family planning methods? (Measure DHS 2008)

We argue that the questions in the DHS survey regarding media consumption are inherently limited in their generality and present limited insight into citizen's access to information. Further, establishing the relationship between citizen access to information and the achievement of a broad range of development objectives like the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) is not possible with current data-gathering efforts.

Millennium Development Goals

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are eight international development goals that all 192 United Nations member states and at least 23 international organizations have agreed to achieve by the year 2015. They include reducing extreme poverty, reducing child mortality rates, fighting disease, epidemics such as AIDS, and developing a global partnership for development.

Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education.
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women.
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality rate.
Goal 5: Improve maternal health.
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases.
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability.
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development.
(UN Millennium Project 2005).

Currently none of the eight Millennium Development Goals mention the provision of information. In the context of MDGs, provision of information is mentioned only as one of the sub-targets and one of the indicators.

The provision of information therefore appears as an indicator for monitoring progress within MDG 6:

> Proportion of population aged 15–24 years with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS (UN 2008).

Information Communication Technologies appear as an MDG target within Goal 8, specifically within target 8F:

> In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications (UN 2008).

This target is measured by three indicators, namely, increasing telephone lines per 100 population, increasing cellular subscribers per 100 population, and increasing Internet users per 100 population.

Progress towards reaching the goals has been uneven. Some countries have achieved many of the goals, while others are not on track to realize any. The major countries that have been achieving their goals include China and India. The poverty rate in East Asia dropped from 452 million to 278 million primarily because of the dramatic reduction in poverty in China. However, areas needing the most reduction, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, have yet to make any drastic changes in improving their quality of life. In the same time as East Asia, the Sub-Saharan Africa regions reduced their poverty by about 1% and are at a major risk of not meeting the MDGs by 2015 (Besley and Burgess 2003). Table 15.1 summarizes the progress on each one of the eight MDG goals in the three countries focused on in this chapter: Zambia, Ghana, and Kenya. In general, Ghana fares the worst, while all three will only achieve many of their targets "if some changes are made" (MDG Monitor 2010).

In an interdisciplinary review of the MDGs, Waage *et al.* (2010) highlight the fragmentation and lack of synergy between the MDGs, particularly the division of the health MDGs concerning reducing child mortality (MDG4), maternal health (MDG5), and combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases (MDG6). The authors believe that there are lost opportunities created by limited goals, especially with reference to universal primary education (MDG2). The focus on primary education means that secondary and tertiary education, which is essential for improving future incomes and training health care professionals to help achieve certain other MDGs, remains underdeveloped. There is no reference to the role of information in the report from nineteen academic authors from seven countries across multiple sectors.

In contrast, we argue that citizen access to information is an important catalyst for the achievement of the MDGs. Second, we believe that tracking citizen access to information over time would aid in resource allocation efforts to support all of the objectives. Third, we propose that a useful and active measure of citizen access to information should capture the experience of multiple dimensions across different subgroups within different countries, in order to be valid and reliable. In the next section, we review the literature linking information, communication, and media to the MDGs.

Information, Communication, Media, and the MDGs

Much has been written about access to information and its role in development from poverty reduction to encouraging good governance. However, the discourse has been largely framed in the context of ICTs (Information Communication Technologies). While there is a general consensus that ICTs can play a pivotal role in enhancing citizen participation and contributing to the achievement of the MDGs there has been a lack of empirical evidence and statistical analysis to support this assumption. In 2003, the World Bank in their paper entitled ICT and the MDGs highlighted the impact of ICTs on all eight of the MDGS. They maintain that ICTs can bridge geographical distances and provide rural residents with relevant information, which can significantly reduce poverty.

Table 15.1 Progress by goal – MDG Monitor (www.mdgmonitor.org).

	ZAMBIA	GHANA	KENYA
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	◐	⊖	⊘
Achieve universal primary education	◐	◎	◐
Promote gender equality and empower women	◐	⊘	◎
Reduce child mortality	◎	⊘	◎
Improve maternal health	◎	⊘	◎
Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases	◎	⊘	◎
Ensure environmental sustainability	⊘	◎	◎
Develop a global partnership for development	⊖	◎	⊖

LEGEND	
◉	ACHIEVED
◐	VERLY LIKELY TO BE ACHIEVED, ON TRACK
◎	POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE IF SOME CHANGES ARE MADE
⊘	OFF TRACK
⊖	INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION

They claim that ICTs can improve information flows and communication services to make government and organizations serving the poor more efficient, transparent, and accountable. ICTs can help the disenfranchised voice their concerns, demand their rights, and take control of their own lives.

In 2006, those who took part in an InfoDev online discussion (Shields, Chetley, and Davies 2008) about the role of ICTs and health pointed out that they had yet to find any studies or research, especially on the issues of child mortality and maternal health (MDG 4 and 5). Most could only provide case studies on the issue of disease prevention (MDG 6). The overall conclusion of the discussion was there was a lack of "impact" data and analysis about ICTs and health, which is essential for proving effectiveness. The main theme running through the discussion was that ICTs were only as good as the communication they enabled. Furthermore, the consultation concluded that ICTs cannot be considered individually, they were only a tool for development, and their main purpose is for communication and information. There was also recognition that although ICTs play a pivotal role in health communication there was a risk of overemphasis on ICTs at the cost of other communication tools that could be more effective and appropriate depending on the specific circumstances.

In a 2006 report (UNDP 2006), the UNDP referred to "Communication for Empowerment" as a critical driver for securing the necessary participation, ownership, and accountability for achieving the Millennium Development Goals. The rationale behind these initiatives stems from the assumption that for media to play an effective role in international development, support is required to develop "healthy" media systems. These media systems should be able to respond to and reflect the information and communication needs of citizens. The same report also highlighted the call for "information and communication audits" in order for the development sector to direct the role of media in international development better. According to Wilson, Warnock, and Schoemaker (2007), there is a need to take a holistic view of communication processes, and thus integrating communication into development planning should be essential, as political processes are communication processes. They argue that: "reaching the MDGs in 2015 will require a belated recognition that communication is a prerequisite and central to all aspects of sustainable development" (Wilson, Warnock, and Schoemaker 2007, p. 4).

Many researchers point out that there is a need to combine both old and new technologies. For example, it is important to find out whether new technologies are being used in such a way that they strengthen existing information channels. In the same vein, convergence of communication technologies can spread knowledge more quickly and reach a larger proportion of people at a cheaper cost. Inagaki (2007) highlighted a limitation in the current research on communication for development, noting that the majority of the empirical analysis report positive impacts of communication on development projects and that there was a lack of evidence of failure. One of the reasons for the lack of evidence is that MDG monitoring has been relatively new. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) argue that more applicable indicators of universal access should be measured while Bedi (1999) notes it has been difficult to substantiate the quantitative impact of the ICT–growth link. In the next section we review the challenges of establishing the impact of media on development.

Media Development

The study of media environments in developing countries has largely adopted a media mapping perspective, documenting the scope and breadth of the media landscape. Such was the approach adopted in the *African Media Development Initiative* (BBC World Service Trust 2006). This work, while timely and focused on policy development to advance the robustness of the media sector, did not address the needs of the citizenry (BBC World Service Trust 2006). Furthermore, while anecdotal evidence and calls for research on the information and communication needs of people living in poverty are in abundance, limited empirical research has been undertaken to assess the extent and nature of those needs.[2] A comparison of results from decades of media intervention activities across developing countries has given rise to doubts about the influence of the media in the world of international development (Puddephatt 2007; Putzel *et al.* 2005). There are a number of reasons for this state of affairs. First, the objectives of stakeholders are inconsistent. The field of media and development is fragmented, largely because it represents a confluence of stakeholders with varied and sometimes conflicting priorities – bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, media development agencies, civil society organizations, journalists, media practitioners, activists, and academicians. The fragmentation of the field is reflected in the plethora of terms employed including ICTs for development, media development, media for development, educational broadcasting, and development communication (DANIDA 2007). Second, there is a dearth of robust evidence to substantiate the claims about the importance of the media. Much of what is known about the history and experience of media and development exists in the gray literature – unpublished theses and dissertations, donor agency policy papers, NGO reports, and websites. Efforts to centralize these data have been made by the Communications Initiative, the Global Forum for Media Development, CommGAP, CAMECO, and the National Endowment for Democracy's Centre for International Media Assistance.[3] Third, part of the reason that it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of media for development is that while there are great expectations (Sugg and Power 2011), the expected "effects" are rarely expressed in specific and precise terms. Rather, they appear as broad sweeping and general statements in project documentation that are not always operationally defined in terms that are easily captured either quantitatively or qualitatively. Further, the standard of technical research skills in the field is often extremely low and the inability to gather empirical evidence of impact of media initiatives is often not a failure of the initiatives but a shortcoming of the research endeavor. In their critique of media development indicators, McCurdy, Power, and Godfrey (2010) point especially to the difficulty of interpreting generic measures or questions about "media", without specifying the identity of the source in more detail. Wasserman (2010) also argues that there is a content divide where the global media expresses the interests of its producers, and whether one is talking about television, radio, or the Internet, global media are still largely the media of the developed world. Sometimes there is a "Third World" voice, but it usually speaks a First World language (Manyozo 2010; Deane 2008). Yet, despite these circumstances, there is continuing investment in information and media initiatives and interventions by a range of stakeholders in developing countries, fuelled by a belief in the power of information dissemination to citizens on a range of issues. In the next section we describe the multicountry initiative *AudienceScapes* that supported a program of research on information, communication, media, and development trends across Africa, to illustrate how these methodological issues were addressed.

Information Measurement in Developing Countries

In this section we review InterMedia's *AudienceScapes* research initiative. We also describe the questions that are asked in the DHS surveys in the context of Zambia, Ghana, and Kenya.

AudienceScapes

AudienceScapes is a research initiative launched by InterMedia in 2009, with initial support from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Building on InterMedia's experience and expertise conducting ICM research with hard-to-reach populations under difficult conditions, the key aim of *AudienceScapes* is to provide development organizations with a better understanding of communication, information, and media environments they work in, to help guide their advocacy and communication efforts, and, therefore, indirectly support better development outcomes.

Many stakeholders in the development process, particularly those working for smaller, locally based NGOs, have limited access to empirical research that could help them better target and deliver communication, information, and education efforts in a range of development activities. These include HIV and AIDS prevention campaigns, gender equality programs, dissemination of better agricultural techniques, and supporting media development. *AudienceScapes* aims to fill this knowledge gap. In addition, the *AudienceScapes* project is designed to facilitate healthier two-way communication in the development process by making the practitioners more aware of the information assets and needs of citizens and policymakers in developing countries.

The primary data source for the research initiative is the *AudienceScapes* research program, which was piloted in four African countries – Kenya, Ghana, Zambia, and Tanzania[4] – and includes both a quantitative and a qualitative component. Nationally representative surveys (the quantitative element) focus on the grassroots level and provides insight into media and ICT use, word-of-mouth communication patterns, levels of trust in various information sources, levels of access, and the use of information on key development topics among the general population. In addition, within the qualitative element, in-depth interviews with high level policy makers and policy influencers give insights into how these policy actors gather, share, and use information that is relevant to their policy-making and provide guidance to development practitioners about ways to improve communication and media efforts aimed at the policy level.

Nationally representative surveys in Ghana and Kenya were conducted in July and August 2009 and included face-to-face interviews with adults aged 15 and older. The nationally representative survey in Zambia was conducted in April and May 2010. The sampling plans for all surveys were based on the probability-proportional-to-size (PPS) sampling approach and included a sample of 2051 respondents in Ghana, a sample of 2000 respondents in Kenya, and a sample of 2000 respondents in Zambia. The qualitative element of the study included in-depth interviews with senior-level members of the Kenyan, Ghanaian, and Zambian policy community, including representatives from parliament, government ministries, business associations, nongovernmental organizations, and multilateral donor institutions, who are directly involved in development-related policy formulation and implementation. Fifteen one-hour interviews were completed in Kenya, 15 interviews were completed in Ghana, and a total of 17 interviews were completed in Zambia (Debeljak 2010; Bowen 2010a; Montez 2010).

The DHS Perspective on Zambia

In the 2007 DHS report for Zambia, 59% of women and 74% of men responded that they listen to the radio at least once a week and 31% of women and 37% of men said they watched television at least once a week. Overall, one-third of women and one-fifth of men are not exposed[5] to media of any type. In Zambia, urban residents were more likely to be exposed to all types of mass media than rural residents.

The 2007 report highlights general patterns in access to the media in Zambia. We use the example of family planning messages to illustrate the variations in access to health information among different population subgroups:

> More than half of women (56 percent) and about four in ten men (41 percent) were not exposed to any family planning messages through radio, television, newspapers, or magazines. Radio is the most frequent source of family planning messages for both women (39 percent) and men (52 percent). One in five women and one in four men reported seeing a family planning message on television in the 12 months preceding the survey. Newspapers and magazines are the least common source of family planning messages for both women and men (12 and 19 percent, respectively) (Central Statistical Office (CSO), Ministry of Health (MOH), Tropical Diseases Research Centre (TDRC), University of Zambia, and Macro International Inc. 2009, p. 85)

The DHS Perspective on Ghana

The 2008 DHS survey for Ghana found that, in general, men had greater access to mass media than women. For example, 76% of women listened to the radio at least once a week compared to 88% of men. Furthermore, men and women in urban areas were four times as likely to be able to access the mass media compared to their rural counterparts. Residents in greater Accra (24% of women and 43% of men) were more exposed to all three mass media compared to people in the other nine regions.

These findings highlight general patterns in access to the media in Ghana. For example, radio is the most common source of family planning messages for both women (60%) and men (69%). Specifically, the DHS analyses consider how people in Ghana are accessing health information through the mass media. Again exposure to family planning messages illustrates the variations in access among different population subgroups:

> Approximately half of respondents (45 percent of women and 51 percent of men) saw a family planning message on the television. Newspapers and magazines are the least common source of family planning messages for both women (11 percent) and men (20 percent). Roughly one in three women (32 percent) and one in four men (24 percent) were not exposed to any family planning messages in the three media. (Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), Ghana Health Service (GHS), and ICF Macro 2009, p. 100).

In 2003, only about one in five women (20%) and one in eight men aged 15–59 (12%) were not exposed to any family planning messages through radio, television, or newspaper/magazines in the few months preceding the survey. The 2009 figures, therefore, represent a considerable decline in exposure to messages on family planning in radio, television, newspapers, and magazines over the past five years.

The DHS Perspective on Kenya

The 2008–2009 DHS report for Kenya uncovers similar patterns to Zambia and Ghana. Men had more access to all mass media than women. Radio was the most popular medium for both men and women while reading a newspaper was the least popular. Urban women had more access to all mass media relative to women residing in rural areas. Access to all three mass media is greatest in Nairobi. Access to mass media was positively correlated with wealth and education for both men and women. The proportion of women who access all three mass media increased from 13% in 2003 to 16% in 2008/2009.

There are similar patterns in exposure to family planning messages among different population subgroups, with a sharp contrast between urban and rural areas regarding exposure to television and in print media. In urban areas, for example, 64% of women and 60% of men are exposed to family planning messages through television, while in rural areas only 29% of women and 31% of men are exposed.

> About 30 percent of women and 25 percent of men have not been exposed to family planning messages through the media. Most women (69 percent) and men (71 percent) hear family planning messages through the radio, while almost 40 percent of women and men hear messages on the television, and 34 percent of women and 40 percent of men see messages in the print media. (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) and ICF Macro 2010, p. 72).

The Context of Citizen Access to Information

A significant body of media and communication research has dominated the field of development, focusing on the "digital divide". Hilbert (2009) identifies two types of digital divide: international divide and domestic divide. International divide refers to the divide between societies while domestic divide is concerned with different groups within a specific society. Hilbert (2009) finds income distribution to be the most influential and predictive variable for the digital divide although he also reports that other socio-economic inequalities define the digital divide, including level of education, skills, employment status, geographical location, age, gender, and ethnicity. Gerster and Zimmermann (2003) suggest that access to information is determined by:

(1) Connectivity: are the services available?
(2) Affordability: can people afford the access?
(3) Capability: do the potential users have the skills to access?

Scholars have also debated the definition of ICTs. Skuse (2004), Tacchi (2005), and Gigler (2004) believe there is a need to avoid the phrase ICT if we are only referring to the Internet. They argue that the term needs to be more inclusive and should be acknowledged as including a wide range of communication technologies – both the new (Internet, email) and traditional (radio, film, TV, press). The influence of gender on access to ICTs in developing countries has received much greater attention.

Constraints on women's time or their movement outside of the home can reduce their ability to access any type of technology (Marker, McNamara, and Wallace 2002). Kaplan (1994) argued that women were more likely to be forced to use computers due to the nature of the jobs held by women; this, however, cannot explain the differences in mobile phone usage. Bimber (2000) points out that women tend to be less intensive Internet users than men and less frequent users. The research also highlighted different uses between men and women. Men tend to use the Internet for entertainment while women use the Internet for education and training. Overall, gender-related inequalities accounted for less than 0.5% of the variations in ICT (Hilbert 2010). Another important variable in access to ICTs in developing countries is whether one lives in a rural or urban location.

Typically a high percentage of developing country residents live in rural areas. Evidence, however, shows that access to media and technology platforms is clustered in major urban areas and in industrial regions (Huyer and Mitter 2003). At every level of income, households in rural areas are significantly less likely (sometimes half as likely) to have home Internet access (Hudson 2007). Network costs are higher in rural areas because providing networked services to low population-density rural areas, such as forest or mountain regions, is more expensive than providing those services in urban areas (Kenny 2002).

On the other hand, radio still dominates across the African continent and remains the most important communication tool despite the recent growth in mobile telephony and the Internet. Radio is by far the most widely used medium and is a vital information vehicle for some of the poorest and disadvantaged people in developing societies. Radio is a popular medium as it does not exclude those who cannot read or write (Skuse 2004, 2006). Skuse (2006) believes that there is a need to provide direct training to radio staff on pro-poor content creation and supporting radio-based educational opportunities for those children who are still not attending school.[6]

Radio also dominates the media markets in Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia. As findings of the *AudienceScapes* national surveys in all three countries show, radio is not only the most widely available but also the most trusted mass medium. In Ghana, for example, 86% of all respondents said they have radio available in their household in working order and more than nine in ten (95%) of all respondents find it either very or at least somewhat trustworthy (Bowen 2010c). Similarly, in Kenya 87% have a radio in their household and 98% find it either very or at least somewhat trustworthy (Bowen 2010b). Radio is also the most widely available medium in Zambia, although the share of the population that has radio available in their home is substantially lower than in Kenya and Ghana. In the Zambian survey 73% of respondents said they had a radio in their household and 87% of all respondents find information obtained via radio trustworthy.[7]

As in many other developing countries, radio is also an indispensable tool for delivering development content, such as information about health issues and personal finances. In the 2009 *AudienceScapes* Kenya survey almost four in five (79%) respondents said they received information about HIV and AIDS via radio; in Ghana this share was 75%. Similarly, radio is a key source of information on using mobile phones for financial transactions: in Kenya, for example, almost two-thirds of all respondents (65%) received information about this issue via radio, far ahead of friends and family as the second most prominent source, with 36% (Bowen 2010b). In Zambia, almost two thirds of respondents (63%) perceived radio as a very important source of information on health issues.[8]

Beyond the platform or technology, attention has also focused on the quality of the content. A significant concern about both state and commercial media in the developing world is the low quality of the content, partly due to the lack of resources, skills, and often inherent bias in the selection and coverage of topics (BBC World Service Trust 2006). Observers have noted the limited and often biased perspectives of those who own and control the mass media systems in developing countries.

> The quality, diversity and relevance of information are as important as the sheer volume of information available in a society, or the scale of its communication networks (Marker, McNamara, and Wallace 2002, p. 9). Until they come to trust new sources of information, poor people may not switch quickly to new technologies even if these allow quicker access to information. This is particularly relevant in countries where information is not freely available and where the media are controlled or heavily influenced by the state or concentrated in the hands of a small elite (Marker, McNamara, and Wallace 2002, p. 17).

Liberalized media environments can lead to capture of the media by narrow commercial, religious, ethnic, or political interests. State broadcasters, on the other hand, are often the only media actors capable of reaching rural audiences across the whole of the country, which means that their information may be sub-regionally limited compared to their urban counterparts (Mody *et al.* 2010). These concerns over the ownership and control of mass media systems have partly fuelled the growth of community media and community radio in particular, which afford a higher degree of citizen participation in knowledge production (Manyozo 2011).

In recent years, much attention has been paid to the growth in mobile telephony across the developing world. Mobile telephony has increased considerably in developing countries. Across Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, there is a profound transformation in the way people are gaining access to information (Bar, Pisani, and Weber 2007; West 2008). Global mobile phone subscriptions are expected to reach 7.9% of the world's population during the period 2007–2012, boosting the number of global mobile phone subscribers to 4.5 billion in 2012. Most of that increase is happening in developing countries in which it is having a transformative effect. Since 2000, mobile ownership has grown by 70% every year across the fifty of the poorest countries of the world. The ITU (2009) reported that mobile phone subscriptions have increased dramatically in Africa from around 4% to 28% of the total population in the period from 2002 to 2007. One of the main reasons for this is that wireless technology requires less upfront investment in infrastructure, which results in lower prices compared to fixed-line telephones.

Most people in developing countries use mobile telephony to mainly communicate with friends and family. This goes against the expectations held by many in the development sector who believed that mobile telephony would lead to people accessing more direct beneficial information such as health, government information, etc. (Sey 2007).

> But as far as mobile phones are concerned, users for now seem to place a higher emphasis on communication, not because information is not important, but because by communicating, they are able to get the information they need (Sey 2007, p. 13).

Mobile phones have also become an important platform for sharing development focused content and play an increasing role in the delivery of various services. For instance, M-PESA, a mobile money service launched in Kenya in 2007, enabled millions of previously unbanked people to have access to financial services without needing to visit a bank branch (CGAP 2009). In November 2010, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation announced several grants to scientists who are pioneering the use of mobile phones to improve health care in poorer communities. Among others, grants were given to scientists who aim to develop a disposable malaria biosensor based on a SIM card platform, which will make diagnostic testing more widely available in remote areas. A grant was also given to a project aiming to develop a mobile-phone-based tool that will quickly identify women at risk during labor and delivery and assist with emergency transfer to a hospital, thereby reducing maternal and infant mortality rates (Gates 2010). Ushahidi is another example. The website, originally developed to map reports of violence in Kenya after the post-election fallout in January 2008, for instance, tracks near real-time stockouts of medical supplies at pharmacies in Kenya, Uganda, Malawi, and Zambia, to ensure access to essential medicines for treating common diseases, such as malaria, pneumonia, diarrhoea, HIV, TB, diabetes, and hypertension.[9]

In terms of evidence of impact it is argued that the case for mainstreaming ICTs to meet the MDGs cannot be made without more thorough analysis and empirical evidence (Gilhooly 2005). Furthermore, it is difficult to quantify the impact of ICTs and to separate their influence from other factors such as economic growth and governance. Although there has been an increasing amount of literature and evidence on the significant impact of ICTs, it is not clear to what extent ICTs have been responsible in reducing development concerns as reflected in the MDGs (ITU 2003). ICTs cannot replace the need for political stability and physical infrastructure. The basis of the ICT and MDG discussion is whether ICTs can step up the achievement of the MDGs. There is growing consensus that ICTs can improve the delivery of services and facilitate management and transfer of knowledge, which is a main issue in achieving the MDGs. The next section lays out our approach to establishing the link between "citizen access to information" and development outcomes embedded within the MDGs. We present a more nuanced approach to capturing citizen access to information in developing countries, with a focus on Zambia, Ghana, and Kenya.

Capturing "Citizen Access to Information"

As stated earlier in the chapter, we propose five dimensions and several sub-dimensions within the five dimensions designed to capture the variation in citizen access to information in developing countries. In each case, we illustrate the dimensions with data from the *AudienceScapes* research in Zambia, Ghana, and Kenya. Where possible, we focus on survey questions that are directly relevant to the MDGs. Figure 15.1 summarizes the key dimensions and sub-items proposed to capture a robust, valid, and reliable measure of "citizen access to information". This is followed by a description of each of the dimensions and the sub-dimensions.

Access to Source or Platform – Foundation: Dimension 1

Access to platform or source is the basic criterion for the other four dimensions. In the case of media and technology, it is important to distinguish between those who have access and those who own. Second, it is valuable to know whether access occurs in a public versus private space. Third, access may be restricted at certain times, because of electricity cuts or because of weak signals. Finally, identifying the medium of access is important, recognizing that, in the context of convergence, citizens may be using one medium to access the content originated from another:

- *Access versus ownership.* It is imperative to establish the distinction between access and ownership in measures of access to platforms and sources. High levels of group listening to radio and viewing of television, use of Internet Cafés, and pay-as-you-go customers rather than mobile subscribers can lead to dramatic underreporting if access to a source of information or a platform is based on a question about ownership of the technology.
- *Public versus private.* Similarly, it is valuable to understand the context in which the information source or platform is accessed. Certain information may be culturally or politically sensitive and may not be appropriate for dissemination with strangers. For example, family planning content may be more comfortably consumed by parents without their children or by young people without their parents.

Foundation Dimension 1: Source or Platform

- Access versus Ownership
- Public versus Private
- Restricted Access
  - Time
  - Electricity
  - Signal
- Medium

Dimension 2: Exposure to Content

- Frequency
- Amount of Time
- Recency
- Recall – Format-specific
- Indexing – Dose effect

Dimension 3: Content

- Named Source
- Genre
- Topic versus Sub-topic
- Date

Dimension 4: Evaluation of Content

- Appeal
- Interest
- Trust
- Diversity
- Relevance
- Objectivity

Dimension 5: Self-reported Response

- Self-report
  - Political Participation
  - Health
  - Education
  - Gender
  - Livelihoods

Figure 15.1 Five dimensions of citizen access to information.

- *Restricted access.* Access to a platform or source of information may be interrupted at certain times of the day. For example, not all radio stations broadcast 24 hours every day. Second, electricity cuts will interfere with access to media requiring electricity and not all homes or media outlets will have a generator. Finally, signals may barely reach remote areas, with the result that the audio or video content is not comprehensible.

> Better access to information can help small producers participate in markets on more equal terms: for example, the Internet and text messaging are being used in many countries to enable small farmers to know what price their products are fetching in local and national markets. Access to this information puts them in a stronger position for negotiating prices with intermediaries (Wilson, Warnock, and Schoemaker 2007, p. 19):

- *Medium*. With the rise of technological convergence, it is imperative to establish the platform where the medium is accessed. For example, is the citizen listening to radio on her radio, on the Internet, or on her mobile phone?

In 2002, in South Africa mobile phones, Short Messaging Service (SMS) technology, and a pilot computer database have been used in an integrated approach to health monitoring. Every half-hour, the database scans a list of patients and sends an SMS text message to those patients needing to take their medication. However, establishing the direct relationships between the use of ICTs on media platforms and development platforms can be challenging to substantiate empirically (World Bank 2003).

Figure 15.2 demonstrates the high degree of usage of mobile phones in both Kenya and Ghana and Figure 15.3 shows the high level of convergence between different media platforms. In both countries, about one third of all those who used mobile phones in the past year, for example, also used it to listen to the radio and, in Kenya, about a fifth also used it to access the Internet.

Figure 15.4 illustrates the variation in access to broadcast mobile and Internet platforms in Ghana, between educated and uneducated men and women and between citizens living in urban and rural areas. Further, among rural residents who have access to only one platform, the overwhelming majority are reliant on radio.

Exposure to Content: Dimension 2

Access to a medium or technology does not imply access or exposure to information. It is imperative to establish the frequency of exposure, the amount of time exposed, the recency of exposure, and the criteria for confirming accurate recall of the content and specific format. The combination of responses may afford the possibility of indexing the exposure along a continuum of exposure intensity, sometimes referred to as the dose effect.

Without understanding the nature and extent of the exposure to the information available, it is impossible to attribute the variation in any outcome measure in terms of knowledge levels, attitude change, self-efficacy, interpersonal communication, or self-reported behavior change:

- *Frequency*. Citizens may be exposed to information about an issue multiple times in one day, multiple times in one week, month, or year. The number of times and the time elapsed between the first and last exposure is important to record.



Figure 15.2 Mobile phone usage in Kenya and Ghana.
Sources: AudienceScapes national survey in Kenya, n = 2000, 15+, 2009; AudienceScapes national survey in Ghana, n = 2051, 15+, 2009.



Figure 15.3 Level of convergence between media platforms in Kenya and Ghana.
Sources: AudienceScapes national survey in Kenya, n = 1808 respondents who used a mobile phone in the past year; AudienceScapes national survey in Ghana, n = 1812 respondents who used a mobile phone in the past year.

- *Amount of time*. While the reported frequency of exposure to information may be high, the absolute time spent may be very short. For example, an individual may hear the daily news every evening but only for the first 5 minutes, not for the entire one hour broadcast.
- *Recency*. A common currency in reach figures for broadcasting is recency – viewed last night, listened in the last week, listened in the last month, etc. It is important to capture this aspect of exposure as well.
- *Recall – format specific*. It is valuable to establish format-specific recall, for example, that citizens are recalling the information about the upcoming election from a public service announcement (PSA), rather than on the state news bulletin. The nature of the exposure and the content might be very different.
- *Indexing – dose effect*. Ideally, questions and response categories and scales are constructed in such a way that they can be aggregated to create an "Index of Exposure", where post hoc analysis will facilitate a complex measure of those who can be classified as more exposed or less exposed. This is sometimes referred to as the



Figure 15.4 Access to ICM resources in Ghana.
Source: InterMedia.



Figure 15.5 Percentage of the population using the source for news and information *every day*. *Source*: AudienceScapes national surveys in Ghana, Kenya (2009) and Zambia (2010). Base: n = 2000 for Kenya, n = 2051 for Ghana, n = 2000 in Zambia, 15+. Please note: Only top sources are shown. Other sources that were included in the survey but are not shown are internet, government officials, magazines and brochures/pamphlets.

> dose effect. Dose effect analysis seeks to measure the level of exposure of those surveyed to specific communication programs, controlling for the social economic status of respondents. Dose effect analysis allows investigation into whether those with higher levels of exposure are more likely to report desired behaviors (Bertrand 2005).

> In the case of the Stop AIDS Love Life campaign in Ghana, 80 per cent of the audience was exposed to at least one medium, with TV having the widest reach. In the Ghana analysis, the exposure score was based on the number of channels reported by the respondent. One then tests to determine whether those with greater exposure were more likely to practice the desired health behaviour, controlling for socio-demographic factors (UNICEF 2005, pp. 54–55).

Figure 15.5 shows the variation in the daily usage of different media and nonmedia sources for obtaining news and information across Kenya, Ghana, and Zambia. While radio plays the dominant role in all three countries, Zambians seem to rely on this source much less than Ghanaians and Kenyans. Nonmedia sources, such as friends and family, play a key role, particularly in Kenya, where more than half of the adult population uses them to obtain news and information on a daily basis. These results may also speak to the value of distinguishing between news and information as content genres and, perhaps, to specifying the type of news and the type of information.



Figure 15.6 Percentage who never received information on health topics or received it more than 12 months ago.
Source: AudienceScapes national surveys in Kenya, Ghana (2009) and Zambia (2010). Base: n = 2000 for Kenya, n = 2051 for Ghana, n = 2000 in Zambia, 15+.

Content: Dimension 3

Access to information does not imply that the information on the sub-topic is of specific value or interest to the citizen. In this case, it is imperative to identify the specific attributes of the content. For example, instead of a question about "health content on the radio", it is critical to ask about information on acute respiratory infection (ARI) on the program for young mothers on Channel 4 on Friday at 6 pm. The content dimensions include the medium, named station or source and program/format, the subtopic, and the date and time:

- *Named source*. Building on the medium-specific data in Dimension 1 and the format-specific data in Dimension 2, it is imperative to establish the named source of the information. Citizens may remember that they heard the information on a women's discussion program on the radio but not remember the exact program. The accurate recall of the radio program may be aided and determined by the branding and prompting with audio jingles.
- *Genre*. Traditionally, the underlying assumption in media and development studies is that news and current affairs content is of primary importance (Roman 2005), particularly in the delivery of factual information. This has shifted somewhat with the attention being paid to the potential for radio and television and other media to deliver engaging development content using entertainment genres, including drama (Skuse, Gillespie, and Power 2011). Entertainment content can be more interactive and has the potential to impact assumptions and perceptions about cultural norms and practices. It is valuable, therefore, to identify the genre of content that citizens are accessing.
- *Topic versus sub-topic*. As Figure 15.6 illustrates, asking survey questions about a generic health information category masks and often dilutes the variation in access to information about a range of significant health sub-categories. Similarly, asking generic questions about news and current affairs may disguise the fact that many young people regard celebrity gossip as news and current affairs.

- *Date*. When the information is provided in a serial format or series of programs, it is important to confirm the date when the content was consumed. For example, if the content is delivered in one episode of a drama and the viewer did not see it, then the information will not have been received.

Figure 15.6 shows the variation in citizen's access to information on a range of health sub-topics across Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia, all issues that constitute key components of the targets around health for MDGs 4, 5, and 6, in particular.

Evaluation of Content: Dimension 4

Access to information does not imply access to quality information. Establishing measures of quality according to the citizen is an essential dimension in understanding the potential of information to effect individual and social change. The salient dimensions are appeal, interest, trustworthiness, diversity, relevance, and objectivity.

Engagement with content can be evaluated on a broad range of dimensions:

- *Appeal*. The extent to which citizens find information appealing may be influenced by a combination of factors, some of which are listed as sub-dimensions. However, this is a useful generic measure to understand the general resonance of the content for citizens (Bertrand 1978).
- *Interest*. Capturing the degree to which citizens regard the information of interest to them is a more cognitive than affective measure. The intention here is to go beyond what Petty and Cacioppo (1986) would refer to as the peripheral cues to the central cues.
- *Trust*. Trustworthiness and credibility of the source of the content are important, particularly in the socio-cultural contexts where the ownership and control of media sources may exercise more explicit editorial control. In a recent study in Zambia, Debeljak (2010) reports a variation in trust in different information sources from 87% trusting in radio to 22% trusting the Internet.
- *Diversity*. An important challenge for media sources in developing countries is to produce content that represents a number of different perspectives. This applies to governance, economic, health, human rights, and livelihood-related issues.
- *Relevance*. While citizens often acknowledge the value of content to others, they do not always regard it as relevant to themselves. Establishing the degree of perceived personal relevance of the information is also important.
- *Objectivity*. A common measure in studies of media content is the extent of its objectivity, often defined in terms of absence of bias or presence of opposing viewpoints. It is important to recognize that objectivity is often culturally defined and should not be assumed to be universal. Capturing a culturally nuanced measure of objectivity is also valuable.

Figure 15.7 illustrates the differences in trustworthiness of different sources for information on health issues across Kenya, Ghana, and Zambia.



Figure 15.7 Percentage who find the source at least somewhat trustworthy for information on health issues.
Source: AudienceScapes national surveys in Kenya, Ghana (2009) and Zambia (2010). Base: n = 2000 for Kenya, n = 2051 for Ghana, n = 2000 in Zambia, 15+.

Self-Reported Response: Dimension 5

Self-reported data on behavior change presents a challenge in studies designed to capture impact (Pisani 2009). This dimension is designed to explore the extent to which citizens identify that their knowledge levels, attitudes, or self-reported decision-making or behavior can be attributed to information they received from a particular source.

The objective of this dimension is to capture the extent to which citizens attribute their newly acquired knowledge, change in attitude, or a shift in their behavior to information acquired from a particular source or platform. This may be in the realm of health, governance, livelihoods, human rights, etc. As with all self-reported data, it is important to be aware of the potential bias introduced by the assumed social desirability of the response and the possibility that this might result in over- or underreporting (Kreuter, Presser, and Tourangeau 2008). Further, it would be valuable to corroborate the survey research findings by triangulating with other sources of secondary data. Ideally, service delivery agencies might include a question in their intake or registration forms to identify where citizens found out about a particular service or offering (see Twaweza.org).

ICTs can empower women and help them overcome gender inequality by raising awareness of their social and political status and creating new economic opportunities. They can also be an invaluable tool in positively changing people's attitude, including women themselves, toward women by providing educational programs on gender equality, by providing information platforms for educational programs on gender equality (World Bank 2003).

The intention here is not to capture any self-reflexive processes, although we acknowledge that these may occur as a result of citizens being challenged to think about and



Figure 15.8 Access to information and access to formal financial services in Ghana. *Source*: InterMedia.

explain the reasons why their thinking or behavior may have changed (see Gumuchio-Dagron and Tufte 2006).

Figure 15.8 illustrates variations in citizen access to information on formal financial services and the use of these services between different population subgroups. We include these data as an example of the differences in self-reporting on information reception and related use of services between men and women, urban and rural, and educated and uneducated citizens in the same country.

Conclusions

Drawing on the experience of nationally representative studies of citizens in Zambia, Ghana, and Kenya, this chapter proposes a framework that employs citizen access to information as the means to understand the relationship between ICM resources (Information, Communication, and Media) and development outcomes. We argue that "citizen access to information" is a catalyst for achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) across a broad range of development indicators in health, education, and livelihoods.

We use the term ICM to incorporate traditional mass media (radio, television, and print) and newer platforms (Internet and mobile). We recognize that social media facilitate the propensity to share information. Although radio remains dominant in Africa, the adoption of the mobile is dramatic; the availability of media and technology platforms varies across different population subgroups; men and women, among educated and uneducated citizens, and between those living in rural and urban areas. The results of the studies from Ghana and Kenya suggest the increasing importance of convergence, where citizens are using their mobile phones to listen to the radio and to access the Internet. While much of the research in the area of media and development has focused on ICTs and we draw heavily on that literature, we believe that the digital divide debate has distracted attention away from the low quality of content available on a range of media and technology platforms in developing countries.

We propose a five-dimensional index with multiple sub-items to capture the complexity of "citizen access to information" in developing countries, where conditions are very different from those extant in the North. The five dimensions are based on the following three assumptions: first, that information is a key facilitator in achieving development targets; second, that access to media or technology does not guarantee access to information; and, third, that access to information does not guarantee access to information that meets the specific development needs of citizens.

Finally, the framework proposed in this chapter is a work in progress, informed by our research practice on the ground in Zambia, Ghana, and Kenya, and in multiple other countries around the world. We expect that the thinking reflected here will evolve as we draw on new work and as our methods and measures are tested and refined in future studies. The comparative approach is a key pillar to our work in reminding us simultaneously not only of the similarities and differences across countries and sub-populations but also of the inherently static nature of those comparisons in information, communication, and media environments that are fluid and dynamic.

Acknowledgments

The authors acknowledge the support of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation for their investment in InterMedia's *AudienceScapes* Research Initiative as well as the *AudienceScapes* Director Peter Goldstein and the *AudienceScapes* research team Hannah Bowen, David Montez, and Gayatri Murthy.

Notes

1. These were among the challenges experienced by the team of African researchers, who collaborated in the African Media Development Initiative, a study of the media sector across seventeen countries in 2006 (BBC World Service Trust 2006). The multicountry research in Africa on the Internet and mobile use is also worthy of note for its methodological rigor (see Gillwald and Esselar 2005), as is the work of the African Media Barometer, http://fesmedia.org/top/resources/amb-reports/#c102.
2. In the United States, understanding the information and communication needs of communities has recently been recognized by the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation and the Aspen Communications and Society program. These two organizations have established a nationwide initiative called the Knight Commission, focusing on the information needs of American communities.

3. Communications Initiative: http://www.comminit.com/, Global Forum for Media Development: http://www.gfmd.info/, CommGAP: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTDEVCOMMENG/EXTGOVACC/0,,menuPK:3252017~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:3252001,00.html, CAMECO: http://www.cameco.org/, and the National Endowment for Democracy's Centre for International Media Assistance: http://cima.ned.org/.
4. The results from the 2010 *AudienceScapes* pilot survey in Tanzania were not included in this article as the data were not readily available at the time of writing.
5. In all DHS Surveys exposure to the media is assessed by asking how often a respondent reads the newspaper, watches television, or listens to the radio.
6. Most recently, the *Global Monitoring Report on Education for All 2010* and *Reaching the Marginalized* both report shocking figures about the state of education in the developing world. Less than 55% of school-age children in developing countries attend secondary school, 72 million children are still out of school, and, if current trends continue, there will still be 50 million out of school by 2015. We know that investment in education produces significant returns in poverty reduction, economic growth, child survival, and democracy. We also know that there is huge potential for radio and mobile platforms to meet the information needs of people living in poverty. However, the extent to which the educational and other benefits of the increased access to information and communication technologies will be shared equitably among citizens of developing countries has been challenged (Etzo and Collender 2010).
7. *AudienceScapes* nationally representative survey in Zambia, 2010, $n = 2000$, 15+.
8. *AudienceScapes* nationally representative survey in Zambia, 2010, $n = 2000$, 15+.
9. http://www.ushahidi.com/platform.

References

Albright, K. (2003) *HIV/AIDS Information Seeking and Healthcare Communications in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Sheffield: University of Sheffield, Department of Information Studies.

Bar, F., Pisani, F. and Weber, M. (2007) Mobile technology appropriation in a distant mirror: baroque infiltration, creolization and cannibalism, Paper presented at the *Seminario sobre Desarrollo Económico, Desarrollo Social y Comunicaciones Móviles en América Latina*. Buenos Aires, April 20, 2007.

BBC World Service Trust (2006) *African Media Development Initiative*. London: BBC World Service Trust.

Bedi, A.S. (1999) *The Role of Information and Communication Technologies in Economic Development: A Partial Survey ZEF*. Discussion Papers on Development Policy. Bonn: The Center for Development Research.

Bertrand, J.T. (1978) *Pretesting Communication Materials*. Chicago: Communication Laboratory, Community Family Study Center, University of Chicago.

Bertrand, J.T. (2005) *The Drum Beat 302: Evaluating Health Communication Programmes*. Comminit, accessed 23/11/2010, http://www.comminit.com/drum_beat_302.html.

Besley, T. and Burgess, R. (2003) *Halving Global Poverty*. London: LSE, accessed 05/01/2011, http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/rburgess/wp/jep11.pdf.

Bimber, B. (2000) Measuring the gender gap on the Internet, *Social Science Quarterly*, **81** (3), 868–876.

Bowen, H. (2010a) *Communicating with Policymakers about Development Issues: A Guide for the International Development Community. InterMedia's AudienceScapes Research Initiative*. London and Washington, DC: InterMedia.

Bowen, H. (2010b) *Information at the Grassroots: Analyzing the Media Use and Communication Habits of Kenyans to Support Effective Development. InterMedia's AudienceScapes Research Initiative*. London and Washington, DC: InterMedia.

Bowen, H. (2010c) *Making Connections: Using Data on Ghanaians' Media Use and Communication Habits as a Practical Tool in Development Work. Africa Development Research Series*. Ghana, London, and Washington, DC: InterMedia.

Central Statistical Office (CSO), Ministry of Health (MOH), Tropical Diseases Research Centre (TDRC), University of Zambia, and Macro International Inc. (2009) *Zambia Demographic and Health Survey 2007*. Calverton, MD: CSO and Macro International Inc.

CGAP (2009) *M-Pesa: Connecting Urban and Rural Communities*. CGAP, accessed 29/12/2010, http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.26.11223/.

Chatterjee, J.S., Bhanot, A., Frank, L.B., Murphy, S.T., and Power, J.G. (2009) The importance of interpersonal discussion and self-efficacy in knowledge, attitude, and practice models, *International Journal of Communication*, **3**, 607–634.

Chisholm, L. (1995) European youth research: tour de force or Turmbau zu Babel?, in L. Chisholm, P. Buchner, H.-H. Kruger, and M. Bois-Reymond (eds), *Growing Up in Europe: Contemporary Horizons on Childhood and Youth Studies*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 21–34.

DANIDA (2007) *Monitoring and Indicators of Communication for Development*. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Denmark.

Deane, J. (2008) Why the media matters: the relevance of the media to tackling global poverty, in M. Harvey (ed.), *Media Matters: Perspectives on Advancing Governance and Development*. Global Forum for Media Development. Paris: Internews Europe.

Debeljak, K. (2010) *Communicating with Policymakers about Development: A Guide for the International Development Community. InterMedia's AudienceScapes Research Initiative*. London and Washington, DC: InterMedia.

Etzo, S. and Collender, G. (2010) The mobile phone "revolution" in Africa: rhetoric or reality?, *African Affairs*, **109** (437), 659–668.

Gates, B. (2010) *Cell Phone Science*. Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, accessed 04/01/2011, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/foundationnotes/pages/bill-gates-cell-phone-science-101109.aspx.

Gerster, R. and Zimmermann, S. (2003) *Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) for Poverty Reduction?* Discussion Paper. Berne: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, accessed 08/10/2010, http://www.gersterconsulting.ch/docs/ICT_for_Poverty_Reduction.pdf.

Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), Ghana Health Service (GHS), and ICF Macro (2009) *Ghana Demographic and Health Survey 2008*. Accra, Ghana: GSS, GHS, and ICF Macro.

Gigler, B.S. (2004) Including the excluded: can ICTs empower poor communities? Towards an alternative evaluation framework based on the capacity approach, Paper presented at *4th International Conference on the Capability Approach*, September 5–7, 2004. Pavia, Italy: University of Pavia.

Gilhooly, D. (2005) *Innovation and Investment: Information and Communication Technologies and the Millennium Development Goals*. Report prepared for the United Nations ICT Task Force in Support of the Science, Technology and Innovation Task Force of the United Nations Millennium Project. New York: UN Millennium Project.

Gillwald, A. and Esselar, S. (2005) A comparative analysis of ICT access and usage in 10 African Countries, in A. Gillwald (ed.), *Towards an African e-Index: Household and Individual ICT Access and Usage Across 10 African Countries*. Johannesburg: Link Centre, University of the Witwatersrand, pp. 18–31.

Gumuchio-Dagron, A. and Tufte, T. (eds) (2006) *Communication for Social Change Anthology: Historical and Contemporary Readings*. New Jersey: Communication for Social Change Consortium.

Hilbert, M. (2009) When is cheap, cheap enough to bridge the digital divide? Modeling income related structural challenges of technology diffusion in Latin America, *World Development*, **38** (5), 756–770.

Hilbert, M. (2010) *Digital Gender Divide or Technologically Empowered Women in Developing Countries? A Typical Case of Lies, Damned Lies and Statistics* (draft). California: University of Southern California.

Hudson, H.E. (2007) *Access to the Digital Economy: Issues in Rural and Developing Regions*. Working Paper. San Francisco, CA: University of San Francisco.

Huyer, S. and Mitter, S. (2003) *ICTs, Globalisation and Poverty Reduction: Gender Dimensions of the Knowledge Society. Part I. Poverty Reduction, Gender Equality and the Knowledge Society: Digital Exclusion or Digital Opportunity*? Gender Advisory Board, UN Commission on Science and Technology for Development.

Inagaki, N. (2007) *Communicating the Impact of Communication for Development. Recent Trends in Empirical Research*, World Bank Working Paper 120. Washington, DC: World Bank.

ITU (2003) ICTs and the Millennium Development Goals, in Goodrick, J. (ed.), *World Telecommunications Development Report 2003*. Geneva: ITU, pp. 71–98.

ITU (2009) *Measuring the Information Society*, ICT Development Index. Geneva: ITU.

Kaplan, R. (1994) The gender gap at the PC keyboard, *American Demographics*, **16** (1), 18.

Kenny, C. (2002) Information and communication technology for direct poverty alleviation: costs and benefits, *Development Policy Review*, **20** (2), 141–157.

Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) and ICF Macro (2010) *Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2008–2009*. Calverton, MD: KNBS and ICF Macro.

Khatun, S., Debeljak, K. and Power, G. (2010) *Citizen Access to Information: MDG Tracker* (draft). London and Washington, DC: InterMedia.

Kohn, M.L. (1989) *Cross-National Research in Sociology*. Newbury Park: Sage.

Kreuter, F., Presser, S. and Tourangeau, R. (2008) Social desirability bias in CATI, IVR, and web surveys. *The effects of mode and question sensitivity, Public Opinion Quarterly*, **72** (5), 847–865.

Livingstone, S. (2003) On the challenges of cross-national comparative media research, *European Journal of Communication*, **18** (4), 477–500.

McCurdy, P., Power, J.G. and Godfrey, A. (2010) When theory meets practice: critical reflections from the field on press freedom indicators, Manuscript submitted to S. Abbott and M. Price (eds), *Evaluating the Evaluators: Measures of Press Freedom and Media Contributions to Development*. New Jersey: Hampton Press.

Manyozo, L. (2010) The day development dies, *Development in Practice*, **20** (2), 265–269.

Manyozo, L. (2011) *Engaging Communities Using Radio. Sustainable Development in Africa*. Penang: Southbound Sdn. Bhd.

Marker, P., McNamara, K. and Wallace, L. (2002) *The Significance of Information and Communication Technologies for Reducing Poverty*. London: DFID, accessed 07/10/2010, http://www.oecd.org/dac/ictcd/docs/matrixdocs/GBR_paper1.pdf.

Matsaganis, M., Katz, V. and Ball-Rokeach, S.J. (2010) *Understanding Ethnic Media: Producers, Consumers and Societies*. California: Sage Publications.

MDG Monitor (2010) *Progress by Goal*, UNDP, accessed 11/11/2010, http://www.mdgmoni tor.org/index.cfm.

Measure DHS 0000(n.a.) *DHS Model Questionnaires*. Calverton, MD: Measure DHS, accessed 05/10/2010, http://www.measuredhs.com/aboutsurveys/dhs/questionnaires.cfm.

Measure DHS (2008) *Demographic and Health Surveys. Model Woman's Questionnaire with HIV/AIDs and Malaria Modules*. Calverton, MD: Measure DHS, accessed 05/11/2010, http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/DHSQ5/DHS5-Womanpercent27s-QRE-22-Aug-2008.pdf.

Mody, B., Maki, J., Hofschire, L., Swenson, T. and Mansouri, A. (2010) Beyond watchdogs and mouthpieces: taking the state-owned press seriously, Presented at *ICA Singapore*, Singapore, June 2010.

Montez, D. (2010) *Communicating with Policymakers about Development Issues: A Guide for the International Development Community. InterMedia's AudienceScapes Research Initiative*. London and Washington, DC: InterMedia.

Panos (n.a.) *Mission Statement*. London: Panos, accessed 05/01/2011, http://www.panos.org.uk/?lid=14.

Petty, R.E. and Cacioppo, J.T. (1986) *Communication and Persuasion: Central and Peripheral Routes to Attitude Change*. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Pisani, E. (2009) *The Wisdom of Whores: Bureaucrats, Brothels and the Business of AIDS*. London: W.W. Norton and Company.

Power, G. (2011) Audience research in drama for development: a contact zone of translation and transnational knowledge production, Manuscript submitted to A. Skuse, M. Gillespie, and G. Power (eds), *Drama for Development: Cultural Translation and Social Change*. New Delhi: Sage.

Puddephatt, A. (2007) *Defining Indicators of Media Development: Background Paper*. Paris: UNESCO, accessed 20/10/2010, http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/files/24288/11743196661media_development_indicators_background_paper.pdf.

Putzel, J., van der Zwan, J., Allen, T., Price, M. and Stremlau, N. (2005) *Why Templates for Media Development Do Not Work in Crisis State. Defining and Understanding Media Development Strategies in Post-War and Crisis States*. London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics.

Roman, R. (2005) The place of theory in development communication: retrospect and prospects, *Communication Yearbook*, **29**, 311–331.

Sey, A. (2007) Mobile phones and the pursuit of sustainable livelihoods: why connectivity matters, Presented at *ICA Pre-conference Workshop Mobile Communication: Bringing Us Together or Tearing Us Apart?* San Francisco, May **2–24**, 2007.

Shields, T., Chetley, A. and Davies, J. (2008) *Improving Health, Connecting People: The Role of ICT in the Health Sector in Developing Countries: Summary of Online Discussion with Key Experts*. Washington, DC: infoDev, Healthlink, AfriAfya, ISHED, accessed 20/10/2010, www.infodev.org/en/Document.486.pdf.

Skuse, A. (2004) *Radio Broadcasting for Health: A Decision Maker's Guide*. London: DFID.

Skuse, A. (2006) *Voice of Change: Strategic Radio Support for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals*. London: DFID.

Skuse, A., Gillespie, M. and Power, G. (2011) *Drama for Development: Cultural Translation and Social Change*. New Delhi: Sage.

Spence, P., Lachlan, K. and Burke J. (2008) Crisis preparation, media use, and information seeking: patterns across Katrina evacuees and lessons learned for crisis communication, *Journal of Emergency Management*, **6** (2), 11–23.

Steier, F. (1991) Reflexivity and methodology, in F. Steier (ed.), *Research and Reflexivity*. London: Sage, pp. 163–185.

Sugg, C. and Power, G. (2011) Great expectations and creative evolution: the history of drama for development at the BBC World Service Trust, Manuscript submitted to A. Skuse, M. Gillespie, and G. and Power (eds), *Drama for Development: Cultural Translation and Social Change*. New Delhi: Sage.

Tacchi, J. (2005) Radio and new media technologies: making technological change socially effective and culturally empowering, in S. Healy, B. Berryman, and D. Goodman (eds), *Proceedings Radio in the World: Radio Conference 2005.* Melbourne: RMIT Publishing, pp. 342–353.

Twaweza (n.a.) *What Are Our Goals?*, accessed 23/11/2010, http://twaweza.org/.

UN (2008) *Official List of MDG Indicators.* New York: UN Development Indicators Unit, accessed 04/01/2011, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/OfficialList.htm.

UNDP (2006) *Communication for Empowerment: Developing Media Strategies in Support of Vulnerable Groups.* New York: UNDP Publisher, accessed 20/10/2010, http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs06/Communicationforempowermentfinal.pdf.

UNICEF (2005) *Strategic Communication for Behavior and Social Change in South Asia.* Kathmandu: UNICEF, accessed 23/11/2010, http://www.unicef.org/rosa/Strategic_Communication_for_Behaviour_and_Social_Change.pdf.

UN Millennium Project (2005) *Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Overview.* New York: UN Millennium Project.

Valentino, N.A., Hutchings, V.L., Banks, A.J. and Davis, A.K. (2008) Is a worried citizen a good citizen? Emotions, political information seeking, and learning via the Internet," *Political Psychology*, **29** (2), 247–273.

Waage J., Banerji, R., Campbell, O. *et al.* (2010) The Millennium Development Goals: A Cross-Sectoral Analysis and Principles for Goal Setting after 2015, *Lancet*, September 13.

Wasserman, H. (ed.) (2010) *Taking it to the Streets: Popular Media, Democracy and Development in Africa.* London: Routledge.

West, J. (2008) *The Promise of Ubiquity. Mobile as Media Platform in the Global South.* Paris: Internews Europe, accessed 23/11/2010, http://www.internews.eu/publications/promise-ubiquity.

Wilson, M., Warnock, K. and Schoemaker, E. (2007) *At the Heart of Change: The Role of Communication in Sustainable Development.* London: Panos.

World Bank (2003) *ICT and the MDGs. A World Bank Perspective.* Washington, DC: World Bank, accessed 06/10/2010, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/09/15/000090341_20040915091312/Rendered/PDF/278770ICT010mdgs0Complete.pdf.

16

India and a New Cartography of Global Communication

Daya Kishan Thussu

The dominant strands of research in global media and communication have traditionally been conducted within a Western or, more accurately, an Anglo-Saxon framework. However, the globalization of media, creating multivocal, multidirectional, and multilayered media flows, challenges many established ways of thinking about international media and communication. This, combined with the internationalization of higher education, has contributed to a rethink on research in this field. Focusing on India, this chapter will investigate the challenge for the study of global media and communication, arising from the increasing importance of countries such as India – an ancient civilization with a rapidly growing economy and geo-political aspirations – arguing that this will have profound implications for the future of media and communication research.

Introduction

To start with an anecdote in 2009, I was invited to attend a symposium to mark 50 years of television in India, which was attended among others by a senior managerial executive from the *Times of India* Group, which owns one of India's oldest newspapers (established in 1838) and today is one of its largest media conglomerates, with interests in newspapers, magazines, television news, music, and retailing.

I was berating the executive for imitating the American commercial model of journalism and for compromising the rather staid and solid analytical journalism that the *Times of India*, the "Old Lady of Bori Bunder" (the area of Bombay where the newspaper has its headquarters), had championed for more than a hundred years. His answer was simple and direct: his organization had borrowed from the American journalism model but

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

indigenized it to suit the Indian social and political market. Unlike the *New York Times*, which is consistently losing readers and advertising revenue and consequently shedding staff, the *Times of India* is in better financial health than ever before, claiming to be the largest circulation English-language quality daily newspaper in the world. It has grown into the most successful newspaper brand in India. In an "innovative business strategy" that blurs the boundaries between editorial and advertising content, the group has made strategic investments in companies in return for guaranteed advertising and editorial exposure in the group's various publications as well as other media outlets – a trend that has been successfully replicated by many other newspapers as well as television news networks.

This change is indicative of a vibrant and expanding media sphere in one the world's fastest growing economies: despite the global economic downturn, India posted an economic growth of nearly 9% in 2010, according to the International Monetary Fund. The rapid liberalization, deregulation, and privatization of media and cultural industries in the world's largest democracy, coupled with the increasing availability of digital delivery and distribution technologies, offers interesting sites for research, challenging the Western-dominated epistemological and pedagogic frameworks for the study of media and communication.

The growth of media and communication studies internationally is a reflection of the huge impact of the globalization of the media, ensured by the explosion of transnational flows, made possible by new technologies and institutional changes at international level. Coupled with this is the growing globalization of higher education; the internationalization of student and faculty profiles; the mobility of faculty and increasing tendency for multinational joint research programs – all strongly affecting the study of global media and communication. Teaching and researching of media and communication scarcely seem to have kept pace with these transformations, as universities across the world continue to follow conventional ways of thinking about media and communication, despite it being one of the fastest growing academic fields globally as well as a rapidly globalizing subject. With the expansion of digital delivery mechanisms there now exists a plethora of material for media and communication research, giving many more windows into researching media cultures and consumers in different socio-economic and political contexts.

This chapter argues that in a complex globalized world, media and communication studies, as an inter- and transdisciplinary field, is well placed to draw in and deploy a range of paradigms and approaches from the social sciences, arts, and humanities. It suggests that both international media and communication and their study are in the process of transformation, partly as a result of an increasingly mobile and globally networked and digitized communication infrastructure. The multivocal, multidirectional, and multilayered media and communication flows challenge many traditional ways of thinking about the media (Thussu 2007, 2009). As a recent UNESCO report notes: "While it is undeniable that globalization has played an integrative role as a 'window on the world', mostly to the profit of a few powerful international conglomerates, recent shifts prompted by technological innovation and new consumption patterns are spurring new forms of 'globalization from below' and creating a two-way flow of communication and cultural products" (UNESCO 2009, p. 131).

A New Map for Media and Communication Studies

If the 1990s, the first decade of globalization, was the period of extensive expansion of largely Western cultural products around the world, the first decade of the twenty-first century has witnessed a steady rise in the visibility and volume of such products emanating from Asia, especially its two largest countries, China and India. Any meaningful discussion of global media research must take into account the rapid growth of these two ancient civilizations with huge potential to influence the emerging global scene (Khanna 2007; Sharma 2009; Bardhan 2010). As a new study attests: "After a long period of relative stagnation, these two countries, containing nearly two fifths of the world population, have had their incomes growing at remarkably high rates over the past quarter century or so. In 1820 these two countries contributed nearly half of world income; in 1950 their share was less than one tenth; currently it is about one fifth, and the projection is that in 2025 it will be about one third" (Bardhan 2010, p. 1).

As in many other fields, the "rise" of China and India, coinciding with cracks within the neo-liberal model of US-led Western capitalism, will challenge traditional thinking and research paradigms for international media and communication as power begins to shift away from the West. As one commentator notes: "A seismic shift in the balance of global economic and political power is currently underway as the rise of China and India has increased not only their regional but also their global influence and leverage" (Sharma 2009, p. 9). The combined economic and cultural impact of China and India, aided by their extensive global diasporas – 30 million and 25 million, respectively – is likely to create a globalization that has an Asian flavor to it.

Some have argued that if one takes a long view of history, the rise of Asia must be viewed as "re-emergence" or, as Mahbubani has noted, "the return" of the continent to global prominence, signaling a corresponding decline of the West (Mahbubani 2008). Maddison has shown that until the eighteenth century, China and India were the largest economies in the world, accounting for more than 60% of global GDP (Maddison 2001, p. 28).

Gradually, but surely, India is shedding its 'Third World' label, though despite very impressive economic growth, it still remains home to the largest number of poor people on the planet. Yet an upwardly mobile, English-fluent middle class India – the chief beneficiary of globalization – has emerged and is going global. Demonstrating a robust annual economic growth in the past decade, India is increasingly viewed internationally as an emerging economic and political power. On the basis of purchasing-power parity, it was the fourth largest economy in 2010, behind Japan, China, and the United States. One manifestation of this status is how India's popular culture is being perceived outside India. In the past two decades India has become an important source of media products, both indigenous as well as a production base for transnational – largely US-based – media conglomerates. The changing geo-political equation in Asia has contributed to a closer economic and strategic relationship between the United States and India. In the media and cultural sphere, this has led to a greater visibility of Indian cultural products – from Bollywood cinema to Bhangra music (Kavoori and Punathambekar 2008; Gopal and Moorti 2008; Rai 2009; Gera Roy 2010).

Global Circulation of Indian Popular Culture

According to the UN's *Creative Economy Report 2010*, India showed the largest growth in exports of creative goods during 2002–2008 (UNCTAD 2010). This growth is partly because India-based creative and cultural industries have been very active in such areas as animation and post-production services for Hollywood and other industries. Today, Indian cultural products have a transnational reach, attracting consumers beyond their traditional South Asian diasporic constituency. The growing cultural links with the US-dominated transnational media conglomerates facilitate this circulation, in terms of marketing, distribution, etc. (Kohli-Khandekar 2010). The availability of new digital delivery and distribution mechanisms has also contributed to this. The most widely circulated content is from India's bourgeoning film industry – the world's largest film factory producing on average a thousand films annually (Rai 2009). Since 2000, the Indian film industry has formally been given the status of an industry by the Indian government, ensuring that it becomes a major source of revenue as well as of promoting India via its "soft power". Beyond the South Asian diaspora, Indian films are increasingly being watched by an international audience. They are shown in more than seventy countries and exports account for nearly a third of industry earnings (UNESCO 2005; UNCTAD 2010).

Indian films have been exported since the 1930s, even when India was a British colony. However, their global presence has been only recently and intermittently acknowledged in academic discourses. It has even been suggested that one candidate for the title of the "most popular film of all times" is an Indian film – *Awaara* (*Vagabond*, released in 1951),[1] directed by Raj Kapoor, one of India's most popular actors, as it was very successful in the Soviet Union and China, as well as in many other countries (Iordanova *et al.* 2006). Such examples, it has been argued, "challenge theoretical and historical paradigms of transnational cinematic exchange" (Iordanova *et al.* 2006, p. 80). Unlike those in the Western world, the media and cultural industries in India are growing rapidly (Mehta 2009). International investment is increasing in India's media sector, as cross-media ownership rules are relaxed (Kohli-Khandekar 2010; Thomas 2010). At the same time, Indian media companies are also investing outside national territories. As an industry report noted: "Aspirations of Indian players to go global and foreign players entering the industry are likely to help the industry target a double digit growth in the next five years" (FICCI-KPMG 2010, p. 15).

Indian entertainment and telecommunication companies are investing in Hollywood production in an emerging synergy between Hollywood and Bollywood, creating a "global" Bollywood (Kavoori and Punathambekar 2008; Gopal and Moorti 2008). Indian popular music – an integral part of Hindi cinema – is also being globalized in the process: in 2008, the *Times of India* group acquired Britain's Virgin Radio, the first such overseas acquisition by an Indian media corporation.

New configurations are developing, representing South–South media and cultural flows. Indian entertainment is increasingly being recognized as an important part of the "global popular", even in China as it opens up to non-Western media content. The release of the 2005 Bollywood-inspired Chinese film *Perhaps Love* – the first musical in that country since the 1950s – as well as the announcement by Beijing-based film group, Lighthouse Productions, to produce China's first Bollywood film titled *Gold Struck*, is indicative of the potential of cultural collaboration among the world's two large economies with old histories and new ambitions (Krishnan 2010).

Jairam Ramesh, currently India's Environment Minister, is credited with the notion of "Chindia" (Ramesh 2005). The "Chindia" phenomenon represents what has been termed as the "rise of the rest" in a "post-American world" (Zakaria 2008) and is likely to influence globalized media (see the special themed issue of the journal *Global Media and Communication*, 2010). The idea seems to be catching up – at the time of writing, a Google search for the word "Chindia" showed more than 176 000 hits. One key indication that the "Chindia" phenomenon is more than just a neo-logism is the fact that trade between India and China – negligible at the beginning of the 1990s – had climbed to US$60 billion by 2010, surpassing by a large margin India's bilateral trade with the United States and making China its largest trading partner.

Another example of such South–South media flows is the successful Brazilian soap opera *India – A Love Story*, screened in prime time for months on end in 2009 on TV Globo. The dramatic series, which won the 2009 International Emmy Award for Best Telenovela, was set in India and Brazil and dealt with Indian themes, including caste, gender, and class, with Brazilian actors playing the Indian characters.

Such contraflows indicate a different kind of media globalization in which countries such as India, Brazil, Egypt, South Africa, and China are taking a leading role (Thussu 2007). According to industry estimates, the Indian entertainment and media industry is expanding rapidly; it will be worth US$29 billion by 2012 with an annual growth rate of 18%. Supporting this growth is the growing convergence between cultural industries and information technology services, given the strength of India in the IT sector; industry estimates say that despite the economic slump, IT exports from India will reach US$148 billion by 2012 (FICCI 2008).

In the telecommunications sector too, India has demonstrated impressive growth: India is already the planet's biggest mobile telephone market. Its communication infrastructure, though still weak in comparison to many developed countries, has been crucial in fostering a revolution in telecommunication and television. The INSAT (Indian National Satellite) system, made up of a constellation of ten satellites, is the mainstay of television broadcasting, providing connectivity to more than 1100 TV transmitters as well as a network for radio stations and tele-education (Reddy 2008, p. 238). Indeed, India was the first country to use television for education through its 1970s SITE (Satellite Instructional Television Experiment) program.

However, Internet penetration in India remains very low: according to the International Telecommunication Union, by 2009 only 81 million Indians were Internet users – merely 7% of India's 1.2 billion population, while broadband subscription was barely 5.2 million. Such social computing networks as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and MySpace are relatively elitist operations. However, the use of the Internet is growing exponentially, jointly promoted by the state and corporations: it demonstrated user growth of 1520% in the period 2000–2010, according to Internet World Stats (2011). It is interesting to speculate what kind of content will be circulating on the web when more and more Indians get online. It is particularly important in the context of so-called "demographic dividend": more than 70% of Indians are below the age of 30. As their prosperity grows, a sizable segment of young Indians are increasingly going online, producing, distributing, and consuming digital media, especially using their skills in the English language, the vehicle for global communication.

Indian Journalism in English

This demographic is also relevant in the context of the growth of English-language journalism in India, opening up possibilities for journalistic opportunities offered by the globalization of Indian media industries.

Global news players such as CNN have entered into partnerships with Indian companies – CNN-IBN, an English news and current affairs channel, launched in 2005, in association with TV-18 Group. The NDTV Group (New Delhi Television) has strategic ties with NBC, while *Times Now*, owned by the *Times of India* Group, ran a joint news operation with Reuters between 2006 and 2008.

This is an indication of how, unlike in much of the Western world, journalism in India is thriving partly as a result of rising literacy and the demonstrable purchasing power of the bourgeoning middle class. The most striking change is in the broadcast sector (Mehta 2008; Thomas 2010). Until 1991, India had a highly regulated state broadcasting monopoly *Doordarshan*; by 2009, 461 channels were in operation – 44 of which were broadcasting in English, making India one of the world's largest English-language television markets – in a country with 500 million TV viewers (FICCI-KPMG 2010).

Admittedly, entertainment and infotainment dominates what one commentator has called the "ABC of Media – Advertising, Bollywood and Corporate Power" (Sainath 2010). India has the distinction of having the largest number of dedicated news channels – 81 by the end of 2010 and likely to touch three figures soon afterwards – making India home to the world's most competitive and crowded news market.

Some of these channels – especially those broadcasting in English – have a global reach and ambition. The richer members of the Indian diaspora – estimated to have a net worth of $300 billion and annual contribution to the Indian economy valued at up to $10 billion – are tuning in to Indian news channels and online news portals to keep abreast of developments. NDTV 24 × 7 was available in 2011 to the Indian diaspora in the United States (via DirecTV), the United Kingdom (BSkyB), the Middle East (Arab Digital Distribution), and southern Africa (Multi-choice Africa).

In parallel with the transformation of the broadcasting sector, there has also been a massive expansion in newspaper circulation: in 2009, India had 2337 'paid-for' daily newspapers – the highest number in the world – and it was also the world's largest newspaper market with 110 million copies sold every day, according to the World Association of Newspapers (WAN 2010).

Many of these newspapers are in the English language with journalists who can operate in a global media sphere that continues to be dominated by an Anglo-American duopoly. Indian-born or Indian-origin journalists are increasingly visible in leading global news outlets: two prominent examples are Fareed Zakaria, editor of *Newsweek International*, and Raju Narisetti, Managing Editor of *Washington Post*.

Growth of Media and Communication Studies in India

Reflecting the growth in the media sector, its study too has gained much popularity in India, a country where media and communication studies were traditionally not considered proper academic subjects, following the British elitist higher education model. However, in the past decade, the study of media and communication has expanded rapidly, as evidenced by the mushrooming of mostly vocational media institutes in India. With a few exceptions, most of these are geared to train students for careers in journalism, television and radio production, public relations, among others, to fulfill the need for a growing industry. However, a few institutions and universities have started to take research in media, communication, and popular culture more seriously.

Like other sectors of the economy, the government is also keen to liberalize the higher-education sector. The government argues that the imminent entry of top-ranking foreign universities will further give a fillip to research – already India is among the top ten countries in terms of scientific research papers published globally. These transnational centers would provide "world-class education" to the students who can afford it and indirectly ensure better performance of Indian institutions through competition.

At present, government expenditure on education is 3.5% of GNP, of which the allocation for higher education is merely 0.37%. A government appointed board has recommended that public expenditure on education should be raised at a minimum to 6% of GNP, a quarter of which should be devoted to higher education. Such a move is likely to galvanize research in media and communication, as in other fields.

Apart from state support, private investment is also being earmarked for higher education in a country where university education is highly valued. Reliance – one of India's top corporations – has announced the creation of a world-class university within the next decade. In 2010, the top industrial house in India, the Tata Group, announced a gift of US$50 million to the Harvard Business School, the biggest international donation since the school's founding. Indian corporate largesse has also benefited other Ivy League universities. Conversely, international interest and involvement in Indian universities has become prominent, as India is seen as a major source for students, researchers, and faculty.

India has one of the biggest higher-education sectors in the world and a well-established tradition of learning and scholarship. Such centers of higher education as Taxsila (in present-day Pakistan) and Nalanda (an international Buddhist university based in eastern India between the fifth and twelfth centuries) existed for a millennium before universities were established in Europe.

Chinese scholars such as Huen Tsang visited Nalanda to exchange ideas on law, philosophy, and politics. Such cultural interaction led to the translation into Chinese of the Sanskrit *Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* (*Diamond Sutra*), the world's first printed book on paper, published in the ninth century (Sen 2005).

In 2010, a major initiative was launched, led by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, to revive Nalanda University as a center of global learning in the twenty-first century. As Sen has noted: "Nalanda was more than six hundred years old when Bologna (the first university in Europe) was born. Had it not been destroyed and had it managed to survive to our time, Nalanda would be, by a long margin, the oldest university in the world" (Sen 2011).

India and International Media Studies

India's example of a multiethnic, multilingual, and multicultural media system may offer interesting sites for future media and communication research. The rise of India may also have a long-term effect on how capitalism evolves and international relations are managed. How can the growth of media and communication studies in India contribute to broadening research concerns and agendas of media and communication studies worldwide?

It is instructive to recall how the field of communication and media studies has evolved. Given the power of US academia, the US model of mass communication studies, with its health, development, interpersonal, and organizational variants, has received the widest global currency (Scannell 2007). During the Cold War years, in much of what was then called the Third World, media and communication research was profoundly influenced by the American tradition of research. A dependency relationship in the field of research developed between the West – led by the United States – and the South, evident in the setting up of courses and syllabi; import of textbooks, journals, citations, employment of experts, and, crucially, the funding, planning, and execution of research. This situation was characterized "by a one-way flow of values, ideas, models, methods and resources from North to South. It may even be more specifically as a flow from the Anglo-Saxon language fraternity to the rest of the world …" (Halloran 1997, p. 39).

No wonder that US-inspired approaches – particularly the modernization paradigm – were adopted in media and communication courses around the developing world (Sparks 2007). Critical research, which was a powerful counter approach to the modernization thesis, did not take a differentiated view of the global South; for example, India a continental size poor country was grouped with Singapore a prosperous city state – both described as Third World.

Such broad generalizations demonstrated the limitations of scholarship not just of media and communication studies but the social sciences more generally. As Edward Said has shown, such approaches are deeply rooted in Eurocentric thought. In the European intellectual imagination, Said has argued, the "other" was created as part of an ideological discourse, promoting and privileging European imperialist epistemology (Said 1978). That there exists a pervasive Eurocentric or Occidental bias, which constitutes in the words of Samir Amin "one dimension of the culture and ideology of the modern capitalist world", is well recorded and has also deeply affected social theory (Amin 1989, p. vii; also see Said 1978 and Goody 2006).

Remapping Media Theory

Media studies, like other fields broadly within the arena of social sciences and humanities, is affected by what might be called epistemological essentialism, rooted as it is within an Euro-Atlantic intellectual tradition (Thussu 2009). The dominance of English as the language of global media and communication has contributed to the primacy of English-language scholarship in media and communication. In addition, the study of media and communication as an academic field itself emerged in the United States. It is not surprising then that a majority of textbook and journal publishing in the area continues to emanate from the United States, closely followed by Britain (Lauf 2005).

Even in the twenty-first century, such works as Siebert and his colleagues' book *Four Theories of the Press* (Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm 1956) is prescribed in media courses around the world, though as one critic noted, the book "does not offer four theories: it offers one theory with four examples" (Nerone 1995, p. 18). Such formulation fitted the political climate during the Cold War era when the authoritarian – represented by the communist bloc – versus the liberal media theory – practiced by market-driven democracies led by the US – remained the dominant paradigm in the study of media. It failed to take into account the fact that large countries such as India and Chinadid not quite fit the bipolar construction of the world.

As one of the founder members of the Non-Aligned Movement, India was a leading voice during the 1970s debates within UNESCO about the creation of a New World Information and Communication Order. Though these often acrimonious debates did not make any dent in the structural imbalances in international media flows, they did nevertheless bring the South into global communication discourse (Thussu 2006; Sparks 2007).

The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, signaling the end the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union two years later, transformed the media landscape in Europe and globally. This prompted scholars such as Downing (1996) to offer reflections on the transitional state of the media in the former communist countries of the Eastern bloc. Downing argued for "the necessity for communication theorizing to develop itself comparatively, acknowledging in particular that to extrapolate theoretically from such relatively unrepresentative nations as Britain and the United States, is both conceptually impoverishing and a peculiarly restricted version of even Eurocentrecism" (Downing 1996, p. xi). Such course correction was strengthened by the belated recognition for the need for "de-Westernizing" media studies, part of "a growing reaction against the self-absorption and parochialism of much Western media theory" (Curran and Park 2000, p. 3).

Despite this progress in media theory, endeavors at providing comparative models of media systems have ignored analysis beyond the Euro-American arena, despite the extraordinary expansion of the media, especially in Asia (Hallin and Mancini 2004). How can comparative studies of global journalists (Weaver 1998), journalism history (Muhlmann 2008), and journalism research (Löffelholz and Weaver 2008) even be called "global" if they exclude, as these books do, journalism in a country of the size and complexity of India?

Looking Ahead

I started this essay with the *Times of India* episode. What is happening in the media and communications sphere in India is difficult to analyze within traditional media theory – whether liberal or critical, though both have insights to offer. There seems to be a pressing need to develop original methodological approaches that encompass new phenomena and identify differences and similarities through comparative and collaborative research. To achieve this, a broader theoretical framework is needed that draws from the best practices of both the critical as well as liberal traditions of media and communication scholarship and takes on board the historical and cultural contexts of a particular polity and society.

This entails, among other things, a revision and re-evaluation of pedagogic parameters as well as research agendas, methods, and methodologies. One area that needs particular attention is to explore further the dynamics between religion and media, something that media studies have traditionally ignored, apart from a few notable exceptions. It is a pity that critical scholars tend not to engage with the study of religion. Even in this secular age, religion defines the social and cultural lives of millions of people across the globe. Arguably, there has been a revival of religious tendencies as witnessed in the growth of Hindu nationalism in India, fundamentalist Christianity in the United States, and assertion of an Islamic identity in many Muslim countries, most notably and recently in secular Turkey.

Particularly important is the engagement of scholars with representation of Islam, which has acquired deep political connotations in the post-9/11 world characterized by an open-ended and global "war on terror", though under President Obama it is now officially called the "Overseas Contingency Operation" (Wilson and Kamen 2009). The research community may benefit from drawing on Indian contribution to this discourse. What is distinctive about India, and in contrast to the West, is that it represents a culture and civilization whose roots are not in the Abrahamic religions. The perception of Islam therefore is less likely to be influenced by discourses that refer to the crusades and the "clash of civilizations", though sections within Hindu fundamentalist groups have been slavishly following the anti-Muslim diatribe. It is important to remind ourselves that had the British not partitioned India at independence in 1947, it would have been the world's largest Muslim country in terms of population. Today, the country has the world's third largest Islamic population, contributing significantly to the millennia old Indo-Islamic culture, noticeable in its high culture – classical music and cuisine – as well as popular media discourses in news and current affairs or in Bollywood representation of Muslims (Farouqui 2009).

The Indian case provides an incentive for a new research imagination, which would entail what has been called "deparochialization of the research ethic – the idea of research itself" (Appadurai 2001, p. 15). In the era of "grassroots globalization", as Appaduari notes, the relationship between "the knowledge of globalization and the globalization of knowledge" needs to be reappraised (Appadurai 2001, p 14).

As Indian media integrates with the global media sphere how would it affect research imaginings and theorization? Would an Indian media perspective on events in other developing countries be less affected by the colonial mindset? Would development discourse be different if it was shaped in New Delhi rather than in New York? What does Indian experience tell us about the power of indigenous media, as the Hindi language *Dainik Jagran* has emerged as India's largest circulation daily newspaper (Ninan 2007)? Newspapers and news magazines in other Indian languages, notably Tamil and Telugu, are also growing in circulation. This should provide incentive to researchers in other developing countries to study the Indian case for comparative and collaborative research. Indian journalism has evolved within the context of a tradition of anti-colonialism, represented by such leaders as Mahatma Gandhi (who edited for most of his political life the weekly newspaper *Young India*, later renamed *Harijan*) and more recently sustained and nurtured within a vibrant and noisy democracy. There is a strong and deeply entrenched tradition of argumentation and critical conversation in the Indian body politic, in its academic and journalistic life (Sen 2005). As Indian media and academia globalize will this critical mass contribute to a critical journalism and critical media studies?

Such a socio-political background and cultural capital may offer possibilities of what has been called "transnational interdisciplinarity", which encourages researchers to "engage in, and try to connect to, knowledge formations and vocabularies that reside in other modernities and other temporalities that are either refused recognition, or are not adequately translated, in machines of knowledge production (Shome 2006, p. 3).

Indian scholars and scholars of Indian diaspora have a good record for pushing the boundaries of research in social sciences and increasingly in media and communication studies, with a major impact on developing post-colonial critiques of literary and cultural works, as well as historiography, which privileged the subaltern (Spivak 1988; Bhabha 1994; Appadurai 2001; Chakrabarty 2007; among others). India has the potential to develop academic discourses that are not derivative; though research into media and communication in India is in its early stages already some innovative and experimental work is beginning to take shape. However, there is a great deal that needs doing, including what has been called the need for "a commitment to empirical research" as well as "real interdisciplinarity" (Murphy and Kraidy 2003, p. 306). The importance of grounded research that questions old paradigms and provides material for new theorization cannot be overemphasized (Abbas and Erni 2005; Erni and Chua 2005; Miike 2006; Thussu 2009). It will help researchers to reflect on the globalizing tendencies of the mass media and of higher education, and to take account of the processes unleashed by the rise of major countries like India in a "post-American" world.

Note

1. Vagabond is the translation of the Hindi word Awaara.

References

Abbas, A. and Erni, N.J. (eds) (2005) *Internationalizing Cultural Studies: An Anthology*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Amin, S. (1989) *Eurocentrism*. London: Zed Books.

Appadurai, A. (2001) 'Grassroots globalization and research imagination,' in A. Appadurai (ed.), *Globalization*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, pp. 1–21.

Bardhan, P. (2010) *Awakening Giants, Feet of Clay*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bhabha, H. (1994) *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge.

Chakrabarty, D. (2007) *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, 2nd edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Curran, J. and Park, M.-J. (2000) Beyond globalization theory, in J. Curran and M.-J. Park (eds), *De-Westernizing Media Studies*. London: Routledge, pp. 3–18.

Downing, J. (1996) *Internationalizing Media Theory: Transition, Power, Culture*. London: Sage.

Erni, J.N. and Chua, S.K. (eds) (2005) *Asian Media Studies: Politics of Subjectivities*. Cambridge: Blackwell.

Farouqui, A. (ed.) (2009) *Muslims and Media Images: News versus Views*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

FICCI (2008) *The Indian Entertainment and Media Industry – A Growth Story Unfolds*. London: PriceWaterhouseCoopers in association with Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

FICCI-KPMG (2010) *Back in the Spotlight – FICCI-KPMG Indian Media and Entertainment Report, 2010*. Mumbai: Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

Gera Roy, A. (2010) *Bhangra Moves: From Ludhiana to London and Beyond*. London: Ashgate.

Global Media and Communication (2010) "Chindia" and global communication, *Global Media and Communication*, Special Themed Issue, **6** (3), 243–389.

Goody, J. (2006) *The Theft of History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gopal, S. and Moorti, S. (eds) (2008) *Global Bollywood: Travels of Hindi Song and Dance*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Hallin, D. and Mancini, P. (2004) *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Halloran, J. (1997) International communication research: opportunities and obstacles, in A. Mohammadi (ed.), *International Communication and Globalization*. London: Sage, pp. 27–47.

Internet World Stats (2011) *Asia*, accessed 11/01/2011, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm.

Iordanova, D. *et al.* (2006) Indian cinema's global reach: historiography through testimonies, *South Asian Popular CultWure*, **4** (2), 113–140.

Kavoori, A. and Punathambekar, A. (eds) (2008) *Global Bollywood*. New York: New York University Press.

Khanna, T. (2007) *Billions of Entrepreneurs: How China and India are Reshaping Their Futures – and Yours*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

Kohli-Khandekar, V. (2010) *The Indian Media Business*, 3rd edn. New Delhi: Sage.

Krishnan, A. (2010) China Gives Green Light to First "Made in China" Bollywood Film, *The Hindu*, December 26.

Lauf, E. (2005) National diversity of major international journals in the field of communication, *Journal of Communication*, **55** (1), 139–151.

Löffelholz, M. and Weaver, D. (eds) (2008) *Global Journalism Research: Theories, Methods, Findings, Future*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Maddison, A. (2001) *The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective*. Paris: OECD.

Mahbubani, K. (2008) *The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East*. New York: Public Affairs.

Mehta, N. (2008) *India on Television: How Satellite News Channels Have Changed the Way We Think and Act*. New Delhi: Harper Collins.

Miike, Y. (2006) Non-Western theory in Western research? An Asiacentric agenda for Asian communication studies, *Review of Communication*, **6** (1/2), 4–31.

Muhlmann, G. (2008) *A Political History of Journalism*, Cambridge: Polity. First published in 2004 as *Une Histoire Politique du Journalisme*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Murphy, P. and Kraidy, M. (eds) (2003) *Global Media Studies: Ethnographic Perspectives*. New York: Routledge.

Nerone, J. (ed.) (1995) *Last Rights: Revisiting Four Theories of the Press*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Ninan, S. (2007) *Headlines from the Heartland: Reinventing the Hindi Public Sphere*. New Delhi: Sage.

Rai, A. (2009) *Untimely Bollywood: Globalization and India's New Media Assemblage*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Ramesh, J. (2005) *Making Sense of Chindia: Reflections on China and India*. New Delhi: India Research Press.

Reddy, V. (2008) India's forays into space: evolution of its space programme, *International Studies*, **45** (3), 215–245.

Said, E. (1978) *Orientalism*. New York: Penguin.

Sainath, P. (2010) How to Feed Your Billionaires, *The Hindu*, April 17.

Scannell, P. (2007) *Media and Communication*. London: Sage.

Sen, A. (2005) *The Argumentative Indian*. London: Penguin.

Sen, A. (2011) Nalanda and the Pursuit of Science, *The Hindu*, January 8.

Sharma, S. (2009) *China and India in the Age of Globalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shome, R. (2006) Interdisciplinary research and globalization, *Communication Review*, **9**, 1–36.

Siebert, F., Peterson, T. and Schramm, W. (1956) *Four Theories of the Press*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Sparks, C. (2007) *Globalization, Development and the Mass Media*. London: Sage.

Spivak, G. C. (1988) Can the subaltern speak?, in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds), *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, pp. 271–313.

Thomas, P. (2010) *The Political Economy of Communications in India: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly*. New Delhi: Sage.

Thussu, D.K. (2006) *International Communication – Continuity and Change*, 2nd edn. London: Hodder Arnold.

Thussu, D.K. (ed.) (2007) *Media on the Move: Global Flow and Contra-Flow*. London: Routledge.

Thussu, D.K. (ed.) (2009) *Internationalizing Media Studies*. London: Routledge.

UNCTAD (2010) *Creative Economy Report 2010*. Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

UNESCO (2005) *International Flows of Selected Cultural Goods and Services 1994–2003*. UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

UNESCO (2009) *UNESCO World Report Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue*. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

WAN (2010) *World Press Trends: Advertising Revenues to Increase, Circulation Relatively Stable*. World Association of Newspapers, accessed 20/08/2010, http://www.wan-press.org/article18612.html.

Weaver, D. (ed.) (1998) *The Global Journalist: News People Around the World*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Wilson, S. and Kamen, A. (2009) "Global War on Terror" is Given New Name: Bush's Phrase Is Out, Pentagon Says, *Washington Post*, March 25.

Zakaria, F. (2008) *The Post-American World*. London: Allen Lane.

17

What Is Governance? Citizens' Perspectives on Governance in Sierra Leone and Tanzania

Vipul Khosla and Kavita Abraham Dowsing

> Because the field of governance is multi-disciplinary and not yet codified, thinking about governance allows one to think freely and imaginatively about the future. Striving to improve governance is indeed a "projet de société" that compels us to look ahead, invent dynamic futures without negating the lessons of the past (Jocelyne Bourgon in Wyman 2001, p. 6).

The term "governance" has long been a part of academic and political discourse. More recently, it has also become a part of development discourse, with a growing awareness that "good governance" is crucial for development (Court 2006, p. 1). However, the meaning, scope, and understanding of the term is not constant and varies depending upon the discourse. Moreover, "governance is contextual" (Court 2006, p. 1) and so its meaning also varies according to social, cultural, and historical backgrounds. This leaves work in the area of governance open to multiple levels of interpretation and so, for the objectives and scope of individual projects or governance work to be clear, defined parameters of understanding must be outlined.

This chapter will look at different theories of governance, explaining the methodology that was used by the BBC Media Action (then known as the BBC World Service Trust[1]) to explore the concept of governance through the voices of citizens, as part of cross-country research in Sierra Leone and Tanzania.

BBC Media Action: A National Conversation

The BBC Media Action's "A National Conversation" project is funded by the UK Department for International Development's Governance and Transparency Fund. The purpose of "A National Conversation" is to enhance the media's capacity in three countries with different governance contexts. It seeks to provide citizens with

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

opportunities to check government decisions and voice their views on key governance issues, thereby increasing demand for good governance and accountability, as well as levels of trust in the media as an independent watchdog. Broken down, the purpose of the project has two linked components: the provision of opportunities for citizens to check government decisions through the media and building the capacity of the media to provide these opportunities in the longer term (BBC World Service Trust 2010).

The project "A National Conversation" started with the following questions, which this chapter also addresses: What is governance? What does governance look like in different country contexts? How do citizens interpret/encounter governance in their everyday lives? The project covered three countries: Angola, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania. However, the formative research discussed in this chapter focuses on Sierra Leone and Tanzania, where the formative phase research was administered at a national level.

BBC Media Action: Approach to Research

At the BBC Media Action, the research team consists of 48 researchers across 15 different countries who have conducted research in more than 42 languages. Research is embedded within the project cycle alongside media production, media capacity-building and outreach (see Figure 17.1).

In terms of project structure, the qualitative work conducted during the formative research informs the project design, ensuring it remains faithful to the context in which it operates. The baseline survey is intended to understand the more macro concerns, such as media usage, electoral knowledge, and political engagement that the project also seeks to address. The baseline results are often compared to the midline and/or endline survey results providing project impact statistics. This chapter will focus on the formative, qualitative research undertaken for the "A National Conversation" project and carried out in Sierra Leone and Tanzania in December 2009–March 2010. The formative research explores how citizens understand governance and how it manifests itself in their everyday lives.

In order to define the scope of the research it is important to explore the various understandings of concepts of governance at the outset. The research methodology used to explore citizens' understanding of and relationship with governance was focus groups using participatory photography. The BBC Media Action has used participatory photography as part of its projects in the past. For example, the "My Life" project, which covered Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen (2003–2005) and was carried out with NGO (or quasi-NGO) partners in participant countries, provided an opportunity for girls across the Arabic-speaking world to explore aspirations for and expectations of their futures using photographs and digital media.

Theoretical Underpinning

As mentioned previously, governance is a contested term in the academic, development, and policy arenas. It is conceptualized in multiple ways and is a cross-disciplinary construct. At a very broad level governance has been identified as "what the government



Figure 17.1 BBC Media Action project cycle.

does". However, this definition has been criticized for being institutionalized, narrow, and focused on the state, without acknowledging the other key nonstate actors who form a part of the governance process. We must therefore look at interpretations of governance in academic and development discourse to understand its various dimensions.

The notion of governance focuses in academic debates on public governance, comparative politics, and international relations (Hayden and Court 2002). Public governance relates to the process and how different organizations and stakeholders interact for service delivery within the public sector. The terms public governance and public management are often used synonymously as the focus of both is on service delivery for citizens. However, the two have been identified differently within academic literature. Public management focuses on outputs and improving efficiencies (individual and organizational) while public governance focuses on processes and institutions (Bovaird and Löffler 2009). In comparative politics, governance involves "the study of different institutional models and processes that are relevant to economic development and regime change" (Kjaer 2004, p. 195). The focus in comparative politics has recently been on transition of countries from nondemocratic to democratic systems (Kjaer 2004). In international relations, governance is identified as a function to fulfill the need for regulation at a global level. Global governance is identified "as a process whereby rules of global public policy-making are set, applied and enforced" (Kjaer 2004, p. 192). However, it is worth noting that there are concerns about international institutions, in terms of their effectiveness and accountability (Kjaer 2004). These diverse constructs of governance relate to the different levels at which governance is examined, that is, national, international, and global. Theories on governance also use the concept as an open malleable construct used to address different issues in different disciplines such as political theory, government, development studies, and management.

In a development context, governance is identified as an activity undertaken to achieve certain desirable outcomes (Hayden and Court 2002) and the focus of governance is at a local and national level. Also, development practitioners define and engage with governance based on their specific mandates (Court 2006, p. 1). Their conceptualization of governance focuses on the aspects of governance that are most relevant to the kind of programs, projects, or interventions that they are or can potentially be involved in. There are two examples that we can examine here, as part of our understanding of governance in practice from a development practitioner perspective:

The World Bank defines governance as

> … the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes (i) the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced, (ii) the capacity of the government to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies, and (iii) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them (Kauffman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010, p. 3).

The UK Department for International Development's governance framework focuses on three key aspects of the state:

- Capability – the ability and authority of leaders, governments and public organisations to get things done.
- Accountability – the ability of citizens to hold governments and public organisations to account.
- Responsiveness – how leaders, governments and public organisations actually behave in responding to the needs and rights of the citizens (DFID 2008, p. 3).

The World Bank's approach to governance is apolitical. While it identifies the political regime to be a part of governance, it explicitly states this is beyond the Bank's mandate when defining their scope of work. The definition of governance used by the UK Department for International Development to define their scope of work is also focused on the state–citizen relationship but does not take into account the complexity of governance as a process. For example, it does not explicitly account for the role of private organizations or public–private partnerships as part of a governance framework.

Within the development discourse, the terms "democracy" and "governance" have been conflated. This may be contentious in some parts of the world as governance may be considered as a means of increasing Western influence (Hayden and Court 2002). For example, the United Nation's Development Program on the importance of good governance states that "in order to achieve and sustain human development, both the ends and means of good governance, should be democratized" (UNDP 2010, p. 15). There is also a thematic focus on governance when working on particular development themes. For example, practitioners working on health issues focus on health governance.

Just as is the case between different groups within the development sector itself, governance is a contested term with multiple levels of interpretation and perspectives mediated by the agenda of the development practitioner. Reviewing the various debates, it is clear that different stakeholders involved in international development focus on particular elements of governance.

Our research has been influenced by Gow's perspective on governance. Gow notes that

> … the discussion of governance will be helpful only if people are willing to separate out components of governance. If, however, governance is left as a tangled set of ideas which range from popular participation through to strengthened parliaments and more powerful press then it is likely that governance will be used as a continuing critique of the state in developing countries repeating the anti government rhetoric of the 1970s (I. Gow in Wyman 2001, p. 16).

The academic and development discourses focus on different aspects of governance but, while citizens form part of the conceptualization of governance as beneficiaries, there is limited participation from citizens in defining what governance is.

The BBC Media Action's understanding of governance is guided by a focus on citizens' perspectives on governance and is informed by looking at citizen voice. Because governance is a complex concept it is important to identify the key "component" that we need to focus on. Therefore, we deliberately focused our formative research on the construction of citizen voice.

Citizen voice is the discursive element of governance that allows the state to debate and deliberate issues of public interest among and with citizens and all other stakeholders in order to arrive at a rational consensus. One perspective on citizen voice within the academic discourse has been propounded by Thomas Jacobson through his work on the concept of democratic legitimacy. Jacobson used the concepts of "democratic legitimacy" and "citizen voice" to construct a model of "democratic governance", informed by the work of Jurgen Habermas (1989) and his construct of the public sphere and theory of communicative action.

Jurgen Habermas' idealized public sphere is "designated as a theatre in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk. It is the space in which citizens deliberate about their common affairs, and hence an institutionalised arena for discursive interaction" (Fraser 1992, p. 111). This debate and deliberation, based on evolving communicative capacities or capacities of reason, constitutes communicative action. According to Habermas, communicative action is the only means of societal rationalization and integration available to the citizenry (Calhoun 1992, pp. 30–32). According to Jacobson: "Citizen voice can be defined as communicative action in the public sphere" (Jacobson and Pan 2007). He claims that if citizens are allowed to challenge government validity claims, outlined in Table 17.1, and if speech conditions are fully met in resulting debates, then citizens are more likely to feel they have been heard. He also considers citizen intuitions concerning fairness, during public political communication, as the basis of democratic legitimacy (Jacobson and Pan 2007).

Jacobson's model of citizen voice is based on perceptions of citizens' validity claims and speech conditions. While the model establishes citizen voice as the basis of communicative action and public sphere, in order to determine democratic legitimacy, it

Table 17.1 Key concepts for action oriented to understanding. The criteria of validity and speech conditions.

Conceptual category	*Category criteria*
Validity claims	Truth (accuracy)
	Appropriateness
	Sincerity
	Comprehensibility
Speech conditions	Symmetric distribution of opportunities to contribute
	Ability to raise any proposition
	Full and equal treatment of propositions raised

does not necessarily consider or explore citizen understanding of governance. When understanding governance as a social construct, it is helpful to look at the group level of society to understand how new knowledge enters social groups, how this knowledge is mediated into populations, and how, at a localized group level, it is incorporated into everyday life and thinking. Citizen voice is a construct that helps us to consider voice at the population level. Our work during the project formative phase of research was intended to be at the level of the social group based on "The Theory of Social Representations" (Farr and Moscovici 1984). Therefore, as part of our research we explore both citizen voice and governance as social constructs.

Conceptions of social representations help to assess ways in which social groups construct new knowledge and explores their fundamental role in the construction of local meanings. Social representations help to illustrate the social processes behind the construction of meaning around new knowledge (Farr and Moscovici 1984). The theory suggests that meanings are constructed socially between two subjects rather than individually. When social "knowns"/beliefs are confronted at the boundaries of communities or by new knowledge, previously held assumptions are questioned and a social process of new knowledge creation begins.

As new knowledge is created it is further represented in the form of language, image, and sound. All that is image or concept does not entirely pass into language, though every representation is translated into discourse (Voelklein and Howarth 2005, pp. 431–454).

Therefore, while unpacking citizen perspectives on, what is for many, the new concept of governance it is helpful to think about these processes of social representation (see Figure 17.2). The production of new knowledge is the basis of social representation. In the discourse space between individual subjects and the object of discourse the new information is socially represented.

When looking at the meta-level debate on governance, we also considered two main measures of good governance that focus on citizen voice: Worldwide Governance Indicators and the Mo Ibrahim Index on Governance. The two indices are both composite indices. The data sources used for the Worldwide Governance Indicators include surveys of firms and households, as well as the subjective assessments of a variety of commercial business information providers, nongovernmental organizations, and a number of multilateral organizations and other public-sector bodies (Kauffman, Kraay,



Figure 17.2 The representational triad.

and Mastruzzi 2010, p. 4). Similarly, the Ibrahim Index also includes some measures of citizen engagement (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2010). In addition, voice and accountability is one of the six key dimensions of governance as part of Worldwide Governance Indicators. Most meta-level data focus on survey methods and seek to quantify measures of governance with citizen voice as embedded within it. However, there were limited actual voices of citizens on governance and what it means to them. The key research objective was to understand the social construct of governance through citizen voice. The challenge was to gain access to the authentic voice of the citizens as part of the methodology. It is only through participation that one can understand how new knowledge is created.

Methodology – Focus Groups Using Participatory Photography

The research methodology that was employed to achieve the research objectives was "focus groups using participatory photography". It was informed by two research traditions: participatory action research and photography as a research method.

Participatory research enables people to represent and interpret their own social realities. It is also based on the premise that social facts are subjective constructs that must allow for people's interpretation of their own reality. In the context of our formative research, it was important to use a participatory method of research to ensure that the research outcomes captured the social representations of governance among citizens.

The objective of participatory research is also to overcome the researcher–respondent dichotomy, to ensure that the respondents are not just the "subjects" in a research process but are co-inquirers and participants. Hence there is a shift from a moderator–respondent approach to a facilitator–participant approach (Grant, Nelson, and Mitchell 2008). While this is a semantic shift it is also a shift in approach from a positivist approach, with a focus on eliciting information to validate social reality, to a more constructivist approach, trying to share information to define social realities (Gergen and Gergen 2008). It entails a more collaborative collective approach to research and focuses on research "with people rather than on people" (Gergen and Gergen 2008, p. 165).

Our own approach to participatory research was informed by participatory action research (PAR) or action research. Participatory action research, or action research, is one of the methods of research that has gained increasing popularity among development practitioners as a practical, empowering, and action-oriented approach to research.

> Action research is a participatory process concerned with developing practical knowing in the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes. It seeks to bring together action and reflection, theory and participation, in practice with others, in the pursuit of practical solutions to issues of pressing concern to people, and more generally the flourishing of individual persons and their communities (Reason and Bradbury 2008, p. 4).

The focus of action research is not only to understand what has happened in the past but also to focus on "key challenges or problems in the world of everyday life" (Gergen and Gergen 2008, p. 167). These key issues then become "practical priorities" that need to be addressed. Therefore, it considers both social construction and research as actions for attaining "worthwhile human purposes" (Reason and Bradbury 2008).

Participatory Photography

Photography has traditionally been used as a research method in anthropology and has been recognized as a core methodology in visual anthropology. Visual anthropology studies various aspects of human life including community design, cultural inventory, technology and social circumstances, and interaction (Collier and Collier 1986). While it is acknowledged that photography gathers selective information, it is also established that the information so gathered is specific and represents material reality.

Photography is used during research to serve a number of different purposes:

- It depicts the "qualifying and contextual relationships" that may not be captured as part of a discourse (Collier and Collier 1986, p. 10). However, it must be noted that research based on photographs can take two different forms: content and context (Banks 2002). The content-based research focuses on the material reality as represented through the photo. The context-based research focuses on the social, cultural, and historical context of production and consumption of such photos.
- Photography can also make an important contribution as part of formative research because it enables the researcher to make accurate observations even during early stages of research, with little or no contextual knowledge (Collier and Collier 1986).
- Photography can also be used as a tool with which to obtain knowledge, when used as stimulants for interviews or group discussions with "native eyes interpreting and enlarging upon the photographic content, the potential range of data enlarges beyond that contained in the photographs themselves" (Collier and Collier 1986, p. 99). Photographs can be used as a "reference point" to define concepts, foster discussions, or probe into details. As reference points they also allow the participants to take a lead in the interviews and discussions. Moreover, photographs can allow for very structured interviews and discussions and provide participants greater opportunity for self-expression (Collier and Collier 1986).

In "A National Conversation" we used photographs to help citizens to articulate issues around governance in their everyday lives, within a focus group setting. The photographs were facilitation tools with two aims: (1) to help citizens to articulate foreign concepts and (2) to help focus and structure the discussions on this relatively broad topic.

Various media outputs, from photographs to films, can be used as part of focus groups to stimulate discussion. As part of our research, the key research objective was to understand governance from the point of view of citizens' everyday lives. The project aimed to communicate issues related to governance using media, not from a theoretical or academic standpoint but to make it relevant to citizens in their day-to-day lives. It was therefore imperative that research has a participatory orientation.

Understanding the meaning of governance in a context where it has not naturally evolved requires an exploration through pure discourse as well as through the symbols that represent it. Photographs can help capture these symbols, which can in turn be used as a precursor to the discussion.

The focus group discussion will help to articulate the symbols captured as part of the photography. Also, "symbols, objects and diagrams can represent realities that are cumbersome to express verbally" (Chambers 2008, p. 306). On this basis, it was decided that we would use photographs as part of the focus groups to stimulate discussions.

The next challenge was what photos to use as part of focus groups and how to use them. Taking into consideration our participatory approach to the entire research process, it was decided that the photos must be taken by the participants themselves This was important because we were seeking diversity in the representations of governance and governance issues among citizens. Pre-selected photographs could have limited the agenda of the focus group discussions.

Research Stages

Our approach to research was informed by the three stages of action research as identified by Reason and Bradbury (2008): first-person participatory research, second-person participatory research, and third-person participatory research. We therefore used images and discourse to understand governance through the three stages of research. In the next section of the chapter we look at these stages of participatory research across the two countries Sierra Leone and Tanzania.

Participatory Action Research

First-person participatory research was carried out with the researchers themselves. At this stage of research the focus was on developing the ability of the researcher to foster an inquiring approach to his or her own life. The objective at this stage was to allow the researchers to understand the foundations of action research practice and to use the same principles as part of the further participatory research (Reason and Bradbury 2008).

When embarking on first-person participatory research it was important to first understand the background of the researchers. We were working with one researcher in each of the countries: Sierra Leone and Tanzania. The researchers were experienced focus group facilitators but had not used participatory methods before. Each researcher was a citizen in the country where they worked and had worked in the development sector before working on this project.

Ideally the first-person participatory research would be done at the very beginning of a project before the project objectives and focus are identified. However, in the case of this project, the researchers had already been working on different aspects of the project, such as monitoring governance outputs on media and participating in governance initiatives launched by other civil society organizations. This meant that they were already orientated in governance as "experts" and had a relatively high level of understanding and exposure to issues related to governance.

As part of this stage of research two tasks were assigned to the researchers to reflect their own perceptions of governance. The two tasks assigned were:

1. To select and share photos that represent governance to you (photos could be from secondary sources like websites and newspapers).
2. To explain their work around issues of governance and transparency in Tanzania to their grandmothers.

These tasks were set to help the researchers to reduce their preconceptions around what they had learned about the governance discourse by working on the project. The focus of this process was to allow the researchers to become participants, drawing in "experiential learning" as part of the process.

The outputs for the assigned tasks were sent to the BBC Media Action via email and illustrated some interesting contrasts between the two countries. An example of the material shared is now given.

To the researcher in Tanzania, their selected photo of an organized demonstration in a sports stadium was an illustration of all that was wrong with the electoral system in Tanzania. She asserted that the kind of rallies depicted in the photograph, with people marching through stadiums, were not genuine as she felt that people were compensated either in cash or in kind to participate in these movements and their votes had been bought, thereby undermining the electoral system and the governance process. This was followed by an open-ended discussion around governance related issues. Explaining their work on governance and transparency the researcher also used the following quote:

> 40 years back white man went to the moon, today 40 years after independence, Africa is still struggling with construction of roads, are we cursed or bewitched? (Unknown).

To the researcher in Sierra Leone, the selected image (see Figure 17.3) was just one example of governance in action. The researcher asserted that there were promises made for the provision of basic amenities, such as good roads, at the time of the elections and there is a need to understand how far these promises have been fulfilled. While explaining governance and transparency the researcher also stated the following:

> You voted them in because you believed that life would be easier for you … you will be provided with basic amenities like access to health care, school for your children and grandchildren and good roads so you can transport goods. … This project will create a kind of familiarity between the state and its citizens.

Figure 17.3 Governance in Sierra Leone.

This was followed by an open-ended discussion on governance. The first-person participatory research enabled us to understand the researchers' perceptions of governance and governance-related issues, which were used at the second stage of research as a part of determining the research design.

Second-person participatory research involves a "face to face" discussion on issues of mutual concern (Reason and Bradbury 2008). It is based on interpersonal dialogue and results in the creation of communities of interest. As part of an international NGO, with the research team spread internationally, we had to undertake this process remotely and not in person. It was distinct from the action research approach at this stage as we were not looking to build communities of interest and so we used this stage as a process to refine the research approach. We also reflected on the first-person participatory research and the development of research tools.

This stage of research involved decisions to inform the research design. It involved addressing the following key issues:

1. Using photography as part of the discussions.
2. Designing research tools.
3. Determining the scope of the study.

In order to make the process participatory it was decided that the participants in the focus groups would take photos of the key governance issues that they face in their day-to-day lives. The researchers in each of the countries were asked to structure the focus groups based on their understanding of context and how participants in the focus groups would be able to use the photos best for stimulating the discussion.

In Tanzania it was decided that the photos would be taken at the beginning of the group and then followed by a discussion. In Sierra Leone the researcher felt that there was a need for discussions to enable the participants to take relevant photos. If the photos were taken before any discussion the photos may cover a broad range of issues, which may make it difficult to draw any generalizations from the discussion. Both their perspectives were valid considering the different historical contexts of the country. While Tanzania assumed its current form in 1964 (BBC News 2010) with a multiparty democratic system (Jones and Mhando 2006), Sierra Leone emerged from a decade of civil war in 2002 (BBC News 2010). Therefore, it was agreed that in Tanzania the groups would be structured with participants taking photos first, followed by a group discussion, while in Sierra Leone the participants would first have a discussion, then take photos in the middle, and have follow-up discussions.

The design of the research tools was led by the researchers themselves after the first phase of research. The researchers from each of the countries designed their own research tools based on their experience within the country.

Traditionally the focus group discussion guides that were used by the researchers were quite detailed and included a series of questions to which answers were solicited. This training experience helped the researchers to learn how to facilitate an open-ended focus group discussion around a small number of photographs. The focus group guides for "A National Conversation" varied by country due to the different structures of the group. However, the discussion guide in both countries focused on the following fundamental governance issues:

- What are the governance issues facing the citizens?
- Who is responsible for them?
- How can these issues be addressed?
- What is the role of media in this process?

This type of participatory method and open focus group discussion guide facilitated the following two objectives of our project: (1) the creation of spaces where citizens are encouraged to state their views in their natural setting and languages without the imposition of the researcher and the research agenda and (2) the focus group discussion reflecting a more authentic natural conversation held by citizens rather than a facilitated series of question and answers, which traditional focus group discussions can sometimes become. This subtle shift in power from the moderator to the participants creates a more natural environment and therefore allows for more open conversations to occur.

The formative research also aimed to explore diversity in citizen voices on governance, as part of the cross-country study. The researchers were encouraged to identify social groups across the country that would help capture the breadth of the ongoing national conversations on governance. The focus of the qualitative work was to gain as rich a context as possible, by trying to increase the diversity of participants and ensuring the inclusion of so-called "hard-to-reach" groups that are often underresearched or underrepresented.

The researchers designed population stratification grids (see Tables 17.2 and 17.3) to guide the qualitative formative work at the national level. In Sierra Leone, the stratification

Table 17.2 Stratification grid for the focus group discussions in Sierra Leone.

Sierra Leone		
	Focus Groups	
	Urban	*Rural*
Bombali District	6	4
Koinadugu District	6	4
Moyamba District	6	4
Bo District	6	4
Kenema District	6	4
Waterloo	7	-
Tombo	3	-
	40	20

Table 17.3 Stratification grid for the focus group discussions in Tanzania.

Tanzania				
	Focus Groups			
	Kigoma	*Kinondini*	*Kongwa*	*Lindi*
Bankers	-	-	-	1
Business	1	1	1	-
Disabled	1	-	-	-
Drivers	1	-	1	-
Farmers	-	-	1	1
Fishermen	1	1	-	1
Hairdressers	-	-	1	-
Health workers	-	-	-	1
Journalists	-	1	-	-
Old people	-	-	1	1
People living with HIV	-	1	-	-
Sports group	-	-	-	1
Teachers	1	-	-	1
Unemployed	-	-	1	-
University students	-	1	-	
Women/housewives	1	1	-	1
	6	6	6	8

was based on urban–rural and regional coverage. In Tanzania, the stratification was based on regional coverage and representation of different citizen groups like fishermen, drivers, housewives, and disabled people. It was based on the experience of the researchers on the ground and ensured that a diverse representation was obtained of how different citizen groups articulate governance, both in symbols through photographs and in words through the discourse that followed the discussion on photos. The stratification of population in Tanzania and Sierra Leone, which informed the formative research, is summarized in Tables 17.2 and 17.3.

The key decisions taken at this stage around the structure of group discussions, designing research tools, and determining the scope of the study informed the next stage of research, which included fieldwork, data analysis, and findings.

Third-person participatory research carried forward the learning from the previous stages as we launched the formative research for the project at a national level (Reason and Bradbury 2008).

The facilitators arrived at a predetermined location where photographs were not readily available and we first introduced cameras. There were two digital cameras per focus group and the researchers were encouraged to give the cameras to the participants either at the beginning or middle of the group discussions to encourage them to take pictures of the governance issues that mattered to them in their everyday lives. The fieldwork for the research was spread over a three month period, starting from December 2009 to February 2010. The in-field researchers provided regular feedback on the fieldwork and the progress they were making.

The focus group discussions were transcribed and translated into English for analysis. The analysis focused on the text of the discourse as part of the focus groups and the data was also analyzed for differences by communities and regions. The photos provided stimulants for and also acted as evidence to illustrate visually the findings of the group discussion. These findings were used to derive a summary outline for informing the project media outputs.

Research Findings

Large volumes of focus group data were analyzed with the help of qualitative text analysis software called ALCESTE. This software helped the researcher to divide up a large volume of text systematically into thematic clusters. Based on a linguistic logarithm it was increasingly used to analyze text to help reduce qualitative researcher bias and increase transparency.

Overall governance manifested itself in citizens' everyday lives as service delivery on basic infrastructure and there was a focus on service delivery in both Tanzania and Sierra Leone when asked about governance issues. However, the discourse around the issues varied by country.

Sierra Leone

In Sierra Leone, the discussions were dominated by the rhetoric of rights and responsibilities, particularly citizens' rights and government responsibility in relation to service delivery, mostly at a local level. The focus of discussions was largely on structural and institutional issues that affected the lives of the citizen. This was reflected in the photos taken as part of focus group discussions (Figure 17.4). This also, in some ways, reflected a focus on the institutional basis of governance; that is, governance is what the government does.

Figure 17.4 Hospital in Bauya, Moyamba, Southern Province, Sierra Leone. Photo taken as part of the group discussion in Sierra Leone.

- The key governance issues identified in the country were security, infrastructure, and empowerment. Nearly all participants felt the government was responsible for and had provided security and some basic services.
- Despite this, many participants felt frustrated that they were paying taxes to an elected body that was failing to deliver development.
- There was very limited communication or contact between the government and citizens. Participants got their information from the media, particularly the radio. Many participants were aware of the potential for the media to provide a means of communication between citizens and the government and thereby affect change.

> Just as we are talking about education we do not even have tap water, junior and secondary schools, even social amenities, we don't have (FGD participant, Rural, Moyamba).

The focus group discussion transcripts were analyzed by ALCESTE and resulted in six thematic clusters – infrastructure, empowerment, media, security, education, and other. The table of proportions of the national conversation in Sierra Leone is illustrated in *Table 17.4.*

Tanzania

In Tanzania, the rhetoric of rights and responsibilities was secondary to the discourse of disenchantment and disillusionment that dominated the discussions. The discussions were less focused on the institutions and structures and there was a greater focus on the quality of life and issues faced by citizens on a day-to-day basis.

Table 17.4 Proportions of national conversations by region (unit as a percentage).

Sierra Leone			
		North	
		Security	21
		Education	18
		Government	14
West		Empowerment	7
Security	21	Infrastructure	6
Education	18	Development	34
Government	18	**South**	
Empowerment	18	Media	18
Infrastructure	11	Government	12
Others	14	Education	26
		Security	10
		Infrastructure	12
		Empowerment	23

- The key governance issue raised by the participants was on service delivery. However, the specific services vary by community depending on their interests; for example, the fisheries officers' failure to deal with illegal fishermen was the main issues raised by the fishing community and local transport like buses among the drivers. However, the majority of participants stated that the government was not doing enough to address their problems.
- Despite having complaints about the governance of the country, many do not feel they can, or know how to, raise these issues and resolve them.
- Many respondents were aware of the potential for the media to challenge politicians and voice their concerns. However, this potential was not realized due to factors such as self-censorship, government control, and lack of skills among journalists.

The table of proportions of the national conversation in Tanzania is illustrated in Table 17.5.

> The government collects tax and yet the environment is still very dirty … if they are not going to do anything then there is no need for them to collect taxes. We are paying taxes in order for us to benefit (FGD participant, Fishermen Group, Kigoma, Tanzania).

These differences in the findings present an interesting contrast in relation to the socio-historic context of the countries. The idea of governance and citizens' expectations of it are rooted in the history of the country. As a fragile state, citizens in Sierra Leone associate governance with a higher level of security and thereby stability. On the other hand, citizens in Tanzania, as a relatively stable country with a history of democratic governance, are more concerned about service delivery and there is a higher level of disillusionment and disenchantment toward governance and government. The voices

Table 17.5 Proportions of national conversations by region (unit as a percentage).

Tanzania			
Central			
Transport	23		
Working conditions	13	**East**	
Media	12	Education	15
Farming	27	Transport	10
Public discussions	16	Media	35
Herding	9	Awareness	21
West		Infrastructure	19
Education	11	**South**	
Transport	21	Education	31
Working conditions	17	Working conditions	13
Media	12	Farming	25
Health	9	Health	31
Government	23		
Prices	8		

of citizens are also fundamentally influenced by the cultural contexts around public speech, hierarchies, public versus private debate, and social norms concerned with maintaining face.

Lessons Learnt

During our participatory research process there were a number of lessons learnt. These are summarized in Table 17.6 and followed by a detailed discussion.

Methodological Challenges

In contexts of participatory research, the researcher's subjectivity and reflexivity must be accounted for as part of the research and the research outcomes (Grant, Nelson, and Mitchell 2008). A number of the issues faced and lessons learnt in the project relate to maintaining the integrity of the methodology in a complex real-world research situation, with deadlines and budgets. The success of participatory methods are integrally tied up with the skill level of the researcher or facilitator, the experience and training that they receive, and the resulting flexibility that the researcher demonstrated in varied field situations.

One of the important premises of participatory research is identification. In order to overcome the researcher–respondents dichotomy, it is important that the respondents can identify with the researcher as "one of them" and not as the "other" (Swantz 2008). The challenge of identification is also the challenge of trust and the relationship between the facilitator and participants (Grant, Nelson, and Mitchell 2008).

Table 17.6 Participatory research in a cross-national context – lessons learnt.

Research element	*Cross national issue*	*Lesson learnt*
Use of participatory methods in data collection	National contexts are very specific and different	Data gathered across countries using PAR will not be comparable across countries
Training in-country researchers	In-country skills and research abilities vary and training over the telephone/video conference has limited impact	PAR required face-to-face training due to the pedagogy of experiential learning
Research instruments like focus group discussions	Due to the participatory nature of research, the researchers are free to design and contribute to the research instruments without any predetermined agenda	FGD guides may only be standardized to a limited extent and data gathered may often be incomparable
Maintaining quality in the translation and transcription processes	The costs and abilities of the bank of translators vary across country. The ability of a language to be translated also varies. Translation and transcription costs vary	Planning and costing during the research design stage need to include appropriate translation and transcription costs
The cross-national research team	The NGO team structure and varied research capacity traditionally leads to a break in the development research process. The data in this project were collected by one set of researchers who know and understand the field and analysed centrally together by a different group	Researchers should be involved in this process from the beginning through the field research and interpreting the results. Too much data are lost in the break of this process and travel budgets should reflect the need for these discussions as integral to the research output
Time and access issues	Development research being done to tight budgets and deadlines leads to work being conducted in parallel	Analysis of the qualitative data needs to be done together for the collective themes and insights to emerge and inform the rest of the project
Photographs as a research tool	• Taking new technologies into the research context • Location restriction of photographs • Photographs as a research tool and not data	See below
Media landscape	Context specific media landscapes	Different social context will allow for different partnership arrangements to be made, which could lead to an incomparable dataset
Pragmatic concerns	Transcription, translation, costing, and budgeting	An understanding of the practical difficulties of each data field, for gathering the data, transcribing, translating, and storing needs to be understood during the research design phase

In "A National Conversation" the researchers/facilitators were experienced researchers in the field, trained in conducting focus group discussions and interviews. However, these are traditionally quite structured and follow strict protocols and so training in the participatory method was needed. The participatory method training was conducted over the telephone due to budgetary restrictions and there was therefore a limit to the amount of learning that was possible in these conditions. Face-to-face training is important in this form of experiential learning to highlight the need for flexibility and the participatory nature of the process. These were difficult concepts to communicate via a telephonic training process.

Participatory research assumes and requires that the research is conducted and interpreted by the same individual or closely integrated team. The structure of the "A National Conversation" research team (as is often the case with research conducted in the international NGO sector) creates a separation between the field researcher and the analysis. This separation is important to this piece of research as it seeks to make comparisons across the different contexts in which the data were collected that would be difficult for in-country researchers to make. The two-tiered team structure helped the fieldwork to remain true to context, while allowing the international researchers to do the comparative analytics. Conducting this kind of work within the tight deadlines of the project-led deliverables imposes a limited amount of communication between the field team (conducting between 20 and 60 participatory focus groups) and the team involved in the analysis across the country. This research was conducted over 3 months end to end, which necessitated fieldwork and analysis/interpretation of the results heavily overlapping.

The use of photographs and cameras in the field had many challenges and outcomes. Positively, they proved very engaging and allowed for the structuring of discussions as was intended. Challenges of using the cameras included:

- There is a need for reflexivity around the introduction of this new technology into the field site. Just as the researcher can influence the contexts in which they work, the cameras and photographs did the same. The cameras were new in some contexts and while the "newness" was intended to encourage engagement, it is important to consider the artificiality this brings along with it.
- There are limitations in terms of participants' ability to take the images that really represent their real-life worlds in some of the locations where the focus groups were conducted. Introducing photographs taken by the group into the discussion inherently carries the assumption that the location for the FGD provides sufficient opportunity to see and thereby photograph the key issues that are affecting a community. This is not always the case.
- It is important to manage people's expectations of the research around the analysis of photographic data. The photographs are useful as a communication and a participatory tool and are significant as a conversational prompt, but for the participatory method they were not analyzed as data.
- The archiving and transfer of digital photographs requires special planning and costing in hard-to-reach areas, where there may be a poor Internet connection and a lack of access to appropriate software for storage.

The participatory method is adaptable across multiple contexts. This was core to its use within "A National Conversation". However, the resulting process and data have limitations in their suitability for comparative research. This is due to a number of contextual variables that impact on the quality and scope of the data collected. By its very nature, the focus of participatory research is the participants, all of whom have different voices and perspectives. The focus group helps create a locally relevant collective voice that remains true to its context, but using these data in comparative research has its limitations. This was highlighted in our research findings. When doing cross-national or cross-cultural research, with the intention of comparing data, incorporating this into the research design is important. The data created from a participatory method of this nature are structurally limited in the comparability of outcomes.

As previously stated, governance varies by the socio-historic context of the country. Research on a theme like governance must be sensitive to this and take it into account. The governance context in a post-conflict state like Sierra Leone is clearly distinct from that in a stable country like Tanzania. This has an impact on the citizens' perspectives and discourses on governance within the country and this must also be taken into account when making cross-country comparisons.

Differences in discussion guides in the two countries also meant that the data are less comparable on a question-by-question/topic-by-topic basis. While the discussion guides were designed by the in-country researchers, taking into account the national context, it is questionable and also contentious as to how far the research tools can be standardized across countries. Standardizing the research instruments without taking into consideration the national context can result in framing the research findings from the very onset of the research. Therefore we decided to go forward with an open-ended discussion guide, but this did come at the cost of losing some elements of comparability. An example of this was the question on trust in media that was included in the Tanzania discussion guide but was not a part of the Sierra Leone discussion guide. While we have some very interesting findings around trust in media and government control in Tanzania, there is no such data from Sierra Leone. The data resulting from this data-gathering process were therefore distinct and specific to its context. This made it a challenge to compare and contrast and draw any cross-national conclusions. The data, while rich in contextual specificity, both textually and in photographs, were not comparable.

With participatory research, and as these countries were selected for their differences (Tanzania being stable with a history of democratic governance and Sierra Leone being a transitional post-conflict nascent democracy), cross-cultural comparative data may not be the intention of the research agenda. The research concerns at the formative stage of research are likely to be around establishing the differences and understanding the richness of the individual contexts and country concerns, in this case around governance issues. The ontology of comparison in this research situation is questionable.

The media landscape within the country has implications for the research design, analysis, and findings. The project was working on very different scales and had distinct partnerships in the two countries. While in Tanzania the partner station was a national broadcaster, in Sierra Leone the focus was more on community radio stations. There was a need to analyze and report findings that will be relevant to a broadcaster at a national level for the formative research to be useful in Tanzania. The formative research in Sierra Leone was to feed into the media outputs at a more regional and community level for the community radio stations. This implied that there was a need to focus analysis and communicate the research findings at a regional level.

The research team involved in this cross-national project were located in three countries – the United Kingdom, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania. The transferring and translation of data into a single language and at a single location was challenging and incurred unplanned costs. Some of the operational challenges included: the transfer of photographs; translation and transcription quality control in a country where we have a single researcher; the sheer volume of data that needed to be archived and stored; traveling to different locations; and the input of the field researchers to the analysis.

Concluding Remarks

Despite the methodological challenges outlined above, participatory action research proved a useful tool through which to listen and understand citizen voice in Sierra Leone and Tanzania. In turn, accessing citizen voice allowed us to uncover the diverse range of contextually, socially, and personally driven interpretations of governance that exist at a citizen level. In so doing, we were able to design country-specific projects in Sierra Leone and Tanzania that were both relevant to and driven by citizen understandings of governance, as opposed to imposing our own discourse or meaning. With citizens as drivers in the process of project design we sought to develop sustainable, locally relevant, and participatory governance programs that responded to the diversity that is inherent to the concept of governance.

While the fluidity and subjectivity of the concept of governance presents difficulties in drawing conclusions across different sectors or social, historic, and cultural contexts, in terms of the work carried out by the BBC Media Action, localized research that assesses and understands society level meanings can be extremely effective in defining parameters to ensure that governance-related work, particularly in transitional states, is both valuable to and understood by the citizens at which it is aimed.

The cross-national element of the research also allowed us to "zoom out" and consider the role of national context (social, political, and historic) to how citizens interpret and interact with governance. This dual function of the research demonstrates the strength of this research design. The research, however, also highlights the challenges of applying principles of research methodology to the multicultural contexts of the real world. While challenging and messy in process, this provides rich insights into the realities that the research seeks to reflect.

Note

1. The BBC World Service Trust changed its name to BBC Media Action in December 2011.

References

Banks, M. (2002) Visual research methods, *Indian Folklife*, 1 (4), 8–10.

BBC News (2010) *Country Profiles*. BBC, accessed 16/09/2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/country_profiles/default.stm.

BBC World Service Trust (2010) *2nd Annual Report for Governance and Transparency Fund, April 2009–March 2010: BBC World Service Trust – A National Conversation*. Unpublished.

Bovaird, T. and Löffler, E. (eds) (2009) *Public Management and Governance*, 2nd edn. London: Routledge.

Calhoun C.J. (ed.) (1992) *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Chambers, R. (2008) PRA, PLA and pluralism: practice and theory, in P. Reason and H. Bradbury (eds), *The Sage Handbook of Action Research: Participatory Inquiry and Practice*, 2nd edn. London: Sage, pp. 297–318.

Collier Jr, J. and Collier, M. (1986) *Visual Anthropology: Photography as a Research Method*. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press.

Court, J. (2006) *Governance, Development and Aid Effectiveness: A Quick Guide to Complex Relationships*. London: ODI.

DFID (2008) *Media and Good Governance*. DFID, accessed 16/09/2010, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/briefing-media-good-governance.pdf.

Farr, R.M. and Moscovici, S. (1984) *Social Representations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fraser, N. (1992) Rethinking the public sphere: a contribution to the critique of actually existing democracy, in C.J. Calhoun (ed.), *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 109–142.

Gergen, K.J., and Gergen, M.M. (2008) Social construction and research as action, in P. Reason and H. Bradbury (eds), *The Sage Handbook of Action Research: Participatory Inquiry and Practice*, 2nd edn. London: Sage, pp. 159–171.

Grant, J., Nelson, G. and Mitchell, T. (2008) Negotiating the challenges of participatory action research: relationship, power, participation, change and credibility, in P. Reason and H. Bradbury (eds), *The Sage Handbook of Action Research: Participatory Inquiry and Practice*, 2nd edn. London: Sage, pp. 589–601.

Habermas, J. (1989) *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Hayden, G. and Court, J. (2002) *Governance and Development, World Governance Survey Discussion Paper 1*. Tokyo: United Nations University, accessed 16/09/2010, http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/3136.pdf.

Jacobson, T.L. and Pan, L. (2007) Indicating citizen voice: communicative action measures for media development. Paper presented at the *Workshop on Measuring Press Freedom and Democracy: Methodologies, Uses, and Impact*. University of Pennsylvania Annenberg School of Communication, Center for Global Communication Studies.

Jones, J.M. and Mhando, N. (2006) *Tanzania AMID Research Report*. BBC World Service Trust, accessed 16/09/2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/researchlearning/story/2006/12/061204_amdi_tanzania.shtml.

Kauffman, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. (2010) *The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues*. Washington DC: The World Bank.

Kjaer, A.M. (2004) *Governance*. Cambridge: Wiley-Blackwell.

Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2010) *The Full Structure of the 2010 Ibrahim Index*, accessed 16/09/2010, http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/media/get/20101003_eng-tree-iiag2010.pdf.

Reason, P. and Bradbury, H. (2008) Introduction to groundings, in P. Reason and H. Bradbury (eds), *The Sage Handbook of Action Research: Participatory Inquiry and Practice*, 2nd edn. London: Sage, pp. 1–11.

Swantz, M.L. (2008) Participatory action research as practice, in P. Reason and H. Bradbury (eds), *The Sage Handbook of Action Research: Participatory Inquiry and Practice*, 2nd edn. London: Sage, pp. 31–48.

UNDP (2010) *A Guide to UNDP Democratic Governance Practice*. New York and Oslo: UNDP, accessed 15/09/2010, http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs10/DG_forWebAsSpreads.pdf.

Voelklein, C. and Howarth, C. (2005) A review of controversies about social representations theory: a British debate, *Culture and Psychology*, **11** (4), 431–454.

Wyman, M. (2001) *Thinking about Governance: A Draft Discussion Paper. The Commonwealth Foundation*. Citizens and Governance Programme, accessed 18/09/2010, http://www.democracyeducation.net/Publications/governance.pdf.

18

Forced Migrants, New Media Practices, and the Creation of Locality

Saskia Witteborn

Migration, mobility, and connectivity as characteristics of globalization have received much attention in social science research, including Communication Studies. Forced migration is a less studied phenomenon and yet one that represents the paradoxes of globalization processes, such as transnational mobility versus closing of borders; virtual connectivity versus restricted access to new technologies. *Forced migrant* refers to refugees[1], asylum seekers[2], disaster displacees, trafficked persons, and internally displaced people (Forced Migration Online 2007). In 2010, almost 34 million forced migrants (including returnees and stateless persons) were of concern to UNHCR (2011a).

Research on forced migration has gained prominence in several fields, such as sociology, psychology, social work, law, and anthropology, and has received an exclusive study focus at the Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford. In addition to psychological and social phenomena related to being displaced, like trauma, depression, and violence in refugee camps in developing countries (Harrell-Bond 2004), refugees in industrialized nations face problems, like pending asylum processes, social isolation in bureaucracy-driven and technology-based societies (Witteborn 2011c), and a lack of access to new technologies (Leung 2007, 2010). Especially the lack of access to new communication technologies and limited opportunities to engage with family and the public do not align with the universal right to communication:

> Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression: this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19, UNHCHR 1997; in Leung, Lamb, and Emrys, 2009, p. 5).

Despite these contradictions, research on new technologies has rarely focused on asylum seekers and refugees (Leung, Lamb, and Emrys 2009). There are some promising

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

examples though for taking forced migrants and their uses of new media[3] and technology seriously, especially from countries like Australia and New Zealand (Kabbar and Crump 2006; Leung, Lamb, and Emrys 2009; O'Mara, Babacan, and Borland 2010; Leung 2007, 2010). One of the few large-scale projects in Europe was an EU-funded study to empower refugee children through media (De Leeuw and Rydin 2007).

The topic of forced migration is tightly connected to locality[4] as forced migrants cross borders, are arrested through legal and political mechanisms in space and place (Witteborn 2007, 2008, 2011c), and yet position themselves as socio-political, cultural, and legal subjects (Witteborn 2012). Although research on locality, new media and technology, and asylum seekers is still rare, there is ample empirical evidence about how transnational migrants create locality (Appadurai 1996; Massey 1994, 2005; Massey and Jess 1995) through new media practices (Al-Qasimi 2011; Bernal 2006; Gajjala 2004; Gajjala and Gajjala 2008; Landzelius 2006; Mandaville 2003; Witteborn 2011a, 2011b). Global cities have become locales that attract internal and transnational migrants. Due to their economic, socio-cultural, and economic potential and political resources, those cities have played an important part in creating diasporic spaces and global diasporic networks (Georgiou 2006; Sassen 2004, 2006). The resources available, including new technologies and social networks, can enable migrants to create a global imaginary and become political actors on a global scale (Sassen 2004). However, as Sassen (2006) has cautioned, new communication technologies are not only important for creating global (diasporic) networks but also for affirming and strengthening locally situated communities and communication.

Forced migrants are mentioned as part of transnational migrants in the previously discussed literature (e.g., Sassen 2004) but have rarely been the focus of attention in terms of how they create locality and/or global networks through new media practices. Unlike other migrants, forced migrants are assigned to particular places like detention centers or asylum shelters, are identified through a bureaucratic label like *asylum seeker* (Zetter 2007), and subjected to national asylum laws like residency requirements. This chapter asks how new media practices enable asylum seekers to create locality in the face of physical[5] and social arrest. Moreover, what does locality mean to forced migrants who are *dis*-located? I have organized the chapter into three parts. First, I will explain my approach to studying locality and (new) media. Then, I will illustrate how an ethnography of communication approach is one methodological way of comparing (new media) practices and understanding the meanings of practices and localities to people engaging with them and creating them. As an illustration, I will discuss my research in asylum seeker accommodation in Germany and two particular practices creating locality for asylum seekers: searching the Internet and using Facebook.

Locality and Communicative Practice

The question of what constitutes locality is not banal, especially in the age of interconnectivity and mobility. Locality has come under scrutiny during the last two decades as it has often been related to a fixed place in the territorial, ethnic, national, and cultural sense (Gupta and Ferguson 1992). It has long been referred to as pertaining to a bounded territory and an indigenous patterned way of knowing and doing, which is *endogenous*, that is, exclusive, bounded, and often mystified (Pottier 2003, p. 5). In addition to anthropology, the local and locality have also been discussed extensively since the 1980s in sociology and geography. A focus on the local was driven by three main concerns, according to Duncan (1989): a focus on specific case studies that should overcome overgeneralizations, an emphasis on empirically driven research, and research on the scale of the nation.

Kraidy and Murphy's (2008) essay on translocalism has continued an important conversation in media studies on how to research the local empirically and comparatively. Based on the epistemology of interpretive ethnography and a Geertzian commitment to understanding the local, Kraidy and Murphy argued for a comparative study of the local and analyzing "how one local can help us understand another local" (2008, p. 343). The local, to the authors, is a place that is enacted in dynamic ways by situated interlocutors. It does not exist in opposition to an abstract global. Studying how various locales are interconnected globally transcends the hierarchical and rather deterministic structural "center-periphery model" (2008, p. 347). Kraidy and Murphy put forward the idea that studying local practice and relations means studying an enactment of translocal historical, political, and socioeconomic forces, an idea that is pivotal to this chapter.

One question is how to conceptualize the local and locality.[6] Authors like Kraidy and Murphy seem to conceptualize it as *place*, *practice*, and *event*. Place as a geographical, sociopolitical, and cultural site is the starting point for the analysis (nation-states like Lebanon, France, or Saudi Arabia). As practice, the local can refer to localized TV format adaptation and reception by the audience, both realized through performances, linguistic and semiotic "codes" (2008, p. 348), and genres infused with the cultural (e.g., "Arab, French, and Italian repertoires," (2008, p. 347)). The practices construct the "ethnographically accessible 'event'" (2008, p. 349). The discussion raises several important questions. Can the local be a (pre)defined site, for example, the nation, cultural/ethnic/national practices, or both? Moreover, what do we compare? Groups? Practices? Events? Nations? Sites? And how are groups, practices, or the nation related to locality?

I take a Sophist view to approach this question: "first communication, then epistemology, and only then finally ontology" (Pearce 2009, p. 46). Communication, not ontological categorization, is the primary social process. Communicative practices are the very ways in which content comes into being: "They *are* our relationships, identities, cultures, and institutions. Relationships *are* the ways each person acts into the actions of the other …" (Cronen 2009, p. 62, italics in the original).

The ethnography of communication takes communicative practice, socially and culturally distinctive ways of communicating in particular, as its central theoretical and methodological focus. It studies communicative practice, place, and culture and treats "the talk of place as part of … cultural life" (Carbaugh 2005, p. 131). In this chapter, communicative practice refers to the repeated and habitual ways and modes of interacting with people or signs in virtual environments. The ethnography of communication (or ethnography of speaking) is a descriptive approach developed by Dell Hymes (1962, 1972) and later made known in communication studies by such scholars as Philipsen (1989, 1992, 2002), Philipsen and Coutu (2005), Fitch (1998, 2003), Carbaugh (1996, 2005), Katriel and Philipsen (1997), and Covarrubias (2002), among others. It focuses on the interconnections between language and social life and how people construct speech community and social life through particular ways of communicating. Key concepts include, among others, means of speaking, meanings, and situated communicative conduct (Philipsen and Coutu 2005). Means of speaking (or more broadly, means of communication) and ways of communicating can also be called communicative practice when interlocutors engage with them in a repeated and habitual way.

Means of speaking (or communicative practice) can include "media and modes of communication, … communicative habits … and beliefs pertaining to communication" (Philipsen 2002; Philipsen and Coutu 2005, p. 357). An ethnography of communication approach emphasizes the situated meanings of those means of communication as they are understood by the people orienting to them in a particular place. Philipsen summarized the concept of place as referring to "notions of social, physical, perceptual, and heuristic location" (Philipsen 1992, p. 22). The researcher illustrates how interactants position themselves in and as geographical, social, or cultural locales by engaging with communicative means and practice. Locality can thus be understood as social relations, positionalities, physical context, and grouping processes, which are constructed through communicative practice. The approach enables researchers to compare and contrast one or various communicative means (practices), the ways in which they construct social groups and locales in similar or different ways, and how interlocutors orient to them (Philipsen and Coutu 2005).

An ethnographer of communication would start observing instances of communicative practice as they are produced in localities and at the same time construct localities. Communicative act, its sequences, setting, participants, goals of the interaction, topics, mediated or nonmediated ways of interacting, and premises related to the interaction (as understood by the participants) are elements to which a researcher can orient in order to understand how interactants engage in grouping processes and social life (Hymes 1962, 1972).[7]

I summarize the previous arguments as follows. First, communication is the primary social process to understand how asylum seekers create social realities. Second, the point of reference is the viewpoint of the asylum seekers themselves (see Kraidy and Murphy 2008). Third, the practices through which forced migrants create locality are central to understanding the meanings of locality to the people. Fourth, communicative practices can be compared in the ways they construct meaningful localities for the people engaging with those practices.

Research Context

In early 2011, approximately 594269 refugees, 51991 asylum seekers, and 7920 stateless persons lived in Germany (UNHCR 2011b), making Germany one of the important asylum seeker destinations in Europe. I conducted interviews with asylum seekers in shared accommodation in the cities of Munich and Berlin in the summer of 2011. The cities were chosen as both have asylum accommodation and are examples for global urban centers due to tourism, migration, internationalization of the population, and economic, social, and cultural interconnectivities with other cities in the world. The purpose of selecting those was not to compare the cities in terms of how they are linked to global forced migration processes but to understand which new media practices asylum seekers used in both locales and how those were similar or different from each other across research sites.

The numbers of asylum seekers each state receives in Germany are calculated according to the capacities of the accommodation,, in which state office for migration the country of the asylum seeker is processed, and the population of each state and related tax income (BAMF 2011). As Bavaria has the second highest population of all states in Germany, it also receives one of the highest numbers of asylum seekers. In 2010, there were 8500 asylum seekers in approximately 120 collective accommodations (Flüchtlingsräte 2011, p. 54). In the whole country, approximately 40% of adults and 35% of children live in collective accommodation. The rest live in private accommodation (Flüchtlingsräte 2011, p. 16). Unlike in Berlin, asylum seekers need to live in collective accommodation in Bavaria, a regulation that was loosened somewhat in June 2010.

Berlin is the largest city in Germany with 3.35 million inhabitants. Munich has around 1.3 million. While Munich is often represented in the international imagination as the "essence" of what it means to be German – beer, Lederhosen, Oktoberfest, BMW – Berlin has developed as the symbol of political power in the new Germany after reunification. Berlin also has a relatively high percentage of people with a migration background; 14% have a foreign passport (Commissioner for Integration and Migration of the Senate of Berlin 2011). In 2011, the state of Berlin received over 5% asylum seekers and the state of Bavaria over 15% (BAMF 2011).

In Berlin, I interviewed in ten shared accommodations, in Munich in eleven. The accommodations in Berlin are supervised by LAGeSo, *Landesamt für Gesundheit und Soziales* (Office for Health and Social Affairs), of the city and state government of Berlin. The accommodations in Munich were supervised and managed by the *Oberregierung Bayern* (Government of Bavaria). The accommodations administered by the Government of Bavaria in Munich were located either in the city or in the metropolitan Munich region, like in the towns of Dachau, Germering, or Höhenkirchen. The ones administered by LAGeSo in Berlin were located exclusively within the city.

The accommodations managed by the government in and around Munich come in the form of barrack-type houses, concrete blocks with apartments inside, or, more rarely, apartment houses integrated into neighborhoods. In Berlin,[8] I did not see any barracks but mostly individual or shared apartments in buildings that used to be army accommodation, Red Cross accommodation, hospices, homeless shelters, company buildings, or regular apartments. I interviewed 79 people, men (41) and women (38), from countries in the Arab world, Africa, Eastern Europe, and Asia. They were from 17 to 65 years of age, male, female, singles, and families.[9] Education ranged from illiterate to university diploma. One-third had more than seven years of schooling. Accommodation managers either helped me to contact the interviewees or I asked for volunteers once I visited the accommodations. I also conducted participant observations in the accommodations. I was invited by social workers to attend German courses, weekly discussion groups, or a "Women's Café", a weekly meeting of female asylum seekers, to have tea and coffee and chat about personal and socio-political topics. I interviewed mostly in German and English. In case I did not speak the language (well), I had friends of the interviewees translating for me.

New Media Practices and Their Meanings

I observed early on how people living in shared asylum seeker accommodation engaged with social networking sites (specifically Facebook), voice and video-sharing services like Skype, or searched the Internet. They used desktop and laptop computers in the accommodation, the private spaces of friends and family, Internet Cafés, youth clubs, and libraries. Only very few people (3) had Internet on their phone and I saw only one smartphone. Out of the 79 interviewees more than half had one and sometimes several computers (38) and 54 interviewees were computer literate.[10] The latter number is not representative as I did snowball sampling and asylum shelter managers sometimes (but not always) directed me toward people with computers and new media knowledge. A little less than half of the interviewees had computers in the accommodations in Munich (21 of 47) and a little more than half of the people in Berlin (17/32). In several cases, the computers were in need of repair. Only 15/47 (Munich) and 11/32 (Berlin) had Internet access in the accommodations at the time of the research. Several interviewees mentioned that new technology was not important to them; the future of their families was. One Somali man said in Munich: "Everybody in my wife's family was killed in Somalia. You see, computers are not the first thing on my mind. The Internet is a waste of time and does not make life easier." And yet, even he spent 30 minutes per week in an Internet Café to email.

The access to computers and the Internet depended on several structural factors, such as support of new technology by the accommodation managers, refugee advocacy groups, literacy and education of asylum seekers, age, financial means, family access to new media in the home countries, and access to libraries or youth clubs with computer facilities. When managers were knowledgeable and open to new technologies, they tended to support central Internet access and acquiring computers (e.g., through donations). For example, in one accommodation situated in a smaller town outside Munich and built in basic barrack style, the shelter manager had installed central Internet access with the help of a local asylum seeker support group.

Literate interviewees with teenage children, who had saved some money or had friends/family in Germany were more likely to own a computer than others. Especially children wanted computers to do their homework: "I always get worse grades in school than the others as I do not have as much time as they do to prepare my homework on the computer. We don't have money, so we don't have a computer," a 13-year-old girl said. Those people who had family in their home countries owning a computer were especially motivated to use new technologies. Several people had learnt computer skills in the centralized reception shelters from co-nationals who told them about the advantages of Facebook and other services. If there was no computer in the accommodation, people went to Internet Cafés or used the library and sometimes youth clubs. The latter three options, however, were related to paying money for either computer use (from 70 cents an hour to 2 euros in Internet Cafés in Berlin) and for transportation by bus or tram – a challenge for people living with a budget from 40 euros to 370 euros[11] a month. In the following, I focus on two particular practices that were important to the asylum seekers I interviewed: searching the Internet and using Facebook. Interviewees had frequently mentioned those and I have observed the practices in Munich and Berlin in a variety of accommodations. There were more practices and ways of constructing locality, but due to the space I decided being selective instead of comprehensive.

Searching the Internet

During one interview the cell phone of a Palestinian man rang. He repeated the conversation for me as an affirmation of the importance of new technology in his life: "The woman said your computer is ready. I have just sent you an instant message on your cell phone." Then he laughed and told me how happy he was that the computer was working again, including the Internet.

"The internet is our close friend. It helps, is our best friend, is for education when I am so bored" (Afghan asylum seeker in Dachau, Munich area). More than one-third of the interviewees had lived in shared accommodations for more than 2 years and up to 22 years in one case, mostly without work permits. Boredom and a feeling of not having a purpose in life was a commonly shared experience, regardless of where asylum seekers lived. All the interviewees using a computer and the Internet *searched* for particular information, whether in the accommodations in Berlin or Munich, in Internet Cafés, or in the houses of family and friends.

To the interviewees, searching the Internet meant "looking for information", "searching addresses of lawyers and doctors", "information about work", "information about studies", "getting information about Berlin", "look up asylum law", or "reading the news". Information, how the people understood it, was a general term for all types of facts, figures, addresses, opinions, and hyperlinks that provided answers to a particular question, problem, and aspiration. The term *information* was often related to verbs like *looking* or *searching*, verbs that describe a person as doing something purposeful and goal-directed, such as receiving expert knowledge (e.g., information on asylum law), directions for mapping a place (e.g., addresses for doctors or lawyers), facts, figures, and opinions about a country (e.g., news), or directions for personal and social development (e.g., studies or work).

Interviewees mapped the city as an information and service place by searching for lawyers and doctors. In order to *go* to a virtual place, they also mapped the city physically by walking or taking the tram or metro to an Internet Café. In Munich, asylum seekers often went to Internet Cafés near the train station in the Munich city center as cheap international call shops, cell phone stores, kebab shops, and cafés catering to Turkish, Afghani, Middle Eastern, and African migrants were located there.

Interviewees also positioned themselves socio-culturally by feeling forced to distance themselves from certain places related to new media practices. For example, some women complained that Internet Cafés around the train station in Munich were places where men approached them in disrespectful ways. One 27-year-old Iraqi woman said: "Many people there are men. They ask, how are you? I am a woman and when other families see me talking with a man, there will be many problems." Therefore, some women avoided Internet Cafés. They adhered to culturally coded gender roles by avoiding public places where they could violate expectations of what it means to be an unmarried woman. Due to the force of the cultural code of not interacting with men who are strangers, some of those women were excluded from engaging in virtual practices and becoming a member of virtual (speech) communities as they did not have private access to computers.

Sometimes interviewees would look for legal information on the asylum process in Germany. A woman from Armenia in her twenties said, "I look up asylum law on the Internet just to be informed." When searching for legal advice, interviewees positioned themselves in a legal space and as a person whose life was defined by the law. "It is amazing how a piece of paper can stop your life here," said a young Iraqi man. Navigating this legal and related bureaucratic space, going to appointments with lawyers and social workers, took up much of the time for the interviewees.

Moreover, about half the people with computer access mentioned that they read newspapers or accessed websites with news about their home countries on a daily basis. They did so in their private rooms, in Internet Cafés, and in the houses of family and friends. Specifically, people looked for political news and potential changes in conflict areas like in Afghanistan, Somalia, or Pakistan. They talked about the city they were from, sometimes why they fled, and how their families still lived there under difficult circumstances, like in Baghdad or Kabul. People also talked about how some of those cities provided opportunities for Internet access and staying in touch with family members abroad. "We had a computer in Kabul but now cannot afford it anymore," said an Afghani man who lived with his family in a shared accommodation in Munich. Interviewees thus positioned themselves as a social location (refugee and asylum seeker), backed by information on the situation in the countries obtained from TV and the Internet.

Searching the Internet also positioned asylum seekers into an imagined social location: "I want to be a nurse later on and look for information about how to do this when I am out of here," a woman in her thirties from Nigeria said. "I want to go to a university and look for how I can do this," another young woman from Iraq said. The act of searching for information was thus pragmatic and affective, a source of hope, an act of imagining a future sense of being and acting, but also a means to an end.

However, searching the Internet was not always goal-oriented. People also engaged with it to pass time. "I am so bored, I cannot work, I cannot travel to other cities, I cannot start a life" is what I heard repeatedly during the interviews. "The computer keeps me going," said the woman in her early thirties from Nigeria in a Munich shelter while I watched a cockroach climb up the wall.

Asylum seekers can live in prolonged situations of insecurity, uncertainty, and stress. Coupled with difficult flight experiences, torture, poverty, and other previous experiences, these situations can produce anxiety disorders, depression, and suicidal thoughts (Tribe 2002; Freedman 2007). Asylum seekers were aware of the importance of mental health and many mentioned psychological difficulties, such as chronic headache, depression, anxiety, and panic attacks. Searching the Internet was not a cure but one way to map, direct, and project one's own position in life and that of the people one related to and to imagine a future.

Using Facebook

Facebook was a term that some interviewees mentioned immediately when asked what they do on a computer. Of 54 who were computer literate, 22 interviewees (13 in Munich and 9 in Berlin) used Facebook. "Everybody has Facebook here," said a 23-year-old

Iranian man, referring to a shared asylum seeker accommodation in a small town outside Munich. He had arrived from Iran 9 months ago and spoke fluent German. He used Facebook to connect with friends and family in Europe, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Almost all of the Facebook users were literate, under the age of 40, and used it in the accommodations, Internet Cafés, youth clubs, and houses of friends and family. But there were exceptions. One Palestinian man in his fifties, for example, who lived with his wife and children in an asylum accommodation in Berlin and who had spent much of his life in the Jenin refugee camp in the West Bank, was an active Facebook user and documented his and his families' daily life. While sitting in front of a laptop with his wife and two teenage daughters, he proudly showed me his Facebook page with pictures of his twin daughters in Berlin and pictures of his Dabke[12] group and their performance during a cultural festival. "He has friends from Jordan to Sweden," said his wife.

Interviewees had from 23 to over 200 "friends" all over the world, including some family members and people they had met in asylum seeker accommodations, in schools, language courses, sports teams, or online. Interviewees in their late teens and early twenties said that they *connected* mostly with people in Germany, not so much in their home countries. One reason was that especially unaccompanied minors, which means children under the age of 18, and younger people in their late teens and twenties wanted to have their private space, away from parental supervision. A man in his early twenties said: "I have Facebook friends all over but not many family members. I don't always want my parents to know what I am up to." A Kurdish Iraqi man in his twenties said: "I do connect with my brothers and sister in Iraq but I have more friends from Germany. I play soccer and many of my friends are from the team." Another young man from Somalia told me: "I do Facebook in addition to MSN. I go to the Internet Café at the train station in Munich. I use Facebook more with people in Germany, *connect* with friends from school and language school. I only go for a short while to the café as it is expensive, one euro an hour."

Connect was a frequent term used when asked what Facebook meant to the users. People *connected* from multiple times daily to once a month. *Connecting* had multiple meanings to the interviewees. "I update my profile two or three times a day," said a Syrian man whom I met in one of the shelters in Munich. He was 25 years old and had been in Germany for five years with his mother. I was introduced to him by a Syrian acquaintance of his who also lived in the accommodation. When I entered the room I saw a young man smiling, telling me to sit next to him as he could not move. He was paralyzed from the neck down. "Facebook makes me feel connected with the world although I cannot leave the bed," he said. He used a specially designed finger-piece which helped him to move the cursor and to type. His father and sister lived in Chicago while his 60-year-old mother and he had come to Germany as asylum seekers. Two siblings still lived in Syria. He had used Facebook for more than a year and had befriended strangers from the United States, Canada, Syrians abroad, and Germans. For the young man, connecting meant being in the presence of others and presenting himself beyond the bed and room that he could hardly leave due to a car accident in Syria. His cousin had driven the car. It was the same cousin who also lived in Germany who had provided him with the computer as a way of relating, that is, connecting to the world.

Connecting with others also meant *engaging with* other people's opinions, *posting* comments on mundane issues like movies or life in Germany, *discussing* everyday issues related to personal or public life, or looking at pictures. "I cannot move and yet I am interested in many things in life," the young man told me. While I was there, he was visited by a friend. He appreciated the meetings and people visiting him very much as he loved interactions, but the visits were up to the people and their schedules. With Facebook, the young man could decide when and how long to interact with others. Virtual conversations allowed him to transcend the experience of his body in a bed in a small room in an asylum seeker accommodation and acting into the experiences and lives of others, like others acting into his. To the young man, Facebook became a physical place and social space as the platform allowed others to get to know him as a young man with interests in movies, languages, and philosophical thinking. This social space was important to the man as it helped him feel alive by being acknowledged by others (see Stewart 1996).

Connecting was tightly related to social, (trans)cultural, and religious positioning. Churches were places for asylum seekers from different countries to find community, follow their faith in their languages, and meet new people. Through Facebook, interviewees received information about services and related with members of the congregation. Other people used Facebook to find information about social events organized by community organizations catering to people from particular countries (e.g., Iraqis), ethnic groups (e.g., Kurdish community organizations), or regions (e.g., people from the African continent). One woman in her thirties from an island off the coast of Somalia found Facebook key in getting notice of gatherings for people who spoke a similar language (Suahili). I was invited to eat with the woman, her mother, and her children who had just come home from school. They lived in two rooms in an asylum seeker accommodation outside Munich where few people shared their language. While the women chuckled as I decided to eat with my hands instead of the fork they had provided me with, they told me about parties by and for people interested in African countries and cultures. "The Khanga party is happening soon," the young woman told me. Khanga, so she explained and showed me, is a garment, a piece of colorfully printed cotton worn by people in East Africa. The parties are good ways to connect and have some fun. Facebook was one way to know about those gatherings. Facebook thus helped people to become aware of, create, and maintain social, cultural, and religious positionalities and communities.

In addition to being a place and space to expand socio-cultural relations and engage in grouping, Facebook was also a way of producing positive affect spaces. For example, a 36-year-old Iraqi Assyrian man showed me pictures of his family in Chicago. I saw him with a laptop when I passed his door. He was sad, angry, and talked in a frustrated voice as he could neither find work nor an apartment although he had a work permit and the status of *Aufenthalt* (permission to stay). He had fled Iraq with his family via Jordan where he had lived before he was directed toward Germany by UNHCR. He sat in his room, which he shared with three other males and which was filled with clothes and dishes. The man apologized for the condition of the room. His 14-year-old son was visiting him and had brought a laptop, which the father used to show me his Facebook profile. The father used to be a car mechanic, soldier, and policeman in Iraq, was divorced, with the son living with his mother in Berlin in a rented apartment.

The father used Facebook about once a month. He did not own a computer but used the son's when he visited. The man showed me pictures of his brother and mother in

Chicago and how they had established themselves there with good jobs. He sent pictures to his mother regularly as she missed him and cried a lot. Although he had applied for a US visa to visit his family, he was denied entry, which made him desperate as he feared not seeing his family again. He hoped to have better chances once he got the German passport. Yet, after looking at the pictures and comments from his family, he said, “I am calmer now. They do well and make good money over there. I wish I could do the same. It makes me feel good seeing them and knowing everything is all right.” Then he smiled for the first time. Engaging with visual images available on Facebook was thus positive emotional work and produced positive feelings for the man in a situation of frustration. Overall, connecting through Facebook referred to communicative acts like updating a profile, reading and responding to information, or discussing mundane topics, thus positioning oneself socially, culturally, religiously, and affectively. Connecting had several functions like making oneself present in the lives of others and vice versa and generating evidence about one’s life through looking at pictures, thereby creating personal but also collective ways of remembering. Remembering was not so much related to being an asylum seeker but to moments of belonging, like dancing in a cultural performance, walking the streets of Munich or Berlin, or being with family.

Similarities and Differences between the Practices in Creating Locality

Many studies on transnational migrants and diaspora have emphasized the importance of the virtual world for creating a sense of belonging, safe spaces for information gathering and expression, and construction of common experiences and needs (Everett 2009; Gajjala 2004; Gajjala and Gajjala 2008; Hegde 2011; Kadende-Kaiser 2000; Mitra 1997; Parham 2004; Witteborn 2011a, 2011b; Wilding 2006). For many of the asylum seekers in this study, virtual places were important to map their surroundings and create social networks. Searching the Internet and using Facebook are similar practices in that they help orient asylum seekers in their immediate surroundings and map place. Both practices created locality as a physical and embodied experience. People rendered their neighborhoods and urban space familiar by walking or taking public transport to an Internet Café or a library, to a friend’s house, or to take a computer course. Cultural codes sometimes excluded women from engaging with virtual practices. People sometimes also learnt how to navigate legal restrictions, for example, how to use public transport without paying for a ticket due to limited financial means.

The practices were also similar in that they helped people pass time and produce positive emotional localities by either helping people to imagine what could be in the future or engage with family and friends across borders. Interviewees positioned themselves as persons with individual aspirations, hopes, and dreams, and communal identities that transcended an asylum seeker identity. The latter claim is important as asylum seekers saw themselves as a social, cultural, and relational being first in many interactions and settings. *Asylum seeker* was a term and related way of living that people did not want to be reduced to. In addition, both practices enabled asylum seekers to create the everyday experience. In the face of constant uncertainty about one’s future and insecurity about legal status, work, financial means, and the future of one's family, the creation of the everyday and the mundane was important to the people.

The practices were different in that searching the Internet was more monologic and goal-oriented than engaging with Facebook. People mapped information space for health-related and legal information or to prepare for work and study. They also related to their home countries by reading the news. Facebooking was more interactive, performative, and productive in helping asylum seekers construct themselves in and as social and cultural localities, as members of communities, and to perform and archive cultural ways of being. Facebook users tended to be younger and interviewees in their late teens and twenties emphasized that they networked with friends in Germany, preferably without parental supervision. Maintaining relationships in close proximity was often more important to the young people than engaging in distant, transnational relations (for an overview of SNS, see Boyd and Ellison 2007).

Through its interactive character, Facebook provided even more opportunities than searching the Internet to engage in emotional work and create positive affective spaces. People showed pride when updating their profiles and performing a sociocultural identity, were happy and hopeful when getting information from their families and friends, or looking at images that created visual maps of remembering what it meant to belong. This emotional work was especially important in the face of the legal and social arrest of asylum seekers, disability, and the difficulty of visiting family, even within Germany, except with special permission. Facebook thus provided an opportunity for socioemotional bonding across imposed social and legal restrictions and borders (see Komito 2011).

New Media Practices, Comparison, and Urban Centers: Conclusions

This study discussed new media practices and their role in constructing different types of localities for asylum seekers. I suggested the ethnography of communication as a methodology to compare communicative practice from a participant perspective. Through this approach a researcher can analyze (and compare) situated practice, along the lines of situated uses, communicative acts, premises, purposes, and meanings of those premises and purposes to the people. A researcher can also compare how the practices create certain types of localities. One purpose of such a comparison can be to understand better how people who live outside global mobility flows and are dis-placed create a sense of place and belonging through particular ways and modes of communicating.

In this study, the practices enabled asylum seekers across research sites to map place physically, position themselves in local networks and future imagined spaces, and create positive affect as well as a sense of normality beyond being an asylum seeker. Facebooking was an interactive way of creating and maintaining cultural, religious, and affective positionalities and communities, mostly for younger asylum seekers. People positioned themselves through verbal and sometimes visual communicative acts and archived their personal and collective ways of belonging, thus creating a sense of place beyond social and physical arrest.

Overall, the ethnography of communication is a productive methodological approach to global and comparative communication research due to its analytical focus on distinctive and highly contextualized communication practices, its attention to the interrelationship between communicative practice, place, and grouping processes, and its premise to understand communication and hence social phenomena from the perspective of interlocutors.

Moreover, the study illustrated how new media practices as used by the people in this study related to urban settings. The majority of asylum seekers I interviewed wanted and needed access to new media technologies within the urban and legal contexts of physical, social, and economic isolation and uncertainty. Cities like Munich or Berlin as well as smaller towns connected to those cities offered access to technological infrastructures, like Internet Cafés, libraries, and youth clubs, to ICT courses initiated by NGOs, (wealthy) citizens willing to donate to asylum seeker accommodations, and advocacy organizations promoting the use of new technologies. However, access is still limited due to structural conditions such as obstacles seen by shelter officials to install computers, lack of financial means to buy smartphones or computers, illiteracy, lacking infrastructures such as close-by Internet Cafés, and the high cost of transportation.

Asylum seekers in this study did not engage much in political advocacy. However, they practiced a global politics of place by linking urban centers like Munich, Lagos, Baghdad, Mosul, Grozny, Pristina, Tehran, Kabul, Kinshasa, and Berlin by reading and discussing political news amongst each other, finding information on asylum law related to their accounts of flight from particular cities, and in some cases connecting with friends and family to receive information about the political situation in particular urban centers.

Future research could examine a variety of new media practices and how they create a sense of place for *dis*-placed people after forced transnational migration. Those studies could look at the particular resources that urban centers offer to asylum seekers and refugees to create local as well as transnational legal, political, social, and cultural alliances. How are new media practices as used by forced migrants, global connectivity, and place-making similar or different in urban centers around the world and why? How are urban centers connected globally by forced migrants? Or what are similarities and differences between urban and rural areas with regard to new media practice, global connectivity, and the creation of place by people who are out-of-place?

As an afterthought, the party “Bündnis 90/Die Grünen” sent a request to the Senate of Berlin for responding to the question of access to information and communication technologies for all asylum seekers in Berlin (Bayram 2010; Fritsch 2010). The response was negative at the time. However, the outlook for access to new technologies for asylum seekers is not so bleak. The planned creation of Internet rooms in the new central accommodation in Berlin and the efforts by grassroots groups like in Dachau/Munich are small steps to enact a universal right to communication and information that is also for asylum seekers.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the asylum seekers for participating in this study and the accommodation managers and government officials in Berlin and Munich for their support. The author also thanks her research assistant Zhifei Mao for her help and Ingrid

Volkmer for her constructive feedback. The work described in this chapter was fully supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (RGC Ref. No. CUHK456010).

Notes

1. A refugee is a person who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country …" (UNHCR, Article 1, The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, UNHCR, 1951).
2. Asylum seekers are persons who have started the legal and bureaucratic process of applying for asylum in a respective country. In this study, I include people with the status of Duldung (temporary protection from deportation under particular circumstances after the termination of the asylum process; see Parusel, 2010). I have included such people as many residents of asylum seeker accommodations I visited in Munich and Berlin had this status.
3. I take the term new media to refer to technological devices as well as virtual services accessible through computers and computer-like applications like smartphones and iPads as well as the practices related to that use.
4. Locality refers here to place and space and the practices through which those are co-constituted. I use the term synonymously with the term *local*.
5. There is a residence law for asylum seekers in German states like Bavaria, which means that during the asylum process, asylum seekers can only stay within the vicinity of the city or region they are registered in (Bundesministerium der Justiz 2009). In Berlin, this law has been loosened somewhat so that the people can travel from Berlin to the neighboring state of Brandenburg and vice versa.
6. I use the terms local and locality synonymously here.
7. An ethnography of communication approach would focus specifically on the construction of a speech community, a concept that refers to a social unit that engages with particular communicative means and is constructed through those at the same time. In this study, the speech community is people who create conceptually shared positionings (physical, legal, social, cultural, affective, transnational, imagined) through the communicative practices of searching the Internet and using Facebook.
8. As asylum seekers in Berlin are not required to live in shared accommodation during the asylum process, more of them live in rented apartments than in Munich. However, like in Munich, I only interviewed asylum seekers in shared accommodation in Berlin.
9. Those interviewees who turned out to be below the age of 17 were taken out of the interview sample.
10. Computer literate means that the people were able to navigate the Internet, use video and voice-sharing services, or knew how to use Microsoft Word, Excel, etc.
11. The budget depends on the legal status and the federal state the asylum seekers live in.
12. A dance.

References

Al-Qasimi, N. (2011) Ladies and Gentlemen, Boyahs and Girls: uploading transnational queer subjectivities in the United Arab Emirates, in R.S. Hegde (ed.), *Circuits of Visibility: Gender and Transnational Media Cultures*. New York: New York University Press, pp. 284–302.

Appadurai, A. (1996) *Modernity at Large*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

BAMF (2011) *Verteilung der Asylbewerber* (*Distribution of Asylum Seekers*), accessed 09/08/2011, http://www.bamf.de/DE/Migration/AsylFluechtlinge/Asylverfahren/Verteilung/verteilung-node.html.

Bayram, C. (2010) Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Canan Bayram (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) und Antwort Unterbringung von Flüchtlingen in Berlin – Informationen und Kommunikation. Drucksache 16/14 410. (Query by the representative Canan Bayram (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) and reply about the accommodation of refugees in Berlin – Information and communication), accessed 09/08/2011, http://www.parlament-berlin.de:8080/starweb/adis/citat/VT/16/KlAnfr/ka16-14410.pdf.

Bernal, V. (2006) Diaspora, cyberspace and political imagination: the Eritrean diaspora online, *Global Networks*, **6**, 161–179.

Boyd, D.M. and Ellison, N.B. (2007) Social network sites: definition, history, and scholarship, *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, **13**, 210–230.

Bundesministerium der Justiz (Federal Ministry of Justice) (2009) *AsylVfG §56*, accessed 10/06/2010, http://bundesrecht.juris.de/asylvfg_1992/__56.html.

Carbaugh, D. (1996) *Situating Selves: The Communication of Social Identities in American Scenes*. New York: SUNY.

Carbaugh, D. (2005) *Cultures in Conversation*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Commissioner for Integration and Migration of the Senate of Berlin (ed.) (2011) *Encouraging Diversity – Strengthening Cohesion. Integration Policy in Berlin, 2007–2011*, accessed 08/08/2011, http://www.berlin.de/imperia/md/content/lb-integration-migration/publikationen/berichte/integration_policy_in_berlin_2007_2011_bf.pdf?start&ts=1207556926&file=integration_policy_in_berlin_2007_2011_bf.pdf.

Covarrubias, P. (2002) *Culture, Communication, and Cooperation: Interpersonal Relations and Pronominal Address in a Mexican Organization*. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield.

Cronen, V.E. (2009) Social construction without dualism: repairing the ruptures and making connections, in G.J. Galanes and W. Leeds-Hurwitz (eds), *Socially Constructing Communication*. Creskill, NJ: Hampton Press, pp. 57–95.

De Leeuw, S. and Rydin, I. (2007) Migrant children's digital stories, *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, **10** (4), 447–464.

Duncan, S. (1989) What is locality?, in R. Peet and N. Thrift (eds), *New Models in Geography*, vol. **2**. London: Unwin Hyman, pp. 221–252.

Everett, A. (2009) *Digital Diaspora: A Race for Cyberspace*. Albany, NY: SUNY.

Fitch, K. (1998) *Speaking Relationally: Culture, Communication, and Interpersonal Communication*. New York: Guildford.

Fitch, K. (2003) Cultural persuadables, *Communication Theory*, **13** (1), 100–123.

Flüchtlingsräte (2011) *AusgeLAGERt: Zur Unterbringung von Fluechtlingen in Deutschland* (*Decamped: About the Housing of Refugees in Germany*), accessed 12/06/2011, http://www.nds-fluerat.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/webversion2.pdf.

Forced Migration Online (2007) *Types of Forced Migrants*, accessed 06/03/2011, http://www.forcedmigration.org/whatisfm.htm.

Freedman, J. (2007) *Gendering the International Asylum and Refugee Debate*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Fritsch, R.-M. (June 16, 2010). Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Canan Bayram (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) und Antwort Unterbringung von Flüchtlingen in Berlin _ Informationen und Kommunikation. Drucksache 16/14 410. (Query by the representative Canan Bayram (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) and reply about the accommodation of refugees in Berlin –

Information and communication), accessed 09/08/2011, http://www.parlament-berlin.de:8080/starweb/adis/citat/VT/16/KlAnfr/ka16-14410.pdf.

Gajjala, R. (2004) *Cyber Selves: Feminist Ethnographies of South Asian Women*. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press.

Gajjala, R. and Gajjala, V. (eds) (2008) *South-Asian Technospaces*. New York: Peter Lang, Digital Formation Series.

Georgiou, M. (2006) *Diaspora, Identity and the Media: Diasporic Transnationalism and Mediated Spatialities*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton.

Gupta, A. and Ferguson, J. (1992) Beyond "culture": space, identity, and the politics of difference, *Cultural Anthropology*, 7 (1), 6–23.

Harrell-Bond, B. (2004) Weapons of the weak, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, **17** (1), 27–28.

Hegde, R.S. (ed.) (2011) *Circuits of Visibility: Gender and Transnational Media Cultures*. New York: New York University Press.

Hymes, D. (1962) The ethnography of speaking, in T. Gladwin and W. C. Sturtevant (eds), *Anthropology and Human Behavior*. Washington, DC: Anthropological Society of Washington, pp. 13–53.

Hymes, D. (1972) Models of the interaction of language and social life, in H.H. Gumperz and D. Hymes (eds), *Directions in Sociolinguistics: The Ethnography of Communication*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, pp. 35–71.

Kabbar, E.F. and Crump, B.J. (2006) The factors that influence adoption of ICTs by recent refugee immigrants to New Zealand, *Informing Science Journal*, **9**, 111–120.

Kadende-Kaiser, R. (2000) Interpreting language and cultural discourse: Internet communication amongst Burundians in the diaspora, *Africa Today*, **47** (2), 120–148.

Katriel, T. and Philipsen, G. (2007) "What we need is communication": "communication" as a cultural category in some American speech, in L. Monaghan and J.E. Goodman (eds), *A Cultural Approach to Interpersonal Communication: Essential Readings*. Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 88–102.

Komito, L. (2011) Social media and migration: virtual community 2.0, *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology*, **62**, 1075–1086.

Kraidy, M.M. and Murphy, P.D. (2008) Shifting Geertz: toward a theory of translocalism in global communication studies, *Communication Theory*, **18**, 335–355.

Landzelius, K. (2006) *Native on the Net: Indigenous and Diasporic Peoples in the Virtual Age*. New York: Routledge.

Leung, L. (2007) Mobility and displacement: refugees' mobile media practices in immigration detention, *M/C – A Journal of Media and Culture*, **10** (1), accessed 19/09/2011, http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0703/10-leung.php.

Leung, L. (2010) Telecommunications across borders: refugees' technology use during displacement, *Telecommunications Journal of Australia*, **60** (4), 58.1–58.13.

Leung, L., Lamb, C.F. and Emrys, L. (2009) *Technology's Refuge: The Use of Technology by Asylum Seekers and Refugees*. Sydney: UTSePress, accessed 15/09/2011, http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/handle/2100/928/TechnologysRefuge.pdf?sequence=1.

Mandaville, P. (2003) Communication and diasporic Islam: a virtual ummah?, in K.H. Karim (ed.), *The Media of Diaspora*. New York: Routledge, pp. 135–147.

Massey, D. (1994) *Space, Place and Gender*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.

Massey, D. (2005) *For Space*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Massey, D. and Jess, P. (1995) *A Place in the World? Places, Cultures and Globalization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press and The Open University Press.

Mitra, A. (1997) Virtual commonality: Llooking for India on the Internet, in S. Jones (ed.), *Virtual Culture: Identity and Communication in Cybersociety*. London: Sage, pp. 55–79.

O'Mara, B., Babacan, H. and Borland, H. (2010) *Sending the Right Message: Use and Access of ICT for Communicating Messages of Health and Community Wellbeing to CALD Communities*. Institute for Community, Ethnicity and Policy Alternatives. Melbourne: Victoria University, accessed 19/09/2011, http://www.apo.org.au/research/sending-right-message-use-and-access-ict-communicating-messages-health-and-wellbeing-cald-c.

Parham, A. (2004) Diaspora, community and communication: Internet use in transnational Haiti, *Global Networks*, **4**, 199–217.

Parusel, B. (2010) *The Granting of Non-EU Harmonised Protection Statuses in Germany*. Research Study II/2009 within the framework of the European Migration Network (EMN), Working Paper 30, German National EMN Contact Point and Research Section of the Federal Office.

Pearce, B. (2009) Communication and social construction: claiming our birthright, in G.J. Galanes and W. Leeds-Hurwitz (eds), *Socially Constructing Communication*. Creskill, NJ: Hampton Press, pp. 33–56.

Philipsen, G. (1989) Speech and the communal function in four cultures, *International and Intercultural Communication Annual*, **13**, 79–92.

Philipsen, G. (1992) *Speaking Culturally*. Albany, NY: SUNY.

Philipsen, G. (2002) Cultural communication, in W.B. Gudykunst and B. Mody (eds), *Handbook of International and Intercultural Communication*. New York: Sage, pp. 51–67.

Philipsen, G. and Coutu, L.M. (2005) The ethnography of speaking, in K.L. Fitch and R.E. Sanders (eds), *Handbook of Language and Social Interaction*. Mahwah, NJ: LEA, pp. 355–381.

Pottier, J. (2003) Negotiating local knowledge: an introduction, in J. Pottier, A. Bicker, and P. Sillitoe (eds), *Negotiating Local Knowledge: Power and Identity in Development*. London: Pluto Press, pp. 1–29.

Sassen, S. (2004) Local actors in global politics, *Current Sociology*, **52** (4), 649–670.

Sassen, S. (2006). *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Stewart, J. (1996) The symbol model vs. language as constitutive articulate contact, in J. Stewart (ed.), *Beyond the Symbol Model: Reflections on the Representational Nature of Language*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, pp. 9–63.

Tribe, R. (2002) Mental health of refugees and asylum seekers, *Advances in Psychiatric Treatment*, **8**, 240–247.

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) (1997) *Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments*. United Nations: Geneva.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (1951) *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, accessed 30/08/2011, http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2011a) *Frequently Requested Statistics*, accessed 20/02/2012, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a0174156.html

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2011b) *Statistical Snapshot*, accessed 27/09/2011, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48e5f6.

Wilding, R. (2006) "Virtual" intimacies? Families communicating across transnational contexts, *Global Networks*, **6**, 125–142.

Witteborn, S. (2007) The expression of Palestinian identity in narratives about personal experiences: implications for the study of narrative, identity, and social interaction, *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, **40** (2&3), 145–170.

Witteborn, S. (2008) Identity mobilization practices of refugees: the case of Iraqis in the United States and the War in Iraq, *Journal of International and Intercultural Communication*, **1** (3), 202–220.

Witteborn, S. (2011a) Gendering cyberspace: transnational mappings and Uyghur diasporic politics, in R. S. Hegde (ed.), *Circuits of Visibility: Gender and Transnational Media Cultures*. New York: New York University Press, pp. 268–283.

Witteborn, S. (2011b) Discursive grouping in a virtual forum: dialogue, difference, and the "intercultural", *Journal of International and Intercultural Communication. Special Issue*, **4** (2), 109–126.

Witteborn, S. (2011c) Constructing the forced migrant and the politics of space and place-making, *Journal of Communication*, **61** (2), 1142–1160.

Witteborn, S. (2012) Testimonio and spaces of risk: a forced migrant perspective, *Cultural Studies* (in press), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09502386.2011.587881#preview.

Zetter, R. (2007) More labels, fewer refugees: remaking the refugee label in an era of globalization, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, **20**, 172–192.

Part IV

Identifying Spheres of Comparison in Globalized Contexts

19

Researching the News Agencies

Oliver Boyd-Barrett

An Evolving Paradigm

When I started out in communications research shortly after graduation in the mid to late 1960s, it was dominated by a narrow interest in "effects" research, driven by an obsession with the cognitive, attitudinal, or behavioral consequences of exposure to media "messages" (with particular reference to political campaigns, violence, and sales). It was "positivist", limited to what could be seen and measured. The literature grew more complex and inconclusive with every new variable, and researchers were torn between endorsing either Klapper's celebrated conclusion that the media served the function of reinforcement of the status quo – through the operation of processes of selective exposure, attention, and retention (Klapper 1960) – *or* (the view of many psychologists who studied the impact of television violence) that media fostered social disruption, through their effects on the young and vulnerable. Bizarrely, this tug-of-war coexisted with a contradictory discourse in the emerging study of international communication (which dovetailed, unhelpfully, with development communication) where media were lauded for their positive capacity to haul the masses of developing countries – mired in "traditional" customs and ways of thinking (which could not possibly be good for them) – towards a benign modernity as represented by the Western countries whose colonies the developing countries had recently been. The effects tradition was stymied by what in retrospect was a naive way of thinking about media content, as represented by studies of media violence that identified "violent" texts on the basis of simple counts of violent incidents. "Sophistication" in this debate was manifested in struggles to define "violence", rather than in explorations of what these incidents, however defined, actually "meant" to viewers, in full narrative and reception context.

Research failed to take account of the institutional structures in which media content was produced or of the socio-cultural contexts in which they were consumed.

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

Much research fell into Lazarsfeld's (1940) category of the "administrative", its purpose being to help policy-makers engage the media for persuasive intent – the term "propaganda" was avoided, since it had been over-used to denote what Communist or Fascist governments did with *their* media. There was little understanding of how media are integrated with the major political and economic institutional structures of society, or of the impact of business models, and advertising, on media process and media content, and barely any sense of day-to-day routines of media work. Such naivety may be attributed perhaps to a trusting faith in the protective frameworks of representative democracy and, in the case of British scholarship, experience of not-for-profit public service broadcasting.

In subsequent developments in the 1970s–1980s, research pursued two important and somewhat contradictory pathways toward a more compelling understanding of media and society. Political-economy explored the relationship between media and centers of social, political, and cultural power. This led to an examination of the relationship between media and political/economic systems, media owners and workers, and their routine professional practices. This approach typically attracted sociologists, economists, and political scientists. Cultural studies focused both on how audiences make or take meaning from texts (drawing on sociological tools to survey audience practices and understandings, and the tools of social anthropology to observe audience behavior, culture, and meaning-making), and on how texts themselves are structured to render meaning possible (drawing on the insights of literature and film studies). These approaches converged over time as researchers increasingly appreciated that however sophisticated the analysis of institutional context or of media text, it is rarely advisable – solely on the basis of such study – to assert the meanings that audiences draw from texts, or the uses to which they put them. The "effects" tradition also became more sophisticated, moving beyond the presumption of the "hypodermic needle" concept of media effect toward more interactive conceptions of media, text, and audience interrelationships, initially by way of agenda-setting and uses and gratifications theory.

Approaching the study of news agencies in the early 1970s it was not self-evident which available paradigms might most usefully advance thinking, and the features of these paradigms were far from distinctively clear. One advantage of tackling the subject in this period was that there was still a consensual understanding as to what a "news agency" was, namely, a journalistic "wholesale" business-to-business organization that gathered news (usually print, but also photography, video, or radio) for sale to other media, mainly newspapers and broadcasters. Later generations of international broadcasters, 24/7 operations and online news sites have significantly blurred the boundaries between "wholesale" and "retail" operation. I had interviewed many news agency journalists (principally Reuters) for Jeremy Tunstall's classic 1971 sociological study, *Journalists at Work*. By the time I began focusing specifically on news agencies in 1973, I was aware of Schiller's seminal work *Mass Communications and American Empire* (1969, updated 1992). Schiller seemed too stridently (if understandably) focused on US imperialism for a subject that had to include European as well as other, smaller, international and national agencies throughout the world. Yet along with the researches of Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge (1965), Kaarle Nordenstreng and Tapio Varis (1974), and others, Schiller's work informed emerging discourses in the nonaligned movement and UNESCO, in the early 1970s NWICO debates, and pointed toward inequalities of media access, coverage, and flows as substantial issues of concern. A focus on inequality fitted appropriately with what came to be identified, across the disciplines of sociology, politics, and economics, as a critical "dominance-dependency" model for dissecting relations between Western countries and the post-colonial world. The model responded to a gathering disillusionment in the ex-colonies with the challenges they faced following their hard-won "independence" in withstanding the superior resources available to the ex-imperial powers in the pursuit of their global interests. The Cold War context suffused all such intellectual debate. Choice of models and hypotheses derived from or fed into the different positions that scholars assumed on the question of the merits or otherwise of Western capitalism, American militarism, and Soviet or Chinese-style communism. There was the continuing question of how far news agencies played a part, if any, in social and economic development of a developing world. Work on such topics invited the prospect of somewhat static and laborious content analysis, and was less enticing than another possibility, which was to find out who and what these organizations actually were and how they went about compiling and distributing their services, a form of grounded research that could postpone macro-theorizing to a later day. This also occurred in parallel with an emerging, sociological interest in newspaper structures and journalism practice, which demonstrated interesting tensions between normative theories (fourth estate, watchdog, and so on) about how the press was supposed to operate in democracies and how, and what the press actually did (chase circulation numbers and advertising dollars).

The Disciplinary Origins and Paradigms of News Agency Research

If my categories were limited to the effects, political economy, and cultural studies approaches, I might describe research on news agencies as mainly falling within the political economy paradigm. Not all researchers are notably fired by the critical questions characteristic of this paradigm, but most do exhibit strong historical analysis, contextual awareness of an agency's relationship to other centers of powers as well as to clients, and invoke normatively evaluative considerations related to such issues as monopoly and competition, quality of public service, inequalities of access, content and distribution, and the scope for alternative agencies. This is the stuff of political economy by any other name. Although most contributors to such research resist easy pigeon-holing by discipline, a number are primarily historical by training or, at least, have become interested in news agency history at some point in their careers. (Here, as in other such lists in this chapter, I give a single reference date for each author merely as an exemplar.) The names of Pierre Frederix (1959), Hans Hohne (1976/1977), Theodore Kruglak (1962), A. Lefebvre (1992), Michael Palmer (1987), Peter Putnis (2006), Terhi Rantanen (1987; see also Rantanen and Vartanova 1990), Donald Read (1999), Victor Rosewater (1930), Ingrid Schulze-Schneider (1998), Richard Schwarzlose (1990), Donald Shaw (1967), and Graham Storey (1951) are among those that come to mind and their research tends to focus on historical rather than contemporary dimensions of one or more agencies. Those whose backgrounds are from anthropology, communication, economics, political science, or sociology tend to be more contemporary, including myself, Cristina Archetti (2008), Esperança Bielsa and Susan Bassnett (2008), A. Cohen *et al.* (1996), Marlene Cuthbert (1981), L.E. Escobar (1978), Derek Forbes (1998), Phil Harris (1977), Al Hester (1974), Stig Hjarvard (1998), P. Ivačać (1978), C.B. Johnstone (1995), Stijn Joye (2006), M. Musa (1997), Gertrude Robinson (1981), Jeremy Tunstall (1971), Theodore Van Dijk (1988), Elena Vartanova and Tatjana Frolova (2010), Jurgen Wilke (1998), and Xin Xin (2010). Others come to news agency research following careers in agency, print, or broadcast journalism (sometimes reaching senior executive levels), maybe later capped by an academic position, and their foci may encompass both the historical (sometimes through personal biography) and the contemporary. Chris Paterson had a background in broadcast journalism before he embarked on researching both the television news agencies and the presence of agencies online. Other names here would include Ignacio Muro Benayas (2006) (once director of EFE), Kent Cooper (1942) (once head of AP), Gavin Ellis (2010) (once editor-in-chief of New Zealand's largest newspaper), Anthony Giffard (1998), Oliver Gramling (1940) (once assistant general manager of AP Inc., in charge of broadcasting), Beverly Horvit (2006), J. Huteau and B. Ullman (1992), S. Kim (1989), Ullamaija Kivikuru (1998), Donald Nordberg (2006), Henri Pigeat (1987) (once CEO of AFP) (see also H. Pigeat and J. Huteau 2000), Jennifer Rauch (2003), Mort Rosenblum (1980) (once an AP bureau chief), K.M. Shrivastava (2007), Melville Stone (1921) (once general manager of AP), Daya Thussu (2006) (once a PTI journalist) (see also O. Boyd-Barrett and D. Thussu 1992), and Patrick White (1997) (once a Canadian Press bureau chief).

The effects and cultural studies traditions are less in evidence, very likely because news agencies historically have been business-to-business operators; whatever the "effects" of their news services these have been "mediated" by retail news media, particularly newspapers and broadcasters, although in the past ten to fifteen years agency news is more and more available to the public in its original form through Internet portals and websites. "Framing" analysis of news agency content has become more popular in the past decade, and scholars with backgrounds in linguistics, socio-linguistics, and translation studies have begun to examine news agency content with a high intensity of concentration on linguistic features as well as on the production contexts in which content is constructed (names here include Alan Bell 1991, Esperança Bielsa and Susan Bassnett 2008, and Erkka Vuorinen 1995).

Until the 2000s there had been little focused research on national news agencies as an industry or genus, as opposed to a few scattered histories of individual agencies. I contributed a report of a UNESCO workshop on news agencies that took place in Amman, Jordan, in 2001 (*Final Report of the Workshop on News Agencies in the Era of the Internet*), and an edited book of a similar title (*News Agencies in the Turbulent Era of the Internet*) in 2010, commissioned by the Government of Catalonia to celebrate the tenth anniversary of ACN, the news agency of Catalonia. In between there was an excellent compendium assembled by the Austrian Press Agency (Austrian Presse Agentur, or APA) in 2002, *The Various Faces of Reality*. It may seem overall that there is a substantial volume of material on news agencies, but this is the sum of work that has developed over six or more decades. At any one time, on the other hand, there is little new research material available. My book, *The International News Agencies* (1980) was the first to take a comprehensive look at the news agencies as underpinning a global system of news-gathering and distribution, but it was published over three decades ago and only now am I revisiting this project with a view to a comprehensive update. In the meantime, a few scattered histories have appeared of one or other of the major agencies, often at moments of crisis. This is an insufficient basis to allow any one scholar or practitioner to consider, at any given moment of time, that he or she is well informed about news agencies as a whole or about the vast majority of individual agencies. A passing illustration: two smaller agencies attracted a relatively high amount of attention in the 1970s and 1980s, in parallel with the NWICO debate. They both seemed promising as partial alternatives to an international news system dominated by the giant Western agencies. One was the Caribbean News Agency, CANA, and the other was the news agency of Yugoslavia, Tanjug, which, for several decades, was a leader in coverage of the affairs of member nations of the Movement of Non-aligned Nations, and was coordinator of the international news pool set up by the movement in the 1970s. CANA was later folded into a more comprehensive news and broadcast institution; Tanjug has survived the disintegration of Yugoslavia to become the national news agency of Serbia. Yet virtually nothing has been published about the post-1970s histories of these two organizations. Perhaps more serious, few scholars can consider themselves up to date in their appreciation of the main trends impacting the giant agencies, including Agence France Presse, Associated Press, Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, or Xinhua. Even among news agency scholars there is almost total ignorance about the news agencies of some of the most influential countries of the world: the Japanese agencies of Kyodo and Jiji might be one such example.

Much of what is written, as I have said, is scattered, some of it quite inaccessible, tucked away in esoteric journals or chapters of edited volumes whose overall focus may only relate tangentially to agencies, and in a variety of languages. Books in this area tend to go out of print quickly. Much of the most useful work is in obscure MA theses or doctoral dissertations, burrowed away in university libraries, found only by chance through Internet searches. In the past it has been helpful to monitor trade journals such as Editor and Publisher or the UK Press Gazette, but their coverage is patchy at best. In short, the subject matter hardly lends itself to a coherent assembly of accumulated knowledge, given the geographical dispersal of its principal actors – the agencies themselves or, in the case of the large international agencies, their global networks – and because of the many different languages in which agencies operate. Researchers often encounter difficulties of access to organizations, perhaps because they do not command the relevant languages or because some agencies are not keen to be investigated or have simply not maintained much by way of historical or organizational records.

Existing work covers a range that is somewhat eclectic in guiding questions, methods of inquiry, and focus. Annual reports and similar documentary evidence are important, as are interviews with agency personnel and their clients, and studies either directly of agency content or of how agency content is used in client media. We know a great deal about some agencies, or about some aspects of some agencies, and next to nothing about most of them. Studies tend to be rather partial in their focus. Books that deal with the international news agencies, for example, are relatively weak on the importance of national news agencies as news sources or have little to say about some of the larger national or regional agencies, such as those of China, Germany, Russia, or Spain. The valuable work of Xin Xin (re. Xinhua) (2010), Jurgen Wilke (re. dpa) (2010), Elena Vartanova and Tatjana Frolova (re. ITAR-TASS) (2010), and Ignacio Muro Benayas (re. EFE) (2006) – all of whom are contributors to my 2010 edited volume – has helped shine valuable but fragile light, dependent on the vagaries and eccentricities of personal careers. There is a tendency to concentrate on specific issues: a number of agency studies were inspired by the NWICO debates of the 1970s and were constrained by that focus. There is a tendency to narrowness in the ways in which agencies have been framed; there is probably a case for embedding consideration of news agency operations within broader perspectives of, say, content syndication and/or international wholesale content supply. Author continuity is a problem: journalists who may write about news agencies on the basis of personal involvement or experience move on to new topics and posts; academics find it difficult to build a career just on the basis of news agency research and either move into broader areas of media studies or move up the ladder into administration.

Theory Development

Most problematic and challenging of all, perhaps, is the issue of theory development. Almost from the beginning there was a fascination with ideas about media diversity and media homogeneity: in the nineteenth century, news agencies were one of the earliest examples of a pattern that has become more and more pronounced over the ensuring hundred and eighty years, namely, the role of a small number of suppliers, competing and collaborating among themselves, in feeding homogenized content to an *apparently* diverse media. This had implications for theorization about the responsibilities of the press for informed citizenship and for the maintenance of a watchdog role overgoverning elites, on behalf of democracy. Similar concerns were developed under the auspices of the United Nations and UNESCO in the first one or two decades following the Second World War, when discourses about news agencies were couched in normative debates about diversity, autonomous expression, development, and modernity, often citing the principle of "free flow". A discourse of dominance-dependency has been evident in the literature for a long time, in part inspired by notable agency historians who were themselves practitioners. When Kent Cooper celebrated what he considered was the triumph of Associated Press in asserting its independence from the news agency cartel that up until 1934 had been dominated, principally, by Reuters, in his 1942 book, *Barriers Down*, he was contributing to a literature about the relationship of news agencies to one another and to networks of alliance, domination, and dependency between nations. These were precisely the concerns of the later NWICO debates in the 1970s, now mostly articulated from a viewpoint that was critical of how Anglo-American media had intensified their hegemony behind a smokescreen of "free flow" ideology, and have maintained it across the subsequent three decades. Scholarly flirtation with "media imperialism" or "cultural imperialism" models was, if anything, less developed with reference to news agencies than it should have been. Scholarship seems to have been seduced, pretty much, by the Western protestation that, with the era of decolonization, discourses of actual imperialism became a thing of the past: if there was any controversy it was about whether post-colonialism could deliver on the promises of independence or whether these would forever be subverted by multinational corporations and by the governing institutions of neo-liberalism, the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. This was a not unimportant debate, clearly, but in the light of events in the 2000s it has to be questioned whether the Western world actually did allow a transition to a post-imperial world or whether the upsurge of imperialistic aggression on ever-shifting pretexts of humanitarian intervention, counter-terrorism or pre-emptive action against weapons of mass destruction represents a reality that has always been there but was temporarily obscured (with the help of mainstream media). That is to say, the real challenge to scholarship in the NWICO years was not so much in tracing the structures of hierarchy in news flow and news exchange, but in tracing how the strategies of imperialism, neo-imperialism, post-colonialism, and neo-colonialism are represented, refracted or disappeared by mainstream media in pretty much every part of the world.

There is a considerable literature about international news flows in general, inevitably driven by content analysis. This is not always about news agencies, but news agencies figure in quite a lot of it. Theorization of flow studies has tended in the direction of attempting to explain the "determinants" of flow, the multiple factors at various levels that help explain why certain news items appear in specific media of specific countries.

Discourses about modernization, dependency, and flow have segued without too much difficulty into theorization about news agencies as agents of globalization, the place of news agencies in contributing to the "collapse of space and time", and their role in representing what it means to be a "nation", even in offering up resistance to the hegemonic practices of the agencies of imperial powers or those of the official national agencies. These explorations stretch to news agency contributions to the construction of popular imaginings of the world as made up, principally, of individual nations, and to tracing how news agencies have contributed directly to a globalized world, becoming an intrinsic part of the communications infrastructure of neo-liberal global capitalism through print, photographic, radio, television, and online news services and services of financial, business, and economic news to financial, business, trading, money, and commodity dealers around the planet. Theorization about news agencies depends critically on the development of empirical information about these organizations (which, as we have seen, are to be found in almost every country of the world). Because information has accumulated in incremental, piecemeal fashion, the pace of theorization has been slow. This reveals itself in a number of ways. For example, of the range of agencies that have attracted scholarly attention, the most salient are the leading international or global agencies, a few of the less global, regional news agencies (EFE of Spain covered quite well, ANSA of Italy hardly at all), whereas the agencies of most countries of the world have attracted little to no attention. Additionally, reflecting the Western bias of scholarship, information about the major agencies of China, India, and Russia has lagged well behind disclosures about the leading Western agencies and, even today, relatively little is known about the Indian news agency, Press Trust of India. This is despite the fact that PTI is actually a newspaper cooperative independent of the state, unlike ITAR-TASS of Russia or Xinhua of China. State-owned or controlled agencies have generally attracted less attention than independent agencies because there is a loose but uninformed belief that simply because an agency may be subject to state control it is somehow unworthy of serious attention (perhaps because it does not subscribe to how Western journalists and scholars feel the world ought to be run), whereas even momentary reflection would suggest that a state agency is at least as interesting as any other. There are always interests that will need to assess the closeness of the relationship between agency executives and government officials, the extent of an agency's professionalism, or how far it operates journalistically as opposed to diplomatically. There are circumstances (e.g., extreme commercialization of the private news market) when a state agency may become the voice of common sense and public interest.

In my more recent work, in progress, I revisit issues that were present in the early days of the "modernization" paradigm with respect to the relationship between news agencies and national development. This is a debate that took a particular turn in the NWICO years toward issues of inequality of news flow and news resource. Yet I suspect that scholarship missed an important point. Despite acknowledgment of how the major agencies, notably Reuters, had helped mid-nineteenth century market capitalism function by establishing not just a technological network of communication but a credible and trusted machinery for the collection and egalitarian distribution of market-moving information, scholarship underestimated the persistence of an umbilical relationship between news agencies and modern finance capitalism. This has become more visible, perhaps, with the growth and global preeminence of Thomson Reuters, Bloomberg, and Dow Jones, and regional equivalents such as Interfax in the former Soviet Union as lynchpins of financial information flows in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, but it was always there. It explains the role of news agencies as enablers of particular economic regimes and, therefore, of the developmental possibilities that are allowed and disallowed within particular regimes. Similar but contrasting cases can be made vis-à-vis the role of TASS and Soviet communism, and Xinhua and Chinese communism. Alongside this role and interacting with it is another, equally important, to which I have devoted some attention previously, the role of news agencies in helping construct the "imaginary" of the nation-state – through the lenses of the metropolis and those of its most influential inhabitants, the ruling classes, and the executive instrument of their power (often, bourgeois parliamentarianism) – and of the globe as a space whose defining features are the boundaries of nation-states.

Categorizing the Literature

In trying to convey a sense of the diversity of different kinds of news agency researches, by which term I also mean to include the development of any usable sources of relevant data or information that may become evidence for scholarship, I need to cast the net somewhat more widely than that of disciplinary origins and paradigms. I cannot offer a classification system whose categories are mutually exclusive, as that would not be possible. In broad-brush terms I offer the following categories.

Informed anecdotal writings typically take the form of memoires of agency work contained in biographical or autobiographical sketches of celebrated journalists. The account of news agency work in these instances is typically not of substantial significance as a proportion of the total life that is recounted. Eugene Lyons' *Assignment in Utopia* (1937) is revealing of the life of a UPI correspondent in Moscow who had once worked for TASS in the United States. Equally revealing is Joseph Morris' *Deadline every Minute* (1957), on the same agency. There are also accounts of agency work by press and broadcast journalists who have worked alongside agency journalists. Examples might include Peter Braestrup's analysis of press coverage of the TET Offensive during the Vietnam War, recounted in his two-volume *Big Story* (1977), or Robert Desmond's extraordinary five-volume series on world news reporting (1937, 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1982).

Insider accounts are more systematic, analytical, and sustained, written by journalists who have devoted a considerable part of their careers to specific, individual agencies, perhaps reaching high executive positions. These might include works such as Kent Cooper's *Barriers Down* (1942), already quoted; Cooper was General Manager of AP. Melville Stone's *50 Years a Journalist* (1921) might fall here, given that Stone was an earlier General Manager of AP. Similarly, Roderick Jones' *A Life in Reuters* (1951) deserves mention, since Jones was once that agency's owner. Another example is Chris Moncrieff's *Living on a Deadline* (2001), a history of the UK's Press Association by one of its most celebrated reporters.

Official or semi-official histories of individual news agencies are generally written by scholars or journalists who have been specifically commissioned for the purpose and granted privileged access. This was possibly the case of Gramling's *AP: The Story of News* (1940). At least two works have chronicled the official or semi-official history of Reuters. One was Graham Storey's *Reuters Century 1851–1951* (1951). The second was Donald Read's *The Power of News. The History of Reuters* (second edition, 1999). Some histories of national news agencies get written in this way. Examples might include Terhi Rantanen's history of the news agency of Finland, *STT: n Uutisia*' (1987) or LUSA's history of the Portuguese news agency, *Agencias de Noticias de Portugal* (2007) (see also Batista and Ribeiro 2010).

Unofficial histories and other studies of the major international news agencies (although some of these focus more on the domestic development and evolution of national agencies that were also or later became international), by scholars, mainly, and journalists, sometimes deal with several of the agencies, comparatively. The scholarship typically comes from historians or social scientists. Examples include Richard Schwarzlose's two volume study of the early history of Associated Press (1990). Others include *News Dependence: The Case for a New World Information Order* (1977) by Phil Harris, a sociologist whose UNESCO sponsored study was principally based on content analysis, and *The International News Agencies* (1980) by a sociologist, Oliver Boyd-Barrett, a study that combined documentary research with extensive interview and content analysis. Others included *Le Traffic des Nouvelles* (1981) by Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Michael Palmer (a historian), *The International News Services* (1986) by Jonathan Fenby (who had worked to a senior editorial level in Reuters), *Les Agencies de Presse* (1997) by Henri Pigeat (once CEO of AFP), *Le Village CNN* (1997) by Patrick White (a journalist who had worked for both Reuters and Canadian Press), *News Agencies from Pigeon to Internet* (2007) by K.M. Shrivastava (an ex-journalist and scholar), and a 2011 work by Chris Paterson (an ex-broadcaster and scholar), *The International Television News Agencies*. There is quite a range of individual articles and monographs in scholarly and professional publications about specific personalities or events or issues in the history of the international news agencies.

Unofficial histories or other studies about national news agencies. Edited collections on news agencies also include significant original works by scholars (principally historians and social scientists), journalists or scholar–journalists on the international and national agencies, including works that look at the relationship between international, national, and regional agencies. Works include *The Globalization of News* (1998) edited by Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Terhi Rantanen (a historian) and *News Agencies in the Turbulent Era of the Internet* (2010) edited by Oliver Boyd-Barrett. This last work contains separately authored case studies on news agencies in Australia, Canada, Catalonia, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal, Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the alternative international news agency, IPS. Outside these collective works is a very scattered collection of isolated studies, mainly histories, of national news agencies or of the agencies of particular countries. Such studies sometimes have their origin in masters theses or doctoral dissertations, and may appear in journal articles as the products of studies of journalistic coverage of particular countries or issues. Examples (full details in the references) include Maria Antonia Paz on EFE and the role of Havas in the agency affairs of Spain (1988); Soon Jin Kim on EFE (1989), Marlene Cuthbert on the establishment of CANA (1981), George Scott on the UK's Press Association (1977), or the more recent study of the Press Association by Chris Moncrieff (2001). Others that come to mind include Terhi Rantanen's study of pre-revolutionary press agencies in Russia (1990) or Gavin Ellis' work on the news agencies of Australia and New Zealand (2010).

Sociological studies, including several that have already been mentioned, often focus on the development of theory, sometimes concerning the relationship of communications systems to social stability and change. These typically involve the methods of social science, including formal survey, market assessment, and content analysis. A characteristic of these studies is that they tend to be less dominated by "telling the story of news agencies" and focus more sharply on aspects of business practice, market orientation, relationships with clients, generation of revenue streams, and analysis of content. They also tend to be more critical of the relationships between news agencies and centers of political power, which would also earn them the designation as "political economic."

Content analysis studies, a subcategory of the sociological or social scientific, are mostly published as articles in academic journals and conducted by social scientists or communication scholars. They tend to focus on the major international news agencies and to entail analysis across the broad content of one or more specific wires or services. There are some studies of national news agency content, including studies of national news agency uses of international news. A few studies focus on agency coverage of specific countries or issues over time (cf. Harris's *Reporting Southern Africa* 1981). I have encountered only one study, by Al Hester (1974), that traces the development of news wires from the reporter level, through the local bureau, to the international or foreign desk, and on to the consumer.

The language of news agency news. A few studies have achieved insightful analysis of linguistic aspects, including discourse and translation, of news agency news. Of particular note is the work of Alan Bell (a New Zealander and a linguist who had worked for a specialist news agency) in *The Language of News* (1991) and various works by Theodore Van Dijk, in particular his *News Analysis* (1988). More recently, Elena Bielsa and Susan Bassnett have examined the role of translation in the contexts of news production from the Uruguayan regional centers of AFP and IPS, in their *Translation in Global News* (2008).

Crisis analysis. There are a few one-off "crisis" studies, often by journalist insiders: for example, Rosemary Righter's *Whose News?* (1978), which critiqued the efforts of UNESCO to reform the operations of the major agencies; John Lawrenson and Lionel Barber's analysis of *The Price of Truth: The Story of the Reuters' Millions* (1986), which was inspired by concern for events leading up to the flotation of Reuters on the London and New York stock exchanges in 1984; and Gordon Brown and Ronald Cohen's chronicle of UPI's desperate fight for survival in *Down to the Wire* (1989). Two Reuters' insiders, Brian Mooney and Barry Simpson, unearthed, in unusual detail, the reasons for the financial crisis that hit Reuters in the early 2000s, in *Breaking News: How the Wheels Came Off at Reuters* (2003). Donald Nordberg (2006) has written on the parallel 2000s restructurings of Reuters and Dow Jones as these were folded into Thomson-Reuters and News Corporation, respectively.

Outstanding Topics

There are relatively few issues that one may say have been dealt with exhaustively in news agency research, but among the major topics or concerns that emerge from the literature are the following.

Issues of diversity and voice. Whose voices get to be heard through news agency wires and how does this range of voices match up against "real world" configurations of interest and power? This also connects with issues of balance and impartiality, or their absence.

Diversity and uniformity. The role of agencies in supplying news to a broad range of different media has often stimulated comment and concern with respect to the implications: that behind the apparent diversity of media is a relative uniformity of wholesale sources. This then raises questions about market monopoly and oligopoly: the who and why of who and what gets to be considered, and not.

"*Hidden Hands*". There is considerable curiosity and suspicion about "hidden hands" at work behind news agencies. Are news agencies unduly influenced by governments, political parties, corporations, lobbyists and publicists, the intelligence services, the mainstream media that agencies serve, and the Establishment? Are they or have they been used as tools of propaganda? Do they demonstrate sufficient independence in news coverage and integrity of news judgment or are they unreasonably passive and compliant, acting as conduits for whatever information is thrown at them by powerful sources?

Regularity beneath turbulence. Studies of news agency content typically reveal a highly patterned structure with respect to content categorization, frequency of recurrence of datelines, range of sources, style, distribution of correspondents, distribution of clients, etc. There has been a relative dearth of recent and comprehensive content studies of the major print news agencies (with the exception of a scatter of studies that look at agencies in the context of particular stories or issues). Studies across the period 1950–1985 identified a number of outstanding consistencies (see Boyd-Barrett 2000), and it is unlikely that these will have changed dramatically within the last decade or so, although occasional shifts of paradigm should be expected in a multipolar world. Some features of imbalance in print news agencies appear only stronger in the case of television news agencies. Content analysis of Associated Press Television News (APTN) and of CNNI by Clare (1998) and Cavagnero (1998), respectively, show that the services of these international television news agencies/broadcasters demonstrate a strong emphasis on politics and conflict, on the First World, and a tendency for the emphasis on violence and conflict to be exacerbated in the case of Third World coverage.

The "news system". There is considerable interest in identifying the contours and mechanisms of what was and perhaps still is an identifiable global "news system", a system that may have moved from a formal and explicit level, as in the cartel of the period 1870–1930, to being a more diffused network of understandings and business practices that unite together while unequally arranging international and national news agencies and their major clients.

Revenue generation. News agency general news operations for media clients are identified by academic studies as not very profitable, often in need of some form of subsidy or diversified source of income, which, as history shows, posits dangers to credibility, integrity, and fairness. The notion of "subsidy" suggests that general news is subsidized by other revenue streams, whereas there are at least some cases (e.g., Bloomberg 1997) where one might plausibly argue that the general news is inserted to support the need by clients of financial, economic, and business news services for timely alert to potentially market-moving developments in any part of the world. Subsidies appear in a variety of forms, oftentimes in the form of dependence on the state (e.g., generous fees for information services rendered; special fees for agency delivery of nonprofitable information services for the public good; discounted access to public communications). Dependence on private capital for revenue has typically taken such forms as advertising brokerage between news agency clients and advertising agencies; sale of commercial and financial news services to banks, corporations, brokers, etc.; dissemination of corporate and other publicity services; communications subleasing; pre-configured weather, betting, racing, and sports data; and pre-configured page-setting. Some agencies, by virtue of State or cooperative forms of ownership or because of state subsidies, appear to have achieved some degree of insulation from the market. Monopoly or near-monopoly status, sometimes the result of privileged treatment of the agency by the state in state provision of official information, may also come about from exclusivity deals between agencies and major media institutions at national and local levels.

Variety of forms of ownership. News agencies exhibit many distinct systems of ownership, including: media cooperative, news exchange, state owned or controlled public service, common stock, private equity, and individual ownership models. State ownership and/or control is by far the most common among the category of national news agencies. Each model has benefits and problems, and research has made some progress in assessing what these are. The cooperative model is in some ways the most interesting. It takes a variety of forms, sometimes involving the state and print and broadcast media or sometimes involving only two or one of these three. When it works well it can provide a service of very diverse national and international news for retail consumers, offering much more volume than individual consumers will use, and quite cheaply, even if at the cost of exclusivity for the final consumer. The cooperative model secures institutional member/client loyalty (at least for those admitted to membership: many national agencies, for example, exclude "free" newspapers) and for that reason often survives for a long time. It to some extent protects agencies from the worst of naked market forces and underwrites a kind of public-service ethos into news even when members include profit-hungry tabloid publications. The model sometimes stumbles upon problems relating to the potential for conflicts of interest between individual publisher members and news agency executives and to periodic needs to raise capital for major improvements. Some one-time news cooperatives have transitioned to different models of ownership in recent years, including the news agencies of Britain (PA), Canada (CP), and Sweden (TT), and one has disappeared altogether, NZPA of New Zealand.

Influencing the news judgments of retail news media. News agencies exercise considerable but difficult-to-quantify influence on retail news judgments, not least by alerting retail media as to planned or predicted news events in the hours, days, and weeks ahead. Agency services are also selectively influenced by the needs and judgments of their client media. An important issue is whether agency influence on client judgment is increasing or decreasing. It seems probable that when client media cut back on independent newsgathering resources, or reduce the range of third party sources from which they draw, then the influence of particular news agencies will increase considerably. Agency influence sometimes extends to whole pages of news and other forms of news syndication. This intensifies the significance of issues concerning the resources that agencies have for news coverage and how they choose to distribute them, which parts of the world are more generously covered and why, whose interests are being served (or neglected) by given patterns of resource deployment, and how these choices influence client coverage.

Articulating what is news. News agencies have been influential in the development of what is understood as "news" – many agencies subscribed and contributed to the Anglo-American style of "journalism of information", which appeals to criteria of accuracy, recency, and impartiality. It often pretends to a universalism, yet is different to point-of-view journalism – which explicitly circumscribes the methodologies of empirical journalism within particular national, cultural, ethnic, religious, and other frameworks for understanding the world – or to journalism-of-opinion – which prizes understanding and insight over mere fact.

Articulating identity. News agencies have contributed to the consolidation of images of national identity (sometimes involving ethnic hegemony) that are more or less consonant with nation-state boundaries. News agencies have been part of the armory of the Westphalian, nineteenth century model of the industrializing and urbanizing nation-state. By their nature and concept they have been relatively centrist in ideology and centralist in structure. Alongside all the other centralizing forces of the nation-state, agencies acquired a significant role in the machinery of image making and propaganda on which the state depends for peaceful compliance – and were especially important before the arrival of radio and television. The international agencies supported this process by contributing to images of the world as made up of a collection of interacting national states, each nation-state organized according to any one of a small range of distinct "scripts". National and international news agencies disseminated the "script" of what a nation should be all about, and of course almost all new nations have found it necessary to establish their own national news agency or agencies.

Additionally, the international and national news agencies contribute to national formation in the following ways. They consolidate information networks within national boundaries through support for and endorsement of powerful national institutions, contributing to the rationalization of communication between the State and people. The global agencies privilege affairs that relate to relations between nations or between prestigious sectors of these nations, often involving matters to do with national iconography and pride (such as in the case of sport). Otherwise they privilege news of domestic political events. They depend heavily on official or government sources, so that in representing nations to other nations they give pride of place to prestigious "national" actors. This tends to marginalize even the official "oppositional" voices, and even more so the unofficial oppositional voices that lie beyond the formal political apparatus, except in extreme circumstances such as uprisings or violence. Many facets of life that map less readily on to notions of "nation", such as religion, science, ecology, culture, etc., rank low on agency priorities. In the distribution of datelines, as of the news itself, agency coverage favors elite nations (second to the immediate continental region) and capital and big cities. This urban or capital bias, already evident in the coverage of national news agencies, is merely intensified in global news coverage, further reinforcing associations of the "nation" with image of the "capital" or of the urban.

Articulating global divisions. Agencies have figured in the articulation of concerns about the relationship between "North" versus "South", indicating issues of neo-imperialism and the role of both national and international agencies in the construction of national images for global distribution. This has been a persistent issue in the history of news agencies.

Globalization. Agencies have contributed to processes of globalization. The international agencies were among the first of multinationals, they innovated in global business technique, commoditization of information, and technology for information collection and dissemination. They contributed to the process whereby people acquired images of other parts of the world, and to the speed with which these images were nourished with new information. They contributed to the accuracy and speed of financial information and thus to the structure and process of global trade and finance.

Additionally, the classic Western international news agencies have arguably contributed to globalization in some or more of the following ways. They consolidate information networks within national boundaries through support for and endorsement of powerful national news agencies, contributing to the rationalization of communication between the State and people. They contribute to internationalization, constructing influential international news agenda that act upon retail media, governments, and financial markets. They develop and/or exploit technologies to improve global communications networks. They bring the global to the local and incorporate the local within the global in their day-to-day newsgathering and news-dissemination practices, selling international news to national and local media, and using local and national media as sources of news for global distribution. They inflect "globalization" as synonymous to "Westernization" by embedding Western news ideologies – which they themselves helped to construct in the second half of the nineteenth century – as the determining criteria of news selection; by adopting "Western-interests-as-norm" as premises of powerful news frames (e.g. Cold War frame; war-on-terror frame); and by their unequal distribution of attention and selection between different countries and world regions. They contribute to the homogenization of global culture in their distribution of certain influential kinds of political, economic, sports (etc.) discourses, while greatly multiplying (through their "wholesale" services for "retail" clients) the quantity of such texts that is available.

Conclusion: Issues and Topics for Future Research

Many of the research topics, issues, and theories that have been identified in the past continue to be relevant today. A future research agenda, I propose, should be driven by the following research questions, in no particular order of importance:

How have the agencies in different parts of the world responded to the challenge of the Internet and how far has the Internet reformulated news agency business models, with what degree of success (for agency survival) and with what implications for the overall informational environments of agency clients?

Have globalization and/or new technologies undermined or reinforced traditional rationales for national news agencies, and in what ways?

Do news agencies contribute to a "free and balanced flow of information" or do they hinder it?

Do news agencies contribute to a "public sphere" of informed rational discussion between governments and governed? Do they provide a forum for the exchange of ideas and information that contribute to rational public discourse and, through that, to rational political governance (a version of the "fourth estate" model of the press); and do they perform a "watchdog" function protecting the governed from abuses of power? Or, alternatively, does the intensity of advertising-driven commercialization and trivialization of mainstream media corrupt the range and quality of news agency news? Does cost-cutting threaten to turn some agencies into conduits for corporate and government press releases and reports of constructed news events?

In what ways, other than in terms of contributing to national formation and other identities and to infrastructures of information dissemination on behalf of financiers, traders, and brokers, can it be argued that national news agencies contribute to processes of "development"?

How can news agencies most productively nourish alternative sources of revenue and become more financially independent in ways that enhance rather than limit their primary purposes?

Is news agency news comprehensible, at what different reading levels, and how far does this matter? What is the impact of translation on transformation of stories across language and culture boundaries?

And finally, what are the respective strengths and weaknesses of different models of ownership and of different patterns of relations between states and agencies?

References

Austrian Presse Agentur (ed.) (2002) *The Various Faces of Reality: Values in News (Agency) Journalism*. Innsbruck: StudienVerlag.

Archetti, C. (2008) News coverage of 9/11 and the demise of media flows, globalization and localization hypotheses, *International Communication Gazette*, **70** (6), 463–486.

Batista, J. and Ribeiro, S.L. (2010) An overview, in O. Boyd-Barrett (ed.), *News Agencies in the Turbulent Era of the Internet*. Barcelona: Col-leccio Lexicon, pp. 195–223.

Bell, A. (1991) *The Language of News*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Benayas, I.M. (2006) *Globalizacion de la Informacion y Agencias de Noticias. Papeles de Comunicacion*. Madrid: Ediciones Paidos Iberica.

Bielsa, E. and Bassnett, S. (2008) *Translation in Global News*. London: Routledge.

Bloomberg, M. (1997) *Bloomberg on Bloomberg*. New York: John Wiley.

Boyd-Barrett, O. (1980) *The International News Agencies*. London: Constable.

Boyd-Barrett, O. (2000) Constructing the global, constructing the local: news agencies re-present the world, in A. Kavoori (ed.), *The Global Dynamics of News: Studies in International News Coverage and News Agenda*. Stamford: Ablex.

Boyd-Barrett, O. (ed.) (2001) *Final Report of the Workshop on News Agencies in the Age of the Internet*. Paris: UNESCO.

Boyd-Barrett, O. (ed.) (2010) *News Agencies in the Turbulent Era of the Internet*. Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya.

Boyd-Barrett, O. and Palmer, M. (1981) *Le Traffic de Nouvelles*. Paris: Alain Moreau.

Boyd-Barrett, O. and Thussu, D. (1992) *Contra Flow in Global News*. London: Sage.

Boyd-Barrett, O. and Rantanen, T. (1998) *The Globalization of News*. London: Sage.

Braestrup, P. (1977) *Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of TET 1968 in Vietnam and Washington*, 2 volumes. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Brown, G. and Cohen, R. (1990) *Down to the Wire. UPI's Fight for Survival*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Cavagnero, L. (1998) *CNNI*. MA Thesis. Leicester: University of Leicester.
Clare, J. (1998) *Town Criers in the Global Village*. MA Thesis. Leicester: University of Leicester.
Cohen, A., Levy, M., Itzhak, R. and Gurevitch, M. (1996) *Global Newsrooms, Local Audiences. A Study of the Eurovision News Exchange*. London: John Libbey.
Cooper, K. (1942) *Barriers Down*. New York: Farrar and Rinehart.
Cuthbert, M. (1981) *The Carribean News Agency: Third World Model*. Lexington, KY: Association for Education in Journalism.
Desmond, R. (1937) *The Press and World Affairs*. New York: D. Appleton Century Co.
Desmond, R. (1978) *The Information Process: World News Reporting in the Twentieth Century*. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press.
Desmond, R. (1979) *Windows on the World: World News Reporting 1900–1920*. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press.
Desmond, R. (1980) *Between Two Wars 1920–1940*. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press.
Desmond, R. (1982) *Tides of War: World News Reporting 1940–45*. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press.
Ellis, G. (2010) Australia and New Zealand: two agencies on parallel tracks that sometimes diverge, in O. Boyd-Barrett (ed.), *News Agencies in the Turbulent Era of the Internet*. Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, pp. 105–124.
Escobar, L. E. (1978) *Analisis del "Nuevo Orden" Internacional de la Informacion*. Pamplona: EUNSA.
Fenby, J. (1986) *The International News Services: A Twentieth Century Fund Report*. New York: Schocken Books.
Forbes, D. (1998) From apartheid to pluralism, in O. Boyd-Barrett and T. Rantanen (eds), *The Globalization of News*. London: Sage, pp. 154–172.
Frederix, P. (1959) *Un Siècle de Chasse aux Nouvelles de L'Agence France Presse*. Paris: Flammarion.
Galtung, J. and Ruge, M. (1965) The structure of foreign news, *Journal of Peace Research*, **1**, 64–90.
Giffard, T. (1998) Alternative news agencies, in O. Boyd-Barrett, and T. Rantanen (eds), *The Globalization of News*. London: Sage, pp. 191–201.
Gramling, O. (1940) *AP: The Story of News*. New York: Farrar and Rinehart.
Harris, P. (1977) *News Dependence: The Case for a New World Information Order. Final Report to UNESCO of a Study of the International News Media*. Leicester: University of Leicester.
Harris, P. (1981) *Reporting Southern Africa: Western News Agencies Reporting from Southern Africa*. Paris: UNESCO.
Hester, A. (1974) The news from Latin America via a World News Agency, *International Communication Gazette*, **20** (2), 82–98.
Hjarvard, S. (1998) TV news exchange, in O. Boyd-Barrett and T. Rantanen (eds), *The Globalization of News*. London: Sage, pp. 202–226.
Hohne, H.J. (1976/1977) *Report über Nachrichtenagenturen*, 2 volumes. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
Horvit, B. (2006) International news agencies and the war debate of 2003, *International Communication Gazette*, **68**(5–6): 427–47.
Huteau, J. and Ullman, B. (1992) *AFP, une Histoire de L'Agence France Presse, 1944–1990*. Montreal: Robert Laffont.
Ivačać, P. (1978) The flow of news: Tanjug, the pool and the national agencies, *Journal of Communication*, **28** (4), 157–162.
Johnston, C.B. (1995) *Winning the Global Television News Game*. Boston: Focal Press.
Jones, R. (1951) *A Life in Reuters*, London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Joye, S. (2006) *Raising Awareness, Challenging Establishment. The Surplus Value of a Global and Local Alternative News Agency.* Gent: Academia Press.

Kim, S. J. (1989) *EFE: Spain's World News Agency.* New York: Greenwood.

Kivikuru, U. (1998) From state socialism to deregulation, in O. Boyd-Barrett and T. Rantanen (eds), *The Globalization of News.* London: Sage, pp. 137–153.

Klapper, J. (1960) *The Effects of Mass Communication.* New York: Free Press.

Kruglak, T. (1962) *The Two Faces of TASS.* Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Lawrenson, J. and Barber, L. (1986) *The Price of Truth: The Story of the Reuters' Millions.* London: Sphere.

Lazarsfeld, P. (1940) *Radio and the Printed Page: An Introduction to the Study of Radio and Its Role in the Communication of Ideas.* New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce.

Lefebvre, A. (1992) *Havas: Les Arcanes du Pouvoir.* Paris: Grasset.

LUSA (2007) *Agencias de Noticias de Portugal.* Lisbon: LUSA.

Lyons, G. (1937) *Assignment in Utopia.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.

Moncrieff, C. (2001) *Living on a Deadline: A History of the Press Association.* London: Virgin Books.

Mooney, B. and Simpson, B. (2003) *Breaking News: How the Wheels Came Off at Reuters.* Mankato, MN: Capstone.

Morris, J.A. (1957) *Deadline Every Minute: The Story of the United Press.* New York: Doubleday.

Musa, M. (1997) From optimism to reality: an overview of Third World news agencies, in P. Golding and P. Harris (eds), *Beyond Cultural Imperialism.* London: Sage.

Nordberg, D. (2006) News and corporate governance: what Dow Jones and Reuters teach us about stewardship, *Journalism: Theory, Practice and Criticism*, **8** (6), 718–735.

Nordenstreng, K. and Varis, T. (1974) Television traffic: a one-way street? A survey and analysis of the international flow of television programme material, in *Reports and Papers on Mass Communication.* Paris: UNESCO, p. 70.

Palmer, M. (1987) Les agences d'information en France et en Grande Bretagne: Quelques elements de comparison, in J.C. Sergeant (ed.), *Visages de la Presse Britannique.* Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, pp. 117–127.

Paterson, C. (2011) *The International Television News Agencies.* New York: Peter Lang.

Paz, A.M. (1988) *El Colonialism Informativa de la Agencia Havas en Espana (1870–1940).* Dissertation. Madrid: Universidad Complutense.

Pigeat, H. (1987) *Le Nouveau des Ordre Mondial de l'Information.* Paris: Hachette.

Pigeat, H. (1997) *Les Agencies de Presse: Institutions du Passé ou Medias d'Avenir?* Paris: Etudes de la DF-Societe.

Pigeat, H. and Huteau, J. (2000) *Medias et Deontologie: Regles du Jeu ou Jeu sans Regles.* Paris: UNESCO.

Putnis, P. (2006) How the international news agency business model failed Reuters in Australia, 1877–1895, *Media History*, **12** (1), 1–17.

Rantanen, T. (1987) *STT: n Uutisia' Sadan Vuoden Varrelta.* Espoo: Weilin & Göös.

Rantanen, T. (1990) *Foreign News in Imperial Russia. The Relationship between International and Russian News Agencies, 1856–1914.* Helsinki: Federation of Finnish Scientific Societies.

Rantanen, T. and Vartanova, E. (1990) Post-Commuist Russia. From state monopoly to state dominance, *European Journal of Communication*, **10** (2), 207–220.

Rauch, J. (2003) Rooted in nations, blossoming in globalization? A cultural perspective on the content of a "Northern" mainstream and a "Southern" alternative news agency, *Journal of Communication Inquiry*, **27** (1), 87–103.

Read, D. (1999) *The Power of News. The History of Reuters*, 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Righter, R. (1978) *Whose News?* London: Andre Deutsch.

Robinson, G. (1981) *News Agencies and World News in Canada, the U.S. and Yugoslavia: Methods and Data.* Fribourg, Switzerland: Presses de l'Universite de Fribourg.

Rosenblum, M. (1980) *Coups and Earthquakes.* Urbana: University of Chicago Press.

Rosewater, V. (1930) *A History of Cooperative Newsgathering in the United States.* New York: D. Appleton.

Schiller, H. (1992) *Mass Communication and American Empire*, updated edn. New York: Westview Press.

Schulze-Schneider, I. (1998) From dictatorship to democracy, in O. Boyd-Barrett and T. Rantanen (eds), *The Globalization of News.* London: Sage, pp. 108–124.

Schwarszlose, R. (1990) *The Nation's Newsbrokers: The Rush to Institution from 1865–1920.* Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Scott, G. (1977) *Reporter Anonymous.* London: Hutchinson.

Shaw, D. (1967) News bias and *The Telegraph*, *Journalism Quarterly*, **44** (1), 3–12.

Shrivastava, K.M. (2007) *News Agencies from Pigeon to Internet.* New Delhi: New Dawn Press.

Soon, J.K. (1989) *EFE: Spain's World News Agency.* Westport, CN: Greenwood Press.

Stone, M. (1921) *50 Years a Journalist.* New York: Doubleday, Page and Co.

Storey, G. (1951) *Reuter's Century 1851–1951.* London: Parrish.

Thussu, D. (2006) *International Communication: Continuity and Change.* London: Hodder and Arnold.

Tunstall, J. (1971) *Journalists at Work.* London: Constable.

Van Dijk, T.A. (1988) *News Analysis: Case Studies of International and National News in the Press.* London: Routledge.

Vartanova, E. and Frolova, T. (2010) News agencies in Russia: challenging old traditions and new media, in O. Boyd-Barrett (ed.), *News Agencies in the Turbulent Era of the Internet.* Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya.

Vuorinen, E. (1995) News translation as gatekeeping, in M. Snell-Hornby, Z. Jettmarova, and K. Kaindl (eds), *Translation as Intercultural Communication.* Selected papers from the EST Congress. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 161–171.

White, P. (1997) *Le Village CNN.* Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal.

Wilke, J. (1998) The struggle for control of domestic news markets, in O. Boyd-Barrett and T. Rantanen (eds), *The Globalization of News.* London: Sage, pp. 49–60.

Wilke, J. (2010) DPA and the news agencies of Germany, news agencies in Russia, in O. Boyd-Barrett (ed.), *News Agencies in the Turbulent Era of the Internet*, Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya.

Xin, X. (2010) Xinhua News Agency in the context of the "crisis" of news agencies, in O. Boyd-Barrett (ed.), *News Agencies in the Turbulent Era of the Internet.* Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, pp. 283–304.

20

Global Internets
Media Research in the New World

Gerard Goggin

The rise and rise of the Internet since the early 1990s has seen fundamental changes in the very nature, social function, significance, and meanings attached to media. Rightly the Internet is often regarded as the pre-eminent global technology, and taken to be the obvious example of transnational media. Yet how the Internet is understood, and in turn how global media is interpreted, still revolves around a very limited notion of this technology. While it is true that the Internet, with all its dynamic innovation and widespread diffusion, does pose real challenges to media research agenda, theories, concepts, and methods, this chapter argues that we are only at the beginning of appreciating how profound such shifts really are.

The Internet as Global Media Form

In 2010 there were an estimated 2.084 billion Internet users in the world. Of these 857 million were located in Asia and the Pacific, 514 million in the Americas, 401 million in Europe, 127 million in CIS, 88 million in the Arab States, and 77 million in Africa (Union 2010). The developing world (with 1037 billion users) has now definitely outstripped the developed world (885 million users) in terms of Internet use (ITU 2010). More than half the world's Internet use is now comprised of broadband access modes: in 2010 there were 479 million fixed broadband subscriptions and 667 million mobile broadband (third generation mobile) subscriptions worldwide (ITU 2010). This particular statistic cues us to a signal development in Internet and indeed global mobile generally: the rise of the mobile. In 2010 there were an estimated 5282 billion cellular mobile phone subscriptions, eclipsing the poor cousin of fixed-line telephony with a mere 1197 billion subscriptions. The developing world hosted 3.846 billion mobile

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

phone subscriptions, more than double the number of the developed world (1436 billion subscriptions) (ITU 2010).

These are the baseline statistics about world access, use, and distribution of the Internet. While the figures are revealing, they are only the starting point to understand what exactly what kind of global media the Internet is. At the general level, we can identify something called "the Internet". It is a communications, information, and media technology delivered by networks using the suite of protocols called by the shorthand of "Internet protocol". Like other networks, from a technical perspective the Internet is comprised of different "layers": application, transport, network, and link (Clarke *et al.* 1998). Important for our purposes of understanding the Internet as global media is the applications layer. The applications layer includes long-standing protocols including those used: to provide web services (Hypertext Transfer Protocol, or HTTP), email (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, or SMTP), and file transfer (File Transfer Protocol, or FTP) (Clarke *et al.* 1998). When we consider how the applications layer and, indeed, what all the layers of the Internet means for its users and audiences, for those businesses, institutions, or organizations relying on it, the industries delivering it, and for those concerned with its policy, regulation, and governance, we find great variety. Notably for understanding global media, the Internet is actually a great gathering of different applications, many of which are interlinked, but some that are not. These applications have developed greatly since the Internet's official inception in the late 1960s, but have antecedents that stretch back into computing and networking networks, and communication and media forms, well before these. Working back from the present day a very short list would include applications more-or-less accurately categorized as: social networking systems; social software and social media; virtual, immersive worlds; blogs; peer-to-peer networks; search; Internet applications and multimedia; web camera; web sites; chat rooms and discussion forums; email and email lists; directories; file transfer applications. Even on this selective roll call and ordering of parts of the Internet, it is evident that the Internet is many things depending on the application in the fore and horizon of particular individuals, groups, and environments. Again, these applications belong to the Internet because they run across and rely upon the Internet protocol. The applications interoperate, interact, and become more than the sum of their parts because the Internet enables them to do so.

Yet the Internet is even more complex still, if we wish to really understand it as a *global* entity. On the one hand, there are clearly common aspects to the Internet as a global media form, starting with the sense in which there are shared technical aspects and infrastructures across the world. In a material sense, the Internet is carried by transmission networks – wireline or using radio spectrum – that have coverage patterns that vary in different parts of the world. The Internet requires servers to store and retrieve data, and facilitate routing of data packets and the operation of the various networks. Then there are key aspects of the whole system's continuing operation that require global agreement on standards, policy, and procedure, including addressing, and domain name registries, allocation, and management. Such things have an equivalence across the world, even if they are concentrated in particular places. On the other hand, when we look around the world at how different countries, societies, cultural and language groups understand the Internet, we find quite distinct perspectives emerging.

Ideologies of the Global Internet

There are a number of broad approaches regarding how we might understand the nature of the Internet as a global medium that revolve around the idea that the Internet as a medium is universal, or at least tends toward it. The strong version of this claim crops up explicitly in much public discourse, both about the Internet and other things too. A recurrent account is that the Internet is a force for democracy and freedom, open markets and economic innovation. This view of the Internet – a particular ideology or social "imaginary" – plays an important role in accounts of contemporary national and geopolitics.

This is revealed in what appears to be an incidental passage in the former Prime Minister Tony Blair's 2010 memoir:

> All around the globe, the new technology – the Internet, computers, mobile phones, mass travel and communication – was opening the world up, casting people together, mixing cultures, races, faiths in a vast melting pot of human interaction (Blair 2010).

In Blair's mind, the Internet is clearly identified as a force for global good of a distinct kind. It is an important hinge-concept, or boundary object, because it joins societies in a common democratic project. An early version of the Internet's universal bias for freedom is found in the emergence of the North American Internet in the early 1990s, especially associated with the influential *Wired* magazine (Flichy 2007) and also with counterculture movements (Turner 2006). A diverse group of inventors, thinkers, and promoters of the Internet contributed to this notion of the Internet – and indeed the computer before it (Friedman 2005) – and the idea is at times suitably ambiguous. This fuzziness, however, helps to resolve contradictions, or at least hold them in tension. The concept of "cyberspace", and a rather more developed account of cyberculture, were important in the early to mid-1990s to suggesting that there was something new about the Internet – a new realm, beyond economics (or at least to do with the "new economy"), beyond traditional laws and regulations (akin to a new frontier, or "Wild East"). In the realm of policy, US Vice-President Al Gore proposed a national information infrastructure, that he took to the international realm, so a sense of urgency developed about the need for a global approach to the "information superhighway" (of which the Internet formed part).

We have now the makings of a much more precise historical, political, and ideological understanding of this still dominant account of the Internet that washes through many debates. For instance, the polarization of views about the Internet and journalism sees many scholars and commentators hailing the technology as a global force for media diversity and freedom of expression (Deuze 2007; Bruns 2008; Gillmor 2006), while others deploring it for destroying journalism's business models and standards as a profession (King 2010). A number of historical accounts of the Internet have precisely located this amalgam as not only particular to the "West" but the United States (Friedman 2005; Flichy 2007; Turner 2006). Various critical accounts have also pointed out the investments in terms such as "cyberspace", or "new economy", and their location in particular linguistic and national contexts, and also the geopolitical dynamics in which these assume their shape and meaning (Paasonen 2009; Lovink 2002, 2003; Wellman and Haythornthwaite 2002). Despite this, we find a recurrence of the idea of the Internet being synonymous with freedom, democracy, unleashing the forces of wealth creation, creativity, and competitiveness. Often this is how new developments pivoting on the Internet are framed. For instance, the Iranian "Green Revolution" of 2009 saw those engaged in protests and dissent prominently using Internet and mobile technologies. As prominent scholar and commentator Timothy Garton Ash would have it:

> Details of demonstration venues, tactics and slogans are passed round via Twitter, social networking sites like Facebook and text messages. Videos of demos and shootings are uploaded on to YouTube and other websites, whence they can be accessed from outside the country and broadcast back into it. Digital David fights theocratic Goliath … Welcome to the new politics of the 21st century (Ash 2009).

Here we see Ash taken with the idea that Internet technologies are galvanizing the citizenry and causing a historical surge for democracy, aided by the good offices of the US government (Twitter being for these purposes a US-based media organization).

This kind celebration of the Internet as a potent force for democracy is often encountered. It tends to see this bias in the Internet for media freedom as exactly what characterizes it as a global media. In my view, this account overstates the potential of the Internet as a set of resources and normative values for achieving democracy and human rights. Certainly the Internet can be an excellent tool for achieving democracy and rights – as can other kinds of media. It is also true that because it is difficult to control and regulate, and functions well as a kind of personal media, the Internet is a vital channel of communications to activists and dissenters around the world – with many examples of this occurring in countries with dire political situations, controlled by governments intent on censoring and limited use of all media (such as Burma, for instance). However, we need carefully to understand how the Internet works in such situations, how it works in conjunction with other media, and also kinds of social, political, and economic structures, strategies, and phenomenon. The obvious lure here is a species of technological determinism – the stubborn tendency to assign undue power, even causation, to technology. The Internet is a classic contemporary example also of an even more exalted regard for technology as a kind of awesome, potent sublime (Mosco 2004; Nye 1994).

Globalization and the Internet

If one obstacle to understanding the Internet as global media lies in its dominant ideologies, or imaginaries, the next challenge lies in situating the technology in the processes of globalization and what constitutes the global today. There are many theories about globalization, and its nature, character, and indeed temporality (is it recent – or has it in fact been something observable for some centuries?). Quite a number of these accounts take the Internet as an excellent example of globalization – which indeed it is

(Castells 2009; Levina and Kien 2010). The difficulty, however, is that, like the global itself, the Internet is actually quite a complex, contradictory, uneven, phenomenon.

This is an argument that Mark McLelland and I have developed through our collection, *Internationalizing Internet Studies* (Goggin and McLelland 2009b) and a subsequent project on *Internet History in Australia and the Asia-Pacific*. It fits into a broad movement to call for an overdue recognition of the international character of media studies (Goggin and McLelland 2009a; Thussu 2009; Morley 2007), which has its parallels in other areas such as cultural studies (Abbas and Erni 2005). There are a number of useful studies and collections that tackle the difficult task of approaching global media through the route of assembling and integrating international perspectives (Allan and Thornsen 2009), although there has recently been a recognition of such differences among Internets and their influence on media around the world, through collections such as Brenda Danet and Susan C. Herring's *The Multilingual Internet* (Danet and Herring 2007; Castells 2004). Also there has been a growing body of work on national Internets (including Wheeler 2006; Aspray and Ceruzzi 2008; Gottlieb and McLelland 2003; Tai 2006; Sreberny and Khiabany 2010). Despite this vibrant and suggestive body of work, the implications of these studies of use, consumption, design, and history of the technology have not significantly flowed through to theory and research regarding global media.

This is why I suggest we need to think about global "Internets". While we can speak about the "Internet", to really appreciate the Internet we need to acknowledge that – at a fundamental level of understanding media – there are actually a diversity of "Internets". The diversity of Internets is partly to do with the specific development of infrastructures in different countries, but it is also to do with a range of policies and market structures, and crucially to do with linguistic and cultural factors. There are very different histories of media that shape the adoption and indeed "invention" of the Internet in particular places. Such factors are often adduced to explain a much-noticed phenomenon of the Internet globally. Not all applications are universally popular or prominent across the world, in the countries and contexts where the Internet is being used. This is something that is likely to be obscured if we overstate the universality of the Internet's nature, use, effects, and impacts. This is why I argue that global media research requires a truly international account of the range of global Internets that there actually are. This is indispensable to build a ground-up account of how the Internet is structured as a global media, made up of a range of common and divergent experiences. To show what I have in mind here, let me discuss three elements of such an analysis: infrastructure; access and use; culture, language, and history.

Infrastructure

There is prevailing assumption – at least on the part of those not so familiar with the intricacies of how technology actually is implemented and takes shape – that all infrastructures are alike. This is a complex question and is the subject of considerable scholarship and critical thinking, and I can only touch briefly upon it here. Suffice to say that there is an idea type or system of various technologies, including the Internet, which assumes – at all sorts of levels – that infrastructures will enable qualities such as access, reliability, bandwidth, and particular applications to function. Further, that across the world there are similarities that pertain to Internet infrastructures. Yet the reality is that despite the uniformity that is both needed, and often delivered, in technology systems, the actual infrastructures that are put in place and develop are typically far messier.

At present for policy makers and indeed publics around the world – especially in the countries that are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, but especially in organizations like the International Telecommunications Union – broadband Internet infrastructures are akin to an obsession. My own country, Australia, has seen a government embarked on the building of a National Broadband Network to the tune of A$43 billion. This is an optical fiber-to-the-premises wholesale network to connect 93% of premises to fast broadband (Given 2010). Yet, what this means in actuality will be very interesting to see. Despite Australia (for once) being a world leader in the amount of money the government has promised to invest, and the reliance upon the public sector in this process, the National Broadband Network will not be the only infrastructure consumers will rely upon. While it certainly will replace the existing public switched telecommunications network, the National Broadband Network is being built across, on top of, and intersecting with various existing infrastructures: wireless networks to connect the 7% of customers to whose premises it is deemed to expensively connect with optical fiber; cellular mobile networks already delivering mobile broadband access; satellite networks; digital television transmission facilities; and many new kinds of sensing, location, and positioning network infrastructures.

As this Australian case indicates, infrastructures are layered, contingent, and the result of particular policy, commercial, and user environments (Sawhney and Wang 2006). Infrastructures are not just technical in nature, they are also intensely cultural. Here Brian Larkin's definition of infrastructure is very helpful:

> Infrastructures are the institutionalized networks that facilitate the flow of goods in a wider cultural as well as physical sense … *Infrastructure* … refers to this totality of both technical and cultural systems that create institutionalized structures whereby goods of all sorts circulate, connecting and binding people into collectivities (Larkin 2008, pp. 5–6).

Thus infrastructures can differ very widely across locations and countries, with the consequence that two places can afford a very different experience of what the Internet is. Larissa Hjorth has drawn attention to the way that Korean students experienced the Internet in Melbourne, Australia in the first years of the twentieth century as a frustrating experience, compared to what they took for granted back home in large cities such as Seoul (Hjorth 2007). Everyday habits of updating profiles, information, and content were often disrupted. Such disparities are more radical still when considering countries with an even greater gulf between technical as well as cultural infrastructures. The majority of countries do not have the ubiquitous landline broadband Internet infrastructure of many Western or Eastern countries, although typically their cellular mobile infrastructures have been fast growing. Hence the kind of Internet unfolding in such countries needs to be understood in the specific contexts of its "hard" and "soft", "technical" and "cultural" infrastructures.

Access and Use

There is a rich, suggestive relationship between Internet infrastructures and access and use. Broadly speaking, the discerning of infrastructures and what they enable, constrain, and afford (in, for instance, what are called "affordances") is only a first step in understanding the Internet as global media. An important second step is understanding the conditions and kinds of access and use. One dimension of access is provided by the aggregate figures of the world Internet cited earlier. However, as emphasized, an overall statistic about Internet access needs to be broken down into meaningful data on how kinds of applications are used, why, how, where, and for what purposes. There are many available studies of Internet access, notably in the multinational World Internet Project offering comparative data in some twenty countries (http://www.worldinternetproject.net/). There are other dimensions of access, however, that remain not so well understood or measured. One of these is accessibility for people with disabilities.

Many people with disabilities face difficulties in accessing the Internet, due to dominant norms of design that still do not include the range of requirements different groups may possess (Goggin 2012). This can be illustrated through the reasonably well-known Web Accessibility Initiative (WAI) guidelines of the world wide web consortium. These are guidelines developed by the organization responsible for the web's standards, which aim to ensure that web pages are coded in a way that makes them easily read by people with a range of impairments. For instance, blind Internet users who use screen-readers (software that reads out commands and words) can find it much easier to access, read, and navigate through web pages that conform to the WAI guidelines. Although being the leading example of inclusive design in the Internet, the WAI guidelines leave much to be desired – not least in their lack of implementation. There are many other areas of Internet technology that pose considerable problems for people with disabilities, where accessible design initiatives are long overdue but still awaited – the inaccessibility of the widely used Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF) being just one relatively well-known example. The case of disability reveals that access really is a multilayered thing when it comes to the Internet. There is access to the computers or devices used to access the Internet and access to the operating systems and applications – when the Internet is not only a network of networks but a medium constructed of the interactions between much software and hardware, and multiple sensory and signifying modes (word, image, sound, and potentially touch).

There are other areas of access that shape the Internet as a global media form. Literacy is a key issue, as Internet access remains firmly predicated on levels of expertise, skill, knowledge, and particular cultural concepts. Affordability is another critical dimension of access, where experiences among groups can vary greatly. We may draw a contrast between social groups in the same society, where those wealthier consumers can afford expensive smartphone handsets and the tariffs for mobile Internet access (to overcome poor Internet infrastructure or supplement access when infrastructure is otherwise poor), whereas others on lower income are vying with pre-paid mobile phones that may provide little or no Internet access.

The forms of access are closely related to contexts of use and consumption of the Internet. Here I hasten to add that I am mindful also of the role of nonavailability, lack of access, and nonuse of technologies, which often decisively shape ideas about technology as much as their counterparts of available access and use (Haddon 2004). (Here I am reminded of a story about a web designer living up in the hills of rural Northern New South Wales, where I lived in the late 1990s. Lacking Internet access due to the hilly terrain, he would write his HTML code in long-hand and come into town once a week, compile it into a file, and upload it to make a website.) The actual uses and consumption of Internet around the world cannot simply be read off the ideas that those who invented, designed, implemented, marketed, or regulated the technology.

Uses of the technology are also symbiotically related to infrastructures discussed above. For example, in addition to the large-scale infrastructures delivered by substantial governmental or corporate players, there are also all kinds of ad hoc, local, user infrastructures – what various researchers have called responses of "making do". Those living in rural areas in the twentieth century in a number of countries often needed to provide extra cable themselves to get connected to the main network. A more recent example of that of wireless communities, where enthusiasts assembled an infrastructure made of individual's Wi-Fi wireless Internet routers and signals that could afford connectivity to those who wished for it. Alternative infrastructures can arise that can be in fact quite substantial and widespread, such as the "infrastructures of piracy" (Larkin 2008) or what theorists have termed "informal media economies" (Lobato 2010).

Indeed, the Internet has been latterly seen as the epitome of the "user"-turn in media and technology; as a medium in which, in its most recent formations, the collective actions, cultures, and habits of users ("user-generated content", for instance) determine its nature and future potential. This hyperinflation of the user in the contemporary Internet is as much as ideology – viz. web 2.0 – as cyberspace was in an earlier epochal. The obvious problem in studying the Internet as global media, however, is that the user again looks rather too much like an ideal type – again, one conceived in the digital groves of North America and seen as defining a large-scale, deep trend in contemporary world culture. While this figure of the user has been theorized in various ways – for instance, in Henry Jenkins' *Convergence Culture* (2006) – the problem is that we actually understand little still about the actual uses of Internet historically and in contemporary settings that are in evidence around the world. This is a problem even in societies in which have originated the kinds of users and uses summoned up by rhetorics such as web 2.0, user-generated content, and the "long tail" thesis. That is, there is debate about how widespread and how significant uses of YouTube, for instance, are – when it comes to distribution of audiovisual material across society as a whole. There is little research available, however, on video-sharing sites, architectures, and user cultures, across a wide range of societies in which conditions and ideas about the Internet are quite different to those that took root in North America and Europe.

Culture, Language, and History

To understand the Internet as global media, we also need to understand the inextricably interwoven matters of culture, language, and history. Already I have alluded to these, especially in relation to positing a broader notion of infrastructure than usually granted in relation to media or technology. Culture is a famously ambiguous concept, but it indicates – in the famous definition of Raymond Williams (1983), for instance – the way of life that a people may have. Also that culture is a power-laden and operative condition. There are well-established approaches to cross-cultural and intercultural research that emphasize the importance of understanding cultural difference and seek to integrate this into a broader understanding. My approach draws on cultural studies work that emphasizes not only such cultural difference, and the traversal, translation, and transformation across cultures, but also the specificity of cultures. This is important when we consider a form of media that appears to span cultures, such as the Internet. Instead of assuming the global, my argument is that it is critical to locate the forms it takes, and which indeed are not just instantiations or local variants, but rather "invent" it in a specific way borne of that culture. A corollary of this argument is that theory about such cultural phenomenon – cultural theory itself – has a specificity, because our ability to think about particular media is shaped by, and modeled upon, particular cultural belonging, experiences, and materiality.

The idea of cultural specificity is linked also to language. If values are inscribed in technology, then we also find, especially in the Internet, a partial view of language. The representation of languages and character sets in computer code has been a work-in-progress. English and other languages were enshrined early on in ASCII, but for many other languages, it has taken a long time, even despite projects such as Unicode, to be adequately reflected in computer code, operating systems, and applications (Danet and Herring 2007), let alone Internet governance (DeNardis 2009). There is a multilayered investigation necessary to understand this central problematic of language in the Internet as global media, to which I have already alluded in the growing literature in this area. Sufficient to say that what "we" often understand as "the" Internet is often strongly correlated to particular language worlds that we inhabit or of which we have some knowledge. This point is made by Nanette Gottlieb in her discussion of the Japanese Internet, which is surprisingly co-terminous to the world of Japanese speakers, rather "closed" or endogenous than the image of the Internet assumed by English speakers (Gottlieb 2009).

This is evident when we go to one of the great decentralized Internet voluntary projects thus far, *Wikipedia*, which, at November 15, 2010, counted some 3.47 million English articles, but only 715 000 Japanese articles and 670 000 Spanish ones (less in fact than the 746 000 in Polish). We still know little about the Internets associated with different languages – the French Internet compared to the Italian, Russian, Polish, or Malay Internet (responsible for 80 426 *Wikipedia* articles at the above time of inspection). There is little comparative research about whether their similarities, differences, and how, taken together, they constitute global Internet imaginaries.

Culture and language together point suggestively to history. Implicit in the discussion so far is that societies come from different places and take different paths, and that an appreciation of their histories is crucial for understanding what their media is and what they make of it. A cultural and media historical perspective is also critical for approaching the study of the domestication, appropriation, and devising of a technology such as the Internet. Again, my gambit is that the *global* in this media form is the outcome and attribute of the many forms it takes and circuits it traverses in a world career.

The experience of the Internet varies because of its different histories in a society, and also because it is framed by, and approached through, particular histories. An excellent example is provided by Yongming Zhou's study of political participation in China (Zhou 2006). Zhou looks at the phenomenon of Internet discussion and its role in civil society through a detailed history of the predecessor technology of the telegraph in China, and how this was viewed. An awareness of the respective histories of Internets is helpful for appreciating and situating variation. Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) were highly influential in the Anglophone Internet in the 1980s and early 1990s, but then typically died out with the advent of the mass Internet. However, BBS remain a very important part of the Internet in China and Taiwan, even with the advent of social media.

Thus far, I have suggested that we need to come to grips with the international range of Internets in order to understand this form of global media. To flesh out this argument, I have suggested three important elements of such an approach, which are to consider infrastructure, access and use, and culture, language, and history. Of course, there are various other factors also that interact with these, such as demographics, geography, market structure, and policy. Such an approach helps us to make sense of an important new direction – mobile Internet.

Mobile Internets

As the statistics at the beginning of this chapter reveals, for many hundred of millions of people in the world, the Internet is a mobile experience. This mobile character of the Internet is doubly significant because now many of the world's five billion mobile phone users are in the developing world, where their innovative domestication of these media technologies – as in low-cost mobile media in India and Africa – calls for similarly imaginative responses in research paradigms.

Famously, Japan was the first country for which the emergence of the Internet occurred via mobiles, as it did in the late 1990s (Ito, Okabe, and Matsuda 2005). The popular form of mobile Internet in Japan was the i-Mode system, which allowed consumers to download music, ringtones, graphics, and so on, some years before mobile data services become commercially viable and popular among consumers in other countries. The other form of early mobile Internet in the Western world was the WAP (Wireless Access Protocol) system, which made it possible for users to access the Internet via their mobile phones. In its first appearance in the late 1990s, however, WAP did not prove popular, bedeviled as it was by a small screen, slow data speeds, and a frustrating user experience. In the intervening decade, there have been a number of developments in mobile Internet. WAP has been redesigned, and with the much greater base of faster third generation (3G) mobile phones, has received user acceptance. Email on mobile devices has become an important phenomenon in many countries, with the appearance of dedicated devices such as Blackberry, but then with phone manufacturers such as Nokia and others also developing their handsets and protocols for an easier mobile email experience. The Apple iPhone appearance in mid-2007 catalyzed the smartphone market, and with its "apps" (applications) has also galvanized and greatly broadened the sluggish mobile entertainment and data market. Last but not least, mobile broadband devices that can be plugged into laptop computers have been successful across many markets – as they use the greater ubiquity of cellular mobile networks (compared to the patchwork quilt of Wi-Fi wireless Internet) to provide Internet access where wired access is not possible or desirable.

In many ways, these aspects of mobile Internet I have outlined are potentially things shared across different countries. Again, however, the task remains of investigating the specific forms that mobile Internet takes in different places, as part of global Internets. The necessity of this task is underscored by a fascinating emergent phenomenon occurring with mobile Internet. We have new research that documents growing numbers of users who experience the Internet first and subsequently as mobile Internet. That is, there are societies where Internet access and use has remained at quite low levels. The availability of mobile Internet is now presenting people with the opportunity to use the Internet for the first time. Therefore the "template" of the fixed Internet, and what we think we know about it, is not necessarily a good guide to understanding this new world of the Internet.

The challenge, and intrigue, is redoubled when we consider some fascinating, home-grown uses of mobile Internet. Jonathon Donner and Marion Walton, for instance, have drawn our attention to a mobile Internet application called Mxit, widely used in South Africa (Walton and Donner 2009). They discuss how it figured in the 2009 South African election as a concrete example of a mobile networked public. In Africa, the mobile phone through SMS has already been involved in significant new developments in news and journalism, activism, social innovation, and entrepreneurship (Ekine 2010). If in Africa and elsewhere, such as Eastern Europe and South America, the burgeoning use of mobile Internet is having significant cultural, social, and political implications, this is something that in its manifold conditions could well cause us to revise our understanding not just of mobile media but of Internet as a global media form (Goggin 2011).

Conclusion

The Internet is indeed a vibrant area of contemporary media – one of the most important medium in its own right, but also critical because it is the stage upon which are playing out transformations and continuity of much media generally. As I have outlined, the Internet offers both challenges and opportunities for studying and understanding global media. The Internet is very much a technology that is globally available and used. How it is organized has common characteristics and elements. However, in many respects, what is "global" about the Internet as media is created through an interplay among "local" and "world" elements. Truly, it is a "glocal" or "translocal" phenomenon.

Once this fundamental proposition is granted, it opens up a wide avenue along which to travel in search of understanding the Internet. What is perhaps most useful in such an endeavor to get to the heart of what constitutes the Internet as such a global media phenomenon is that it promises to re-engage media studies researchers in questions of infrastructure, policy, and political economy, as well as those of cultural, language, and technology. Media scholars really do have something important to contribute to understanding how the Internet has emerged in different contexts, societies, and cultures, and how local as well as global imaginaries of the Internet have taken shape. Such critical work on the Internet is urgently needed, when it figures so centrally in debates about media, their meanings, and implications today and into the future.

References

Abbas, A. and Erni, J.N. (eds) (2005) *Internationalizing Cultural Studies: An Anthology*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Allan, S. and Thorsen, E. (eds) (2009) *Citizen Journalism: Global Perspectives*. New York: Peter Lang.

Ash, T.G. (2009) Twitter Counts More than Armouries in this New Politics of People Power, *Guardian*, June 17, 2009, accessed 01/11/2010, www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jun/17/iran-election-protests-twitter-students.

Aspray, W. and Ceruzzi, P.E. (eds) (2008) *The Internet and American Business*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Blair, T. (2010) *A Journey: My Political Life*. New York: Knopf Doubleday.

Bruns, A. (2008) *Blogs, Wikipedia, Second Life, and Beyond: From Production to Produsage*. New York: Peter Lang.

Castells, M. (ed.)(2004) *The Network Society: A Cross-Cultural Perspective*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Castells, M. (2009) *Communication Power*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Clarke, R., Dempsey, G., Nee, O.C. and O'Connor, R.F. (1998) *A Primer on Internet Technology*, accessed 15/10/2010, www.rogerclarke.com/II/IPrimer.html.

Danet, B. and Herring, S.C.(eds) (2007) *The Multilingual Internet: Language, Culture, and Communication Online*. New York: Oxford University Press.

DeNardis, L. (2009) *Protocol Politics: The Globalization of Internet Governance*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Deuze, M. (2007) *Media Work*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Ekine, S. (ed.) (2010) *Mobile Phone Activism in Africa*. Cape Town: Pambazuka.

Flichy, P. (2007) *The Internet Imaginaire*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Friedman, T. (2005) *Electric Dreams: Computers in American Culture*. New York: New York University Press.

Gillmor, D. (2006) *We the Media: Grassroots Journalism by the People, for the People* (Pbk edn). Sebastopol, CA: O'Reilly Media.

Given, J. (2010) Take your partners: public private interplay in Australian and New Zealand plans for next generation broadband, *Telecommunications Policy*, **34** (9), 540–549.

Goggin, G. (2011) *Global Mobile Media*. London and New York: Routledge.

Goggin, G. (2012) Disability connections: technologies, politics, prospects, in P.M.A. Baker, J. Hanson, and J. Hunsinger (eds), *The Unconnected: Social Justice, Participation and Engagement in the Information Society*. New York: Peter Lang (in press).

Goggin, G. and McLelland, M. (2009a) The internationalization of the Internet and its implications for media studies, in D. Thussu (ed.), *Internationalising Media Studies*. New York: Routledge, pp. 48–61.

Goggin, G. and McLelland, M. (eds) (2009b) *Internationalizing Internet Studies: Beyond Anglophone Paradigms*. New York: Routledge.

Gottlieb, N. (2009) Language on the Internet in Japan, in G. Goggin and M. McLelland (eds), *Internationalizing Internet Studies: Beyond Anglophone Paradigms*. New York: Routledge, pp. 65–78.

Gottlieb, N. and McLelland, M. (eds) (2003) *Japanese Cybercultures*. London: Routledge.

Haddon, L. (2004) *Information and Communication Technologies in Everyday Life: A Concise Introduction and Research Guide*. Oxford and New York: Berg.

Hjorth, L. (2007) Home and away: a case study of cyworld minihompy by Korean students studying in Australia, *Asian Studies Review*, **31** (4), 397–407.

International Telecommunications Union (ITU) (2010) At least half the world's people should have access to broadband by 2015, *ITU Snapshot*, accessed 16/11/10, www.itu.int/net/pressoffice/stats/2010/09/index.aspx.

Ito, M., Okabe, D. and Matsuda, M. (eds) (2005) *Personal, Portable, Pedestrian: Mobile Phones in Japanese Life*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Jenkins, H. (2006) *Convergence Culture: When Old and New Media Collide*. New York: New York University Press.

King, E. (2010) *Free for All: The Internet's Transformation of Journalism*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Larkin, B. (2008) *Signal and Noise: Media, Infrastructure and Urban Culture in Nigeria*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Levina, M. and Kien, G. (eds) (2010) *Post-Global Network and Everyday Life*. New York: Peter.

Lobato, R. (2010) Creative industries and informal economies: lessons from Nollywood, *International Journal of Cultural Studies*, **13** (4), 337–354.

Lovink, G. (2002) *Dark Fiber: Tracking Critical Internet Culture*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Lovink, G. (2003) *My First Recession: Critical Internet Culture in Transition*. Rotterdam: V2_Publishing/NAI Publishers.

Morley, D. (2007) *Media, Modernity and Technology: The Geography of the New*. London: Routledge.

Mosco, V. (2004) *Digital Sublime: Myth, Power and Cyberspace*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Nye, D. (1994) *American Technological Sublime*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Paasonen, S. (2009) What cyberspace? Traveling concepts in Internet research, in G. Goggin and M. McLelland (eds), *Internationalizing Internet Studies: Beyond Anglophone Paradigms*. New York: Routledge, pp. 18–31.

Sawhney, H. and Wang, X. (2006) Battle of systems: learning from erstwhile gas–electricity and telegraph–telephone battles, *Prometheus*, **24**, 235–256.

Sreberny, A. and Khiabany, G. (2010) *Blogistan: The Internet and Politics in Iran*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Tai, Z. (2006) *The Internet in China: Cyberspace and Civil Society*. New York: Routledge.

Thussu, D. (ed.) (2009) *Internationalising Media Studies*. New York: Routledge.

Turner, F. (2006) *From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth Network, and the Rise of Digital Utopianism*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Union, I.T. (2010) Key global telecom indicators for the world telecommunication service sector, accessed 01/11/10, www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/at_glance/KeyTelecom.html.

Walton, M. and Donner, J. (2009) Read-write-erase: mobile-mediated publics in South Africa's 2009 elections, accessed 15/11/10, jonathandonner.com/readwriteerase_prepub.pdf.

Wellman, B. and Haythornthwaite, C. (eds) (2002) *The Internet in Everyday Life*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wheeler, D. (2006) *The Internet in the Middle East: Global Expectations and Local Imaginations in Kuwait*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Williams, R. (1983) Culture, in *Keywords*, revised edn. London: Fontana, pp. 87–93.

Zhou, Y. (2006) *Historicizing Online Politics: Telegraphy, the Internet, and Political Participation in China*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

21

Media, Diaspora, and the Transnational Context

Cosmopolitanizing Cross-National Comparative Research?

Myria Georgiou

Introduction

If all the criticisms to cross-national comparative research could be summed up within a single sentence this would highlight the inherent problems of comparing nations, especially within the context of globalization. In recent times, critique has moved away from earlier criticism about cross-national research "comparing apples with pears", that is, comparing incomparable countries. Increasingly, criticism has focused on the role of the nation per se. The nation either as a taken for granted context or as an interpretative framework of analysis has become a point of contestation. It is thus no coincidence that cross-national comparative studies have often attracted fierce criticism for reproducing social scientific *methodological nationalism* (Beck 2006). When it comes to media and communications research, the habitual attraction to reproducing analysis about national particularities has become even more problematic. No doubt, the explosion of digital and satellite media across territories has presented the field with realities incompatible to the nationalistic gaze. Digital and satellite media, and their role in social and cultural life, have also presented new opportunities for developing methodologies for research across cultural, political, and social spaces. In this chapter and with reference to research on media and diaspora I argue for the need to support and expand cross-national comparative research, learning from debates on *methodological cosmopolitanism* (Beck 2006; Beck and Sznaider 2010), on the one hand, and from research on transnationalism (Portes 1997; Vertovec 2009), on the other. While methodological cosmopolitanism challenges nation-centrism, transnationalism grounds cosmopolitan imagination upon social scientific analysis of power and provides a crucial reminder of the persistence of structural and political inequalities between, within, and across nations and regions.

The present discussion provides a reflexive defense of cross-national comparative research. It draws from direct research experience in discussing its limitations, strengths, and

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

potentials as a methodological approach. The discussion engages primarily with studies on media and diaspora, as these present vivid examples of the challenges and potentials ingrained in large-scale and cross-border research practice. Diasporas are the ultimate transnational social groups, sustaining histories and cultures of commonality across territories (Gilroy 1993; Cohen 1997). Diasporic media cultures reflect the transnationalization of everyday life, as they expand across territories through the production and consumption of local, national, and transnational media (Gillespie 1995; Georgiou 2006; Brinkerhoff 2009). At the same time, research on media and diaspora captures the tensions between the national and the transnational, as it studies mobility (physical and mediated), transitivity (mental and political) between different systems of political representation, and flows (ideological and communicational). In developing this discussion I draw from experience within two cross-European research projects and a trans-Atlantic urban comparative study. While cross-national research initially appears to assume that space is flat, horizontal, and territorially defined, in its more relevant and influential applications, it learns from conceptualizations of space, culture, and mediation in their complexity and multipositionality. In engaging with such conceptualizations of space and mediation (cf. Couldry and McCarthy 2004; Moores 2004; Levebvre, Elden, and Lebas 2003; Silverstone 2007), I propose a multispatial framework. This framework builds upon the recognition of the complex space of mediation and associated power relations that have spatial specificities but which also take their meanings within transnational networks of communication. Through my own experience with cross-national research practice, I have developed a triangular spatial matrix that consists of three elements: the local/urban, the national, and the transnational. This spatial matrix presents a starting point, as well as an interpretative framework in understanding how phenomena on study have distinct connections to structures and places (e.g., national media legislation) but can only be understood in their complexity if studied in their relation with other spatial contexts. For example, national media regulation is directly associated with national structures, but it also represents attempts to control urban media production, as at the same time being positioned between national projects of social cohesion and the transnational liberalization of markets. As will be shown below, the proposed spatial matrix provides a realistic framework for studying the complexities associated with the globalization of media, while avoiding the dangerous territory of methodological nationalism and while being able to benefit from both quantitative and qualitative, large scale, and small scale research conduct and analysis.

A Growing Tradition, a Space for Reflection

Reflection and critique to cross-national comparative research follows an established tradition, especially within the European social sciences. Criticized but also widely used, cross-national comparative research has put its mark on the study of media and communications. From Hallin and Manchini's (2004) comparison of national media systems to Livingstone's *EU Kids Online* (Livingstone and Haddon 2009), scholars and policy makers have become familiar with cross-national research projects of different scale and focus. Since its early days, cross-national comparisons have been seen as a unique opportunity for cosmopolitanizing research:

> At the level of observation, comparative inquiry cosmopolitanizes, opening our eyes to communication patterns and problems unnoticeable in our spatial and temporal milieu. It helps us to see our communication arrangements in a fresh light, enriches the raw material sources of communication theory building, and deepens appreciation of communication policy issues, learning how they have arisen and been dealt with in other places and periods (Blumler, McLeod, and Rosengren 1992, p. 30).

Dutton and Vedel (1992) note that comparative research forces social scientists to develop theoretical explanations that can apply across social systems and therefore that comparative science is best seen as a strategy for extending research in two respects: in level (from the micro-individual towards the macro-societal) and in scope (extending the number of sites to which theoretical propositions might apply). As cross-national research practice developed so has reflection on its strengths and limitations. Needless to say, the umbrella of cross-national comparative research includes a rich and diverse body of empirical studies and applied methods. Studies of national legal systems and of the history of national press have developed next to projects examining behaviors and cultural choices among groups like children, urban subjects, or migrants. The emergence of digital and satellite media, as well as the diversification of cultural practices among audiences, have presented new challenges both from below and from above. For an earlier generation of cross-national research the divides in design and conduct (and consequently in addressing epistemological and empirical challenges) corresponded relatively neatly with divides between political communication studies, on the one hand, and cultural and media studies, on the other. The former have primarily used quantitative variable-oriented tools in conducting larger scale analysis. The latter primarily focused on a few countries at a time as comparative cases and has used mostly qualitative tools in studying complex relations, with the aim to contribute to theory (Ragin 1997). As research traditions, but also public funders, became more aware of diverse communication studies traditions, crossing boundaries between the qualitative and quantitative and the political and the cultural spheres became more common. This shift is increasingly visible in media and communications research funded by the European Union. Projects, such as *EU Kids Online* and *Media and Citizenship*, present recent examples of multimethod projects, combining large-scale cross-European surveys and qualitative research methods (e.g., focus groups and interviews).

While research associated with media studies, cultural studies, and the sociology of the media has for long addressed questions of reflexivity, it has not been protected from its own preconceptions. As cross-national research usually involves collaboration within large transnational consortia, interpretation of findings on the basis of distinct national characteristics sometimes becomes a manageable way to communicate across diverse groups and intellectual traditions. In addition, patterns of methodological nationalism can be reproduced when transnational teams attempt to formulate normative and policy-oriented outcomes. From a normative perspective, cross-national research "serves as a tool for developing classifications of social phenomena and for establishing whether shared phenomena can be explained by the same causes", argue Hantrais and Manger (1996, p. 2). In this context structures – especially those associated with the nation-state (e.g., citizenship systems; legislation about freedom of speech or media ownership) – inevitably become central to analysis. There is a fine line between taking national particularity for granted and understanding its relevance (if any). Reflection on the conceptualization of the nation thus is a necessity at the stage of research design: is the nation a unit of analysis (among others), the contextual framework, or a component of a larger international system (Blumler, McLeod, and Rosengren 1992)? Is it the nation, the nation-state, or both that are recognized as important components of the specific study and analysis? If so, in what ways?

Livingstone (2003) draws from Kohn's typology of cross-national comparative research models. Livingstone (2003) summarizes four different conceptualizations of the nation in each of these models: (i) nation as object of study, where individual national phenomena are studied against each other (e.g., the history of national broadcasting systems); (ii) nation as context of study, where phenomena are studied in terms of their particularistic differences and in their universalist continuities (e.g., television consumption cultures); (iii) nation as unit of analysis, where a common theoretical framework and standard methodology are applied to study variations of phenomena across nations – the key element of this model is a theory-driven approach that recognizes the commonalities and differences across the units of analysis and within them (e.g., the study of national newsroom cultures); and (iv) nation as component of a larger international or transnational system, where underlying processes (e.g., capitalism, imperialism) of all nations are systematically interconnected. Each national case is studied in its particularity, but interpretation links particularity to the overarching global realities (e.g., emergence of reality shows in different countries as associated with the transnationalization of media industries). Livingstone (2003) argues that there are points of reflection that are equally crucial in cross-national research. The selection of countries is important as it might emphasize similarities or difference, but equally the contextualization of participants' own understandings of their action provides insights that might directly challenge preconceived interpretations among the researchers.

Cosmopolitan Cross-National Research?

While methodological nationalism represents the rise of a new vocabulary within social sciences, national biases have long been recognized and taken into account in the conduct of cross-national research. Janoski (1991, p. 62) proposes seven stages, which start (1) by specifying the conceptual framework but also identifying biases and ethnocentrism. Following this initial step, he suggests (2) research design: choose countries; establish variables; (3) data collection and field notes: collect consistent data; (4) research design 2: extract knowledge from within the country; (5) development of a theoretical model for each country; (6) refitting the theoretical models in internal analysis to overall theory in external analysis and providing explanation between countries; and (7) exit from the field to write results. In Janoski's model, like in most early cross-national research, reflexivity on ethnocentric biases has not challenged the centrality of the nation as a category. As such, Beck and Sznaider's critique to methodological nationalism holds its significance even within these frameworks of reflection:

> Methodological nationalism takes the following premises for granted: it equates societies with nation-state societies and sees states and their governments as the primary focus of

> social-scientific analysis. It assumes that humanity is naturally divided into a limited number of nations, which organize themselves internally as nation-states and externally set boundaries to distinguish themselves from other nation-states. And it goes further: this outer delimitation as well as the competition between nation-states represent the most fundamental category of political organization (Beck and Sznaider 2010, p. 382).

Beck (Beck 2006, 2009; Beck and Sznaider 2010) argues that social sciences, being prisoners of methodological nationalism, makes it almost impossible to adopt a cosmopolitan methodological approach. Most data, he argues, is collected with the assumed centrality of the nation as the category of analysis. No doubt this critique has directly and indirectly learned from research with people on the move, being elite or working class migrants, long-standing or newly developed diasporas. The point of contestation however emerges when Beck redraws the outlook of social sciences as cosmopolitan. He emphasizes the need to recognize de-bounded politics and societies in their transformations (Beck 2009), yet is unclear how cosmopolitan scholarship accounts for continuities, alongside changes in political and cultural action and relations of power. Diaspora and media research provides important evidence confirming that old power relations persist next to new politics of representation. The words of Arab-speaking participants in the cross-national research project *Media and Citizenship: Transnational Television Cultures Reshaping Political Identities in the European Union, 2008–11*[1] provides some relevant evidence:

> I can change reality with my vote [in national elections]. It is important to me to vote (Madrid focus group, Females 18–25).

> All Spaniards are racist, because they oblige you to renounce your beliefs and principles if you want them to accept you (Madrid focus group, Males 18–25).

No matter how much these quotations reflect realities, they certainly reflect perceptions about the ongoing significance of national ideologies and the national political system. For the two Arab-speaking focus group participants the nation is interpreted through their experience in Spain, but also from the position they occupy between and across different political and cultural contexts (associated with ethnicity, gender, generation, and class). As these quotations reflect the tense and uneven relation between certain groups of global subjects and the nation they also reflect the limitations of a celebratory cosmopolitan discourse that reproduces elite experiences of cosmopolitanism across different social groups. As such, these examples reaffirm the need to conduct empirical and comparative research in order to understand what a cosmopolitan research orientation should entail. Empirical research presents evidence about the multiple sensitivities required for a globally oriented cross-national research. In Beck and Sznaider's words:

> Methodological cosmopolitanism implies becoming sensitive and open to the many universalisms, the conflicting contextual universalisms – for example, of the post-colonial experience, critique and imagination, where the retreat from empire has resulted in large waves of immigration from the margins (of former empires to it) to the former metropolitan centres (Beck and Sznaider 2010, p. 393).

Indeed, and by going back to the *Media and Citizenship* project, the definition above might make more sense through the words of some other focus group participants:

> I like to watch news and to monitor channels. I find western channels more objective, although Arab channels are not bad. I also monitor Lebanese local channels (Nicosia focus group, Males 46–65).

A transnational outlook is everyday practice for the participant above, who lives in Cyprus but for whom meaningful connections expand across boundaries. In the words of another participant in London, an alternative universalism to a liberal Western version seems possible:

> I watch the BBC 10 o'clock news. When there are troubles I listen to Al Jazeera. I get all the Al-Manaar news from my mother (London focus group, Males 46–65).

What is recorded above is indeed a universalism that takes for granted the ordinary co-existence of the western liberal ideologies as expressed on the BBC, the liberal Middle Eastern ideologies, as they appear on Al Jazeera, and the most outspoken – and extremist, in the eyes of western policy makers – Al-Manaar, which is controlled by Hezbollah. Unlike the often reproduced claims in western research about what watching Al-Manaar means, for many transnational subjects participating in this study Al-Manaar represents one of the main elements of their complex daily consumption of news. A fragment of their media nomadism, Al-Manaar, alongside other media, presents a viewpoint, and, as such, it presents an interest. Methodological cosmopolitanism provides a necessary and reflexive research openness to conflicting realities within global media but also conflicting ideologies within global modernity. Thus methodological cosmopolitanism presents a valuable point of reference for cross-national research, yet not without its limitations and biases itself.

The Ethics of Cross-National Research

When it comes to cross-national comparative research, like with any other research practice, different scholars will make different choices depending on their theoretical orientation and research questions. This makes it even more pertinent for researchers involved in cross-national research to be reflexive and transparent when it comes to recognizing their studies' political, ideological, and empirical limitations. This entails introducing larger conceptual and ethical questions in relation to cross-national research: What is the purpose of conducting a cross-national comparative research project? What is the intellectual and political origin of the project and its desired destination? I address these questions in three parts: first, in relation to a growing debate on methodological cosmopolitanism with a focus on transnational experiences of diaspora; in relation to research in and across culturally diverse societies; and in relation to ethical considerations when conducting research with migrant and diasporic populations.

Traditions of research design and conduct have long suffered from methodological nationalism for various reasons – the *real politics* of research being predominant. Research often responses to national, top-down enquiries (e.g., national policy related research and commissioned research) and also reflects individual researchers' preconceptions associated with national familiarity, loyalties, and affiliations. Funded cross-national comparative research, which has predominated in research practice during the last two decades, especially in Europe, has played a key role in the reproduction of the nation-state as a unit of analysis. The design of cross-national comparative research and the expectations of the funding bodies have encouraged large-scale and easily translatable into policy studies. Though a number of studies within such programs have challenged the dominant trends in EU-funded cross-national research (e.g., *Diasporic Media across the EU: A Mapping*; *Changing City Spaces*), in many cases, everyday experience and transnational media and cultural practices have been overshadowed by nationally framed measurements and indicators.

Indicators and measures with the nation at their core by all means should be recognized for their value. This kind of research – most often quantitative but not exclusively – has significant value as it can grasp some of the elements of the media worlds, which are, at least to some extent, defined within the nation. Such examples are the demographic characteristics of the national media workers; the media ownership patterns in each country; the links between national policies and representation of minorities in national media. At the same time, the limitations of nationally framed measurements relate to their inability to record and to analyze the significance of flows and patterns that are best studied horizontally and *across* nations rather than vertically and with the nation as the comparative framework. Such examples include the transnational success of media industries products; online networks; the production and consumption of Internet media and their meanings for various groups of people; the uses and meanings of email communication; cultural practices in cities and in transurban networks, as well as communication practices among transnational cultural communities. As human mobility and changes in communication technologies have intensified connections within and across territories, diaspora has become an exemplary case of transnational life and no more an exception. Online transnational communication is not a niche area of communication practices but a hugely significant and widespread one (at least in some parts of the world). How can we reproduce the national singular framework when the subject of study is by definition transnational? In my engagement with diasporic media cultures, transnational communities, and identities, I was forced to think about the ways we can study the national context, while also being able to see what goes on at the transnational level, or the translocal and the transurban level, which often are more important for diasporic communication, but also for identity and representation. I have used three techniques, which I will be discussing further later on.

To summarize this section, here are some of the elements of the media worlds that we need to reflect upon and consider the ways in which we can *do the cross-national* through a cosmopolitan outlook:

- Consider transnational connections: transnational mobility; intensification of transnational politics that challenge the nation-state from below and above; migrant and diasporic cultural and political activities across boundaries.
- Explore the significance of juxtapositions (and not just hierarchies and linear relations) of difference in the cosmopolis: the increasingly diverse cities and the complex social

action among migrants, diasporas, and other groups marginalized in the national and supranational formations of citizenship and economic engagement.
- Reflect on the ways in which empirical practice can grasp the complex systems of citizenship and belonging, such as flexible citizenship (Ong 1999), cosmopolitan citizenship (Delanty 2009), and dissenting citizenship (Maira 2004).

A Nuanced Analysis

Research on migration, diaspora, and the media has for long engaged with people whose everyday life expands across transnational communicative spaces. In many cases, this research has recorded social exclusion, lack of formal political rights, and contradictory experiences emerging in their growing mediated mobility against restricted physical mobility. Though only a fraction of these groups are immediately identified as people at risk (e.g. illegal immigrants, refugees), ethical concerns associated with research with people at risk can be useful for research with global subjects whose experience often involves marginalization and stigmatization. Freed-Taylor (1994) argues that one of the major ethical considerations in cross-national studies is researchers' responsibility to ensure that participants of different cultural backgrounds understand the purpose of the study and its conduct. This consideration has been addressed in two ways within the diaspora scholarship. Research with different cultural groups – not only those defined on the basis of national difference but also different ethnic and religious groups – requires at least the level of reflexivity on internal diversity that cross-national research has now established as a core requirement for research practice. Cross-national research needs to record internal diversity by comparing and contrasting the key indicator of nationality with significant indicators of social difference, e.g., French and female, French and ethnically Moroccan, French and working class. Yet, quite often, the recognition of internal heterogeneity of the national sample might stop at this level of recognition, with the danger of unintended reproduction of essentialized understandings of class, gender, and ethnicity.

Two deeper levels of analysis are required in order to understand difference (though of course this depends on the actual subject of analysis), but if understanding cultural difference is an element of the study (and in cross-national studies focused on people and not institutions this is indeed the case) these levels become crucial. First, there is a need to understand the relation between being French *and* female *and* working class *and* full citizen (or not), for example. Going further down into the analysis, it is important to consider whether being female and Moroccan and working class is more important than being French and female and working class, for example. This multilayered analysis then addresses in a meaningful way considerations about recognition and respect of cultural difference among participants. Lacking a multilayered analysis entails the danger of reproducing essentialized and homogeneous categories of migrant and diasporic groups.

Do Participants Have a Presence?

A second ethical consideration emerging in studies of migrant groups at risk, especially refugee communities and illegal immigrants, relates to their often vulnerable state.

O'Neill argues that for refugee groups: "Finding new rhythms in time and space, quelling the anxiety of the unfamiliar and the loss of orientation takes time" (O'Neill 2007, p. 75). Long detention in the "host" countries of the West for these groups is now usual practice. "How can we address these processes of 'othering' and subjugation? How can we foster processes of dignity and egalization in our institutions, policies and practices towards people seeking safety?" asks O'Neill (2007, p. 81), who records the sense of disorientation and humiliation shared by refugees she has studied in Britain. In her work within the methodological traditions of participatory action research (PAR), O'Neill uses "ethno-mimesis", a sociological ethnographic method combined with artistic creativity in challenging inequalities and giving refugees space of recognition and expression. While PAR tends to focus on research conducted with small groups (being very intense and requiring long-term commitment), there is good reason for seriously considering possible adaptations of its values in cross-national research. The reason for integrating methods associated with PAR's research sensitivity to large scale cross-national research become crucial, yet still rare, in cross-national comparative research. People on the move always experience some level of disorientation, especially when they settle in new locations and new cultural and political systems. Very often disorientation is expressed in migrants' incapacity to understand public debate, issues around citizenship rights and responsibilities, and codes of communication within the mainstream public sphere. Numerous cross-national research projects have studied these experiences and have recorded the restrictions in democratic participation among these groups (e.g., various projects within the EMTEL2 network; see Silverstone 2005; Open Society Institute, *Muslims in Europe* 2009; *Media and Citizenship*, in progress). Yet, the debate about the researchers' responsibility toward studied groups remains limited within cross-national research. While most major funding bodies (e.g., EU, ESF, ESRC) invite researchers to elaborate their ethical considerations, the academic debate about the political significance of research with vulnerable or stigmatized groups remains marginal. Cross-national research can learn from Kemmis' suggestion:

> The first step in action research turns out to be central: the formation of a communicative space … and to do so in a way that will permit people to achieve mutual understanding and consensus about what to do, in the knowledge that the legitimacy of any conclusions and decisions reached by participants will be proportional to the degree of authentic engagement of those concerned (Kemmis in Reason 2004).

Needless to say, PAR's methodologies cannot apply in full in comparative research. Yet, opportunities do arise and are worth exploring. In the *Media and Citizenship* project studying Arab-speakers' television use and their sense of belonging in seven European capital cities, our transnational team integrated in its methodology national public engagement events as a participatory method. The main purpose of the events was to engage the public – especially the Arab-speaking public but not exclusively – in public debates around citizenship and the media. As participants in the previous stages of the study repeatedly argued that they feel excluded from the public sphere and stereotyped in national politics and the media, the event provides an opportunity to participate in a public debate within a safe and neutral environment. The different public events provided an uneven experience as the challenges were numerous. The response from the public was often limited and public players, such as the press and policy makers, in most cases did not respond to our invite. A steep learning curve, this experimental method in the context of cross-national research became invaluable. On reflection, engagement with participating communities could be more long term and integrated within the cross-national (yet, importantly, grounded in specific locations) research practice. While the challenges were numerous, the use of a participatory method reaffirmed that there are indeed possibilities for providing space for participation and deliberation in the context of cross-national research.

Media and Diaspora: A Multimethod and Multispatial Approach

While research on diaspora and the media has mostly taken place within specific urban locations, the transnational orientation of analysis of diasporic experiences across boundaries has attracted attention from within the academia and beyond. Within studies of transnationalism, transnational mediated networks connecting locations of origin and destination have been studied in their significance for local, national, and international political lobbying (cf. Portes 1997; Smith and Guarnizo 1998). Transnationalism has brought to the foreground of research agendas the significance of such transnational networks. As Vertovec (2009) argues, these networks involve individuals and institutions and they are of different scale (interpersonal, community, political) and of different consequences (expressed in tight family links, transnational entrepreneurial connections, as well as in patterns of cultural consumption). European media, diaspora, and migration scholarship has brought to the foreground questions of diasporic media cultures and participation in social and political life in the countries where migrants and diasporas live. The cross-national *Diasporic Media in the EU: A Mapping* project (Georgiou 2003) and the current *Media and Citizenship: Transnational Television Cultures Reshaping Political Identities in the European Union* have respectively examined media's role in enabling or destructing participation in European societies and the ways in which transnational television changes or supports existing experiences of citizenship for Arab populations in Europe.

These studies have taken place at times of intensified diversification of mediascapes and of transnationalization of communication networks, but also at times of political turmoil across Western societies around questions of cultural diversity. Diaspora as a concept has provided both a conceptual and an empirical tool useful in understanding change in communication and national societies. I use an expanded definition of diaspora that moves away from parochial reproductions of the national as a conceptual and methodological core point for diaspora. An expanded definition of diaspora best captures shifts in human mobility and the consequent intersections of spaces of belonging. People on the move include established migrant groups and long standing diasporas, as much as new migrants, nomadic subjects, and refugees fleeing conflict and poverty. Changes in political domains and in the field of communication challenge the closed system of classification of what diaspora or diasporic condition and media might mean. For example, most European states have now introduced legislation that allows them to revoke citizenship from individuals with dual nationalities (Slade 2010). In addition, strict immigration laws have replaced previous celebratory discourses of multiculturalism (Lentin and Titley 2011) and refugees have become personae non grata in traditional destinations of refuge. At the same time, developments in global media have given rise to networks that expand across territories, while sustaining their dependence on localized systems of communication, especially those grounded in cities. These new communicative spaces have come with their own politics and associated struggles for presence and control of symbolic power. At the crossroad of these major developments, two distinct social conditions have challenged the limits of cross-national research: first, the enormous increase of access to communication technologies among people on the move and, second, the intense concentration of mobile groups in megacities of the global north. An appropriate conceptual and empirical framework thus needs to take into account the distinct significance of the local/urban, the national and the transnational, as well as the continuity of meanings across all spatial contexts.

What I propose, inspired by debates on methodological cosmopolitanism, is a shift from research that reproduces the *either/or* analytical framework and frameworks for cross-national research that understand media and communications in their growing complexity. This means that cross-national research needs to move beyond methodological divides and vertical analyses. A reflexive framework for cross-national research also needs to avoid being driven by comparisons, but should apply comparisons where appropriate. Such an approach creates space for studying oppositional relations but also trends and attitudes that cross spatial specificities. It is a framework that allows studying vertical but also horizontal relations and phenomena that appear within and across the nation. How does this framework apply to the practice of cross-national comparative research? I will briefly refer to three key elements of a reflexive framework, as I have engaged with it in the case of three different projects. Two of them have been collaborative projects and my take does not necessarily capture the intentions or interpretations of other members of the research teams.

The Cross-National Case Study

A fragment but also a learning field, this approach learns from the tradition of case-oriented qualitative cross-national research. It is an approach that focuses on a small number of cases and, in the example I am drawing from, this involved research in two cities: London and New York. In this case, it is not "the national" that provides the main unit of analysis. Rather, the main analytical unit is a transnationally located diaspora: Greek Cypriots living in London and New York City. The definition of the group is based on emic identification of participants as "Greek Cypriot" and not to a pre-given label. The study took place in London and New York City, applying ethnographic methods (including participant observation, focus groups, and interviews). Before approaching the field, I studied the distinct histories of migration of the specific group and the complex histories of migration and settlement associated with the two countries, but also the two cities. The case study approach has allowed me to investigate, not only the horizontal but also the vertical parameters that are relevant in shaping a social phenomenon, such as the construction of ethnic identities in my case. Politics and policies of migration, alongside flows of migration and the diversification of mediascapes have been studied in their continuities and distinct characteristics associated with each space. This approach is sensitive to particularities not only when comparing countries but also cities and neighborhoods. In practice this means that we could record characteristics of diasporic media cultures that had to do with the national context (e.g., regulation of radio broadcasts), but also others that have to do with the urban context (e.g., emergence of local media), as well as with the transnational flows, connections, and identities (communal media consumption and shared transnational communication in transnational television and the Internet). At the same time, the openness of case-oriented cross-national research allowed me to avoid committing to the examination of a core hypothesis or to restricting the study within defined variables that could reproduce initial assumptions about the local and national dynamics. A rigorous and clearly defined field might support scientific rigor but it can also reproduce familiar and habitual interpretations associated with nationalism, Eurocentrism, or personal biases. If the argument about the preoccupation of social sciences with methodological nationalism has any validity, the reproduction of clearly and predefined research boundaries can only reproduce it. Thus, I argue, smaller scale cross-national research presents valuable opportunities to reflect on research limitations and experiment with methods that are more open to understanding fast-changing media worlds.

A Synthetic Approach: Beyond the Qualitative and Quantitative Divide

Case-centered approaches might allow more flexibility and exploratory studies to take place. However, their limitation lies upon their inevitably small scale. Yet, reflexivity and some level of flexibility are possible, as well as desired, in larger scale cross-national research projects. A synthetic approach that brings together case-oriented quantitative studies has its own strengths. Especially when research hopes to have policy relevance and when it explores an understudied area, cross-national synthetic research becomes invaluable. The *Media and Citizenship* research project represents a valuable example for targeted research. In its ambitious design, the project aimed to provide an entry point to understanding qualitative and quantitative characteristics of Arabic transnational television consumption in Europe. The ambition has been great but also important, especially as transnational Arabic television has often been blamed for social segregation and Islamic radicalization, but most of these claims have not drawn from empirical data. As briefly mentioned above, this study focused on Arab-speaking audiences in seven countries and the research design included four phases. At an early stage, we have decided to focus on the seven capital cities instead of the rather complex and diverse category of the nation. The reasoning was clear: cities are locations where most Arab speakers live. The group in the study is ultimately transnational and does not only occupy different territorial locations but it also has a long history of mobility and resettlement. In addition, satellite television is transnational in its production and its consumption, presenting a second strong indicator of the transnationality of the study. The urban/local and the transnational are both organically and dynamically associated with the study and its interrogation of the relation between citizenship and television. However, as citizenship represents a system that is primarily defined within national territories, it reaffirms the centrality of the nation as a category. The "synthetic" approach would allow us to record different elements of significance associated with the relation between citizenship and transnational television. A quantitative two-step first stage of research allowed us to record patterns of media consumption among Arab speakers across Europe. A transnational survey with approximately 2500 participants, followed by a media diary collection among approximately 600 participants, provided wealth of data in relation to media consumption. These patterns were further investigated in their complexity and in their links to a sense of political and cultural belonging through a two-step qualitative research methodology, which included focus groups and public engagement events. These latter stages aimed to record data that quantitative methods could not grasp, especially the discursive emergence of identities and citizenship around media consumption. What this synthetic approach allowed us to do was to develop a rounded understanding of a complex global condition associated as much with changing national societies as with complex multilayered media worlds.

Multispatial Approach: Beyond Either/Or

A third element of a reflexive cross-national research framework is also the most important: a multispatial framing. Like all research, studying elements of globalization requires a conceptualization of space as complex and multilayered. Space is where media production and consumption take place and take their meanings. When conducting research across different countries, the multiple spatial levels of significance become more apparent. These spatial contexts are neither stable nor neatly positioned within communicative and political hierarchies. When it comes to intergenerational cultural reproduction, the domestic becomes more significant than the national; when it comes to citizenship, the national public sphere becomes central, though not singularly significant. In the case of transnational communities, the application of a multilayered spatial analysis becomes almost inevitable, providing a valuable area for reflection for all media and communications research. In my engagement with cross-national research I have found a three-dimensional spatial matrix – that includes the local/urban, the national, and the transnational – the most useful. With brief reference to the cross-European study *Diasporic Media in Europe: A Mapping* (Georgiou 2003), which I led in thirteen European countries, I aim to show how this triangular scheme provides a reflexive conceptual and empirical framework for understanding the significance of media in spaces where diasporic and migrant unfolds. The study recorded patterns of commonality and difference among diasporic media production and consumption and enquired into the relation between diasporic media cultures and the level of social inclusion and participation. The study examined numerous variables – thirteen countries, dozens of diasporic groups, different media and communication platforms, and applications. While this complexity presented various challenges in terms of analysis, the comparative framework that positioned specific forms of media engagement within a spatial matrix provided both realistic and relevant outcomes. For example, in recognizing spatial particularity, urban ethnic media appeared as directly associated with the urban space (and its social politics). A different dimension became visible when ethnic media were positioned in a multispatial matrix. This framework revealed how ethnic local media reflect an element of a communicative continuum that includes both local ethnic and transnational media.

Cosmopolitan, Theory-Driven and Ethical Cross-National Comparative Research

Beck and Sznaider (2010) emphasize the significance of a multiperspective approach that is both boundary transcending and boundary effacing and adopts different "lenses" of analysis. "A single phenomenon, transnationality, for example, can, and perhaps even must, be analysed both locally and nationally and transnationally and trans-locally and globally" (Beck and Sznaider 2010, p. 398). There are three points in this proposition worth highlighting. First, the inevitable recognition of the nation as one of the elements of a "multiperspective approach" in empirical research. Second, the significance of space and spatial relations as a framework of analysis, not just as an element of it. Finally, the emphasis on studying all spatial relations in their interconnection. How is it possible, for example, to understand the meanings of urban pirate ethnic radio if not juxtaposed with the diasporic histories of its producers and their marginal position within the politics of the nation?

The epistemological propositions for a methodological cosmopolitanism present less of an opposition to cross-national comparative research, unlike perhaps what its advocates would suggest. What is perhaps the most significant contribution of methodological cosmopolitanism is the systematic manner in which it highlights three key elements that cross-national research needs to build in at global times. It emphasizes the significance of applying a common theoretical framework that recognizes spatial relations, and similarities and differences across and within place. It also acknowledges migration and transnationalism not as marginal but as core elements of current social realities. Any research across nations (especially when focusing on human subjects and behaviors) needs to take into account human mobility and its consequences both in its design and its analysis. Finally, it recognizes the point of tension between researcher's analytical approach to cosmopolitanism and subjects' experience in place and within social and political systems. It is necessary, Beck and Sznaider argue (2010), to distinguish the actor perspective and the observer perspective. While the actor perspective is associated with relations of power linked to the nation-state, the observer perspective requires an analytical reflection on the challenges to the nation-state's power presented by human subjects and other centers of power within a global context.

Cross-national research presents one of the most fascinating and challenging opportunities for conducting comparative research across boundaries and learning from different research traditions. Methodological triangulation and collaboration between researchers with different empirical expertise are challenging, yet potentially invaluable for advancing a cosmopolitan, yet reflexive and critical, outlook. Combined methods, which do not interpret the cross-national based on singular and vertical national divisions, can contribute to theory and bridge the gap between the grand or meta-theories and the theorizations that emerge from our empirical studies. In concluding this discussion I want to emphasize the continuity in our cross-national comparative research interrogation and claim that it has made and it will continue to make a significant contribution to the epistemological debates that we now call *methodological cosmopolitanism*. We need to separate methodological nationalism from the study of the role of the nation(-state) and to establish an "epistemological filter" to any celebratory form of methodological cosmopolitanism. The nation-state and associated systems of organization and control of political, social, and cultural life remain central elements of analysis and critique. While the nation-state faces unprecedented challenges within modernity, both from below (local/urban level) and from above (transnational corporate/political/cultural systems), it retains its role as a powerful political institution. In this context, methodological cosmopolitanism presents an inspiring starting point for reflecting on research within global contexts, but nationalist prejudices shall not be replaced by new cosmopolitan ones.

Note

1. The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007–2013 under Grant Agreement No. 217480. The research team is a consortium of five European universities (consortium leader: C. Slade). The author had led the team conducting research in London, Madrid, and Nicosia. More information is available at www.media-citizenship.eu.

References

Beck, U. (2006) *Cosmopolitan Vision*. Cambridge: Polity.

Beck, U. (2009) Foreward, in M. Nowicka and M. Rovisco (eds), C*osmopolitanism in Practice*. Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, pp. xi–xiii.

Beck, U. and Sznaider, N. (2010) Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: a research agenda, *The British Journal of Sociology*, **61** (1), 381–403.

Blumler, J.G., McLeod, J.M. and Rosengren, K.E. (1992) An introduction to comparative communication research, in J.G. Blumler, J.M. McLeod, and K.E. Rosengren (eds), *Comparatively Speaking: Communication and Culture across Space and Time*. Newbury Park, London, and New Delhi: Sage, pp. 3–18.

Brinkerhoff, J. (2009) *Digital Diasporas: Identity and Transnational Engagement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cohen, R. (1997) *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*. London: UCL Press.

Couldry, N. and McCarthy, A. (2004) Introduction, in N. Couldry and A. McCarthy (eds), *Mediaspace: Place, Scale and Culutre in a Media Age*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 21–36.

Delanty, G. (2009) *The Cosmopolitan Imagination: The Renewal of Critical Social Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dutton, W. and Vedel, T. (1992) Dynamics of cable television in the US, Britain, and France, in J.G. Blumler, J.M. McLeod, and K.E. Rosengren (eds), *Comparatively Speaking: Communication and Culture across Space and Time*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, pp. 70–93.

Freed-Taylor, M. (1994) Ethical considerations in European cross-national research, *International Social Science Journal*, **142**, 523–532.

Georgiou, M. (2003) *Diasporic Media in the EU: A Mapping*, Final Report for the EC within the EMTEL2 Network. London: LSE.

Georgiou, M. (2006) *Diaspora, Identity and the Media: Diasporic Transnationalism and Mediated Spatialities*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Gillespie, M. (1995) *Television, Ethnicity and Cultural Change*. London: Routledge.

Gilroy, P. (1993) *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double-Consciousness*. Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press.

Hallin, D.C. and Mancini, P. (2004) *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hantrais, L. and Manger, S. (1996) *Cross-National Research Methods in the Social Sciences*. London and New York: Pinter.

Janoski, T. (1991) Synthetic strategies in comparative sociological research: methods and problems of internal and external analysis, in C. Ragin (ed.), *Issues and Alternatives in Comparative Social Research*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, pp. 59–81.

Lentin, A. and Titley, G. (2011) *The Crises of Multiculturalism*. London: Zed.

Levebvre, H., Elden, S. and Lebas, E. (2003) *Henri Lefebvre: Key Writings*. London: Continuum.

Livingstone, S. (2003) On the challenges of cross-national comparative media research, *European Journal of Communication*, **18** (4), 477–500.

Livingstone, S. and Haddon, L. (2009) Introduction, in S. Livingstone and L. Haddon (eds), *Kids Online: Opportunities and Risks for Children*. London: Policy Press, pp. 1–18.

Maira, S. (2004) Youth culture, citizenship and globalization: South Asian Muslim youth in the United States after September 11th, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, **24** (1), 219–231.

Moores, S. (2004) The doubling of place: electronic media, time-space arrangements and social relations, in N. Couldry and A. McCarthy (eds), *Mediaspace: Place, Scale and Culutre in a Media Age*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 21–36.

Ong, A. (1999) *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

O'Neill, M. (2007) Re-imagining diaspora through ethno-mimesis: humiliation, human dignity and belonging, in O. Guedes-Bailey, M. Georgiou, and R. Harindranath (eds), *Transnational Lives and the Media: Reimagining Diasporas*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp. 72–85.

Open Society Institute (2009) *Muslims in Europe: A Report in 11 EU Cities*. London, New York, and Budapest: Open Society Institute.

Portes, A. (1997) Immigration theory in the new century: some problems and opportunities, *International Migration Review*, **31** (4), 799–825.

Ragin, C. (1997) Turning the tables: how case-oriented methods challenge variable-oriented methods, *Comparative Social Research*, **16**, 27–42.

Reason, P. (2004) *Action Research: Forming Communicative Space for Many Ways of Knowing. Response to Md. Anisur Rahman*, accessed 05/09/2010, http://people.bath.ac.uk/mnspwr/Papers/DhakaFormingCommunicativeSpaces.pdf.

Silverstone, R. (ed.) (2005) *Media, Technology and Everyday Life in Europe: From Information to Communication*. Basingstoke: Ashgate.

Silverstone, R. (2007) *Media and Morality*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Slade, C. (2010) Shifting landscapes of citizenship, in C. Slade and M. Mollering (eds), *From Migrant to Citizen: Testing Language, Testing Culture*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp. 3–23.

Smith, M.P. and Guarnizo, L.E. (1998) The locations of transnationalism, in M.P. Smith and L.E. Guarnizo (eds), *Transnationalism from Below: Comparative Urban and Community Research*. New Brunswick and New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, pp. 3–34.

Vertovec, S. (2009) *Transnationalism*. London and New York: Routledge.

22

Post-colonial Interventions on Media, Audiences, and National Politics[1]

Ramaswami Harindranath

In a recent, fabulously conceived, and richly informative BBC radio series entitled *The History of the World in a Hundred Objects*,[2] one of the programs centers around "the head of Ife", an exquisitely sculpted human head found in the city of Ife in Nigeria, dating back several centuries, whose allegedly "classical" proportions, indicative of particular aesthetic sensibilities and technologies, so baffled early twentieth century art historians and scholars that a Dutch anthropologist in the 1930s proposed the theory that the Nigerian community must have encountered Greek culture, sensibilities, and techniques on the island of Atlantis. In a series whose very logic rides on using various "objects" as springboards for a brief but sensitive exploration of the richness of various civilizations around the world, this particular program highlights the limitations of parochial, intellectually narrow scholarly, and interpretive paradigms. Reaching for the mythical Atlantis as even a possible explanation for the "classical" excellence of the Ife head underscores not only the hubris but the deficiencies inherent in specific frameworks that exemplify Orientalist perceptions of the non-West. Even more damagingly, it also exemplifies a refusal to acknowledge the possibility of local artisanal expertise and cultural sophistication, and of other modes of cultural exchange that contributed to specific artistic developments.

Despite the validity of several subsequent critiques of it, and in spite of its limitations, Said's *Orientalism* provided both a critical vocabulary and a point from which to examine the relations between culture and imperialism. Since then there have been several attempts at "decentering" or "provincializing" Europe. More recently there have emerged more substantive and concerted efforts at formulating epistemologically penetrating and politically productive interventions that engage with the material realities and complexities of lives, cultures, nations, and other collectivities in the non-West. As such, these are both political and academic projects, and range from critiques and formulations from collectives such as the Latin American group of scholars championed

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

by Walter Mignolo (2005, 2007), to those who endeavor to bring to existing debates and insights from fields such as post-colonial studies (Raka Shome and Radha Hegde 2002). Historically and politically, both these are post-colonial, and in important ways are interested in both tracking the consequences of colonialism on post-independent states and in tracing the complex social, economic, and cultural formations that constitute the contemporary post-colonial contexts. Interventions like these are interested in developing a critical and academic vocabulary based on grounded theoretical initiatives with the express intention of changing existing conceptual orthodoxies.

The clearest expression of the intellectual–political project inaugurated by the Latin American scholars, led by Walter Mignolo, appears in a special edition of the journal *Cultural Studies* (2007). In his introduction to the special issue Mignolo (2007) outlines the project of this collective, entitled "modernity/coloniality", encapsulating the argument that there is no modernity without coloniality, that is, coloniality is inextricably implicated in modernity. The "modernity/coloniality" project is, therefore, explicitly and overtly concerned with decolonizing theory and knowledge through the construction of alternative conceptual formulations that engage with and build on existing socio-cultural and political realities in Latin America and, by extension, elsewhere. As Mignolo (2005) points out in his introduction to this academic and political project:

> Those who are familiar with conversations in the humanities could see the argument itself as an attempt to shift the geography, and the geo-politics of knowledge, of *critical theory* (as introduced by the Frankfurt School in the 1930s) to a new terrain of *decoloniality*. The first reading can still be performed within the paradigm of modernity that emphasizes the linear evolution of concepts and, above all, newness. The second reading, however, demands to be performed within the paradigm of (de)coloniality that implies modernity but emphasizes "co-existence" and simultaneity instead (Mignolo 2005, p. xix).

Most significantly, he and the Latin American collective see their role as conceiving a critical theory that goes beyond the local European histories to engage with the "historical–structural heterogeneity" that characterizes local material realities elsewhere. This decolonial critical theory

> *beyond* the history of Europe proper and *within* the colonial history of America (or Asia or Africa; or even from the perspective of immigrants *within* Europe and the US who have disrupted the homogeneity) becomes *decolonial theory*. That is, it is the theory arising from the projects of decolonization of knowledge and being that will lead to the imagining of economy and politics *otherwise* (Mignolo 2005, p. xx).

Mignolo (2007) refers to this as "pluriversality", a conscious attempt at destabilizing universalist discourses through theoretical formations grounded on local contexts.

While the modernity/coloniality project is premised on an attempt to liberate social and cultural theory from what Dipesh Chakraborty (2000) has referred to as "asymmetric ignorance" by making more locally relevant critical interventions, the recent conversations between the fields of post-colonial studies and communication and cultural studies are more evidently interested in locating the ways in which each of these fields could benefit from the insights of the other. Once again, this project also finds its most clear exposition in a special issue, this time in the journal *Communication Theory* (2002). Recognizing that "the politics of postcoloniality is centrally imbricated in the politics of communication", the editors of this special issue of the journal argue that

> bringing these two areas together could invite a productive reconceptualization of communication, as well as a thinking through of the politics of postcoloniality from the perspective of communication. … [W]hat we see are the ways in which various cultural phenomena of postcoloniality and communication are intertwined with each other, and how recognizing the postcolonial politics of communication opens up new vistas for communication scholarship (Shome and Hegde 2002, p. 249).

In an interesting and productive development, the vocabulary of post-colonial theory has been taken beyond the confines of its engagement with aspect of the politics and culture in former colonies to situations such as those in China. Lu Xinyu, in her recent, wide ranging discussion with Zhao (2010) on the consequences of media marketization in China on the subjectivities of Chinese peasants and workers discusses the "subaltern narratives" enabled by China's New Documentary Movement, which, according to her, "pay tributes to the dignity of those in suffering and try to critically reflect upon the urban from the perspective of the rural" (Zhao 2010, pp. 19–20), and not merely represent the "subaltern" with mere pity or "cheap humanistic compassion". Several issues arise from this discussion that are relevant to our present purposes: by self-consciously and knowingly using the term "subaltern", it underlines the relevance of post-colonial studies to the emerging critical vocabulary that engages with material and other forms of inequality that exist outside the Euro-American context; by emphasizing peasants and workers it brings into focus two communities that share similar experiences in most if not all developing and post-colonial nations in the neo-liberal world order and that are nevertheless largely ignored by academic literature and mainstream media; and, finally, in presenting itself within the context of modernity, media, and democracy the conversation alludes to three of the significant aspects of global media and communication.

Central to the issue of analyzing global media is the question of contemporary global economy and culture. It would seem that the choice between "globalization" and "imperialism" as a term to account for the neo-liberal market economy underlying the "liberalization" of economies and the concomitant changes in terms of flexible capital and labor often reflects different positions with regard to these changes. Broadly speaking, "globalization" appears to reveal a tendency to either describe various global social and cultural formations in terms of interconnectedness or the shrinking of time-space, or as a celebration of the triumph of Western liberal politics and capitalist values signified by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a historical event that is seen as a sign of the inevitability of the spread of capital. Those taking as their starting points such issues as the processes of equal exchange and partnership, which belies the fundamental inequality in the flow of media and capital, and in the international division of labor, however, prefer the term "imperialism" to "globalization". Harvey (2003, p. 26), for instance, refers to current developments as "the new imperialism", defining imperialism as "a contradictory fusion of 'the politics of state and empire', … and 'the molecular processes of capital accumulation in space and time'". Preferring the term "imperialism" implies focusing on patterns of economic, political, and cultural power. Harvey suggests that one of the constituents of the new imperialism is the process of accumulation by dispossession through a combination of coercion and consent enforced by the international financial system and organized state power. Coercion and consent link this process of imperialism not only to Gramsci, to hegemony, and to culture but also to Guha's (1996) analysis of colonial power in India. The cultural imperialism thesis thus relates not merely to the spread of Western values through the media, but more significantly to a fundamental reorganization of local cultures that is linked to economic liberalization, neo-liberalism, and imperialist formations of global capital.

This provides a possible corrective to the excesses of earlier critiques of cultural imperialism that divided the world along West versus the Rest lines, and conceived of imperialism as a form of imposition by the West on the Rest. This appears far too simplistic given contemporary formations of global capital whose pathways wind in and out of both the West and the developing world, incorporating cultural and economic elites situated in different locations. The analysis of global patterns of inequality and of the relations between global media and power therefore has to account for both the structural aspects of global economy as well as the roles of national elites, particularly in the developing world. As McChesney (2001, pp. 2–3) argues, with regard to analyzing global media, "one has to start with understanding the global system and then factor in differences at the national and local levels". This is mainly because of the spread of neo-liberalism as an ideology underpinning the "liberalisation" of national economies, and because "proponents of neoliberalism in every country argue that cultural trade barriers and regulations harm consumers, and that subsidies inhibit the ability of nations to develop their own competitive media firms" (McChesney 2001, p. 6).

Examining the role of national elites in sustaining the neo-liberal orthodoxy consequently entails two complementary moves – market versus the state and the politics of cultural nationalism. The other side of the debate on globalization is the role of the state. While the state is seen as increasingly irrelevant by both supporters of the apologists for globalization such as Fukuyama, who celebrate its apparent demise, as well as more critical theorists such as Hardt and Negri (2000), who see its decline as an inevitable consequence of the inexorable dynamic of global capital, others such as Wood (2003, p. 23), on the contrary, argue that the state plays a significant role in the expansion of capital beyond direct political control, whereby "local states have proved to be far more useful transmission belts for capitalist imperatives". She makes a similar argument in an earlier essay (1998, p. 45) while distinguishing between older forms of colonialism and contemporary global economy: "today, transnational capital may be more effective than was the old style military imperialism in penetrating every corner of the world, but it tends to accomplish this through the medium of local capital and national states". Implicated in this process are local elites, who are both the guarantors and the beneficiaries of market liberalization. Ahmad (1995, p. 11) insists even more strongly on the complicit role of the state to the globalization of capital: for him national bourgeoisie have an ambivalent attitude to the state, as "they wish to more or less bypass the regulatory aspects of this state (through liberalization, marketization, etc.), and yet they utilize it both for securing the domestic conditions of production favourable to capital … and for facilitating the articulation of domestic and foreign capitals. In other words, the new national bourgeoisie, like imperial capital itself, wants a weak nation-state in relation to capital and a strong one in relation to labour".

Taking on board the crucial role of the local political, cultural, and economic elite has significant implications for the global media and cultural imperialism thesis, as it undermines a simplistic definition of it as Western domination and replaces it with a much more nuanced argument. This, in turn, is related to debates on nationalism and national culture as a site of resistance against imperialism. The reconstruction of national culture as possible resistance or an alternative to cultural imperialism implies both the undermining of the idea of the inevitability of globalization of cultures as well as the return of agency to national cultural production. The reorganization of national media is central to the critique of cultural imperialism, as Dan Schiller (1996, p. 102) suggests: "the baseline for judgement of national culture was this: what could communications media contribute to revolutionary social transformation?" Recent developments in countries such as India and China concerning the media, markets, and the state impinge on nationalism and identity, particularly in the context of the liberalization of both national economies and the media. Seemingly paradoxical developments in India and China reveal the complexity of the issue: for instance, while in India the progressive liberalization of the national economy developed in tandem with the emergence of the nationalist Hindu party and its claim to political–cultural legitimacy, in China this apparent paradox is manifested in the adoption of "market socialism" as the doctrine underpinning economic liberalization. Of primary interest is the articulation of the national in the global, as in the construction on Indian television of the Hindu citizen-consumer of multinational consumer goods and the legitimation of fundamentalist politics through the invocation of "Hindu" moral and legal discourses, both of which have to be considered alongside the proliferation of cable and satellite channels and the putative imperial discourses of "Westernization". In the case of China, this includes media reforms as a balancing act between state control and commercial constraints, characterized by some as "market authoritarianism", and the liberalization of the media including state validation of advertising as a part of economic liberalization. Opposition to ethnocentric Western notions of democracy have also formed the basis for the alleged "Asian way" of cultural nationalism promulgated by Malaysia and Singapore, which consider liberal democracy as inappropriate to East Asian populations. This is premised on arguments that construe East Asian populations as attracted more to the ethics and practice of communitarian values and intergroup harmony than to individual rights. Quite apart from the epistemologically suspect nature of such conceptions, and while they present an alternative to Western formulations of democracy by promoting political pluralism and cultural reflection and awareness, they "can also serve as a potent ideological refuge for authoritarian rule by providing the theoretical basis for a strongly interventionist state dominated by a political party" (Rahim 1998, p. 56).

Rajagopal's (2001) well-known study of the complex ways in which Indian television as the site for the revival of Hindu nationalism as well as the espousal of neo-liberalism and the apparent merits of globalization presents a convincing analysis of the complicitous relations between the media, the market, and nationalist politics. In terms of the media, the market, and religious nationalism in the context of globalization, however, Fernandes (2000) and Chakrarvarty and Gooptu (2000) are exemplary attempts at tracing the complicated lines of connection. Fernandes (2000, p. 611) is interested in shifting the terms of debate on the apparent failures of the state in order to examine "how the nation is being reformed through the processes of globalization to the question of how the production of "the global" occurs through the nationalist imagination". The transformation of national political culture from the post-independence Nehruvian vision that included industralization and a steadfastly secular state to the economically liberalized contemporary India is for her marked by the deepening of the culture of consumption. In a culture that has subscribed increasingly to the visible indicators of wealth in the form of "foreign" products, the adoption of the global within the purview of the national is evident, Fernandes (2000, p. 615) argues, in the "visual representations of newly available commodities [that] provide a lens through which we can view the ways in which meanings attached to such commodities weave together narratives of nationhood and development with the production of middle-class identity" in India. Her essay presents a convincing analysis of television and print advertisements of consumer goods that draw on images and narratives from a nationalist and Hindu tradition as instances of advertising strategies that successfully combine the global, in the form of the products that they sell, with the idiom of the national. The conclusion that "the aesthetic of the commodity does not merely serve as a passive reflector of wider social and cultural processes but instead becomes a central site in which the Indian nation is re-imagined" (Fernandes 2000, p. 619) presents a different conception of the apparent paradox of economic liberalization and cultural nationalism that has been a characteristic of contemporary India, in which both developments combine to produce a particular national imaginary. Chakravarty and Gooptu (2000, p. 97) see the consolidation of Hindu nationalism in India as an antidote to a presumed perils of subsumption by "Western culture, on the one hand, and on the other the apparent threat to national security presented by the Muslim 'other'". However, this essay also focuses on the mediation of consumption and consumerism linked to specific constructions of family and national community. "With the market driving the growth of the media," they argue, "and the middle class forming its primary target audience, not surprisingly, media productions not only drew upon, but also reproduced and magnified middle class notions of the 'Hindu' nation in a bid to promote consumerism among these classes."

The media are centrally implicated in discussions of the functioning of contemporary democracies. Most studies on the role of the media in democratic societies have focused on debates surrounding notions of the public sphere, media texts as the site of contestation and conflict, and the ideals of public service broadcasting as opposed to commercial media (Keane 1991). This take is not restricted to the Euro-American context, but also incorporates other regions, including developing societies (recent examples include Cohen 2005; Zhao and Hackett 2005; Kitley 2003). These are crucial interventions that continue to make very significant contributions to the ongoing debates. For instance, Zhao and Hackett's (2005) preliminary remarks setting out their project on media democratization include an astute observation on the limitations in the fields of political science and media studies: while the former abounds in publications exploring the links between globalization and democracy, these largely neglect the dimension of the media. On the other hand, media or communication studies contain elaborations on media and democracy or media and globalization, "few combine these problematics. Moreover, there is little dialogue between cultural and political communication dimensions of the debate about media globalization" (Zhao and Hackett 2005, p. 1). They seek to explore "both democratization through the media … and democratization of the media".

It is worth noting here Garnham's (1993, 2000) argument regarding the globalization of political power and the corollary need for a global public sphere in the shape of a unitary global media system as opposed to a plural media public. Intrinsic in this is the notion that a global power bloc requires a system of accountability of similar scope and that the media offer the best means of achieving that. "If the impact [of economic and political decisions] is universal, then both the political and media systems must be universal. In this sense a series of autonomous public spheres is not sufficient. There must be a single public sphere, even if we might want to conceive of it as made up of a series of subsidiary public spheres, each organized around its own public political sphere, media system, and set of forms and interests" (Garnham 1993, p. 264). As Barnett (2004) has noted, Garnham identifies the lack of a symmetry between contemporary global politics and a fragmented media system and the consequent lack of democratic political participation as leading to the emergence of a politics of identity. This position takes for granted a connection between a common media system and democratic functioning, in the form of deliberative democracy, without taking into account the sheer variety intrinsic to the practices of consumption among audiences. In other words, what is emphasized here is the democratic potential of cultural production over the socio-cultural variables that are characterized in audiences' appropriation of media material. It presumes a knowledgeable citizenry possessing the social, political, and cultural means to guarantee accountability from those exercising political and economic power. The differentiated access to specific symbolic resources and the disproportionate distribution of cultural or political knowledge – specifically through education – is largely ignored in this formulation. Akhil Gupta's (1999) examination of how the *state* is imagined by the rural populace in India through their everyday experience of the intermediaries of the state is indicative of a need to rethink citizenship and knowledge. His argument is suggestive of a new direction of research on media and citizenship, bringing anthropology as an approach to the study of the political process, particularly in developing countries.

An alternative to the traditional political science approach to media and democracy that Dahlgren (2004, p. 16) points to – the "culturalist" approach – examines communication and the media from the perspective of citizenship, "which in turn offer frameworks for analysing and assessing features of political communication … Themes such as meaning, identity and social agency are highlighted" in this approach. A recent special issue of the *European Journal of Communication* (2006, volume 9, issue 3)[3], a collection of essays seeking to explore citizenship in cultural terms, attempts to begin a reconceptualization of citizenship through an engagement with the ways in which meaning-making, belonging, and the exercise of power are linked in important ways. This includes an emphasis on the everyday rather than on the governmental. As the editors declare, "citizenship can be found both above ground as parliamentary politics … and as the 'underground' reflection on what binds us, what we expect from life and of what we are critical. We need to broaden and deepen our efforts to understand this" (Hermes and Dahlgren 2006, p. 260). For the purposes of the arguments in this book, the crucial point here is the idea of meaning-making and its relation to citizenship, in particular in relation to the media. If we agree with Hartley (1999) that television plays a pivotal role in shaping the ways in which we consider difference and identity, the centrality of the audience becomes evident.

Audiences as publics is a central concern for any attempt to present a theoretical frame with which to examine media audiences in relation to the diversity of their responses to media, and how that might reflect on participation in practices of deliberative democracy. Crucial to this are the ideas of mediated knowledge and representation, and inequality of access to symbolic resources and cultural capital, both of which are essential components to the conception and nature of democratic dialogue and debate that constitute public spheres. The premise underlying this argument is that, while debates on the role of the media in democracy continue, the audience perspective remains relatively underexplored in such studies (one of the exceptions here is Madianou 2005). There is thus a need to the discussion the audience, by way of refocusing the arguments on media and democracy along the lines of citizenship, the audience public, and public knowledge.

Recently two kinds of research on global audiences have emphasized the role of ethnicity: those engaging with certain assumptions of the cultural imperialism thesis and those examining the role of the media in the formation of diasporic identities. While these two streams of audience study have contributed significantly to the reformulation of media/cultural imperialism and to the study of the formation of diasporic communities, respectively, their conception of ethnicity is extremely problematic both on epistemological and political grounds. Using Liebes and Katz (1993) and Gillespie (1995) as exemplars of a particular kind of cross-cultural and diasporic audience research, it is possible to argue that emphasizing racial or ethnic difference as determining audience behavior is problematic. Given the consolidation of the politics of the New Right (Giroux 1994), the blending of "race", ethnicity, and culture raises uncomfortable political and conceptual issues. As Gilroy (2005) has observed, the politics of "race" and ethnicity, always constitutive of debates on multiculturalism, has taken on a new dimension following more recent apprehensions relating to the "war on terror", particularly in North America, Europe, and Australia. Given this situation, it seems to me that a great deal of sensitivity is required while dealing with the complex dimensions of ethnic identity, belonging, and transnational cultures.

Tomlinson's (1991, 1999) approach to different conceptions of cultural and media imperialism is in many ways indicative of the variety of critiques that have been aimed at the thesis. These have included outright attacks that seek to undermine the presumption of unequal power relations that underlies the thesis, attacks that, for instance, celebrate the apparent "semiotic democracy" (Fiske 1987), and the diverse kinds of pleasures that audiences gain from their experience of the media. Other critiques (such as Ang 2001) attempt to refine what are seen to be the excesses of the thesis, as, for example, the emphasis on the homogenization of global culture, in an attempt to sustain the fundamental aspects of the thesis while jettisoning its more extravagant claims. Ang (2001, p. 34) is justifiably suspicious of the at-times simplistic anti-Western sentiment that formed a significant part of some of the arguments about cultural imperialism, claiming that the "West" has become "decentred" as both an analytical and geographical category. She is, however, unwilling to forgo the analytics of contemporary forms of global capital, underlining its incorporation of cultural and racial differences. By extension, Ang's position relates to the politics of inequality while acknowledging the complexity brought to the global cultural landscape by efforts at promoting discourses of cultural nationalism. As she argues, the issue of nationalist discourse is particularly relevant in the case of East Asia, where the economic growth in the early 1990s contributed to a corresponding increase in national and regional self-confidence, which turned critiques of cultural imperialism from that of a largely defensive discourse pointing to a putative "West" imposing an alien culture on the region to calls for the initiation of a cultural "counter-offensive", a move that Ang (2001, p. 41) interprets as indicative of a contradictory impulse constituted by both confidence and anxiety. Central to the issue of researching audiences across cultures is Ang's (2001, p. 41) observation that "the 'real' significant differences within the region [South East Asia] cannot be easily subsumed within a unifying and unified pan-Asian whole …; it is something that Western satellite broadcasters were quick to learn when they realized that there is no such thing as a pan-Asian television audience". The Murdoch-owned Star TV's decision to promote separate services for different languages is a consequence of that realization – an indication, as Ang remarks, of the "localization" of globalization, that is, the recognition of the cultural diversity within a region and consequently of divergent audience participation and interest.

This is important to our present concerns in broadly two ways: first, the acknowledgment of the precariousness of attempts to locate a cultural whole within a region given the sheer diversity of languages. What is generally regarded as a "region", however, becomes an interesting issue. Granted that pan-Asianism is problematic, how are we to regard even pan-Indian, or pan-Malaysian, or pan-Indonesian elements, given the sheer diversity of languages, religions, and other social divisions that characterize those cultures and indeed have played a significant role in the constitution of those cultures? This question is crucial to the analysis of both the mediation of global culture as well as attempts to promote a variation of cultural nationalism riding on conceptions of a putative national culture. What constitutes a "national culture" is as a result imbued with issues of the power to define it, the role of elites, and ethnic and cultural differences within a nation-state. The legitimacy of various forms of cultural nationalism consequently becomes questionable.

The second way in which this acknowledgment of cultural difference within a region is important for us is more closely linked to the debates on the diversity of global audiences and the questionable assumptions regarding ethnicity and cultural differences that underlie a few well-known international audience studies that seek to interrogate the claims of media or cultural imperialism, or to trace the links between diaspora, cultural change, and ethnicity. Challenging the idea of global media as vehicles of particular ideologies, with its attendant assumption regarding international audiences who are more often than not read into the analysis of texts as ideologically loaded, there has developed more recently a stream of audience studies that set out to explore the ways in which audiences engage with different texts. The guiding assumption in these studies is that audiences "actively" engage with media texts and that this engagement is informed and influenced by social and cultural factors. I have argued elsewhere that these do not offer sufficiently complex explanations of how socio-cultural factors influence audience interpretations (Harindranath 2000), but in the present context it is worth exploring the achievements and problems in such research.

One study that is often referred to by media scholars as offering the definitive challenge to the cultural imperialism thesis (as espoused, for example, in Tomlinson 1991), in particular the uncritical assumptions regarding international audiences, is Liebes and Katz's (1993) examination of the ways in which "ethnically homogeneous" groups of families engaged with specific episodes of *Dallas.* The main aim of this research was to investigate the ways in which "the melodrama of a fictional family in Texas is viewed, interpreted and discussed by real families throughout the world" (Liebes and Katz 1993, p. 4). The primary rationale behind Liebes and Katz's choice of families representing putatively diverse ethnicities was that such diversity constituted different symbolic resources and value systems, which could then be studied in their interaction with the episodes of the soap opera. The authors generated interesting data, which suggest clear lines of interpretive difference running along the fault lines of "ethnic" difference among the various groups. The reasons for this difference, according to Liebes and Katz, is to do with the "traditional" nature of Arab and Moroccan cultures, the inherent critical attitude of Russian Jews, and finally the "comparative security" of the "modern" American and kibbutzim groups. In framing their discussion of the different takes on the episode of Dallas by different groups along racial lines, Liebes and Katz reproduce a monolithic conception of ethnicity. Their discussion delimits the mutability of ethnicity as opposed to the biographically determined category of "race", what Fanon referred to as the "corporeal malediction" of racial markers. Given the context of their research – Israel – the reference to Arab and Moroccan communities as "traditional" falls uncomfortably close to positioning the Arab community within Israel as homogeneous and culturally backward.

Given their stated objective to challenge ideas of media imperialism and the alleged homogenization of diverse global cultures, however, the elision between "race" and cultural distance takes on a particular significance. In claiming that the cultures of Moroccan Jews or Arabs have something immutable, essential, and unchanging, their research comes close to "new racism" in which, according to Gilroy "culture is conceived along ethnically absolute lines, not as something intrinsically fluid, changing, unstable, and dynamic, but as a fixed property of social groups rather than a relational field in which they encounter one another and live out social, historical relationships. When culture is brought into contact with race it is transformed into a pseudobiological property of communal life" (quoted in Giroux 1994, p. 36). As noted earlier, in a later book Gilroy (2005) underlines the enduring legacies of the politics of cultural difference, which have, particularly since September 11, 2001, intersected with issues of national security and "race", and with the reassessment of immigration and multicultural policies. Given such developments, eliding "race" and cultural difference becomes even more problematic.

Liebes and Katz's reification of "race" as a defining category and the subsequent collapsing of "race" into culture as synonymous concepts is mirrored in some of the literature on diaspora groups and the media. In their anxiety to explore the links between the collective identities of such groups and their experience and use of the media, a few of the studies similarly elevate "race" to normative levels, that is, racial identity becomes a self-fulfilling category. In terms of media audiences, this becomes in essence a problematic formula suggesting that certain ethnic groups watch particular programs and films that then contribute to the maintenance of a collective identity in those ethnic groups. Most damagingly, such circular arguments, in their refusal to recognize the relevance of the politics of location of various groups in a diaspora, amount to a disavowal of the critical issues of histories of migration, and the localized histories marking the changing relationship between such communities and the host culture. It is through such histories that identities are forged, contributing to differences between generations of immigrants and between new arrivals and older immigrants. The "social and historical relationships" that Gilroy emphasizes as constituting cultural encounters is neglected in some of the studies on diaspora and the media.

As in the case of Liebes and Katz (1993), Gillespie (1995) is an important study, in this instance making a valuable contribution to debates on the ethnography of diaspora cultures and identities, and those on the complexities of audience negotiations with and appropriations of the media. Her laudable aim is to avoid the political and methodological pitfalls of construing diaspora cultures in terms of binary oppositions or of putative "purity", by conceptualizing "the term 'ethnicity' in the sense of an array of strategic positionings in a field of differences, and [adopting] a dynamic concept of culture, in the hope of challenging in some small way the limiting, paralysing or destructive effects of such binary thinking" (Gillespie 1995, p. 207). This challenge takes its cue from Hall's (1992) formulation of ethnic identity as discursively and contextually constituted by history, language, and culture. The discursive aspect of identity formation makes the "strategic positionings" referred to by Gillespie possible, particularly in relation to the media, which are then seen to contribute, as Gillespie demonstrates, a variety of possibilities for audience groups to "translate" appropriate and "indigenise" strategic readings, which are then used to refine their notions of local cultures and group (ethnic) identities. Seen from this perspective, audience groups "read" media texts along ethnically influenced ways, while at the same time these readings engender constructions of ethnic identities. Apart from the problems of the circularity of the argument – that different ethnic groups read media differently, which then contributes to a reworking of their identities, the focus on "race" as a defining category to the neglect of other factors such as class and gender is problematic, particularly in the context of diasporas. Politically, the reification of "race" amounts to a refusal to recognize the significance of patterns of inequality embedded in socio-cultural factors that influence engagement with the media as well as access to cultural resources (Harindranath 1998).

Mankekar's exceptional analysis (1999) of the textual privileging of specific patriarchal and nationalistic discourses in the Indian television serialization of the *Ramayana* and the diversity of responses to it from disparate Indian groups demonstrates a reassuring degree of sensitivity to the political significance of both the serial as well as audience interpretations and evaluations of principal characters. Far from presenting audience responses as a unified and singular take on the serial, Mankekar's study reveals nuanced multiple positions along the lines of gender, religious, regional, and linguistic differences, which highlight various points of divergence from assessing the patriarchal underpinning of Sita (the main female character) as an ideal woman to interrogations of different versions of the epic, as for instance between the serialized version and the one by the Tamil poet Kamban. The discussions sufficiently demonstrate her view that "'popular' narratives [such as the television serialisation of *Ramayana*] do *not* yield an infinite range of interpretations. At the same time, the heterogeneous responses of viewers (including Hindu viewers) reveal that the 'popular' is not a monolithic category: viewer's modes of engagement were shaped by their life experiences, gender, and class" (Mankekar 1999, p. 196; emphasis in the original). She presents several instances of this diversity in modes of engagement. For example, in terms of class difference, "although some upper-class viewers complained that the *Ramayan's* sets … were kitschy and gaudy, many lower-middle-class viewers I worked with described the sets as 'glorious' or 'magnificent'", and that "while upwardly mobile and English educated Uma Chandran complained that she was 'bored' with the 'plastic expressions' of Ram and Sita, Poonam Sharma, who was precariously middle-class, said: 'What was amazing about the *Ramayan* serial was that Ram and Sita looked exactly like I had imagined'" (Mankekar 1999, pp. 191–192). Even in terms of aesthetic assessment, therefore, issues such as class and educational background figure as important influences.

In other words, what emerges as significant in Mankekar's study is the diversity of cultural positioning with regard to the serial, depending on the different cultural resources that various audiences were able and willing to call upon. Given the emergence of Hindu nationalism in the late 1980s, which was rapidly consolidated as the validation of a form of cultural nationalism and a political force from the early 1990s, Mankekar's work underlines the relevance of such research, which go beyond either merely challenging the media/cultural imperialism thesis or the gestural aspects of studying diasporic groups conceived on notions of ethnic absolutism.

Another audience study, Harindranath (2009) is mainly concerned with how the interpretive practices of audiences, the frames of understanding employed *by* them, reveal broader socio-cultural contexts. It attempts to explore the relations between the media and citizenship from the perspective of audiences, in particular the ways in which discrepancies in cultural capital impact upon citizenship as an active engagement in civil society. In this instance, the inequality of access to these resources were manifestations of access to or lack of university education, which underlined the differences in interpretations of environmental documentaries between different groups of audiences in India and the similarities between those Indian audiences with higher education and British audiences. The data underlined the importance of conceiving geographical space as not necessarily corresponding to cultural space, as if such spaces existed within confining, protective boundaries, which excluded any "outside" influence. To assume a nation to possess a monolithic culture, the inhabitants of which exhibited a certain measure of uniformity in their behavior, is both grossly simplistic and patently erroneous. The responses of the Indian group of respondents are indicative of, first, the role of education in the formation of a particular life-world and, second, the presence of a "third", hybrid, culture whose members retain their Indian identities within some aspects of their life-worlds, which simultaneously possess "modern" or Westernized attributes in others.

In the Indian context the difference created by higher education is particularly germane. The notion of India's "national" identity, which is under constant threat from the sheer diversity that the political nation-state encompasses, has been questioned elsewhere (Das and Harindranath 1996). The multilingual, multiethnic, multireligious nature of the population suggests a multicultural state. The current prognosis by researchers such as Kumar (2000) retains concerns regarding the hardening of separate identities: "In the context of India's pluralism, the new technologies of information and communication can be expected to consolidate linguistic identities, including sub-regional identities. This may constitute a process of localization and regionalization of commitment in the face of the homogenizing influence of the global imperative" (Kumar 2000, p. 12). Among the forces instilling a sense of national integration, education, particularly formal higher education, should rate as one of the most important.

Another important factor to be noted with regard to higher education in India is its colonial legacy. Most university education is Western oriented, which is reflected in course design, syllabuses, and reading lists, but most importantly by the fact that the medium of instruction in universities is English. The consequence of this has been profound, creating and sustaining a politically influential, Westernized, hybrid culture significantly different from the majority indigenous one. Thus higher education in India has generated a "culture" significantly different from others within the country. Not only does the minority who occupy this cultural space possess values inherent in the educational "sub-world" that is denied to the majority, but the essentially Western orientation of these values and norms sets this group or category apart from the rest to an even greater degree. Even at the level of education, therefore, India's claim to a cultural unity is weakened. The "modern consciousness" provided by higher education is markedly Western and therefore inimical to the indigenous "sub-worlds". In essence, formal higher education effectively creates "two nations" in India: those who are "Westernized", English-speaking, and "modern" and those who are not.

The most significant aspect of the audience studies mentioned here is their underscoring of the importance of inequality of access to symbolic resources and how this influences audiences' interactions with and evaluation of media content. This is crucial for any discussion of the relations between the media, public knowledge, and citizenship. Public participation in deliberative democracy presumes a knowledgeable citizenry. In his exploration of media and citizenship, Dahlgren (1995) underlines the significance of the concepts of civil society and citizenship to the analysis of the role of the media in democracy. Central to linking these two concepts, for him, is the process of television reception. Entangled in the network of audience, knowledge, and symbolic resources is the politics and experience of difference. As demonstrated in Harindranath (1998), the other complicating factor, in particular in post-colonial and developing societies, is education, which acts as a conduit to certain kinds of knowledge, predispositions, and expectations in relation to the media, as well as to perceptions of democratic rights and the role of the state. Education is significant in this context not only in terms of literacy but also in relation to processes of imaginings of the state, knowledge of rights and responsibilities, the in-built hierarchies that characterize everyday life in both rural and urban areas, and in terms of social mobility. This exemplifies Grossberg's (2002) argument regarding the importance of post-colonial studies to the analysis of global media and communication. One of the significant contributions that the former can make is the ways to engage with the complexities of contexts, understood in geographical and historical terms: "at least part of the understanding of any contemporary social context involves its location within the history and geography of colonialism as a crucial and deep structure of North Atlantic modernity. Not only does any communicative context exist at a particular geohistorical position, it also is located in complex geohistorical relations – both horizontal and vertical – to other contexts" (Grossberg 2002, p. 369).

Notes

1. The arguments presented in this essay have been developed further in Harindranath (2006) and (2009).
2. This series was broadcast on BBC Radio 4 in 2009 and 2010, and can be downloaded for free from the BBC.
3. This issue of the *European Journal of Communication*, edited by Joke Hermes and Peter Dahlgren (2006), contains essays examining the notion of cultural citizenship from different perspectives such as political philosophy, the politics of the everyday, gender, and the sociology of news.

References

Ahmad, A. (1995) The politics of literary postcoloniality, *Race and Class*, **36** (3), 1–20.

Ang, I. (2001) Desperately guarding borders: media globalization, "cultural imperialism", and the rise of "Asia", in Y. Souchou (ed.), *House of Glass: Culture, Modernity, and the State in Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 27–46.

Barnett, C. (2004) Media, democracy and representation: disembodying the public, in C. Barnett and M. Low (eds), *Spaces of Democracy: Geographical Perspectives on Citizenship, Participation and Representation*. London: Sage, pp. 185–206.

Chakraborty, D. (2000) *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Chakravarty, R. and Gooptu, N. (2000) Imagi-nation: the media, nation, and politics in contemporary India, in E. Hallam and B. Street (eds), *Cultural Encounters: Representing "Otherness"*. London: Routledge, pp. 89–107.

Cohen, E. (ed.) (2005) *News Incorporated: Corporate Media Ownership and Its Threat to Democracy*. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.

Dahlgren, P. (1995) *Television and the Public Sphere: Citizenship, Democracy, and the Media*. London: Sage.

Dahlgren, P. (2004) Theory, boundaries and political communication, *European Journal of Communication*, **19** (1), 7–18.

Das, S. and Harindranath, R. (1996) *Nation-State, National Identity and the Media*. Unit for MA., Distance Learning. Leicester: Centre for Mass Communication Research.

Fernandes, L. (2000) Nationalizing "the global": media images, cultural politics and the middle class in India, *Media, Culture and Society*, **22** (5), 611–628.

Fiske, J. (1987) *Television Culture*. London: Routledge.

Garnham, N. (1993) The mass media, cultural identity, and the public sphere in the modern world, *Public Culture*, **5**, 251–265.

Garnham, N. (2000) *Emancipation, the Media, and Modernity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gillespie, M. (1995) *Television, Ethnicity and Cultural Change*. London: Routledge.
Gilroy, P. (2005) *Postcolonial Melancholia*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Giroux, H. (1994) Living dangerously: identity politics and the new cultural racism, in H. Giroux and P. McLaren (eds), *Between Borders: Pedagogy and the Politics of Cultural Studies*. New York: Routledge, pp. 29–55.
Grossberg, L. (2002) Postscript, *Communication Theory*, **12** (3), 367–370.
Guha, R. (1996) The small voice of history, *Subaltern Studies*, **9**, 1–12.
Gupta, A. (1999) *Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Hall, S. (1992) New ethnicities, in D. Rattansi and J. Donald (eds), *Race, Culture and Difference*. Sage, pp. 252–259.
Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2000) *Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Harindranath, R. (1998) Documentary meanings and interpretive contexts: observations on Indian "repertoires", in R. Dickinson, R. Harindranath, and O. Linne (eds), *Approaches to Audiences*. London: Arnold, pp. 283–297.
Harindranath, R. (2000) Ethnicity, national culture(s), and the interpretation of television, in S. Cottle (ed.), *Ethnic Minorities and the Media: Changing Cultural Boundaries*. Buckingham: The Open University Press, pp. 149–163.
Harindranath, R. (2006) *Perspectives on Global Cultures*. Maidenhead: The Open University Press.
Harindranath, R. (2009) *Audience-Citizens: The Media, Public Knowledge, and Interpretive Practice*. New Delhi and London: Sage.
Hartley, J. (1999) *Uses of Television*. London: Routledge.
Harvey, D. (2003) *The New Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hermes, J. and Dahlgren, P. (eds) (2006) *European Journal of Communication*, **9** (3).
Keane, J. (1991) *The Media and Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Kitley, P. (ed.) (2003) *Television, Regulation and Civil Society in Asia*. London: Routledge, Curzon.
Kumar, A. (2000) *Mass Communication in India*. New Delhi: Jaico Publishing.
Liebes, T. and Katz, E. (1993) *The Export of Meaning: Cross-Cultural Readings of "Dallas"*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McChesney, R.W. (2001) Global media, neoliberalism, and imperialism, *Monthly Review*, **52** (10), 1–19.
Madianou, M. (2005) *Mediating the Nation: News, Audiences and the Politics of Identity*. London: UCL Press.
Mankekar, P. (1999) *Screening Culture, Viewing Politics: Television, Womanhood and Nation in Modern India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Mignolo, W. (2005) *The Idea of Latin America*. Malden: Blackwell.
Mignolo, W. (2007) Introduction: coloniality of power and de-colonial thinking, *Cultural Studies*, **21** (2–3 March/May 2007), 155–167.
Rahim, L.Z. (1998) In search of the "Asian Way": cultural nationalism in Singapore and Malaysia, *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, **36** (3), 54–73.
Rajagopal, A. (2001) *Politics After Television: Hindu Nationalism and the Reshaping of the Public in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schiller, D. (1996) *Theorizing Communication: A History*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Shome, R. and Hegde, R. (2002) Postcolonial approaches to communication: charting the terrain, engaging the intersections, *Communication Theory*, **12** (3), 249–270.
Tomlinson, J. (1991) *Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction*. London: Pinter.

Tomlinson, J. (1999) *Globalization and Culture*. Cambridge: Polity.

Wood, E.M. (1998) Modernity, postmodernity, or capitalism?, in R. McChesney *et al*. (eds), *Capitalism and the Information Age: the Political Economy of the Global Communication Revolution*. Monthly Review Press.

Wood, E.M. (2003) *Empire of Capital*. London: Verso.

Zhao, Y. (2010) Chinese modernity, media and democracy: an interview with Lu Xinyu, *Global Media and Communication*, **6** (1), 5–32.

Zhao, Y. and Hackett, R. (2005) Media globalization, media democratization: challenges, issues, and paradoxes, in R. Hackett and Y. Zhao (eds), *Democratizing Global Media*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 1–36.

23

Media Research and Satellite Cultures

Comparative Research among Arab Communities in Europe

Christina Slade and Ingrid Volkmer

Satellite communication has still today, almost fifty years after the first civil communication satellite was launched in 1965, a peripheral role in the field of media and communication research. This is surprising as satellites no longer serve as "relays" for the delivery of a small number of television events and telephone circuits but – due to technological advancement and a decrease in transponder costs – constitute multilevel platforms of highly diversified globalized communication. In fact, satellites have become drivers of diverse forms of transnational communication as they deliver not only communication services, Internet, and mobile communication, but in addition highly specific "authentic" transnational television content across continents.

Despite these developments, only a small number of debates address conceptual approaches to satellite communication. One of these debates has continuously over the last decades addressed the macrostructure of the "satellite sphere" in regional contexts. Beginning with the UNESCO McBride report in 1980, this discussion has highlighted severe North–South imbalances of satellite communication, and, more recently, critically reflected through a post-colonial perspective, the market orientation of transnational satellite providers (e.g., Thussu 2005). Another set of macro-structural approaches address satellite communication in their relevance for various world regions, such as Asia (Page and Crawley 2001), Sub-Saharan Africa (Mytton, Teer-Tomaselli, and Tudeq 2005) and the Arab region (Sakr 2001), and identify the implication of specific forms of the emerging global/local nexus in these regional television cultures. More recent approaches, however, discuss the implications of satellite communication in the geographies of regional television news (e.g., Kuhn 2010; Mehta 2010).

Given the crucial role of satellite communication, the conceptual construction of satellite platforms should not only be considered in a macro-structural perspective but also as a transnational microstructure, which would help to conceptualize the social and cultural implications of such a supranational communicative sphere on societies. In this sense, the

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

approach of transnational information sovereignty where satellites are not only considered as commercial "traderoutes in the sky" (Price 2002) but rather as components of a globalized communicative sphere vis-à-vis the state, has implications on societal communication cultures (Price 2002). This angle challenges not only traditional frameworks of – mainly national – information sovereignty but helps to remap political boundaries – or even what Sassen describes as "transboundary networks" (Sassen 2006) – of states in the dynamic transnational "markets for loyalties" (Price 1995, 2002). These processes emerge as a new terrain of what might be called "reciprocal" sovereignty as "political boundaries affect media boundaries, and the opposite is true as well: the radical change in the media map will alter the physical map in ways yet unknown" (Price 2002, p. 29). The conceptual approach of what Price understands as "markets for loyalties" (Price 1995) where "large-scale competitors for power, in a shuffle for allegiances, use the regulation of communications to organize a cartel of imagery and identity among themselves" (Price 2002, p. 31) helps to understand not only the "horizontal" changes of the technological culture of satellite communication but the "vertical" political economy of satellite platforms. In fact, one could argue, that "markets for loyalties" already emerged in the first phase of satellite communication in the height of the Cold War, where satellite platforms began to shape the Westernization of international communication. The International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, *Intelsat*, was established in theory as an intergovernmental conglomerate, which was formed in 1964 and originally provided cross-continental program delivery to national broadcasters. However, both *Intelsat* and *Panamsat*, a commercial satellite organization, delivered mainly US-made programs to broadcasters in various world regions. In those days, satellites carried mainly a few entertainment programs and – occasionally – "live" political events. As Lisa Parks (2005, p. 75) argues, these forms of ritualized "liveliness" constitute a characteristic of international satellite communication during the time of the Cold War, which has been utilized for a "Western discourse" on modernization and – through this lens – a construction of "global unity".

The second phase of satellite communication, beginning in the 1990s with the de-liberalization of various media markets, such as in Europe, extended these "markets for loyalties" into a new terrain of globalized diversification to what Thussu (2007) has described as the "localization of Global Americana", with the implementation of commercial satellite communication, delivering American channels in new modes of local "flavor" frames. Examples are the early versions of *CNN*, *MTV*, and *Star TV*. Globalized regionalization of satellite platforms could be defined as the third phase of satellite communication. This third phase has on one hand brought a "race for transnational reach and influence" (Cushion 2010) and a regional plurality on the other (e.g., Rai and Cottle 2010). Whereas early satellites delivered mainly point-to-point programs to broadcasters who delivered these to national audiences in the early days, satellites today operate in point-to-multipoint modes, delivering programs directly to household antennas – beyond national media legislation. In this sense, global satellite communication operates to some extent beyond the "radar screen" of media regulation and – due to decreasing transmission costs – has been diversified over the last years.

The European Union is in this context not only an example of a highly developed satellite environment but of a satellite environment that reaches across twenty-seven nation-states where the "markets for loyalties" (Price 1995) have shifted to "communicative loyalties", a process that has not only implications for sovereignty but conceptions of "belonging" – across national public spheres. Two satellite providers, *SES ASTRA*, based in Luxembourg, and *Eutelsat*, based in Paris, deliver around a thousand television programs to household satellite dishes and provide not only European national and transnational content but – increasingly – highly specific and what we call "authentic" programs from a large number of non-European geographical regions. *Eutelsat*, launched as an intergovernmental organization in 1977, operates a fleet of twenty-five satellites in Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and the Americas. These "direct-to-home" satellite platforms deliver more than a thousand channels across the landscape of European nation-states and – as North Africa shares the European footprint – into North Africa. In Europe, *Eutelsat* delivers through *Hot Bird* satellites television content to diasporic communities across Europe. In Europe, satellite providers deliver even local channels, in addition to highly specific digital program bouquets across the European continent and the Northern tip of Africa, which is also covered by some European satellite footprints. These highly diverse satellite cultures – and this is in our view the crucial characteristic of this current third phase of satellite communication – shift the approach of "markets of loyalties" away from an economy of political information sovereignty to what might be called "networks of loyalties", that is, to conceptions of subjective supra- and sub-national communicative forms. In this sense, satellite communication constitutes no longer simply a "platform" module but a networked component – a "node" – of a transnational environment, along with other communicative platforms, which shape communicative loyalties through subjective networks. This is the paradigm shift of satellite communication from a "mass medium" to a network structure where specific thematic, often culturally and politically "authentic" content constitute a powerful "ritualized" component of integrated subjective network communication structures.

The European satellite culture is also an example for the complexity of the emerging links between "communicative loyalties" and "citizenship" participation in the public sphere and cultural identity. Citizenship conceived as the legal relationship between a nation-state and its citizens, circumscribed by international law, is a formal concept. However, the more amorphous notion of cultural citizenship, encompassing political, economic, and intellectual activity, links notions of legal citizenship to those of national identity (Slade 2010, pp. 8–12). Media are at the heart of cultural citizenship, both forming and reflecting the national and transnational conceptions of the state.

These phenomena are in particular visible in the context of so-called "diasporic" communities where ontological structures of communicative loyalties are constantly reconfigured in the dynamics of highly specific political information flows. Although these globalized public "microspheres" (Volkmer 2002, p. 241), accessible for "diasporic" groups residing in various world regions, emerged almost a decade ago, they consist not so much of transnational satellite channels, often aired in English, such as *France 24*, *Russia Today*, or *Al Jazeera*, but rather of highly fragmented thematic and "authentic" content that constitutes the framework of communicative loyalties of transnational public communication. Migrants negotiate proximity across media spaces (see Aksoy and Robins 2000) and can retreat into ethnic media worlds, or to use a phrase from Cunningham (2001) "ethno-specific public sphericules".

In this chapter, we exemplify our theoretical approach in terms of a case study of the satellite use of Arabic speakers in Europe.

Arabic Speakers and Satellite Use in Europe[1]

The availability of Arabic language programming via satellite has not gone unremarked in a number of public discourses. Indeed, in some European countries the satellite dish itself has become an icon of the "other" and a fear that new communication technologies have obviated the need to integrate, to learn the language of the host country. In the Dutch Parliament in 2009 Kees van der Staaij said: "Minarets, mosques and large satellite dishes provide 'feelings of alienation and disaffection among many native Dutch people'" (*Nieuwsuitamsterdam* 2009).

Concern about satellite dishes mirrors the fear of Arabic communities in Europe, which has accelerated over the last decade. The events of 9/11 and an interpretation in terms of the rhetoric of a "clash of civilizations" between Christian and Muslim has been reinforced in the European context by the terrorist bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), and unsettled relations between migrant communities and the host culture in the Netherlands (following the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004), France (with the riots of 2005), and in Scandinavia (with the cartoon crisis of the same year). Migration issues came to the fore in Europe over the summer months of 2010. From Thilo Sarrazin's *Deutschland Schafft sich Ab (Germany Does away with Itself)* (2010), through the success of Dutch politician Geert Wilders' Freedom Party, PVV, on June 10, 2010, to that of the Sweden Democrats on September 19, 2010, anti-immigrant sentiment is on the rise. As Barber (2010) put it in the *Financial Times*:

> Slowly but surely the perception has arisen that the "native" cultures of France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands are at risk of being swamped by the tides of immigrants who breed more than the indigenous majority and who are neither willing nor able to assimilate (*Financial Times*, September 4–5, 2010).

The satellite dish is a potent symbol of the failure to assimilate, an explicit marker of a retreat into ethnic media worlds. Arabic speakers living in Europe, whether as European citizens, as refugees or on a temporary visa, are seen as of particular concern. Numerous attempts to ban satellite dishes early this century led to the following EU directive:

> The European Commission has adopted a Communication in which it states that private individuals should be free to use satellite dishes without undue technical, administrative, urban planning or tax obstacles. The right to do so flows from the free movement of goods and services, which are both fundamental Internal Market freedoms. The Commission's intention is that the Communication will respond to the numerous requests for information and clarification which it has received on the subject in recent months from private individuals and the European Parliament. This Communication is the first initiative under the new Strategy for Services, launched in January 2001 (see IP/01/31) (EU 2001).

As described in the previous section, satellite communications have accelerated the process whereby citizens can access a rich and varied range of media. Europe witnesses the tensions that derive from this new media landscape. Over the last two decades the European Commission has encouraged "Television without Frontiers" (EU 1989) and transnational harmonization between European television channels (EU 2003) in the hope of creating a trans-European broadcasting space and, in Price's (1995) argumentation, a trans-European "market for loyalties" with satellite communication enabling a broader transnational public sphere.

However, the real pressure is from channels *outside* Europe. This is particularly true of channels from the Arabic region. Not only are national channels from the Arabic region widely available "live" via satellite dish reception, but there are also transnational channels, from *Al Jazeera* to *Al Manar*. This has led to a fundamental shift in the ways "minority" and migrant groups perceive their connection to the country of origin. The tradition of "diasporic" media focused on newspapers, radio, television, cinema, books, and videotapes in which content was delivered in the host country but in the language of the country of origin. Such media forms were, and continue to be, means of building diasporic communities, communities that bring multiple perspectives to the experience of local or international events (Castles *et al.* 1984; Safran 1991). London, for instance, continues to be a major center of Arabic language newspapers. However, the satellite and cable channels bring media from different nations together in a space that is, at least for the viewer, a single simultaneous space of news. News from the country of origin is no longer, as it used to be, months old, and nor is it mediated by others and shot through with nostalgic framing. Instead, it is immediate, equally aired within the country of origin and the host country. This process has been identified in the literature in the 1990s (Gillespie 1995), but the sheer scale and ubiquity of availability of satellite channels over the last years has altered this landscape.

Models of democratic participation continue to be based on the nation-state, while political debate is no longer contained within its boundaries. All citizens of the EU already have dual citizenship, of their nation and of the Union. This puts pressure on the notion that political belonging is a one-to-one relation between a citizen and a nation-state. The Habermasian (1992) conception of an "ideal public sphere" was originally national in scope and consisted in principle of a process of reasoned debate in which matters of public import were shared among the citizens. The ideal public sphere is most readily actualized when there is a shared language within a nation-state (ideally served by public broadcasters). The European public sphere is already transnational and multilingual in reach, so that the sense of a European identity or a shared European public sphere of political discourse has proved elusive. Furthermore, it could be argued whether a European identity in a "collective sense" of community "beyond the nation-state is possible at all" (Risse 2010, p. 38).

It is in the context of concerns about, on the one hand, the national integrity of European nations and, on the other, of the European project as a crucible of a new trans-European national identity that the satellite dish serves as a potent symbol of extra-European transborder loyalties. The communicative networks not only connect Arabic speakers with their homelands but they also lay out the possibilities of connections between Arabic speakers within Europe.

Methodological Background

Comparative quantitative research frequently aims to compare "similarities" and "differences" through the lens of nations. However, diasporic media cultures do not fit into this scheme. Research that focuses on diasporic cultures as "local", relating as a migrant culture to a "place", such as a world city, has led to a number of mostly qualitative studies. For instance, emerging spaces of "belonging" and "identity" within a culture of migrant mobility media practice can be identified in opposition to mainstream national media (Ogan 2001; Georgiou 2007). In this sense, diasporic media cultures are often conceptualized in a transnational, often binational context through a dialectic of inclusion/exclusion. Empirical research is mostly based on qualitative methods but is also built around national case studies. However, the merging forms of diverse "diasporic" media cultures are today situated between sub-national and supra-national connections, not only between socalled "home" country and country of residence or citizenship but also among the larger supra-national communities in their relation to a variety of nation-states.

Although a great body of literature has emerged in the context of the forms of "mediated identities" of Turks living in Europe (for example, Hugger 2009), the European audiences of Arabic-speaking channels are less understood. While *Al Jazeera* does gather data about its reach and viewers, none of the hundreds of Arabic language channels delivered in Europe do so. Even national television channels, such as Moroccan or Egyptian television, which rely on advertising, are not advertising into the European market and do not follow their satellite-enabled viewers. There is a further complication. Under EU rules, satellite-delivered content is regulated at the country of upload not of download. EU states have no regulatory control over satellite-delivered content. When in June 2010 the EU found the Hamas channel, *Al-Aqsa*, guilty of "inciting hatred and encouraging terrorism", the French Government was obliged to act against the satellite carrier delivering the channel, in this case the French based *Eutelsat* (Middle East Affairs Information Centre 2010). In consequence, *Al-Aqsa* was broadcast via *Noorsat*. Within a month, *Al-Aqsa* signed an agreement with the Kuwaiti satellite operator *Gulfsat* and was back on the air (Intelligence and Information Centre 2010).[2]

Our study aimed to identify patterns of media use among Arabic speakers in Europe by investigating "communicative loyalties" and notions of citizenship. One factor to be noted at the outset is that of the Arabic language itself. Those from the Maghreb, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia speak dialects of Arabic very different from those of the Middle East. Many of those who moved to the Netherlands, France, and Spain were Berber speakers; a high proportion were illiterate. Middle Eastern forms of Arabic are themselves widely different. Those who are literate share modern standard forms of Arabic – the religious, classical Arabic. Many of the young, educated in Europe, are not literate in Arabic; others can barely understand Arabic.

While the study deliberately aimed to include Arabic speakers, the research was linked to the wider Arabic identity rather than Arabs of particular nationalities. There is a sense that Arabic speakers share, if not a pan-Arab *ummah*, a language and culture and sense of a shared televisual world. Nowhere is this more evident than during Ramadan when the breaking of the feast is frequently followed by viewing soap operas specially chosen for the period. This has also challenged traditional ways of sampling, for example, first or second generation migrants, as the ways of remaining close to the Arab culture is different across various Arab communities in European nation-states. In France, cultural integration is often easier as opposed to countries that lack a Mediterranean culture, such as the Netherlands. Beyond these challenges, the links to the country of origin are more politicized in some countries than in others, also depending on the status of politically forced or chosen migration.

Qualitative and Quantitative Data

The project aimed to combine quantitative and qualitative data to provide empirical evidence about how Arabic speakers use television. Methodological challenges included the following:

- Today, hundreds of Arabic language channels, television and radio, are available freely through satellite or cable delivery to Arabic-speaking households in Europe. However, there is almost no reliable audience data available. None of the Arabic channels retransmitted in Europe depends for its existence on advertising revenue *from* Europe. Sakr (2010) argues that few commercial Arabic channels are profitable even in their domestic market; the European market is a focus only for transnational channels, all of which are heavily subsidized. Partly as a consequence of this, there are no ratings data about the European audiences of such channels. *Al Jazeera* (which proves in our study to be overwhelmingly the most watched channel by Arabic speakers across Europe) has some research, but in general the field is uncharted. Furthermore, besides *Eutelsat*, non-European satellites beam into various regions of European countries, such as *Nilesat*, uploaded from Cairo, and is available across southern Spain. Arabic language channels include national channels from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, the Lebanon, the Gulf, Syria, Saudi and Iraq, and the Yemen. Furthermore, there are "transnational" channels such as *Al Jazeera* (owned by the Emir of Qatar), *Al Arabiyya*, *Al Manar* (owned by Hizbollah), and *Iqraa*, a religious broadcaster.
- It was originally planned to conduct a proportionate representative survey in each of the seven countries. However, the traditional strategies of defining representative samples could not be applied as detailed social demographic data of Arabic-speaking migrants was not available in all the countries involved. For example, in France data about ethnic origin are not gathered in the census; in Germany population statistics do not indicate the diversity of Arab citizens and residents. For this reason, it was impossible to identify a representative sample of, for example, Palestinians living in Germany or Moroccans living in France.

We have decided to combine quantitative and qualitative data, conducted in the capital city of each of the countries involved – the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, and Sweden. This method consisted of a survey; from this group we identified a subgroup that undertook a full week of diary recordings. Focus group interviews were conducted with six groups per country and a further six groups in Cyprus. The focus group sessions, refined through workshop training with Arabic speakers who administered the groups, were aimed to develop a fine-grained understanding of attitudes to the media and citizenship among Arabic speakers in Europe.

Surveys

Our primary objective was to map and quantify the use of Arabic language television – whether delivered by cable or satellite. The survey included about 400 individuals in Amsterdam, Berlin, London, Madrid, Paris, and Stockholm. The survey consisted of a multiple choice plus open response questionnaire, filled out by an interviewer. Survey questions included the use of Arabic language television in Arabic-speaking households with the use of private and public national television in the nation-states. Furthermore, the survey provided information on age, gender, education level, generation, and dialect. We then asked about the use of media for news, the importance of local, transnational and Arabic media, and media practices. The total sample size of 2470 was obtained by a snowballing methodology. While there are striking differences across the sample space, there are also continuities. We described this sample via "sample indicators" in order to "map" differences and similarities in the six countries involved. These sample indicators revealed a national and cultural diversity (e.g., relating to country of origin, formal status in country of residence, a generational profile) across the entire sample.

Responses of this survey revealed that the dominant pattern of viewing was a combination of national television with Arabic language television across all countries. In the overall group we found that television was the preferred medium of nearly 70% of the sample, with Internet and newspapers equal second at less than 20% of the sample. Over 90% of the overall sample claimed to use both EU national and Arabic television. There were predictable correlations between country of birth and preferred television channels (those born in Europe were less likely to prefer Arabic language channels and those born in Arabic countries prefer their national channels). There were less robust correlations between gender, occupation, and viewing behavior, with those older woman based at home more likely to watch Arabic television.

Television Diaries

The survey clearly indicated the important role of television across the sample. The second stage was a formal television diary. We have developed diary forms for each country, which included spaces for filling in television stations but also a set of nationally available international and national television channels. The diaries included a time frame of 24 hours. With this instrument, we were able to measure the actual viewing pattern of local (of country where they reside) and Arabic language TV channels by Arabic speakers in the six countries for one week, starting in November 24, 2008, what channel and what genre they watched, and when they watched it. The diary data are very rich and indicated a series of patterns that confirm the survey questionnaire data. The most watched Arabic language channel is *Al Jazeera*, except in Paris, followed by *Al Arabiya*. Informants rely on *Al Jazeera* and local (national) channels for news. For entertainment there is a typical mix of Egyptian satellite and local television, and for sport (except in Spain where *Al Jazeera* offers Moroccan soccer) local channels predominate.

The quantitative data did not support the hypothesis of a retreat into ethnic media worlds – on the contrary, more than 90% watch Arabic and local EU TV channels. Only 7.3% of respondents watch exclusively Arabic channels and only 1.3% of respondents watch only local EU channels. Indeed, there is evidence that respondents consciously move between channels with a sharp awareness of the varying ideological perspectives of the Arabic language channels and of the domestic EU channels.

Arabic channels viewed by more than 20% of the audience were *Al Jazeera*, *Al Arabiya* among the transnational channels, *RTM*, *2M Maroc*, *Canal Algerie*, and *Al Maghribya* from Western North Africa, and *Arrabia*, *Al Manar*, *MBS*, and *Al Sharqia* from the Middle East. Local EU channels reaching high proportions of the audience included the *BBC* (44%) and *BBC News* (39%) in the United Kingdom; *NL1* (51%) in the Netherlands; *TF1* (73%) and *France 2* (51%) in France; *RTL* (34%) in Germany; *TV4* (38%) and *SVT1* (38%) in Sweden, and in Spain *TVE1* (74%) *Telecinco* and *Telemadrid* (48%). In Madrid, the number of news programs watched is significantly higher than in the other cities; this is a consequence of the afternoon news viewing tied to the long lunch and siesta.

The television diary identified two *types* of Arabic-speaking audience: one is typical of North African immigrants from the Maghreb and the other is in cities where there is a range of Middle Eastern immigrants. Overwhelmingly the migrant groups in Madrid, Paris, and Amsterdam were of North African Maghrebian origin. This group we describe as "bicultural" insofar as viewing behavior oscillates between local national channels (French, Spanish, and Dutch, respectively) and retransmitted local television of the country of family origin (chiefly Morocco and Algeria but also Tunisia). This pattern survived even in Paris, where a high proportion of Arabic speakers were locally born. The group typically visited the country of family origin at least once a year, even when they were third generation citizens of their European home. The second group, including those non-Maghrebi respondents in London, Berlin, and Stockholm, is more "transnational" insofar as it was more ethnically mixed and more likely to watch the transnational channels, such as *BBC Arabic*, *Al Jazeera*, *CNN*, and *Al Arabiya*. This group, which included a mix of refugees, students, and long term residents was less likely to visit the country of origin. They too followed domestic issues in their country of birth, via Internet or local television station, but there was greater emphasis on the Arabic language sphere as a space of debate and reflection independent of the particular homelands.

Furthermore, there are clear patterns of use across the sample relating to generation in the country, age cohort, and gender. It is no surprise that younger generations share the tendency to turn to the Internet for news and nor that sport is viewed more by men than women. What it does underline is that the use of national-based surveys fails signally to determine how patterns of media use can best be described.

Focus Groups

We built on the media survey data with extended focus group interviews with groups of Arabic speakers, dealing with their use of the media in the understanding of national and international events. The focus group protocols were based on analysis of the diary and questionnaire data, and developed in coordination with a team of Arabic/Berber/English and national European language speakers who conducted the focus groups. There was extensive testing of the questions, which focused not only on media use but also on cultural belonging, the impact of anti-immigrant sentiment, and more rigorous forms of citizenship testing where relevant, and civic literacy. The six groups per country were divided by gender and into three age groups (18–25, 26–45, and above), two per generational cohort, one entirely male, and one entirely female. Focus group interviews were transcribed and compared across the nations, the analysis turning specifically to the construction of notions of citizenship.

The broad general categories referred to above were found generally among the focus groups in the six capital cities already mentioned. Cypriot focus groups remind us that over and above the classification of bicultural and transnational television viewing audiences, there is another grouping: those Mediterranean cultures of Europe where Arabic identity is integrated. Lebanese-origin Cypriots, for instance, regard Arabic as another of the languages of the Mediterranean – a home language.

The focus group data provide insight into the quantitative data. We have clear evidence of the social patterns of media use through different generations. Thus, for instance, families watch together during Ramadan and when there are critical news stories in the Middle East. For instance, a male German respondent said:

> When something happens, for example, a war in our countries or something like that, of course I go to my family and join them (18–25 years).

The family context puts pressure on the younger members in terms of cultural mores, as one Dutch female informant explained:

> When we have visitors we only put Arabic or Moroccan channels on because it would be terribly embarrassing if all of a sudden there was a nude woman or people kissing on TV! (26–45 years).

A younger Spanish female added:

> What we watch in Spanish news at three and at nine. In Arabic we watch most Al Jazeera. During Ramadan … if there is some Syrian movie we watch it (18–25 years).

The younger generations in particular use the Internet as a major source of news and to watch television.

Across the entire cohort there was a sense of concern that issues from their region were not fairly portrayed by mainstream European media, although many had a high regard for national television. Others were more politicized, especially in London, where one male said:

> As far as I am concerned all media are Kathabeen (liars), they are all liars and really good liars from the BBC to the smallest media in the world, this is one thing, they share this characteristic. Some of them are big liars and some of the less so, but at the end of the day they are all partial and have bias racism; there is something at the end, each media has a message they want to distribute (26–45 years).

A more moderate view was apparent in the remarks of a female of the same age group from London:

> I don't trust western nor Arabic 100%, every channel wants me to see events as it is considered by its agenda, every channel is reflecting its own politics … also Zionists have a huge influence on western media, English media tries to be as close as possible to the reality and to avoid supporting a party against another, but still, they are not reflecting the whole truth. Western media are also directed by the politics of their countries … you have to judge by yourself (26–45 years).

This level of media literacy could be found across the cohort and was a striking fact about both bicultural and transnational groupings.

In terms of their citizenship, there were clear differences between bicultural and transnational patterns of belonging and viewership. In Spain the focus was on relationships with Spain and Morocco; one male said:

> My relationship with Morocco is like the relationship between a son and his mother (26–45 years)

while a younger woman said:

> It is wrong to ask if you are Arab or Spanish, you can be both (18–25 years).

On the other hand one of the French men responded:

> With French nationality, one would like to be French, but we are told all the time that we are immigrants first and foremost. Our origins are always reproached us when we go to Morocco, even though it is our country, we are reproached for being French.

The Dutch were more assertive:

> What difference does it make if I have 2 or 3 passports (male, 18–25 years)?

It is in London that we find an explicit attachment to the pan-Arab grouping:

> The thing is over the years the media has added layers to that, so for example I do identify with an Islamic citizenship … I do affiliate with this concept of the global Ummah … I have become a holder of the third nationality, I am no longer English, nor am I Egyptian, because when I went back my family did not greet me as an Egyptian and I was unable to live with them, so now I am a holder of the third nationality, those who have no nation (male, 18–25 years).

A Swedish male warned:

> without having a common Arab market, which is the backbone of any real integration, there can be no Arab unity (>45 years).

One further characteristic is worth noting. Across the entire group there is a relatively high level of understanding of civil society. One Dutch informant said:

> I am a citizen of the Netherlands, because I fully participate in this society. I pay taxes, I work, I have insurance, I live here and my children go to school here (male, >45 years).

In the Swedish group there were many who expressed their gratitude to Sweden, and their admiration of the Swedish legal system. Others were explicit about their concerns about the civic structures of their countries of origin.

Conclusion

The media environment of modern Europe constitutes no longer a terrain of monolithic national public spheres in which the agenda for public debates can be set. Rather we have a range of more or less public, more or less private spheres, delivered via a globalized media infrastructure, Internet, satellite, and individualized digital television platforms. Satellite has fundamentally altered the nature of the public sphere, giving access to new civic spaces of mediated spaces: entertainment, news, music, sport; multilingual, multi-faith, and politically diverse.

The methodology of the Media and Citizenship project was self-consciously transnational. The difficulties of such an approach are evident, even within such a relatively homogeneous space as the EU. Data on ethnicity, on level of schooling, on media access are not strictly comparable, and ratings data had *never* before been gathered transnationally. Moreover, the high costs and sensitivity of our subject has made the process of gathering material extremely demanding. It was necessary to enter the communities with extreme care, allaying concerns that we had connections to government or particular community groupings.

That said, satellite communication *is* transnational and of its essence creates viewerships across national boundaries. There is no question that when controversial issues relevant to the Arabic world arise, Arabic speakers turn to Arabic language television – mostly Al Jazeera but others too. There is a sense of a transnational mediated space, a space of shared understanding and values, which underpins much of the focus group discussion.

Our findings with respect to the three groupings of Arabic speakers – "bicultural" describing the behavior of Arabic speakers of Maghrebian origin, "transnational" that of Middle Eastern origin, and "Mediterranean" as a descriptor for the sense of belonging Arabic speakers have in the eastern Mediterranean are well founded. It is striking that those of Maghreb origin who live in Sweden and London share the bicultural characteristics of those in the more heavily Maghrebi capitals. Whether speaking French, Dutch, Spanish, English, or Swedish as their "European" language, there are patterns of practices that are shared transnationally.

In terms of Price's framework of a transborder "market for loyalties" (Price 1995, 2002) these three groups reflect quite different market models. The penetration of the local North African channels into the European market is a more or less natural extension of strong family links, just as the densely inhabited media sphere of the eastern Mediterranean is a natural consequence of location. The communicative networks, while more immediate and more extended than in the past, reinforce what Wiley *et al.* (2010)

call “assemblages of social spaces.” In the Maghrebian case, social networks, geographical mobility and technological networks are reflected in the patterns of use of media. Communicative loyalties reflect the binational orientation and are typically framed by their viewers dualistically. In the eastern Mediterranean the complex of loyalties, of mobility, and of connectivities frames a space of a multicultural home.

What we have called the “transnational” group follows genuinely transnational offerings such as *Al Jazeera*. The framing by such channels, in Price’s terms, has been a successful attempt to “organise a cartel of imagery and identity among themselves”. The rhetoric of transnational Arabism, identified in terms of an educated, mobile, and politically astute audience, has created communication loyalties that provide a layer of complexity over and above the simpler patterns of homeland and country of residence or citizenship. Those communicative loyalties also play out in patterns of mobility, of connectivity, and of social relationship.

Notes

1. Over 2007–2009, under the auspices of the EU funding mechanism, FP7, Christina Slade led a group studying Arabic media under the title “Media and Citizenship: Transnational Television Cultures Reshaping Political Identities in the European Union”.
2. This is not the first time such confusion has existed. In 2005 the French government sought to ban the Hizbollah (Shiite Lebanese) Al-Manar only to find that, since it was uploaded via Luxembourg, they could not. Only when Al-Manar subsequently sought registration in France could it be banned.

References

Aksoy, A.S. and Robins, K. (2000) Thinking across spaces: trans-national television from Turkey, *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, **3** (3), 343–365.

Barber, T. (2010) European Countries Cannot Have It Both Ways on Immigration, *Financial Times,* September 4–5, 2010.

Castles, S. *et al.* (1984) *Here for Good: Western Europe’s New Ethnic Minorities.* London: Pluto.

Cunningham, S. (2001) Popular media as “public sphericules” for diasporic communities, *International Journal of Cultural Studies*, **4** (2), 131–147.

Cushion, S. (2010) Three phases of 24-hour news television, in S. Cushion and J. Lewis (eds), *The Rise of 24-Hour News Television.* New York: Peter Lang, pp. 15–30.

EU (1989) *Television without Frontiers*, accessed 13/11/2010, http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l24101.htm.

EU (2001) *Europa: Gateway to the European Union. Services: Commission Sets out Right to Use a Satellite Dish in the Internal Market*, accessed 13/11/2010, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/01/913&format=HTML&aged=0&lg=nl&guiLanguage=en.

EU (2003) *The Future of European Regulatory Audiovisual Policy*, accessed 13/11/2010, http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l24107.htm.

Georgiou, M. (2007) Transnational crossroads for media and diaspora: three challenges for research, in O. G. Bailey, M. Georgiou, and R. Harindranath (eds), *Transnational Lives and the Media.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 11–32.

Gillespie, M. (1995) *Television, Ethnicity, and Cultural Change.* London: Routledge.

Habermas, J. (1992) *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Hugger, K.-U. (2009) *Junge Migranten Online: Suche nach sozialer Anerkennung und Vergewisserung von Zugehoerigkeit.* Wiesbaden, Germany: VS Verlag.

Intelligence and Information Centre (2010) *Hamas' Al-Aqsa Has Circumvented the French Media Regulator's Ban*, accessed 13/11/2010, http://www.terrorisminfo.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/hamas_e120.htm.

Kuhn, R. (2010) France 24: too little, too late, too French!, in S. Cushion and J. Lewis (eds), *The Rise of 24-hour News Television*. New York: Peter Lang.

Mehta, N. (2010) India Live: satellites, politics, and India's TV news revolution, in S. Cushion and J. Lewis (eds), *The Rise of 24-Hour News Television*. New York: Peter Lang, pp. 319–336.

Middle East Affairs Information Centre (2010) *France Banning Al-Aqsa TV for Inciting Hatred and Encouraging Terrorism*, accessed 13/11/2010, http://www.crethiplethi.com/france-banning-al-aqsa-tv-for-inciting-hatred-and-encouraging-terrorism/israel/2010/.

Mytton, G., Teer-Tomaselli, R. and Tudeq, A.-J. (2005) Transnational television in Sub-Saharan Africa, in J.K. Chalaby (ed.), *Transnational Television Worldwide*. London and New York: Tauris, pp. 96–127.

Nieuwsuitamsterdam (2009) *News from Amsterdam*, accessed 13/11/2010, http://www.nieuwsuitamsterdam.nl/2009/12/pvda-wel-minaretten-geen-schotel.

Ogan, C. (2001) *Communication and Identity in the Diaspora: Turkish Migrants in Amsterdam and Their Use of Media*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Page, D. and Crawley, W. (2001) The transnational and the national: changing patterns of cultural influence in the South Asian TV market, in J.K. Chalaby (ed.), *Transnational Television Worldwide*. London and New York: I.B. Tauris, pp. 128–155.

Parks, L. (2005) *Cultures in Orbit. Satellites and the Televisual*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Price, M.E. (1995) *Television: The Public Sphere and National Identity*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Price, M.E. (2002) *Media and Sovereignty*. Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press.

Rai, M. and Cottle, S. (2010) Global news revisited: mapping the contemporary landscape of satellite television news, in S. Cushion and J. Lewis (eds), *The Rise of 24-Hour News Television*. New York: Peter Lang, pp. 51–80.

Risse, T. (2010) *Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Safran, W. (1991) "Diasporas" in modern societies: myths of homeland and return, *Diaspora*, **1** (1), 83–99.

Sakr, N. (2001) *Satellite Realms: Transnational Television, Globalization and the Middle East*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Sakr, N. (2010) Arab satellite media: where do we stand now? Paper delivered 30/01/2010 to the Cambridge Arab Media Project Conference on *Religious Broadcasting in the Middle East*.

Sarrazin, T. (2010) *Deutschland Schafft sich Ab (Germany Does away with Itself)*. Berlin: DVA.

Sassen, S. (2006) *Territory, Authority, Rights*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Slade, C. (2010) Shifting landscape of citizenship, in C. Slade and M. Moellering (eds), *From Migrant to Citizen: Testing Language, Testing Culture*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 3–23.

Thussu, D.K. (2005) Privatizing Intelsat: implications for the Global South, in M. Raboy (ed.), *Global Media Policy in the New Millenium*. Luton: University of Luton Press, pp. 39–53.

Thussu, D.K. (2007) Mapping global media flow and contra-flow, in D.K. Thussu (ed.), *Media on the Move. Global Flow and Contra-Flow*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 11–33.

Volkmer, I. (2002) Journalism and political crises in the Global Network Society, in B. Zelizer and S. Allan (eds), *Journalism after September 11*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 235–246.

Wiley, S., Crofts, B., Sutko, D.M., and Moreno Becerra, T. (2010) Assembling social space, *The Communication Review*, **13** (4), 340–372.

24

Stardust in the Audience's Eyes

Weddings as Media Events in Visual Media and the Construction of Gender

Eva Flicker

Living in a mediatized world means being increasingly surrounded by visual information. Pictures and images are crucial components of our everyday life. They are purposefully used in entertainment, advertising, the news, education, and private lives – there seems to be no area of social life that remains bare of visuals.

Pictures and images are representations of social phenomena. They construct meanings that may be decoded in various ways by the audience. Global visual culture and media contribute to a standardization in worldwide communication processes, which makes it possible for pictures to be decoded across cultural borders. The question of construction, de-construction and re-construction of gender in the media is situated between the fields of *media studies*, *cultural studies*, and *gender studies*, whose respective key approaches are presented in this chapter. The practical examples from research on which this chapter focuses are broadcasts of royal weddings (see Figure 24.1) as globally accompanied processes of constructing gender in the media. The chapter closes with open questions to be answered by further research.

Media and Gender

Media and gender feature in different academic fields and controversies as they are deeply embedded not only in everyday life but also in larger cultural dimensions.

The media are a crucial "institution" for observing global society (Featherstone 1990); they allow "our society" to reflect on its own processes. They are mutually exclusive in their diversity – media such as print, radio, TV, the Internet, etc., cannot take each other's places (radio did not replace TV and neither will the Internet). In fact, they complement each other or, in other words, bring about functional changes and new forms of user behavior. Media are cultural technologies. The structures behind the global

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

Figure 24.1 New York – public viewing royal wedding of Prince William and Kate Middleton 2011.
Source: Heidi Gutman/Everett Collection/picturedesk.com.

distribution of technological developments and media contents spread in highly diverse social and political contexts. The paradox of simultaneity and asynchrony creates moments of social contradiction, delivering the same images from South Africa to Northern Russia and from Bolivia to Australia. Transnational and transcultural narrations are produced through television.

The media function as second-order observers: they observe happenings around the world around the clock for us, thus constructing realities just as we ourselves do. This holds true for informative media channels, as well as for fiction, and the transition from claims to reality and documentation to the freedom of imagination happens gradually. Media produce, reproduce, and transform meanings in contemporary societies; this process is referred to as the *mediatization of culture* (Thompson 1995).

Media deliver an enormous variety of content every day. We could differentiate media into classical categories such as cinema, print media, television, radio, Internet/new media, but it is commonly known that a number of formats are used in media crossing. The sociologist Niklas Luhmann offers one possibility for the analytical differentiation in the midst of this complexity across information, entertainment, and advertising (Luhmann 2000/1996). However, this concept disregards mixed formats like infotainment, product placement, and the new media.

Feminist media studies are institutionalized within academia – although they had to go a long way since their beginning in the 1970s (van Zoonen 2012). The areas of research are embedded in the social structure of societies and the inherent order of social power within social systems. Research on gender in the media can be split into three strands: *gender in the organization of media and journalism*, *gender in the media program*, and *gender in the audience*. The second area is the focus of this chapter.

Gender in the Media Program

The presence and representation of women in the media has been a topic of feminist media research from the start. Media provide us with a vast amount of information, ideas, and pictures of women and men. They transport impressions of the social order between the sexes and the social construction of gender.

> In general, inadequate attention is paid in the media to issues of specific importance to women: to the activities of the women's movement or to the social contribution made by independent and gifted women. Women appear, in magazine fiction and in television drama and comedy, as self-deprecating and dependent, irrational, superstitious, and overemotional. In advertising particularly, women are shown either as housewives whose interests are limited to domestic needs or else as the sexually alluring background that makes consumer goods more attractive by association. This departure from reality is now widely recognized (Unesco Report 1980, p. 190).

It is worthwhile examining the changes in the representation of women in the media in the last 30 years – if there have been any.

Gender in Advertising

About thirty years ago, Erving Goffman laid the foundation for the analysis of gender in advertising in his studies on promotional images (Goffman 1979). What we understand by everyday gender knowledge is what "the man or woman on the street" knows about gender, to put it in colloquial terms. It is knowledge that produces expectations, providing people with a kind of recipe on how to act in the field of gender without having to redefine or reconsider each situation anew. Everyday knowledge therefore represents a tool for reducing the complexity of a social field that has been unsettled by feminism and the women's movement. Advertising often recurs to everyday knowledge about gender to stimulate people to acts of purchase, which may be aligned directly with the repertory of familiar actions. Gender equality and gender mainstreaming has triggered the invention of a number of new practices in the field of advertising. Thus, some products are being promoted in the – seemingly – same mode of visualization for the two sexes, that is, for men and women.

The study on stereotypes by McArthur and Resko in 1975 pioneered content analysis and was used by many others in the following, applying similar methods for repetition and comparison. Furnham and Mak (1999) compiled an overview until the late 1990s: a large number of studies used the categorical coding scheme introduced by McArthur and Resko. Nevertheless, international comparisons have to take into account national characteristics of the respective broadcasting system and channel equivalence, advertising conditions and sample equivalence, just as the suitability of content categories. Coding procedures mostly concentrated on the following categories: role, location, age, arguments, and product type.

National and cultural differences are considered the trickiest problem in comparing national advertisements. Results across studies could be summarized in the following way: 80–90% of the narrators are male. "Males are more often presented as voice-overs, while women are more likely to be presented visually" (Furnham and Mak 1999, pp. 418–19). "Women are more likely to have a dependent role" (Furnham and Mak 1999, p. 424). "Males were significantly more often presented outdoors, … while females were frequently depicted at home …" (Furnham and Mak 1999, p. 425). This category shows some variations. "The Mexican commercials did not show a significant difference between males and females across different locations. Both sexes were equally likely to be portrayed at home, at work and elsewhere" (Furnham and Mak 1999, p. 426). For the category of age it is more difficult to draw a clear line: the most common differentiations are young–middle aged–old. Stereotypical patterns of age mostly portray older men and younger women. "Females are consistently shown as younger than males" (Furnham and Mak 1999, p. 432). Within the category of "argument", we can follow the analysis of scientific and nonscientific arguments, as well as of arguments versus opinions. With greater frequency, men are assigned the role of arguing and presenting factual information. Moreover, "males were still more likely to make an end comment" (Furnham and Mak 1999, p. 430). Product types are subject to stereotypical differentiation, as well. Women more frequently present domestic products, body products, and food, while men are more likely to present products not used at home, sports, and technical products. In the late 1990s, Furnham and Mak stated that "advertisements are much less sex stereotyped than previous European studies. This may imply a decline in sex-role stereotyping in the Western world. … current studies in Asia suggest that sex stereotyping in television commercials is not declining there and is much stronger than in Europe. … This indicates that the general pattern over the world is not identical; though in the Western world sex stereotyping appears to decline, this is not the case in Asia and possibly not in Africa" (Furnham and Mak 1999, p. 435).

More recent studies focus on the effect of sex appeal in advertisements. Parker and Furnham (2007) show that men are more likely to remember advertisements with sexual content while women more easily recall commercials without erotic elements (Moser and Verheyen 2011, p. 196).

The study of Bushman (2007) demonstrates that TV commercials with sexual content produce less memory of the label. The conclusion is that the use of sex appeal in commercials indeed attracts more attention but does not further the recollection of the product or label (Moser and Verheyen 2011, p. 197).

It seems that male sex appeal was presented more often in the 1990s and beginning 2000s, but that its depiction has declined toward the present. It is hard to explain why, however – definite statements about the global development can hardly be made, although a large number of studies worldwide analyze gender construction in television commercials – as the changes and developments of commercial practices are too multifaceted. After all advertisements still perpetuate gender stereotypes, although the repertory of role models has softened slightly.

Gender in Movies and Television

The representation of gender in fiction has been analyzed in many studies over the past decades (Hole 2000). The problem of comparison, however, resembles the dilemma mentioned above, with different studies on advertisement conducted in different countries. Gauntlett (2002) offers a historical overview of the representation of gender in media and some of the studies named are quoted below.

Miles (1975) pointed out, that gender roles accentuate gender stereotypes, although the quantitative proportions are fairly equal. Davids and van Driel (2005) show that male roles dominate in adventure and action movies while women more frequently feature in comedies and romances. According to a study by McNeil (1975), the women's movement was largely ignored by TV and portrayed women mostly as housewives.

Already in the 1970s, research results show that representations of women predominantly revolve around their physical attraction. E. Ann Kaplan argued that women were refused a voice and remained an object of male desire. Their relationships and social status are depicted in dependency of a male role (Kaplan 1983).

Gauntlett found that fewer studies were conducted in the 1990s; their results, however, may be summarized as in the following (Gauntlett 2002, pp. 57–90). In TV prime time shows and presenter roles, men account for about 63%. Major or leading characters are only female to about 18%, but all studies show a slow growth of the number of women toward gender equality.

The challenges for media research can be found on several levels: to compile adequate samples and ensure their comparability, to differentiate media formats, and to analyze quantitative as well as qualitative dimensions of roles. There have always been exceptional productions featuring strong, independent, and humorous female lead roles.

Soap operas were seen as a "female" genre for a long time. With her study, Ien Ang (1982/1985) opened a field of research within cultural studies on "Watching Dallas". She focused on the popularity of the TV series and the motivations of its mainly female international audience for watching it. Thirty years later, research has discovered the men in the audience: in his publication "Real Men Watch Soaps" Elzer (2007) asks about the construction of masculinities in and through American daytime drama.

Regarding the majority of film and TV productions, the tendency towards complementary gender roles based on a strongly heterosexual norm still persists.

Gay and queer cinema is growing in small communities alongside mainstream film and TV industries. The beginning of gay and queer cinema followed political movements in the 1960s and 1970s but stayed hidden and marginalized for decades. Lesbians, gays, and bisexuals were supposed to be hidden from the "normal" view. The late 1990s and the first years of the new millennium brought about a change, not only in single minor roles but also in lesbian and gay sitcoms and TV serials and even independent TV and advertising channels (Gamson 2001; Becker 2006; Ciasullo 2012). Public TV channels reacted slower than private ones: the opening seemed to allow lesbians and gays to enter the scene – but the normative control still bans people who are bisexual, transgender, or intersexual from the screens for the larger audience (Gauntlett 2002, pp. 82–86).

This short overview revealed that sex and gender are highly relevant categories in constructing the norms and ideas of social order through entertainment media programs.

Gender in the News, Infotainment, and Print Boulevard

Studying the news yields similar results. Most individuals portrayed in politics, the economy, arts, and even in news reports about accidents and crime in everyday life are male. Women are more often presented as passive objects or victims in crime and war (Tuchman 2012). This is inverted in reports about stars and celebrity gossip. Women magazines have a big impact on maintaining the tradition of typical "female" topics, views on the female body, establishing and constructing gender norms. The study of Hermes (1995) points out that the social impact of these magazines is hard to understand. Not all of the contents are always significant for the readers and much of it is selectively read, while other parts are not even looked at. The main topics focus on the body and beauty, sexuality and desire, celebrities and stardom, leisure and sports, home and lifestyle.

> As well as forming a key part of our everyday routines, media dominate our frames of reference in terms of the values we live by and the ways in which we understand our place in the world. Our understandings of ourselves and our everyday lives, then, are as intertwined with media images as are our perspectives on the broader world (Hodkinson 2011, p. 270).

There is hardly any form of media in which gender does *not* play a role, on the contrary: from the start, media have been transporting gender and gendered role models in linguistic and audio-visual form through all possible channels. In the 1980s, Teresa de Lauretis already described the representation of women in the media as a pervasive form of constituting culture, rendering women an object of the gaze, inscribing visions of beauty in the female body, and placing it in the focus of sexual desires.

> … images are directly absorbed by the viewers, that each image is immediate readable and meaningful in and of itself, regardless of its context or of the circumstances of its production, circulation, and reception. Viewers, in turn, are presumed to be at once historically innocent and purely receptive, as if they too existed in the world immune from other social practices and discourses, yet immediately susceptible to images, to a certain power of iconism, its truth or reality effect. But it is not the case. And it is precisely the feminist critique of representation that has conclusively demonstrated how any image in our culture – let alone any image of woman – is placed within, and read from, the encompassing context of patriarchal ideologies, whose values and effects are social and subjective, aesthetic and affective, and obviously permeate the entire social fabric and hence all social subjects, women as well as men (de Lauretis 1984, pp. 38–39).

West and Zimmerman (1987) published their concept of "doing gender" as a result of their ethnomethodological studies. They conceptualize gender as a product of performance and interaction, rather than seeing it as a given, natural human characteristic. Comparative cultural studies demonstrated that the social category of "man" and "woman" does not refer to the greatly heterogeneous practices common to these two categories. The concept was revised to include "doing difference" in 1995, henceforward including race, ethnicity, and other social differentiations.

Media contribute to overlapping forms of gender identity, gender enactment, and gendered appropriation of media. By an active appropriation of media content on part of the audiences, we understand the phenomenon that media content is translated into everyday contexts in conversations about media content, or in the case of the imitation of role models. An active appropriation of gender-related media content is based on a large range of gender representations, that is, visualized knowledge about gender (see Paul and Ganser 2007). When playing with the audiences' connectivity, the media recur to various forms of knowledge about gender in the sense of visualized gender knowledge, that is, knowledge in the form of images, which is then converted into knowledge about visualization in the production of media and advertising. The term "gender knowledge" was borrowed from the works of Irene Dölling (2007) and Angelika Wetterer (2008, 2010). The gender knowledge used in the analysis here can be split into three ideal–typical categories: everyday knowledge about gender, gender knowledge of experts in the field, and scientific knowledge about gender (Wetterer 2008, 2010). The gap between everyday experiences of "average" members of society and academic discourses about performativity, deconstruction, queerness, or intersectionality might at times encompass whole worlds of social practices. One thing they have in common, however, remains: it is the interest in the relation between the sexes and the social process of valuing gender. Even if theories on gender might question the binary gender order as a social construction resulting from the structures of society, it still has to comply with widespread everyday experiences. The social reproduction of the binary conception of gender (see Hirschauer 1993) is still effected through a large number of institutionalized arrangements. Recognizing, analyzing, and preventing gender discrimination and enabling gender equality is the task of political correctness and gender mainstreaming. This created a demand for the new profession of the gender expert, a professional group that is now responsible for ensuring gender equality. However, theory critics often reproach them for contributing to the reproduction of the binary conception of gender with their work rather than dissipating it. It therefore seems that the paradigms of feminist knowledge about gender and gender practices are split in half for the first time since the beginning of feminist theory: constructing or consequently de-constructing gender.

What are the consequences for visual knowledge about gender, then? How do the media perpetuate the dual system of gender stereotypes? How is this reflected in the practices of visualization in public space? What are the sources of gender knowledge recurred to? Can we witness the creation of new practices of visualization of gender? Is it at all possible to visualize gender according to theories of deconstruction and queer theories, and, if so, what are the concrete forms this could take? In fact, we can find a number of gender images and knowledge about gender in the great variety of media available, both in material and immaterial form: Starting from common, everyday gender differences to the questioning of difference, the binary gender order, and rules of heteronormativity. The present chapter first provides a theoretical outline that is then illustrated with a practical example from research.

Contemporary media society employs a different concept of the body than societies of the past. Not only do we increasingly have to learn to stay seated and still remain healthy without moving our bodies, but also we are in return expected to heed the call to shape our bodies, often neglected in everyday practices, to a form representing fitness. Bodies can be built, and thus bodies and images of the body that serve the purpose of public staging and social positioning come into existence. The body, molded and shaped, becomes the instrument for attaining social habitus and status. It is at exactly this point – where social everyday practices and media representations meet – that the body assumes a double role: it is real and medial, a construct far removed from nature and biology. A gendered body that cannot be separated from its gendered social context is also employed in the depiction of the sexes. Gender representations furthermore form a crucial part of images in the media and advertising. There, heteronormativity dominates in a way that leaves any alternative seem a conspicuous exception. To a great part, homosexuality, queerness, trans- and intersexuality are still hidden in medial niches; only few of them enter the mainstream. We are therefore globally presented with a binary conception of gender in the media that is oriented strongly on stereotypes of men and women, of masculinity and femininity. There are some channels that play with breaking the strong clichés; however, heternormativity always remains the paradigm behind which deviations may be tolerated.

Both previous knowledge in the form of images that audiences have accumulated as well as knowledge about practices of visualization on the part of media producers become salient when it comes to the visualization of gender knowledge in the media. The many facets of gender knowledge are portrayed and varied according to context. The most widespread form is the visualization of everyday gender knowledge, as it is globally compatible with any international audience. The body of knowledge all members of society are familiar with is the main resource for interpretation here, even if arguments may run contrary to the example. The visualization of gender knowledge is linked to the portrayal of social norms of beauty and sexuality (slim, attractive, fit, heterosexual), thus reproducing a complex combination of stereotyped gender knowledge that rests upon visual knowledge about gender. It clearly shows that portrayal and viewing habits about visual and visualized gender knowledge are based on a longstanding, culturally rooted visual memory. A large repertoire of global and transmedia gender images exists in society, beyond any cultural and temporal limits. Visualizing other variants of gender knowledge, especially without any verbal comment, is therefore hindered by the constant recourse to everyday knowledge about gender. Hybrid forms of visualizing gender knowledge allowing for a polysemous, that is, multiple decoding, are increasingly becoming prominent in a globalized media context. A repeated recourse to latent, visual gender knowledge is particularly obvious in analyses over a longer period of time. Gender relations are inseparable from their visualization in our society.

For some time now, gender equality and the dissolution of traditional gender roles have been a topic of discussion, as much in news and entertainment channels as in advertising. At times, this reaches a humorous, tongue-in-cheek, flirtatious, or even deriding tone. The boundaries appear to be fuzzy here.

In academic discourses, gender is often presented as a social technology whose effectiveness is rooted in everyday practices as much as in its staging by the media. The social construction of gender as a binary code of man/woman or masculinity/femininity and of doing gender as actively constructing gender affiliation as an individual are features that are also constantly present in the cultural technology of the media. It shows that "… medial/cultural images of gender and the individual construction of identity are related through processes of identification. The hypothesis thus is that gender difference cannot be conceptualized without thinking about its representation" (Seier 1997, p. 23).

The Visual Representation of Gender in the Media

This contribution is placed in the crossroads of media sociology, gender studies, and studies of visual culture. We live in a society of media that is dominated by images, films, and graphics, and are therefore familiar with how to read and decode visual images (Mirzoeff 1998; Evans and Hall 1999; Van Leeuwen and Jewitt 2001; Rose 2012). The omnipresence of visual media forms part of the mediatization which Krotz (2007) describes as a metaprocess of social change. A broad range of cultural techniques serves artists, people in the media industries, advertisers, and other related groups to construct and encode images and allows audiences and recipients to read and decode the same. Subjective criteria based on taste and biographical experiences are as important in this as recurring to a stock of culturally shaped, collective patterns and memories. "The visual, in our view, does not exist in its 'pure' form, it is always 'contaminated' by the information the rest of our senses (hearing, touch, smell) provide us with and influenced by other texts and discourses …" (Shohat and Stam 1998, p. 55).

Improvements in the technical quality, as well as the quantity of images in private and media use, brought about the visual turn, also known as the pictoral turn, in the 1990s – waving goodbye to the Gutenberg Galaxy and the cultural dominance of the printed word. Visual studies thus form the third pillar of the present contribution; just as media studies and gender studies, this field also has an interdisciplinary orientation and is now becoming established in the academic world. The construction, use, and meaning of pictures and images, of representations and ideas, produced a variety of scientific approaches to the analysis of images. Only the *Handbook of Visual Communication* (Smith *et al.* 2005) alone already distinguishes twelve different theoretical and methodological approaches to the scientific analysis of visual material: aesthetics, perception, representation, visual rhetoric, cognition, semiotics, reception theory, narrative, media aesthetics, ethics, visual literacy, and cultural studies.

In visual studies, what matters is not only the analysis of recorded images but also the investigation of images produced for scientific purposes, for example, in ethnography. The decision to conceptualize and analyze theoretically depends, as always, on the respective research interest and context of application. There is no single road to success in the analysis of static or moving images.

It is particularly the visualization of gender on which the close relationship between media studies and gender studies rests. The performativity of gender is inhabited by concepts of gender created by the media, which have triggered debates and critique for decades. Especially on the visual level, it becomes evident that media and gender are constitutively referring to each other. What furthermore surfaces is the phenomenon termed intermediality – the reciprocal observation of the media by itself and across different media formats and technologies, and historically recurring media representations of gender and related topics. To give a concrete example regarding the medium of film: with a diversity of distinctions between carrier or storage media and media of distribution such as cinema, TV, video, the Internet, telecommunication, and mobile communication, it has recorded a drastic decline in its singular meaning as the subject of scientific study. At the same time, the qualitative and quantitative spread throughout society is happening so quickly that this alone is reason enough for its increased relevance in research. Along with technological diffusion, we witness a diversification of producers, contexts, content, and recipients. For the social sciences, both mainstream and marginal phenomena are of interest.

Feminist film and media theory has developed a number of research topics since the 1970s:

- The relationship between objects and subjects, and a critique of the objectification of the female body.
- Theories on the gaze examine camera perspectives and presentations in the media that support a voyeuristic gaze on the female body.
- The female body as a sexualized subject of images and in otherwise nonsexual contexts.
- Positions and role relationships according to attributions such as active/passive, perpetrator/victim, strong/weak, rational/emotional, etc.
- The visual normatization of body ideals that enter everyday practices as artificially manipulated images, becoming examples of interventions by plastic surgery.

What is crucial to all critique is the knowledge about the relevance of representations in the media. However, the only noncontested fact here is that they are highly efficient – how and on whom and under which circumstances these images become operative still remains the subject of numerous studies in this field.

The voyeuristic and the narcissistic gaze also are central approaches in the analysis of visualization in social media. The body has become an image for all sexes, as may be seen from the liberality of portrayals in the media and in private contexts. Feminist and queer gendered media representations resisting the established patriarchal model and heteronormative stagings increasingly feature on the Internet now. Gender–body–identity – representation: these are dimensions that are constantly undergoing processes of social and medial change. However, media mainstream is guided by everyday knowledge about gender, thus still permitting that stereotyped representations of gender remain dominant in the media.

The Private in Public: Weddings and the Gender Order in the Media

Weddings have always been and still are crucial rituals in all cultures, locating and presenting the couple as the smallest social system and building block of society. At its heart lies the heterosexual couple, consisting of a man and a woman, as a socially recognized reproductive unit. The ideal of romantic love, an achievement of the middle classes that took shape during the past 150 years or so, becomes more salient in this context than class interests and economic aspects related to the security of livelihood. Royal weddings, just as members of aristocratic families or social elites, follow particular, culturally determined rules, social expectations and ceremonial rituals which, however, are being softened in the course of modernity. Goffman (1979) describes the design of weddings as a performance and showing of markers of relationship, where love is being staged employing expressive symbolisms. The meanings that form the background for these actions have often lost their relevance or been forgotten over several generations, and frequently only the established traditions they produced remain as ritualistic patterns.

Mass media have turned royal and aristocratic weddings into media events. Their attraction is no longer restricted to physical presence due to television. In a democracy, mass media are *the* central institution of publicness – this also holds true for media events in democracies modeled on monarchies. Media events are "interruptions of routine" (Dayan and Katz 1992), which allow individuals to connect with society, especially emotionally. At least, an imagined community held together by atmospheric media images is formed. It is not only the text but much more the images that arouse people's curiosity, which bind and move them and appear to bring them closer to others – even to complete strangers.

Dayan and Katz (1992) classify media events into three groups: contests, coronations, and conquests. "What they all have in common is that they are all ritual ceremonial occasions that work to integrate people into the social order by invoking common symbols" (Phillips 1999, p. 223).

Media generate and structure various types of public audiences that transgress social and physical boundaries. In the course of this, transnational communication spaces are created that surpass territorial meanings by far. Global media events also function as catalysts in the formation of international social knowledge, which includes the generation and distribution of gender knowledge. When investigating media events, it is therefore important to consider not only content and visual representations as relevant but also the controversies and social discourses surrounding them, as well as the struggle for opinion leadership, strategies of persuasion, and communication of change. Media events assume the function of ensuring social integration, binding large transnational audiences to the same event more or less simultaneously and breaking down national and cultural boundaries, which in other contexts serve the purpose of exclusion. Emotionally charged, these events, which are primarily driven by images, suppress rational discourses that do not include all educational levels, at least for a short period of time. Therefore, media events also create ties in the vertical differentiation of societies. Last but not least, they produce collective pictures and images and render them available at all times, a task that should not be underestimated in its function for the collective memory of societies.

Various forms of watching people in the media, be it professionals or private persons being made a star, enable the mediation of social relationships through images. Mass media and pop culture increasingly celebrate fame and stardom. "The continued tabloid-, television- and Internet-exposure of celebrities has become a means of staging public negotiations of values and norms, bringing together increasingly fragmented and individualized societies" (Schulz 2010, p. 2). Mediated celebrity culture stages sexuality and gender in a certain way; the audiences assume the role of celebrity judges. It has become a major effort to perform one's own personality, including gender and sexuality, in order to please the audience. Raised awareness on the part of the public is also indicative of a cultural shift: everyone may participate and visibility has become an important value. However, the "heteronormative formula of proper gender presentation" (Schulz 2010, p. 4) still leads the way. It seems that media culture expects a growing number of sexual expressions.

Weddings of royal families have always attracted the attention of the "common people". They concentrate power, sovereignty, reproduction, and gender in the smallest form of a social system: the couple. Mass media and especially television have delivered the public event "the royal wedding" into people's living rooms. Static images and photographs were staged and became moving, filmic narrations. The rather distanced relationship of common citizens to their rulers was changed by images in the media, portraying moving bodies with great immediacy. The development and spread of the zoom from the start of the twentieth century onwards also brought the social elites closer to the eye of the common beholder. Today, the media boulevard with its culture of the image serves the curious gaze of global audiences lusting after a maximum of details regarding clothing, make-up, hairstyle, hair volume or bald heads, old-age lines, evidence of plastic surgery, etc. However, the media are also employed by them in turn to create their own image: just like political parties and governments, companies and arts institutions, royal families have already learned from their press offices how to manipulate the game of the media. The British royal family plays a crucial role here.

In the 1980s and 1990s, Lady Diana became an icon: the media accompanied and staged her development from a young and timid princess to a self-confident and attractive woman. Her person turned into a media figure, until her death under tragic circumstances in 1997. For a long time, the live transmission of the obsequies was regarded the biggest media event in history, gluing a reported number of 2.5 billion people worldwide to their TV screens. Using the example "Lady Diana" as a media figure may serve to retrace several stages of the process that makes a media star: discovery – being pursued by journalists and paparazzi, the photographer as a hunter for pictures – mutual profit – replacement by new stars. Rather than a genuine interest in the personality of Lady Diana, the tremendous economic interests on the part of the media in the fierce struggle for audience attention represent the reason for the popularization of her person. In the course of the years, however, Lady Diana had also learned how to harness the attention given to her by the media in order to effectively stage her own person, transport her personal causes, and win the sympathy of the masses. Presentation in the media and the construction of gender always was one of the main components of the media figure, employing stereotypes of femininity, emotionality, sensitivity, virginity, and later motherliness, fragility, beauty, sexual attractiveness, and likeness to a Madonna.

Royal weddings have to find integration within two distinct social systems of rules and norms. On the one hand, the traditional system of the monarchy imposes a strict behavioral code and hierarchies, clearly and irrefutably placing each individual in a certain position, which already involves expectations of a certain behavior. The media system, on the other hand, recurs to long-standing cultural images and moving images staging romantic love, of which the heterosexual kiss is the central symbol.

Royal Weddings as Global Media Events: "Will & Kate 2011"

"Breaking with tradition, on July 29, 1981 Prince Charles and Lady Diana kissed on the Buckingham Palace balcony in front of throngs of rejoicing fans and a worldwide television audience of 750 million" (Sher 2011). The publicly presented kiss of the young royal couple could be interpreted as a sign for the softening of strict aristocratic rules and their pervasion with middle-class wedding traditions and expectations common to popular culture. Thirty years later, in April 2011, the royal wedding of "Will & Kate", as they are named intimately by the global press, gathered more than 2 billion people in the whole world in front of their TV screens (Sher 2011) (see Figure 24.2).

All channels of modern media were called into action for the purpose of reporting on this global media event: the press, radio, TV, the Internet, as well as social networks such as Facebook, flickr, Twitter, Google, YouTube, just to name a few. Media websites also offered live coverage of the event, streaming it online. It is impossible to measure the number of media and audiences participating in the wedding event worldwide in statistical data. Official representatives "put the potential worldwide audience for the wedding at upward of 2 billion people, perhaps the largest viewership of any program in history" (Stanley 2011). (The media reports contradict each other on this subject: the obsequies of Lady Diana are attributed a reported number of 2.5 billion and the wedding of her first-born son William is given at around 2 billion.) In order to ensure the global transmission of the royal wedding in 2011, around 140 transmission vans from which the broadcasting into the whole world was administered were stationed in Green Park, the area separating Buckingham Palace from Westminster, where 8000 journalists were present, reporting to network stations all over the world. The number of guests invited to the function – 1900 – is relatively small in comparison.

It is not surprising that the biggest drop of demand in TV and ITV connections happened during the balcony scene. The first kiss of the newlyweds was so short that the crowd started chanting, asking for another one: "kiss her again" was the order given to the prince. "It is estimated that one million people were out on the streets of London – but more than 24 million in the UK (Mackenzie 2011).

On the other side of the globe,

> Less than a day before the royal wedding of Prince William and Kate Middleton at Westminster Abbey, a new survey of over 10,000 Chinese people shows that only 33 percent of the respondents are interested in the event and that too for its glitz and glamour. However, over a million Chinese people are expected to watch the event live on Phoenix TV, the only domestic network airing the wedding live (Jou and Jing 2011).

"Royal wedding kicks the footy," said the headline of the Australian *Telegraph* (Byrnes 2011), which is similar to a social revolution, as the weekly football games are a social must. For generations, Friday evenings are traditionally reserved for watching football, either in a stadium or at least on TV. But Friday April 29, 2011 was different. Australia, a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, was infected by the royal wedding fever almost as severely as the United Kingdom itself.

Figure 24.2 Watching the royal wedding of Prince William and Kate Middleton in Iraq – man smoking a waterpipe in a public café.
Source: © Getty Images. Photographer: Ahmad Al-Rubaye.

The media event was broadcast in many countries of the world, regardless of the respective political, religious, or cultural context (see Figure 24.3).

For a long time, new media have been the key vehicles and channels for the transmission of televised images. Satellites, radio stations, and the Internet not only have to resist the commercialization by TV stations but also have to face the frequency of server use by private persons, which is hard to calculate in advance but is the technical prerequisite for spreading and integrating into global communication additional images and videos on YouTube, flickr, private mobile phones, etc.

> At the height of the wedding, global web traffic, as measured by Akamai, was 39% higher than normal. Although there is no firm evidence that this was due to the wedding, the United Kingdom was listed as a hot spot, with the country accounting for 11% of online activity (Mackenzie 2011).

The same source reports that the global celebration was not even censored by the "great firewall of China". The dominance of these images could also be seen in the public sphere. Public viewing transmits media images to streets, parks, and shopping centers. Following global media events on TV, in private living rooms or on computer screens is not enough anymore.



Figure 24.3 Watching the royal wedding of Prince William and Kate Middleton in Kenya – public viewing in an African bar.
Source: © Getty Images. Photographer: Simon Maina.

The images of royal weddings are reminiscent of the importance of monarchy and the heterosexual order of society. The public and the private are intertwined in this event and are visually inscribed in the collective emotional memory, lasting for generations, through effective images and representations in the media. Pictures of the bridal couple appeared in the global media and became an object of the merchandising industry. Various products featuring the image of the engaged and later married couple became a commercial success in the form of stickers, clothes, tableware, bed linen, towels, and ash trays, just to name a few. It is hard to escape a global media event. For hours, images were transmitted in live TV coverage from the streets of London, Westminster Abbey, and Buckingham Palace. The official website (Principal Private Secretary for the Household 2011) provides extensive information and a vast number of images of the ceremony, and innumerable media stations and Internet sites joined in the dance, reporting and commenting on the event. The royal wedding of "Will & Kate" doesn't only represent the most recent, but maybe also the biggest media event, presenting an example of a gender stereotyped staging of masculinity and femininity.

The bride, Kate Middleton, received a lot of attention regarding her figure, hairstyle, cleavage, outfit, wedding dress and its designer, bridal veil, tiara, and bridal bouquet – no detail passed unnoticed. The designer received huge amounts of Internet requests and orders for teleshopping. The chief bridesmaid, Kate's sister Pippa Middleton, also attracted a large amount of attention and comments on her body and styling. The number of hits a keyword search for "Pippa's bottom" yields is striking.

> Ever since Pippa Middleton was shown holding sister Kate's train at the Royal Wedding last month, her butt has nearly eclipsed the event itself in the British news. Pippa's bottom

generated thousands of Tweets and sparked the creation of numerous Facebook sites. In fact, the "Pippa Middleton Ass Appreciation Society" has attracted over 220,000 likes on Facebook (Wyn 2011).

It is not necessary to go into detail here; it can be assumed that the analyses and comments are generally known and easy to research. Decades of feminist media critique have not reduced stereotypical gender concepts and sexualization of the female body; to the contrary, it seems more widespread than ever in global media culture.

For the present chapter, this media event is of crucial importance because it is an example representing similar events in which personalities from politics, the economy, and culture are staged in the media. Also the cases of royal weddings of princes and princesses with commoners are numerous; the role of succession appointing a man or a woman is determined in the constitution of each country. The wedding of the Swedish princess with her civil husband was a large international media event, too, and the patterns of staging the couple always resemble each other. The size of the echo in the media attests the large interest in stagings of gender on the part of the media, as well as among the audiences.

Being a Bride: Fairy Tales and Girls' Dreams

The colors of bridal dresses and veils vary historically and culturally; the white wedding dress and the veil originate in the dressing code of the European aristocracy and have been taken over by civil women about 150 years ago. In the meantime, they have become part of the wedding ritual on all continents as a result of medial globalization, although this may differ according to milieu. The color white has become a quote of female virginity, the veil symbolizes the boundaries between the sexes, and veiling is a form of showing the start of sexual maturity (see Holzer 2004). Unveiling and lifting the veil in the course of the wedding ceremony also contains a sexual reference. Men, on the other hand, marry wearing traditional business outfits. The dressing code also indicates that the transition of the couple from the public into the private sphere has been ritualized. Imaginary images rely on a number of cultural templates and media images.

The tradition of the Aschenputtel/Cinderella/Cendrillon motive goes back a long way in the European cultural context and may also refer to much older prototypes from China, Egypt, Persia, and North America in its function as an archetype. The Cinderella archetype represents an imaginary model that strongly rests on powerful symbolic images. Generally, archetypes constitute basic patterns of association that are similar across cultures, presenting cases of collective consensus. A number of diverse subject areas are dedicated to the study of archetypes; for the present purpose, they shall be termed "ideas". Theatre, film, and television all frequently recur to archetypes and stereotypes for the purpose of characterizing a certain figure. The stereotyped presentation modeled after familiar templates and references may rely on a consensus with the audience and a decoding according to the intentions. Images in film always cater for the subconscious, as well, and therefore media events such as weddings are particularly suitable for reactivating archetypal dreams and wishes, transferring them to the present and offering possibilities for identification. Weddings that are staged in the media also recur to gender stereotyped images and serve the collective and often subconsciously shared dream of being a princess once in a lifetime.

Walt Disney's adaptation of "Cinderella", the animated film, was released in the cinemas in 1950 and has been distributed worldwide on VHS and DVD in innumerable numbers. Millions of children and adults have seen the movie and have memorized the story, the plot, the characters, the music, and the symbols. The film version of the fairy tale supplies a large number of templates of wedding rituals, love romances, and gender roles, which may be found galore across the centuries until the present day in various presentations in the media.

Bride and Bridegroom in Gender Trouble

The large number of levels and sites in society and the media, as well as the conflicts regarding gender hierarchies, have led to a phenomenon that already in 1990 was termed "gender trouble" by Judith Butler (1990).

The heterosexual matrix with its ideal-typical roles ascribed to men and women or bridegroom and bride, respectively, contains ideals and visions that are deeply inscribed in society. At the same time as the legal equality between the sexes increases, laws on divorce are changing, and social factors such as improved education and employment of women are undergoing a slow transformation. Also marriage as an institution loses some part of its former function. Its relevance in terms of social responsibility and security has surely decreased already. In a parallel development, the wedding ritual as a festivity represents the time and place where old stereotypes and clichés come together and are staged in a sumptuous way. The ritual itself therefore has come to mediate the stability that the smallest social system no longer provides or at least seems to offer.

This also holds true now for homosexual couples. Especially famous couples are important pioneers in the media, attracting a great deal of attention and bringing about a switch in the familiar gender order. Man and woman are no longer the norm for marriage – it simply requires two individuals. On the bureaucratic level, too, the binary gender code has lost its former relevance. The deconstruction of the heterosexual order of marriage is happening slowly, and it is nationally and culturally bound.

Having carved out the right to civil partnership or marriage, related images presented in mass media also follow this development. How weddings of homosexual celebrities are visualized clearly indicates a social change. Whereas ascriptions to "man" and "woman" are theoretically as well as practically losing their evidence, a variety of gender stagings and the reconstruction of gender can be witnessed on the visual level. If not before already, the repertory of visual gender knowledge is being upset now. Iconographically, similarities to the traditional bridal couple can be found.

The media presented one famous couple, David Furnish and Elton John (a film producer and a pop musician) in the year 2005, after they entered a civil partnership in the UK. Their dark suits are in line with the male dressing code for a bridegroom; however, this partnership is made up of two of them. They both recur to the typical male dress code.

Another famous couple, Ellen DeGeneres and Portia de Rossi (a TV presenter and an actress) present themselves in The Ellen deGeneres TV Show (2010), "Ellen", and talk about their marriage (YouTube n.a.). The show also features pictures of them in their wedding clothes in the background. This homosexual couple married in 2008. On the visual dimension, they present the reconstruction of male and female dress codes and attributes. The "bridegroom" Ellen is clothed in the traditionally female wedding color white, despite wearing trousers. The "bride" is wearing a light pink dress with a tremendous long tulle skirt. This wedding picture maintains the traditional visual staging of the bridegroom taking his bride by the hand and leading her into the future (see Indra 2009), as well as the "female" dream of a bridal dress. The bare back of the bride in this eroticized depiction may be interpreted to signify the objectification of the female body.

An analysis of wedding photos in the media stresses the prominence of the binary gender order in the tradition of staging masculinity and femininity. The bridal couple perpetuates the entrenchment of everyday gender knowledge in society, and at the same time ironizes it. The audience is left alone with the decoding of the visual message. Do we see a lesbian couple reproducing a dual gender role stereotype? Do we see a lesbian couple ironizing stereotypical gender constructions? Do they reconstruct female and male gender stereotypes from a new point of view on the visual dimension after deconstructing heterosexual gender norms in some way?

Gender in Visual Media: Summary and Outlook

How the royal wedding was staged in the media, how it was internationally and globally distributed and received as a media event served as an example for investigating various processes outlined in the chapter at hand. For decades, gender and media are socially relevant fields of practice and research regarding the construction of social reality. Both represent areas of the formation and questioning of social order. The complex processes surrounding the construction and deconstruction of gender in male-dominated societies are subject to historical and cultural fluctuations and political dependencies. The relevance of how the social and gender order are visually represented and symbolized surpasses the area of the mass media by far, permeating everyday lives. Gender knowledge is being practiced and reflected on different levels in the most diverse social fields and milieus. Academic gender knowledge from feminist theory and gender studies is gradually diffusing into everyday realities and mass media, making its way in small doses from the niches of feminist media out into areas of the mainstream media. In the course of this, it can be witnessed that the classic stereotypical representations of masculinity and femininity still form part of the day-to-day business in the media. Sexualization and discrimination of women are a common daily fact, especially in the area of entertainment and advertising, and thus continue to exert their power as factors of socialization. At the same time, however, a new development relying on the deconstruction of the binary conception of gender has started to arrive from niche programs and is already being included in mainstream programs now. It can be seen that the balance is constantly moving between the two poles – the construction of stereotypes and their successive deconstruction. So far, it could be said that small advances have been made from the perspective of feminist media studies.

New challenges present themselves on the visual level, however, differing from those regarding the verbal, argumentative level of speaking and writing about "him" and "her" or men and women. Can individuals be visualized in the media without any reference to gender? Do images for that exist in our minds? Does it work for a media system that is built so strongly upon the category of stereotypical gender in its multiple mechanisms and its particular internal order?

Also in the future, feminist media studies are called to remain focused on questions regarding the representation of gender and related principles of social order and hierarchies. We are increasingly faced with the controversial situation of perpetuating the binary gender order exactly because we are investigating the same. The parallel construction and deconstruction of gender has triggered a number of paradox processes. In the present chapter, the visual reconstruction of gender has been discussed in order to point out a new quality of staging gender – maybe in an ironical way.

A result of the visual turn in the sciences was to render the transformation of the body into an image visible. In the question about gender, therefore, the body becomes a gendered body. It requires an active examination of and a conscious break with a variety of signs and codes inscribed into the gendered body to desist staging one's own or someone else's body as a gendered one. A number of invasive and surgical techniques have always been available to change and form the gendered body. With the recent boom in plastic surgery, this field is becoming even more prominent, maybe as a result of the presentation of youth and gender in the media. On the visual level of superficial gender markers such as long hair, dresses and skirts for men, and jewelry, the game called staging gender has already entered numerous areas of everyday life, varying according to the respective social tolerance.

In times of diverse social insecurities and the dissolution of unambiguous memberships to social groups, which by far exceed the gender dimension, media events such as a royal wedding appear to fuel various fantasies and desires – if not for anything else at least for entertainment and spectacle.

References

Ang, I. (1982/1985) *Watching Dallas: Soap Opera and the Melodramatic Imagination*. London: Methuen.

Becker, R. (2006) *Gay TV and Straight America*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.

Bushman, B.J. (2007) That was a great commercial, but what were they selling? Effects of violence and sex on memory for products in television commercials, *Journal of Advertising*, **6**, 11–14.

Butler, J. (1990) *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. New York: Routledge.

Byrnes, H. (2011) Royal Wedding Kicks the Footy, accessed 12/11/2011, http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/royal-wedding-kicks-the-footy/story-e6freuy9-1225983301449.

Ciasullo, A.M. (2012) Making her (in)visible: cultural representations of lesbianism and the lesbian body in 1990s, in M.C. Kearney (ed.), *The Gender and Media Reader*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 329–343.

Davids, T. and van Driel, F. (eds) (2005) *The Gender Question in Globalisation: Changing Perspectives and Practices*. Hampshire and Burlington: Ashgate.

Dayan, D. and Katz, E. (1992) *Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

de Lauretis, T. (1984) *Alice Doesn't: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Dölling, I. (2007) "Geschlechterwissen" – ein nützlicher Begriff für die "verstehende" Analyse von Vergeschlechtlichungsprozessen?, in R. Gildemeister and Wetterer, A. (eds), *Erosion oder Reproduktion geschlechtlicher Differenzierungen? Widersprüchliche Entwicklungen in professionalisierten Berufsfeldern und Organisationen*. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, pp. 19–31.

Elzer, B. (2007) "Real men watch soaps": constructing masculinities in and through American daytime drama, in H. Paul and A. Ganser (eds), *Screening Gender: Geschlechterszenarien in der gegenwärtigen US-amerikanischen Populärkultur*. Berlin: Lit Verlag, pp. 175–202.

Evans, J. and Hall, S. (eds) (1999) *Visual Culture: The Reader*. London and Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Featherstone, M. (ed.) (1990) *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*. London and Newbury Park: SAGE.

Furnham, A. and Mak, T. (1999) Sex-role stereotyping in television commercials: a review and comparison of fourteen studies done on five continents over 25 years, *Sex Roles*, **41** (5/6), 413–437.

Gamson, J. (2001) Talking freaks: lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender families on daytime talk TV, in M. Bernstein and R. Reimann (eds), *Queer Families, Queer Politics. Challenging Culture and the State*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 68–86.

Gauntlett, D. (2002) *Media, Gender and Identity: An Introduction*. London and New York: Routledge.

Goffman, E. (1979) *Gender Advertisements*. New York: Harper & Row.

Hermes, J. (1995) *Reading Women's Magazines: An Analysis of Everyday Media Use*. Cambridge: Polity.

Hirschauer, S. (1993) *Die Soziale Konstruktion der Transsexualität*. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp.

Hodkinson, P. (2011) *Media, Culture and Society: An Introduction*. Los Angeles: Sage.

Hole, A. (2000) Television, in F. Carson and C. Pajaczkowska (eds.), *Feminist Visual Culture*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 281–293.

Holzer, A. (2004) Die enthüllte Braut: Hochzeit und Fotografie, *Fotogeschichte. Beiträge zur Geschichte und Ästhetik der Fotografie*, **24** (92), 31–42.

Indra, K. (2009) *Hochzeitsfotografie damals und heute: Eine Analyse der Darstellung des Brautpaares Anfang 20 und 21. Jahrhunderts in professionellen Hochzeitsfotografien*. Vienna: Diploma Thesis.

Jou, E. and Jing, M. (2011) Few Plan to Watch the Royal Wedding, accessed 22/11/2011, chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-04/29/content_12423568.htm.

Kaplan, E.A. (1983) *Women and Film: Both Sides of the Camera*. London: Methuen.

Krotz, F. (2007) *Medisieratiung: Fallstudien zum Wandel von Kommunikation*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Luhmann, N. (2000/1996) *The Reality of the Mass Media*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

McArthur, L.Z. and Resko, B.G. (1975) The portrayal of men and women in American television commercials, *Journal of Social Psychology*, **97**, 209–220.

Mackenzie, I. (2011) *William and Kate's World Wide Wedding*, accessed 22/11/2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-13236856.

McNeil, J. (1975) Feminism, femininity and the television shows: a content analysis, *Journal of Broadcasting*, **19**, 259–269.

Miles, B. (1975) *Channeling Children: Sex Stereotyping as Primetime TV*. Princeton: Women on Words and Images.

Mirzoeff, N. (ed.) (1998) *The Visual Culture Reader*, 2nd edn. New York: Routledge.

Moser, K. and Verheyen, C. (2011) Sex-appeal in der Werbung: Die Entwicklung der letzten Jahre, in C. Holtz-Bacha (ed.), *Stereotype?: Frauen und Männer in der Werbung*, 2nd edn. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, pp. 188–210.

Parker, E. and Furnham, A. (2007) Does sex sell? The effect of sexual programme content on the recall of sexual and non-sexual advertisements, *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, **21** (9), 1217–1228.

Paul, H. and Ganser, A. (eds) (2007) *Screening Gender: Geschlechterszenarien in der gegenwärtigen US-amerikanischen Populärkultur*. Berlin: Lit Verlag.

Phillips, L. (1999) Media discourse and the Danish Monarchy: reconciling egalitarianism and royalism, *Media, Culture and Society*, **21** (2), 221–245.

Principal Private Secretary for the Household of TRH The Prince of Wales and The Duchess of Cornwall (2011) *The Royal Wedding: Prince William and Catherine Middleton*, accessed 22/11/2011, http://www.officialroyalwedding2011.org/.

Rose, G. (2012) *Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to Researching with Visual Materials*, 3rd edn. London: Sage.

Schulz, D. (2010) The Fame to Please: The Normalisation of Celebrities, *Gender Forum. An Internet Journal for Gender Studies*, accessed 22/11/2011, http://www.genderforum.org/issues/private-i-public-eye/the-fame-to-please/.

Seier, A. (ed.) (1997) *Remediatisierung: Die performative Konstitution von Gender und Medien*. München: Medien Welten.

Sher, L. (2011) *Royal Wedding: Prince William and Catherine Middleton Kiss Twice on Balcony as World Watches*, accessed 22/11/2011, http://abcnews.go.com/International/Royal_Wedding/royal-wedding-prince-william-kate-middletons-balcony-kiss/story?id=13480895&page=2.

Shohat, E. and Stam, R. (1998) Narrativizing visual culture: towards a polycentric aesthetics, in N. Mirzoeff (ed.), *The Visual Culture Reader*, 2nd edn. New York: Routledge, pp. 37–59.

Smith, K., Moriartry, S., Barbatsis, G. and Kenney, K. (eds) (2005) *Handbook of Visual Communication: Theory, Methods, and Media*. Mahwah, New Jersey, and London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Stanley, T.L. (2011) *The TV Biz: Networks Go All Out to Cover Royal Wedding*, accessed 12/11/2011, articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/17/entertainment/la-ca-royal-wedding-20110417.

The Ellen DeGeneres Show (2010) *Portia de Rossi on Ellen part 1 of 3*, accessed 22/11/2011, youtube.com/watch?v=3Qrx-XYlJBU.

Thompson, J.B. (1995) *The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Tuchman, G. (2012) The symbolic annihilation of women by the mass media, in M.C. Kearney (ed.), *The Gender and Media Reader*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 41–58.

UNESCO Report (1980) *Many Voices One World: Communication and Society Today and Tomorrow. Towards a New More Just and More Efficient World Information and Communication Order*. Essex: Anchor Press.

van Leeuwen, T. and Jewitt, C. (eds) (2001) *Handbook of Visual Analysis*. London and Thousand Oaks: Sage.

van Zoonen, L. (2012) Feminist perspectives on the media, in M.C. Kearney (ed.), *The Gender and Media Reader*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 25–40.

West, C. and Fenstermaker, S. (1995) Doing difference, *Gender and Society*, **9**, 8–37.

West, C. and Zimmerman, D.H. (1987) Doing gender, *Gender and Society*, **1**, 125–151.

Wetterer, A. (ed.) (2008) *Geschlechterwissen und soziale Praxis: Theoretische Zugänge – empirische Befunde*. Königstein: Helmer.

Wetterer, A. (ed.) (2010) *Körper Wissen Geschlecht: Geschlechterwissen und soziale Praxis II*. Sulzbach: Ulrike Helmer Verlag.

Wyn (2011) Caktuz Comments on Royal Assets Cause Controversy, accessed 04/12/2012, http://theurbandaily.com/1330555/caktuz-comments-on-royal-assets-cause-controversy/.

YouTube (n.a.) Scene in TV show Ellen, accessed 02/29/2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lw2GKxilcwA.

Part V

Comparative Research and Contexts of Challenges

25

Lost, Found, and Made

Qualitative Data in the Study of Three-Step Flows of Communication

Klaus Bruhn Jensen

The vast majority of objects, events, and artifacts that might provide insight into diverse practices of communication around the world are lost forever. In contemporary settings, only a few instances and aspects of either media production or media use are documented, partly out of practical considerations and constraints, partly for epistemological reasons: researchers are in the business of selecting and synthesizing information, always for a purpose and from a particular perspective. Over the course of history, as well, potential sources of evidence have gone missing, intentionally or not, despite the continued efforts of historians and other scholars to later retrieve or reconstruct them. The originator of philosophical pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce, speculated on such possibilities with reference to perhaps the first theorist of communication, Aristotle: "Give science only a hundred more centuries of increase in geometrical progression, and she may be expected to find that the sound waves of Aristotle's voice have somehow recorded themselves" (Peirce 1931–1958, 5.542; cited in Peters 1999, p. 162). In fact, communication in digital media is already recording itself to a significant extent – these data can be 'found'. At the same time, other kinds of data must be 'made' in order to account for the place of digital as well as other media in social change on a global scale. The present media environment provides a unique opportunity to reconsider the traditional distinction between data that, respectively, are found and made.

This chapter, first, suggests that the current media environment can be captured in a model of three-step flows of communication, encompassing new configurations of one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many communication. Second, these new configurations amount to networks, as commonly associated with contemporary society and culture; networks provide both theoretical and analytical categories for media and communication studies. The complexity of networked communication returns the field to classic methodological issues of how best to design and apply quantitative, qualitative,

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

and multimethod approaches in empirical research. Third, digital networks, in and of their operation, document aspects of technologically mediated communication that were mostly lost in previous media – meta-data that can be found and that invite further research. Fourth, whereas network analysis has mostly taken a quantitative route, multistep communications lend themselves to qualitative studies, as well. In conclusion, the chapter discusses the complementarity of different data – found and made – and different methodologies – quantitative and qualitative – in the attempt by research to grasp the wider social and cultural implications of digital media and three-step flows of communication.

By way of introduction, I should note that the chapter grows out of a more encompassing research effort. It draws on a theoretical framework that seeks to reintegrate studies of interpersonal, mass, and networked forms of communication (Jensen 2010) and it builds on a related publication about methodologies for Internet studies that proposed ways of moving research beyond the online/offline divide (Jensen, 2011). The common denominator is an argument that, before focusing on one or more specific media, studies should address those prototypical communicative practices that, historically, have traveled quite well across media. Qualitative methodologies are well suited to exploring the flows of communication that traverse different material media and diverse cultural contexts.

Three-Step Flow

Media and communication research developed as a field of study from the mid-twentieth century in response to an infrastructural demand for more knowledge about the social uses and consequences of print and broadcast media (Park and Pooley 2008). One early finding was that, contrary to widespread contemporary assumptions, these media had rather limited direct effects on the attitudes and behaviors of the general public – instead, media appeared to work in a two-step flow, affecting a relatively few so-called opinion leaders who, in turn, would influence their immediate social relations through conversation and other interpersonal communication (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944). While debated (Gitlin 1978), the two-step model contributed significantly to a more nuanced understanding of mass communication as a multistep process with multilevel effects. One example is the agenda-setting tradition, suggesting that while media do not tell people *what* to think, they can tell people what to think *about* (McCombs and Shaw 1972).

Perhaps surprisingly, the field that gradually expanded to account for the growing importance of media technologies in human communication has experienced a disconnect between "mass" and "interpersonal" communication studies. If communication moves in two steps, research has taken one step at a time, and in two different directions. As evidenced in bibliometric research, in practice the field has amounted to "two subdisciplines of communication study" (Rogers 1999). This is in addition to other theoretical and ideological divisions between social-scientific, interpretive, and critical scholarship (Fink and Gantz 1996). While these latter divisions may be inevitable and, indeed, a source of dynamism, the former great divide between mass and

Table 25.1 Six communicative practices.

	Asynchronous	*Synchronous*
One-to-one	E-mail, text message	Voice, instant messenger
One-to-many	Book, newspaper, audio and video recording, Web 1.0/webpage, download	Broadcast radio and television
Many-to-many	Web 2.0/wiki, blog, social network site	Online chatroom

interpersonal communication has been and remains counterproductive, particularly at the present moment of media history. Many-to-many communication in Internet communities, social networking sites, mobile messaging, and other formats yet to be imagined and invented, have been added to the classic two-step model coupling one-to-one and one-to-many communication. At the very least, a conceptualization of a third variant – networked communication – and of a three-step flow across the variants seems overdue.

In order to examine the ongoing reconfiguration of media types vis-à-vis communicative practices, it is helpful to start from the communication: how do common practices and genres of communication come to be remediated (Bolter and Grusin 1999) – in the face of material, discursive, as well as institutional processes of digitalization? Like the digital computer, on whose shoulders it stands, the Internet, with its stationary and mobile terminals, is a meta-medium (Kay and Goldberg 1977/1999) – a medium that incorporates and refashions other media and old practices of communication, while facilitating new ones.

Table 25.1 lays out six prototypical forms of communication, which are instantiated both in face-to-face embodied interaction and in digital as well as analog media (for an empirical study of their interrelation, see Jensen and Helles, 2011). Along the horizontal dimension, the table distinguishes between synchronous and asynchronous communication. While the dividing line is variable – for instance, intensive text messaging may generate an experience of synchronous communication – the prototypes are well established in both scholarly and everyday understanding: telephone conversations as opposed to voice messages; live reporting from a news event compared to edited coverage in a later newscast. Along the vertical dimension, Table 25.1 distinguishes between communicative practices according to the number of participants: how many get to say something to how many others?

The illustrative examples in the cells of Table 25.1 are instances of technologically mediated communication since the printing press. In the present context, the many-to-many prototypes are of special interest, in part because they have been widely perceived as a new source of public participation in social life across political, economic, and cultural domains. However, many-to-many communication has few precedents. For synchronous communication, historical examples include a marketplace and a sports stadium and, for asynchronous communication, graffiti and community notice boards. (I leave aside here communications in organizations, movements, and communities, which typically involve a limited membership and leadership around specified issues, and which, accordingly, represent a different category than communications on an open network.) It is the coming of digital networks that has enabled many more, and more diverse, forms of many-to-many communication, even while research is still struggling to conceptualize this communicative prototype.

It should be specified that, in three-step (and two-step) flows of communication, the steps are not necessarily equivalent. There is a categorical difference between A telling something to B in the street, who later tells it to C at work or at home, and the condition in which A first listens to a radio newscast and, next, engages in a multiparty and multistep online interaction with B and C (and perhaps others) about it. Equally, the two-step flow (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944) comprised not just steps, but *types* of communication: 1940s news announcers addressing their listeners was one type of communicative event; listeners, whether opinion leaders or not, conversing locally with one or a few other people about their preferred presidential candidate was a different type. Not all communicative steps are created equal. In further research on networked communication, it seems crucial to clarify how, exactly, communication flows across several steps – one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many – including embodied or face-to-face communication (see, further, Jensen 2010).

Flows and Networks

The network terminology has been widespread, and contested, in recent theories of communication and society. Probably the most influential formulation has been offered by Manuel Castells (1996, 2004), who diagnosed an epochal network society – a world-historical transition from industrial capitalism to informational capitalism. While subject to criticism (Webster and Dimitriou 2004), Castells' framework helped to foreground a shift *from information as a resource*, not least of material production and administration ('the information society'), *to communication as a process* across all sectors of society. Three key notions suggest the implications of the general argument for communication research: spaces of flows, timeless time, and a culture of real virtuality. Dispersed physical spaces of social interaction are linked in real time; local times are subordinated to global flows of exchange; and our sense of reality includes both present and absent individuals and settings. The point is not that we enter 'virtual realities' in exceptional instances of media use, but that a substantial portion of all social interaction is technologically mediated – which does not make it any less real and consequential.

Also as a methodological category, networks have been gaining ground, in part, as a response to the coming of digital networks as central objects of study and, simultaneously, tools for analyzing such networks. Whereas the tradition of social network analysis (SNA) has predominantly employed quantitative metrics (Wasserman and Faust 1994), emerging qualitative approaches (Hollstein and Straus 2006) are providing a necessary complement. Networks comprise both global measurable structures and local nodes and links with contextual meanings. Not surprisingly, network analysis has proven quite applicable in previous communication studies (e.g., Wellman 1998). Communication is an inherently relational phenomenon: information represents states of affairs; users access information via diverse media; and users interact with information, and with each other, in contexts that themselves may be related in a material or immaterial, imagined sense.

Network analysis is characterized by its focus on relations, rather than entities. The central units of analysis are the relational ties between social actors (or the nodes in other kinds of systems – from ant colonies to financial markets), not their attributes as entities. Parents and children, buyers and sellers, elected officials and electorates – all can be defined by their interrelations. Relational ties can be understood as channels or vehicles for the flow of resources, which may be either material or immaterial (Wasserman and Faust 1994, p. 4). Parents provide food and emotional care to their children; buyers and sellers relate via goods as well as contracts; votes generate both symbolic positions and material benefits to the successful candidates for office.

Communication is a special, self-reflective type of relational tie: it represents the human capacity to consider how things, including all other types of social ties, might be different. Communication is a source of doubt and delay before individuals, groups, and entire societies do things that may have irreversible consequences. In most cases, communication is a constituent of other social interaction; in some cases, communication is a dedicated activity of deliberating on the ends and means of social coexistence. The nature and import of such deliberation, of course, depends on the historically and culturally available media technologies and institutions, which facilitate different kinds and numbers of communicative steps.

In media studies, the concept of flow was applied specifically to broadcasting by Raymond Williams (1974) in his classic account of television, simultaneously as a technology and a cultural form. Especially in commercial television formats, viewers are expected and encouraged to go with the flow – to keep watching throughout commercial breaks and transitions between programs. In later work, I suggested an analytical distinction between different types of flow (Jensen 1994). The *channel flow* of each station enters into the *super flow* of all the contents on offer; *audience flows* move across the various channel flows. Figure 25.1 indicates the relationship of the three television flows.

In digital media, the flows are comparable, yet different. The super flow of the Internet is much more composite and complex than any traditional television market. The channel flow of any site or service is more differentiated as well as more integrated with other channels. In addition, the user flows, on top of selections from and navigation between channels, include interactivity within the channels in question and a measure of co-creation of a customized flow. Even more important, digital networks, along with mobile terminals, enable the establishment of contexts of communication and action that were precluded in broadcasting: interactions with other users about information across any number of channels and coordinated actions in dispersed physical settings. Instantaneous access to the largest available information archive in history constitutes a resource of social action. The question is how different flows of communication may mediate between the information and the action.

To examine empirically the components of three-step flows, one can approach them from at least three analytical perspectives:

- *Information flows.* Like a broadcast channel, any Internet site can be understood as a flow of information, broadly speaking, including fictional narratives and



Figure 25.1 Three television flows.

entertainment genres. Like broadcast news and series, Internet contents draw on both real-life and literary sources, and give rise to all manner of discussions, online as well as offline. Unlike previous media, digital networks integrate one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many flows of information – technologically, discursively, and institutionally. They further facilitate the linking and embedding of such flows across several contexts of communication.

- *User flows.* Users flow across all available and accessible media types; other users serve as embodied media. The Internet and mobile media, at once, enable one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many interactions, and they support users flowing across these in one session or a later point in time with reference to earlier sessions. Digital media use, of course, also anticipates the use of print and broadcast media contents, in addition to good old-fashioned conversations.
- *Context flows.* Mobile media studies have introduced a notion of contextual mobility (Kakihara and Sørensen 2002). What is mobile in mobile communication is not so much the information, the user, or the technology, but the context in which they come together in communication. In mobile communication, entire configurations of social relations move about. One example, commonly cited in the literature on the liberating potentials of digital media (Jenkins 2006; Rheingold 2002), has been the use of mobile telephones to organize social protests in various national settings: text messages make real people take to the streets to communicate among themselves and to the powers that be.



Figure 25.2 Six levels of empirical research.

It is this multitude of flows that constitute one of the most pressing challenges for media and communication research in the early twenty-first century. Gone is the comparative simplicity of a relatively few mass media feeding information to opinion leaders for further discussion and deliberation, and of a delimited set of broadcast channels from which households or individuals would pick and choose.

Methods and Methodologies

In order to begin to select, or redevelop, research approaches to three-step flows of communication, it is appropriate to note the all too frequently neglected distinction between methods and methodologies. Whereas methods are the concrete instruments for collecting and analyzing empirical data, methodologies are theoretically informed plans of action. Methodologies motivate the choice of particular methods, and they support inferences about the implications of any given set of findings. Even if digital networks require new methods of documentation and measurement, methodologies remain generic and cross-media tools. New media, in certain respects, call for old methods (Jensen, 2011). Figure 25.2 sums up the place of methods and methodologies in a wider process of communication research (Jensen 2012, p. 287).

- The empirical *objects of analysis* include all manner of discourses, practices, and institutions that enable communication as a distinctive form of social interaction across time and space (conversations *via* media and *about* media, production practices, use contexts, legislative frameworks, business models, etc.). For three-step flows of communication, the relevant objects of study are more radically dispersed and variously conditioned than either interpersonal, mass, or two-step communication.

- *Data collection methods* – from content sampling frames to interview guides – necessarily delimit a very small portion of reality from which inferences and interpretations can be made. Importantly, collection and 'sampling' refer both to data that can be 'found' (e.g., online observations of internet communities) and data that are 'made' (e.g., interviews with their administrators and other key members).
- *Data analysis methods* are the diverse operations of segmenting, categorizing, and interpreting evidence. In addition, empirical studies will conduct meta-analyses in the shape of statistical tests for significance or an 'audit trail' (Lincoln and Guba 1985) documenting the steps of a qualitative study.
- *Methodology*, as noted, can be understood as a theoretically informed plan of empirical action. Linking concrete methods and abstract theories, this level serves to explicate the status of the data being found *and* made, by qualitative *and* quantitative means – their explanatory value regarding one or more steps of communication. If methods are techniques, methodologies are the technologies of research, mapping theoretical frameworks on to empirical domains of interest.
- *Theoretical frameworks* lend meaning and relevance to – make sense of – a configuration of empirical findings. Theory constitutes a frame (Goffman 1974; Lakoff and Johnson 1980) that matches a highly selective empirical microcosm with a general conceptual macrocosm. Theories are distinctive or opposed insofar as they afford certain interpretations, while ruling out or discouraging others.
- Whereas theoretical frameworks typically are developed for and applied to different substantive domains – nature or culture, society or the human psyche – theories are supported by additional, meta-theoretical premises and arguments at the *epistemological* level. Most simply, epistemology addresses the what, how, and why of empirical inquiry: what is the nature of the domain of interest, how can we know about it, and why do we want to? Communication is, at once, one of the most common and one of the most socially specific and culturally variable of human practices.

The methods of media and communication research, on the one hand, present a toolbox that has been finely tuned for decades. On the other hand, like media themselves, methods are being remediated (Bolter and Grusin 1999) in response to new media and communicative practices. To begin, Table 25.2 presents six basic sources of evidence, traditionally divided into qualitative and quantitative prototypes (with examples from Internet studies) (Jensen 2011). First, verbal accounts are a raw material of both the humanities and social sciences. Oral and written statements provide multifaceted evidence about communication as a process as well as a product. Second, human actions are meaningful, for the actors in question and for others observing them, including researchers. Whatever anybody does in context is open to interpretation and communication: humans "cannot not communicate" (Watzlawick, Beavin, and

Table 25.2 Basic methods in media and communication research.

	Quantitative	*Qualitative*
Discourse/speech/writing	Survey interviewing (offline and online)	In-depth individual and focus-group interviewing (offline and online)
Behavior/action	Experiment (e.g., web usability studies)	Participating observation (e.g., digital ethnographies)
Texts/documents/artifacts	Content analysis (e.g., of political information resources and search engines as meta-information)	Discourse analysis; historical and aesthetic criticism (e.g. of 'netspeak' and digital artworks)

Jackson 1967, p. 49). Third, the various records and documents that individuals, groups, and organizations leave behind communicate about ideas, plans, and events, whether intentionally or not. The administrative files and autobiography of a media executive likely tell different stories.

In Table 25.2, the two lower cells – content analysis and discourse studies – have gained renewed importance in connection with digital media. The computer and, by extension, the Internet and other digital networks simply generate vast amounts and diverse types of text. For example, subscribing to an RSS feed, forwarding a news story from a website, or meta-tagging a blog entry, first produces an additional communicative event and, next, perhaps proliferating communicative sequences. A new wealth of discourses and documents are becoming available.

Most important, such communicative events and sequences are documented in and of the operation of the system – they leave a bit trail. Also, the data transmitted are associated with meta-data – data about data that are a source of information in their own right, beyond the information that is sent and received. Meta-information situates the information being exchanged in communication in relation to its context, or perhaps several contexts – the source of the information, its connections with other items, their trajectories across sites and servers, the actual users of the information, who, perhaps, add their own meta-information, etc. As a result, the contents, but also the forms and some of the contexts of communication, are readily available for analysis, raising fundamental legal and ethical issues.

Also, the four other prototypical methods present new options and issues. For (participating) observation, what goes on at social network sites or virtual worlds already presents itself as 'contents' and 'discourses,' as examined in digital or virtual ethnographies (Hine 2000). In comparison with the classic written and, later, electronic records of anthropologists, online archives offer a preexisting data structure, in addition to real-time details. For experiments, digital media are both a flexible instrument and a repository of findings concerning variable uses and interactions (Jacko and Shears 2003) – and enhanced possibilities for multisite and field experiments. Finally, for surveys as well as qualitative interviews (Mann and Stewart 2000), the Internet represents an important complement to data collection face-to-face and via telephone; digital networks further facilitate the analysis, visualization, and dissemination of data (to collaborators) and findings (to the end users of research).

In one sense, the evidence is just there – to be found. In another sense, the opportunity to use it must be made and, sometimes, rejected on legal, ethical, or methodological grounds. Meta-information gives insight into meta-communication – the ways in which people seek to establish and maintain communicative ties. While meta-communication has taken on special salience with digital media, it is a necessary condition of communication in any medium. We cannot *not* meta-communicate.

Meta-Communication and Meta-Media

Originated by Gregory Bateson (1972) in studies of face-to-face communication, the concept of meta-communication suggests that 'how' and 'why' we seek to communicate are part and parcel of 'what' we end up communicating. With a standard example from logic – "the cat is on the mat" – Bateson first noted that this proposition carries a denotation that refers to a state of affairs in the world: the position of a furry four-legged organism in space (on a mat that we can point to) and time (is, not was). Beyond denotations, however, people, first, give *meta-linguistic* information, for instance, to clarify that the word 'cat' might include a reference to tigers. Second, they *meta-communicate* about their relationship as communicators, "e.g., 'My telling you where to find the cat [tiger] was friendly,' or 'This is play.'" Communication thus operates at several levels at once, including nonverbal communication, as well. Indeed, "the vast majority of both metalinguistic and metacommunicative messages remain implicit" (Bateson 1972, p. 151), so that they must be inferred from their 'context' – in a discursive, material, or social sense.

Outside face-to-face settings, we still depend on the two mechanisms of meta-communication: codification and communicative relationships. In classic mass communication, genres are key. Genres can be defined as discursive conventions of expressing and experiencing a particular subject matter in common – a contract of sorts between sender and receiver – such as epic, dramatic, and lyrical formats, from the printed page to the television screen. On digital networks, genres include, for instance, websites and wikis, online dating services and first-person-shooter games.

Also below the manifest level of genre conventions, meta-communication is operative; as indicated by Bateson, it is mostly implicit. Web search engines (Halavais 2009) are a good illustration of meta-communication in action: they codify information and enact communicative relationships. Depending on the coded structure of available information on the web, I retrieve it (or not) *as* information and as *this* kind of information with some personal and contextual relevance. Moreover, I establish a communicative relationship, in the first instance not with identifiable individuals or institutions, but with a distributed information resource. As I search, I both provide input to and reconfigure the system, however minimally. My meta-communication, therefore, pre-figures subsequent searches by others (and by myself), who may, next, interact about, and perhaps act on, their outcome. All the while, these communicative events are registered, along with other information that users enter, more or less willingly and knowingly.

The point, in the present context, is not so much that government surveillance and commercial data mining may (ab)use meta-communication, but rather that meta-communication is a ground role of digital media and, hence, of a wide range of relevant research questions. In face-to-face interaction, most meta-communication literally disappears into the air; mass media use traditionally has been sampled and documented for dedicated purposes or research, development, and marketing. Most meta-communication in any medium moves below the users' radar of awareness. In digital media, however, meta-communication is not necessarily or permanently lost. Meta-communication in meta-media is special. The question is who can and will do what with all this meta-information.

It should be noted that the terminologies of meta-communication and meta-media have separate origins. Meta-communication is a constitutive feature of any communicative practice in any medium. In comparison, "meta-medium" (Kay and Goldberg 1977/1999) represented an ad hoc conceptualization of the computer as a medium of communication. By extension, various digital media forms can be understood as meta-media. The Internet is a medium like no other; it also is remediating and, to an extent, subsuming previous media as discourses and institutions. Because the Internet depends and thrives on meta-communication, its distinctive ways of codifying information and maintaining communicative relationships should be at the top of any future research agenda.

The Internet, however, is only one component of the contemporary global communications infrastructure. For one thing, communication is local from any user's perspective. "All experience is local … We are always in place, and place is always with us" (Meyrowitz 1989, p. 326). It is far from every step of communication that is already documented and ready for analysis. For another thing, networks, though far-flung, in practice tend to have centers and hierarchical structures. 'Old' mass media remain hubs in the dissemination of news and entertainment to local, regional, and global publics; as institutions, media are embedded with nation-states, markets, and civil society. On top, technologically mediated communication, of both the interpersonal and the mass variety, is increasingly integrated with face-to-face interactions, as indicated by the extraordinary diffusion of mobile media around the globe (Castells *et al.* 2007). Future communication research needs all the data it can find and make, qualitative as well as quantitative.

Qualitative Data – Made and Found

The current global media environment presents different opportunities for qualitative and quantitative studies. Quantitative research, traditionally the dominant approach, has gained a new resource with digital media. They are, of course, versatile instruments of data collection and analysis for surveys, experiments, and content studies. In addition, digital networks support the extensive sharing and reanalysis of data, whether found or made. More important, large datasets that are auto-generated lend themselves to detailed analyses of use patterns through data mining (Han and Kamber 2006). Records of one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many communications are of obvious commercial interest in user profiling and product development; they also provide a baseline of data concerning communicative practices prevalent in different social and cultural settings. In the terminology of flows introduced earlier in this chapter, information flows, user flows, and some of their intersections are natural candidates for data mining and related methodologies. The point is not that data mining is replacing data collection, but rather that new varieties and combinations of data that are found and made may be possible.

In qualitative research, such opportunities may be less self-evident. Inspired by classic anthropology, Chicago-school sociology, symbolic interactionism, and other approaches with constructionist leanings, qualitative media and communication studies (Jensen and Jankowski 1991) have traditionally emphasized the locally grounded nature of 'data,' if that term is accepted. In this light, it might be more appropriate to refer to the construction, or co-construction, than to the 'collection' of data. The resulting 'datasets,' as in the case of an anthropologist's field notes, have not commonly been shared with other researchers; qualitative group projects still seem to be the exception rather than the rule. The use of computer software for the administration and analysis of data has often met with skepticism, as alien to the qualitative enterprise, despite openings since the mid-1990s (Lewins and Silver 2007).

Qualitative research is eminently suited to explore three-step flows of communication, as always complementing quantitative studies, but also filling the gaps that follow from the very wealth of found meta-data. Essential conditions and circumstances of communication do not record themselves. Qualitative methodologies traditionally have discovered and recovered the contexts of communication – the intersections of information flows and user flows. To exemplify, feature movies are presented one-to-many on silver screens (and smaller screens), recommended (or not) one-to-one by text message and in the flesh, and recreated by fan communities many-to-many online. As already suggested, communicative contexts themselves can be seen to flow: when interlinked, a sequence of communicative events may create, for instance, a public flash mob or a private surprise party. Networks of communication and action can be mobilized as well as established ad hoc. It is the contextual and contingent nature of communication in general and its multiple flows in particular that call for more, and more diverse, qualitative studies of the current media environment.

Information, user, and context flows all lend themselves to qualitative research. Information flows, first, have typically been examined quantitatively and cumulatively, for instance, in studies of the international distribution of news (Sreberny *et al.* 1985). One qualitative route was suggested in a study of "the natural history of a news item" (Deacon, Fenton, and Bryman 1999), that is, the stepwise reconstruction of one news story across many moments of encoding and decoding. User flows, second, while addressed to some degree for communication campaigns (Rice and Atkin 2000), have commonly been examined one medium at a time with commercial motivations. The call by Janice Radway (1988), over twenty years ago, for more qualitative research on media uses, departing from a community and its members rather than from the media, has gone largely unanswered. Context flows, finally, have not normally been part of the conceptual repertoire of media studies, but suggests itself for research on mobile and other communication networks. One topical issue is whether blogs and other new formats might be taking over the role of agenda setters from traditional news media; early studies suggest that they do not (Himelboim, Gleave, and Smith 2009; Meraz 2009), and that established media may remain the central nodes of flows and networks, at least for the politically central news genre.

It should be added that a division of labor that involves 'quantitavists finding' and 'qualitavists making' data will only do part of the job. Also for qualitative research, digital networks constitute a resource that makes available an unprecedented amount of data to be found and studied, much of it locally originated, embedded, and communicated about. For culturally comparative studies, the Internet represents a unique archive, including records of people talking back, both to each other and to distant others as imagined, for better or worse. The book title *The Empire Writes Back* (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2002) suggested how cultural practices and personal identities are articulated in communication, partly in opposition to past and present powers. The world has economic and political centers with many dependents; on the Internet, some nodes are more equal than others. This should not discourage its users from writing back, or qualitative research from studying, in depth and in context, the steps, flows, and networks of their communications.

Conclusion

In the early days of media and communication research, following the realization that mass media, after all, might have limited effects, Elihu Katz (1959) famously proposed that the field must study not only what media do to people but also what people do with media. What people do with media is to communicate – as senders and receivers, and in one-to-one, one-to-many, as well as many-to-many configurations. Digital media entail a shift of analytical focus from media to communication – to the many ordinary and extraordinary purposes that people accomplish in and through communication.

In this chapter, I have suggested that communication in digital networks – and in conjunction with traditional mass media and face-to-face interaction – can be understood as a three-step flow of communication. The two-step flow model (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944) anticipated the contemporary understanding of communicative and other social relations as networks. In empirical studies, three-step communication can be operationalized, further, with reference to information, user, and context flows, each of which may be described by a variety of methods. A distinctive feature of digital or meta-media is that they record (some of) their own flows of communication and meta-communication. As such, they provide quantitative data on information flows and users flows, and qualitative data on their intersection *in* contexts and their flows *across* contexts. In each case, the explanatory value of the methods that serve to tap these data depends on the methodologies that motivate them and the theories that frame them. Neither quantitative nor qualitative data speak directly to us. Whether found or made, data must be communicated and interpreted.

The media environment of three-step flows could be considered a test of the field of communication research, half a century after its emergence. Quantitative studies document, not least, the co-ocurrence and co-variation of information and users across media. Qualitative studies explore the transitions and transformations of information and user flows – within and across contexts. Are current qualitative and quantitative methodologies, jointly, equipped to account for practices and institutions of communication that differ remarkably from the 'mass communication' that the field was founded to address?

Acknowledgment

This chapter draws on and extends work published in Jensen (2011).

References

Ashcroft, B., Griffiths, G. and Tiffin, H. (2002) *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures*, 2nd edn. London and New York: Routledge.

Bateson, G. (1972) *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*. London: Granada.

Bolter, J.D. and Grusin, R. (1999) *Remediation: Understanding New Media*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Castells, M. (1996) *The Rise of the Network Society*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Castells, M. (ed.) (2004) *The Network Society: A Cross-Cultural Perspective*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Castells, M., Fernández-Ardèval, M., Qiu, J.L. and Sey, A. (2007) *Mobile Communication and Society*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Deacon, D., Fenton, N. and Bryman, A. (1999) From inception to reception: the natural history of a news item, *Media, Culture and Society*, **21** (1), 5–31.

Fink, E.J. and Gantz, W. (1996) A content analysis of three mass communication research traditions: social science, interpretive studies, and critical analysis, *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, **73** (1), 114–134.

Gitlin, T. (1978) Media sociology: the dominant paradigm, *Theory and Society*, **6**, 205–253.

Goffman, E. (1974) *Frame Analysis*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Halavais, A. (2009) *Search Engine Society*. Cambridge: Polity.

Han, J. and Kamber, M. (2006) *Data Mining: Concepts and Techniques*, 2nd edn. Boston: Elsevier.

Himelboim, I., Gleave, E. and Smith, M. (2009) Discussion catalysts in online political discussions: content importers and conversation starters, *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, **14**, 771–789.

Hine, C. (2000) *Virtual Ethnography*. London: Sage.

Hollstein, B. and Straus, F. (eds) (2006) *Qualitative Netzwerkanalyse. Konzepte, Methoden, Anwendungen*. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag.

Jacko, J.A. and Shears, A. (eds) (2003) *The Human–Computer Interaction Handbook: Fundamentals, Evolving Technologies, and Emerging Applications*. Newark, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Jenkins, H. (2006) *Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide*. New York: New York University Press.

Jensen, K.B. (1994) Reception as flow: the 'new television viewer' revisited, *Cultural Studies*, **8** (2), 293–305.

Jensen, K.B. (2010) *Media Convergence: The Three Degrees of Network, Mass, and Interpersonal Communication*. London and New York: Routledge.

Jensen, K.B. (2011) New media, old methods: Internet methodologies and the online/offline divide, in M. Consalvo and C. Ess (eds), *The Blackwell Companion to Internet Studies*. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 43–58.

Jensen, K.B. (2012) The complementarity of qualitative and quantitative methodologies in media and communication research, in K.B. Jensen (ed.), *A Handbook of Media and Communication Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Methodologies*, 2nd edn. London: Routledge, pp. 283–301.

Jensen, K.B. and Helles, R. (2011) The Internet as a cultural forum: implications for research, *New Media and Society*, **13** (4), 517–533.

Jensen, K.B. and Jankowski, N.W. (eds) (1991) *A Handbook of Qualitative Methodologies for Mass Communication Research*. London: Routledge.

Kakihara, M. and Sørensen, C. (2002) Mobility: an extended perspective. Paper presented at the Hawaii International Conference on *System Sciences*, Big Island, Hawaii, January 7–10, 2002.

Katz, E. (1959) Mass communication research and the study of popular culture: an editorial note on a possible future for this journal, *Studies in Public Communication*, **2**, 1–6.

Katz, E. and Lazarsfeld, P.F. (1955) *Personal Influence*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.

Kay, A. and Goldberg, A. (1999) Personal dynamic media, in P.A. Mayer (ed.), *Computer Media and Communication: A Reader*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 111–119 (Original work published 1977).

Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. (1980) *Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Lazarsfeld, P.F., Berelson, B. and Gaudet, H. (1944) *The People's Choice*. New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce.

Lewins, A. and Silver, C. (2007) *Using Software in Qualitative Research: A Step-by-Step Guide*. Los Angeles, CA: Sage.

Lincoln, Y.S. and Guba, E.G. (1985) *Naturalistic Inquiry*. London: Sage.

McCombs, M.E. and Shaw, D.L. (1972) The agenda-setting function of mass media, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, **36**, 176–187.

Mann, C. and Stewart, F. (2000) *Internet Communication and Qualitative Research: A Handbook for Researching Online*. London: Sage.

Meraz, S. (2009) Is there an elite hold? Traditional media to social media agenda setting influence in blog networks, *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, **14**, 682–707.

Meyrowitz, J. (1989) The generalized elsewhere, *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, **6** (3), 326–334.

Park, D.W. and Pooley, J. (eds) (2008) *The History of Media and Communication Research: Contested Memories*. New York: Peter Lang.

Peirce, C.S. (1931–1958) *Collected Papers*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Peters, J.D. (1999) *Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Radway, J. (1988) Reception study: ethnography and the problem of dispersed audiences and nomadic subjects, *Cultural Studies*, **2** (3), 359–376.

Rheingold, H. (2002) *Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution*. New York: Perseus.

Rice, R.E. and Atkin, C.K. (eds) (2000) *Public Communication Campaigns*, 3rd edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Rogers, E.M. (1999) Anatomy of two subdisciplines of communication study, *Human Communication Research*, **25** (4), 618–631.

Sreberny, A., Nordenstreng, K., Stevenson, R. and Ugboajah, F. (eds) (1985) *Foreign News in the Media: International Reporting in 29 Countries*. Paris: UNESCO.

Wasserman, S. and Faust, K. (1994) *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Watzlawick, P., Beavin, J.H. and Jackson, D.D. (1967) *Pragmatics of Human Communication: A Study of Interactional Patterns, Pathologies, and Paradoxes.* New York: Norton.

Webster, F. and Dimitriou, B. (eds) (2004) *Manuel Castells.* London: Sage.

Wellman, B. (ed.) (1998) *Networks in the Global Village: Life in Contemporary Communities.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Williams, R. (1974) *Television: Technology and Cultural Form.* London: Fontana.

26

Finding Yourself in the Past, the Present, the Local, and the Global
Potentialities of Mediated Cosmopolitanism as a Research Methodology

Ruth Teer-Tomaselli and Lauren Dyll-Myklebust

Background and Methodology

How do people make sense of themselves in our ever-changing society? These changes are spurred on by media and communications that are deeply implicated in the process of globalization, both as agents of change and as a result of these changes. Massive and rapid developments alter the balance of power on a macro-scale and the way we live our lives and interact with our fellow human beings on a micro-scale. Advances in communication technology have led to the erosion of local boundaries and made for interconnection on a world scale, resulting in what Manuel Castells (2000) refers to as the "network society".

A graduate course at The Centre for Communication, Media and Society (CCMS) of the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), South Africa, explores the fascinating movement of information and communication across the globe. Entitled *Media in a Global World*, it examines the technical, economic, cultural, and political aspects of globalization and provides a holistic overview of the developments in the communication landscape in the twenty-first century.

As part of their assessment, graduate students undertake individual research projects that seek to explore mediated globalization, which, through the choice in student topics, can be more appropriately expressed as mediated cosmopolitanism (explained below). The objectives are to provide exercises in creating "dialogues" between the theoretical tenets of mediated globalization (for example, "time–space distantization", "cosmopolitanism", "global identity", "cultural imperialism", "cultural homogenization", and the concurrent "cultural heterogeneity", "digital divide", among others) and real-world sets of examples (collected empirical data via interviews, observation, recording, coding and cataloguing).

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

The examples in each project must relate to media, or at least a single medium, either "traditional" (television, print newspapers/magazines, radio, billboards) or a quintessentially "new medium", iconic of the period of globalization (the Internet and its various fora – email, blogspheres, chat rooms, or "virtual world" and communal interaction sites such as MySpace, Facebook, Flickr, etc). Other forms of communication, such as telephony in any of its guises (fixed line, cellphone/mobile, Skype, Mxit), are also identified by the project criteria as offering fruitful areas of investigation.

To aid their understanding of this type of global media research methodology, students are introduced to Terhi Rantanen's (2005) concept of a "global mediagraphy". This is a media ethnography that seeks "to incorporate individuals and their media use in a structured way into a phenomenon we can call mediated globalization" (Rantanen 2005, p. 15). Rantanen uses mediagraphies in an intergenerational context, to compare the different experiences of mediated globalization among people of different ages within single families, and in a comparative sense, different families from different parts of the world. Her project seeks to pinpoint the multiplicity and complexity of connections, the crucial differences and similarities in life experience. Thus, there is both an intergenerational and an international comparative aspect to her work.

The methodology for the graduate students, however, is outlined in a more flexible manner: to compare any identified demographic with any other. The project criteria require a comparison of either intergenerational responses (vertical comparison) or intragenerational responses (horizontal comparison) to the changing media environment and social processes. In the examples below, the first four studies employed intergenerational approaches, while the last two used horizontal methodology within a single generation.

The student mediagraphies draw on oral traditions and include memories and family histories. Information can be gathered through biographies and/or autobiographies, which are to be collected through self- and comparative-introspection and reflective ethnography. Contemporary ethnographies can be sourced through interviews – either face-to-face or via electronic communication (emails, blog sites, and telephony). Mediagraphies incorporate an approximate ethnographic study, utilizing interviews that are "at the heart of doing ethnography because they seek the words of the people we are studying, the richer the better, so that we can understand their situation with increasing clarity" (Ely *et al.* 1991, p. 58). In a thoroughly post-modern turn, one of the students, in undertaking his research, recorded the responses of his interviewees on a mobile phone, and then later transcribed his data:

> The use of the mobile phone ensured that the participants were relaxed without the intimidation of a pen and pad as the phone is easily forgotten as the interview progresses. The interviews therefore took a conversational tone which allowed for better expression from the participants regarding such a controversial issue (Mthiyane 2010, p. 175).

The present chapter discusses the concerns and findings of six of these projects, written in different years by different cohorts of students, in order to explore the wide and varying ways in which students *made sense* of this methodology, their preferred topics of exploration, and possible reasons for these choices. Many students took the criteria, expanded them in different ways, and pushed the limits according to their own research interest (fashion, heritage, sexuality). The chapter, therefore, does not offer insights into globalization per se but aims to expand the range of working methodologies in graduate instruction.

All six of the original projects received ethical clearance from the UKZN Research Office, and all authors have provided written permission for their work to be showcased here. While the authors' names have been retained, all their respondents have been given pseudonyms.

Globalization, Media, and Cultural Consumption and the Construction of the "Global Identity"

The first two studies use the classic intergenerational mediagraphy approach. Natalie Emslie (2006, pp. 1–24) explored the role television played in the lives of three generations of her family, "revealing an intersection between personal and institutional influences". Emslie's study argued that "media have a particular role to play in globalization, because media serve a 'dual' role within society, as an 'economic player' and as a 'site of cultural production and dissemination'" (Heuva, Tomaselli, and Teer-Tomaselli 2004, p. 97). Her concern went beyond access to and consumption of television to incorporate the patterns of meaning-making by specific people within a specific socio-political context. Here she self-consciously follows Rantanen (2005, p. 18): "Since globalization is a product of human intervention it is necessary to also analyze how individuals contribute to globalization through their individual media activities, which become social practices". Emslie was specifically interested to tease out the ways in which the production, distribution, and consumption of television programming elucidated issues of globalization: "the immediacy and standardization of time,…an analysis of place and space, as well as related concepts of de-territorialization and indigenization" before concluding with "an understanding of the development of hybrid identities" (Emslie 2006, p. 2). The research supports Anthony Giddens' (1990) proposition that globalization is "reshaping" our lives at a personal and institutional level. The analysis of each generation's relationship to television revealed globalization as a complex phenomenon influenced by the context in which it is produced and consumed, frequently producing contradictory results. Emslie applied a political economic and cultural analysis approach in order to analyze how economic, political, and social/cultural issues intersect at both the personal and institutional levels simultaneously.

Her family sample consisted of her own Grandfather, "Johnny", her mother "Annabelle", and finished it off by including her own perceptions as "Generation Three". "Generation One", Johnny, was born in Cape Town in 1933. Johnny had a rural childhood without running water or electricity. Eight years of school was followed by a career first as an artisan and later as a clerk in the Durban High Court. Johnny lived through World War Two, when South Africa was still a Dominion in the British Empire; he experienced life during apartheid and democracy. He defines himself in terms of his family heritage as an Irish–Dutch, Afrikaans–English South African.

"Generation Two" is represented by Annabelle, born in Durban 1954. She graduated with a Bachelor of Commerce and all her adult life she has been employed in banking, rising to a senior position in one of South Africa's largest banks. Annabelle grew up during apartheid and democracy and defines herself in terms of Polish and South African inheritances.

"Generation Three", Natalie, was born in 1984 in Durban and has lived in only one home her entire life. A masters degree graduate, she is a lecturer in a private college, and a doctoral candidate at UKZN. She lived through the last years of apartheid and now democracy and defines herself in terms of her South African nationality, as well as belonging to "global youth culture" (Emslie 2006, p. 13).

Emslie's mediagraphy illustrated the awareness in each generation of globalization's influence on the immediacy and standardization of time. From the inception of television in 1976 to the introduction of M-Net (the terrestrial subscription channel) in 1984, the national South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) held a monopoly. It was only in 1991 that M-Net migrated to the digital satellite platform offering a multichanneled viewing environment. These developments were premised on political, economic, and technological determinations that had direct consequences for the personal and household routines of viewers. Consequently, for earlier generation's television programming, for example, "the news", was rigidly scheduled, and family routines were arranged around these times: "the news" was at seven in the evening and if that bulletin was missed, one had to rely on the radio for news until the news bulletin at seven the next morning. Emslie (2006, p. 19) notes that "the first and second generation appreciated this immediacy of time much more than the third generation [since] these generations lived through apartheid and remembered how the government controlled and restricted viewing". Thus political–economic circumstances affected the immediacy of experiencing news events, both through the tight hold on the monopoly of news programming and through the ideological control of what and how much information could be released at a specific time. The third generation (Emslie herself), who from the outset of her life enjoyed satellite television's multiplicity of channels and 24-hour rolling news formats, was "much more aware of the global standardization of time" (Emslie 2006, p. 2). All three generations appreciated the way in which television is able to diminish and contract "space", to induce a sense of "being there", of distant experiences and cultures into their everyday lives. They "referred to the events of 9/11 … and how the live news feeds that they watched brought the event into their living space as it happened" (Emslie 2006, p. 14).

In this way, not only were the categories of "time", "place", and "space" interrogated in a concrete way but issues of "de-territorialization" and "indigenization", two further markers of globalization, were given explicit form. Each generation understood that television provides potentialities for the representation and negotiation of local and global identities. Despite the claustrophobically isolationist policies of the apartheid government, it was still possible for individuals to interact with global identities through the incorporation of distant events and processes as an important aspect of their personal lives. Yet, compared to those limited apartheid opportunities, "today each generation has a greater likelihood of interacting with an increased number of global identities" (Emslie 2006, p. 17). Further, "each generation indigenized these global media products by bringing these into the rituals of life" (Emslie 2006, p. 18). Imported programming, mostly American (Johnny enjoys *Survivor* and *The Sopranos*), was integrated into the family's daily routines, and they identified with characters that were essentially "imported" into their lives.

An important result of this de-territorialization has been the way in which television has provided "a site where people can negotiate local and global identities simultaneously and in so doing further contribute to each generation's construction of hybrid identities" (Emslie 2006, p. 20). This clearly reinforces Mike Featherstone's (1995, p. 181) notion that in today's globalized society local and global cultures are relational. "Hybrid identities", to coin Stuart Hall's (1996, p. 277) phrase, occur when individuals compose themselves "not of a single, but of several, sometimes contradictory or unresolved identities". Hybrid identities possibly undermine the very notion of unified national and cultural identities, especially with increased contact with local and global cultures in television over the years.

Alison Logie's (2006, pp. –56) study focused "on questioning the claim of globalisation leading to the homogenisation of fashion identities, by looking at the experiences of one particular family over three generations". Logie interviewed her respondents on their early childhood memories of media consumption, choices, and sources. She was curious to know whether increased media exposure could be correlated with a greater sense of "fashion heterogeneity", and whether a "global awareness" translated into "global fashion identity". Thus clothing and fashion were used as sociological "markers" of cultural consumption and cultural identity.

"June" was born in the 1930s and brought up in the farming districts of the Natal Midlands, and, as with Johnny, rural life was hard and simple: going to school was a horseback ride away and "water had to be collected with donkey carts and then warmed up on the coal stove" (Logie 2006, p. 37). Media consumption was confined to the shortwave radio whose battery was charged on the farm windmill and weekly newspapers bought from the town hairdresser. There was one communal radio in the home, and the "evening news" was a family ritual. Boarding school brought an increase in media consumption with imported British magazines, weekly visits to the cinema, where newsreels were an important element of entertainment, and the family's first telephone, a wind-up communal party-line run from the local switchboard.

"Brenda", daughter of June, was born in the early 1950s and led a relatively itinerant life as her father was an Anglican (Episcopalian) priest and moved from town to village across Natal. Again, radio was the main medium within the household, and the programming schedule dictated much of the family routine, punctuated by specific news, music, and entertainment programming, many of which she was able to remember with clarity. Each day her father would buy milk, bread, and the morning newspaper from "the tearoom" in town. Her first television set was purchased in 1978, two years after the introduction of television into the country and only after her marriage. Thus both women "lived relatively 'isolated' lives, due to the lack of media interference, which Rantanen (2005, p. 8) cites as crucial to the spread of globalized messages" (Logie 2006, p. 44). Logie concludes that both women felt the "wrath of globalization" considerably less than the other two family members interviewed. Both experienced media as being "local, autonomous, distinct and well-defined", sustaining a "connection between geographical place and cultural experience" (Tomlinson 1999, p. 269). Logie (2006, p. 44) notes that "their media did not often move past the borders of their towns. The news received was largely localised. In other words the media was a stable aspect of society, able to stabilise identity".

Gail and Stuart are Brenda's children, born in the early 1980s and 1990s, respectively.

> The younger cohort could not remember a time without television, radio, newspapers and magazines. They remembered always being exposed to ideas which extended beyond their local community. This exposure to a "global cultural identity" experienced by the younger cohort is seen to have influenced their "fashion identities" in many respects. The older cohorts did not remember fashion being of particular importance during their childhood and they did not feel much pressure to dress a certain way, nor did they remember a range of clothes to pick from. They mainly wore what was available, which meant that they probably looked much the same as most people in their communities. The younger cohorts, since being able to search globally for information, had a wider choice of options about what to wear. They could combine ideas locally with those from other countries (Logie 2006, p. 49).

Thus the younger cohorts may exist with a far more heterogeneous fashion identity than their older family members, who did not have access to media and different ideas. The media in this case can be understood as a heterogenizing force, opposed to a homogenizing force, as it is often accused of being. Therefore the generations of today, with the help of media, are able to form identities that extend beyond what is available locally and choose the way they want to "look". Answering her initial question of whether media exposure promoted a homogenization of fashion identity, Logie is ambivalent, drawing attention to the complex processes in childhood fashion sense, and suggesting that media exposure is only one of the many components at work in a fashion identity.

De-territorialization, Immigration, and Mediated Cosmopolitanism

The two families presented in this section are similar in that they are both diasporic and are Muslim, but differ in many ways. The focus of each student's analysis is also different.

Abdi Ali Seid produced a transnational and transgenerational picture of four generations of his family, beginning with his grandmother and ending with his daughter, facing different challenges in different socio-political circumstances and provided with different media choices. Seid's mediagraphy illustrates the way in which they traversed these changes in the face of globalization by intertwining the family member's personal, political and media-policy influences. Representatives of the four generations are his daughter's matrilineal great-grandmother, "Mysha", born in 1919 in a rural area outside Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) where she now lives; grandmother "Rawah" who was born in 1942 in Addis Ababa where she still lives; mother, "Nailah", who was born in Addis Ababa in 1962 but now lives in Lusaka (Zambia); and "Isha" herself, born in 1997, who moved from Addis Ababa to Lusaka when she was six years old. At the time of writing the mediagraphy, Seid lived away from his family as he was in South Africa studying.

Sana Ebrahim's transnational and transgenerational analysis presents an investigation of everyday mediated cosmopolitanism across three generations of the "Dawud" family with two members per generation. They include: her patrilineal grandfather, "Dawud" (born in 1930) and her grandmother "Rabia" (born in 1925), who were both born in the Indian Village of Janghar and now reside in the Seychelles. Generation Two includes her parents, "Wasim" (born in 1951 in the Seychelles) and "Maryam" (born in 1953 in South Africa), both of whom reside in South Africa. Generation Three consists of Sana herself (born in 1985) and her sister "Amal" (born in 1990). Both women were raised in South Africa.

Whereas Ebrahim's study links more clearly with the discussion of mediated cosmopolitanism, Seid's study is important as, like Ebrahim's, it speaks to the relationship between immigration and media globalization.

> The mutual interaction of immigration and those old and new media that can be used all over the world is giving rise to a new complexity…As one generation replaces another, differing styles of media use and production tend to develop, which may bolster both ethnicity and multi- or transculturalism (Hafez 2007, p. 129).

Due to a prevalence of programming from countries of origin via satellite, immigrants "can make themselves at home more effectively than ever before in the old world of their culture, ethnicity and religion" (Hafez 2007, p. 130). Two assumed effects of this de-territorialization within immigrant communities are: (i) integration within an immigrant's new environment is aided, thus creating global cultural change, or (ii) integration with the new environment is hindered reinforcing fragmentation and "ethnicization".

However, both Seid and Ebrahim's mediagraphies illustrate that these two "extreme" frameworks do not completely account for the processes at play, a point that is reinforced by Marie Gillespie's (1997) study with Indian immigrants to England. Different generations of immigrants sometimes perceive the range of television programs and other media offerings, from their country of origin and the country in which they now reside, in dissimilar ways, as is illustrated in Seid's (2006) study.

Great-grandmother Mysha does not place value on either local Ethiopian or foreign media programs. She tells Seid (2006, p. 74), "Now I am too old to follow media. Even when I was adult, I was always busy with my day-to-day activities and I felt sorry for people who listen to radio and watch television and waste their time." However, for her teenage great-grandaughter, Isha, living in Zambia, digital satellite television and Arabsat programming are part of her everyday activities. *Buffy the Vampire Slayer*, *Black Angel*, and *Charmed* are among her favorites. Mysha's negative reaction to these American fantasy programs highlights her religious and moral standpoint:

> She believes that most television messages are the work of Satan. She sometimes scolds her grandchildren, wondering how they can spend their time sitting and watching such "trashes" and gives commands in the house to switch it off especially during prayer times or Ramadan (Seid 2006, p. 73).

Like Mysha, Rawah, as the second generation, lives in Addis Ababa, her country of birth. Rawah remembers listening to the news and programs that were broadcast over the government loudspeaker in Abune Petros Avenue. "Most of the time the news was about the palace and as kids we were happy to hear about the situation of the country. I liked also listening to Roman Work's programme for women which was about hygiene, health related issues for women, how to raise children and how to cook" (Rawah in Seid 2006, p. 65). Media consumption was therefore more the norm compared to when Mysha was a young woman, since the first time she listened to the radio was in her mid-twenties. During Rawah's youth the media agenda was based on politics (nationalism) and health education for females who generally did not have access to high levels of education (at age 14 Rawah stopped attending school when she got married). Over the years Rawah learnt Arabic. As a result she no longer reads newspapers but focuses her reading on the Holy Qur'an, therefore revitalizing her religious identity. She does still, however, listen to/watch current affairs and health programming on the radio or television. She regularly watches local Ethiopian news and also places value on foreign news complaining that:

> Ethiopian television is unable to present foreign news like the old times. She is interested in foreign news because her children are in different parts of the world, and as a result, she wants to know what is going on in the other parts of the world in general (Seid 2006, p. 67).

However, when she went to visit her daughter in Yemen, "she usually watched Lebanese and Saudi channels for religious purposes" (Seid 2006, p. 67). Her sense of connection when away from home was therefore maintained through television.

Nailah, representing the third generation, was also born in Addis Ababa and like her mother consumed media that focused on building a sense of nationalism and "sexual health issues of young people at the time" (Seid 2006, p. 13). Nailah recounts how she also used to listen to "Bible stories despite her Muslim background" – this may be the result of her attending the Norwegian Evangelical School (Seid 2006, p. 69). As a political activist during the Durge Regime[1] her media consumption was heightened. Between 1978 and 1983 Nailah was imprisoned and she used this time to complete her secondary education and engaged with classical and modern literature and philosophy by Western writers. While in prison her situation was similar to immigration in that she was not surrounded by her typical environment. Nailah used the media to stay connected not only to Ethiopian society but also the world at large: "These readings helped me to understand the outside world and prepared myself to get ready for facing my future life after prison" (Nailah in Seid 2006, p. 69). Nailah clearly values the de-territorialization of information and ideas brought along with the globalization of media. She recounts her experience of the 1980s and 1990s in Addis Ababa:

> Our sources were limited not only for international issues even for the local ones; the only sources were government newspapers and other government media. If you need reliable domestic and international news, you have to ask somebody who has access to travel abroad to get for you *Newsweek*, *Times*, *The Economist* or *Reader's Digest*, but now thanks to

> information and communication technology and to the freedom of information, we have various kinds of media access from alternative sources. We can see some light. I guess this is not only true of Ethiopia but of most African countries (Nailah in Seid 2006, p. 69).

Since she immigrated to Zambia in 2004 her media consumption has been a mixture of both local (Zambian) and foreign (BBC, CNN, SKY News, SABC Africa) news. Nailah demonstrates how local news consumption can aid in integrating oneself in a new cultural milieu: "It is appropriate to follow local news as long as I am a resident of this country. I have to know what is happening on an everyday basis" (Nailah in Seid 2006, p. 70).

Isha and Nailah demonstrate high levels of media consumption but their choice is dependent on social context. As a teenager in Ethiopia during the Durge Regime in the 1970s Nailah was imprisoned and read "politically subversive" material. As a teenager in Zambia in the new millennium and with more exposure to international media Isha spends most of her time engaging with American programming, a far cry from her mother's political inclination at the same age. Seid (2006, p. 72) notes that this programming has influenced her way of life – not only on how she receives the media but "[h]er toys, utensils and other equipment are related to the information that she gets from the screen". Seid (2006) concludes that in terms of media consumption the concepts of time, place, and space seem sensitive to the religious, gender, and other related factors associated with the different generations of the family.

The usual question with regards to media de-territorialization is – does it result in homogenization or heterogenization? The answer to this question cannot simply be reduced to either/or, either "homogenization" or "heterogenization", similarly put forth by Hafez (2007, p. 130) as either "globalization" or "ethnicization". If a range of programs are "read" by different immigrants in different ways, "then it will become ever more difficult, as one immigrant generation is replaced by another, to speak of a uniform… "ethnicization" by the media" (Hafez 2007, p. 131). Nevertheless, while immigrants may consume international media it does not necessarily mean that their loyalty to their country of origin/heritage/traditional culture diminishes.

Through "media and communications" (Rantanen's first zone of everyday cosmopolitanism), "issues of global concern are becoming part of the everyday local experiences and the 'moral life worlds' of the people" (Beck 2002, p. 17), which globalization literature argues connects people. Both Ebrahim and Seid recount how their families have been positively affected by the evolution in communications – from Dawud's use of the telegram in his youth to write to his family in Janghar and to conduct business, to Wasim's written marriage proposal to Maryam via post, to Rabia's delight at receiving Wasim's emails sent to Dawud's email address – telling her news about her family.

Although great-grandmother Mysha dismissed the value of television she is nicknamed Kemet Ashker (*seated servant*) as she relies on her telephone to stay connected to her family. In general, the telephone usage in Seid's family is high "since family members live in different continents of the world and there is a very strong family bond which withstands long distances and geographical variation" (Seid 2006, p. 73). This points to the fact that as media and communications are rapidly developing and there is an ever-constant celebration of "the new", the basic *impulses to use* these media have remained the same and this is to communicate on a basic level – to find out how loved ones are or to conduct business. The technology is "new age", but the reasons people engage with them are not.

> Contemporary global developments, notably global migration, greater intercultural contact and interconnectedness, globalizing cities … higher levels of education, and of course increased cultural flows, all have the potential to generate cosmopolitan dispositions (Hopper 2007, p. 177).

The way in which Ebrahim's family consume and use global media points to different trends: (i) the construction of virtual communities and (ii) the promotion of multi- and transcultural developments. Ebrahim (2008, p. 88) reflexively writes:

> Proud to be a cosmopolite, I have adopted a hyphenated "Muslim–South African–Indian" identity … My father, Wasim, considers himself a "Muslim–South African–Seychellois–Indian". Actually, I lie. My dad regards himself an Arab because the Holy Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) was of Arab lineage. I think the fact that he studied at Al-Azhar University (Cairo, Egypt) and can hold a conversation with an Arab in the Arabic language also leads him to believe this.

The Dawud family identity can, therefore, be described as transcultural by which is meant coexisting cultures that undergo synthesis to form something of a "third culture" (Hafez 2007), including hyphenated identities such as Italian-American or British-Asian (Hopper 2007). Although Ebrahim is aware of this interpenetration as illustrated in the hyphenated transnationalities she mentions above, she is also attentive to the distinct traits of each of these nationalities in her family members; she draws on their uniqueness with a sense of pride, believing they add to her family's overall cosmopolitanism.

Ebrahim's conclusion that her family hold a heightened cosmopolitan identity is demonstrated using Rantanen's (2005, pp. 123–130) five zones of everyday cosmopolitanism; (i) media and communications, (ii) learning another language, (iii) living/working abroad or having family members living abroad, (iv) living with a person from another culture, and (v) engaging with foreigners in your locality.

Wasim holds the strongest cosmopolitan identity within the family. He is representative of many countries, choosing instead not to define himself according to the nation in which he was born but rather his allegiance to Islam; he is proficient in six different languages, has traveled to forty different countries, and has a high level of education, culminating in obtaining a masters and doctoral degrees in Religion from Temple University, Philadelphia.

Hafez (2007, p. 131) speaks of how "national publics form within the diaspora". Although Ebrahim herself is not an emigrant but rather her family are diasporic, having originated in Janghar, her "virtual community" or "public" is not based on her family's country of origin, rather on her religion, which has resulted in her fostering a "global public" based on Islam. On various trips she has made, she interacted with people she met using familial greetings: a Kenyan woman in Grahamstown is "my sister", while a travel guide in Goa is a "cousin-brother". "Perhaps it was due to the fact that since childhood, I have always been alerted to the plight of my Muslim brothers and sisters in other parts of the globe (the ummah)[2]" (Ebrahim 2008, p. 6).

Despite the fact that she places most emphasis on the Muslim aspect of her hybridized identity, she is still "proudly South African", demonstrated in the familial project of learning two of South Africa's official languages – isiZulu and Afrikaans. Ebrahim's mediagraphy demonstrates that

> the individual developing a cosmopolitan perspective will retain some allegiance to particular groups, such as families, friends and communities, and will have to balance a combination of demands and concerns – the universal and the particular/local – throughout their lives (Hopper 2007, p. 176).

Both Ebrahim and Seid's families are living proof of Paul Hopper's (2007, p. 48) assertion:

> Contemporary globalizing tendencies are considered to be disrupting the linkage between culture and territory, ensuring that our cultural experiences, identities and practices are becoming separated from the places we inhabit…Indeed, cultural deterritorialization is especially associated with migrant and diaspora communities, many of whom will employ a range of strategies to preserve and adapt their cultures to new conditions, including utilizing some of the developments that are contributing to globalization, such as advances in transportation and communications technology.

Cosmopolitanism: The Relationship of the Local (Durban) to the National and the Global via the Media

Durban, home to three and half million people and the third largest city in South Africa, by international standards is a small city. It has many of the accepted criteria and attractions of a cosmopolitan city. A large and strategic harbor, the balmy subtropical weather and famed "Golden Mile" beachfront, augmented by the new "Sun Coast" casino to the north and the "U-Shaka Sea World" leisure developments to the south, a state-of-the-art International Convention Centre, and four world-class sports stadia offer holidaymakers and citizens alike all the accoutrements of a global metropolis.

With more than two million isiZulu-speaking people, Durban is at the heart of the "Kingdom of the Zulu" – a marketing slogan that epitomizes the dominance of Zulu culture in both the province of KwaZulu-Natal, the city of Durban. This group is seen to be conservative, traditionalist, and male oriented. The "white", post-colonial population of approximately 350 thousand people is largely professional and artisanal. Generations of social isolation have resulted in staid and conservative middle class values that are, at the same time, marked through with streaks of urbane and worldly privilege, and both are juxtaposed with the stain of fear and resentment at the threat or reality of lost privilege, as well as economic and cultural uncertainty. The remainder of the population is of Indian extraction, descendants of nineteenth century indentured laborers and the significant groupings of professional and mercantile people who came to serve their needs. It is from this latter group that the Dawud family, discussed above, originated.

Despite its cosmopolitan aspirations or pretensions, Durban is relatively constricted in terms of the available repertoires of cultural expression. The local life-worlds of the University of KwaZulu-Natal students are circumscribed to a large extent by their location within the city of Durban. The great majority of these students have not traveled beyond the city, for many "the world out there" can only be imagined and grasped through mediated experiences. While some of the graduate students mentioned in the sections above were content to use Durban as a springboard – a point of departure – for exploring wider, international, and cosmopolitan terrains, others felt it constricting in the kind of opportunities it presented. Male sexual identity is just one such area in which opportunities for wider expression is seen to be rather limited. It is against this background that exploring identities, particularly sexual or gendered identities, that do not conform to the "heteronormative discourses" can be challenging. Two male students chose to use the mediagraphy assignment to uncover aspects of their sexual politics as a self-identified gay man and a "metrosexual Zulu man", respectively.

The first study in this section on global explorations of alternative male sexual identities was undertaken by Nkululeko Mthiyane, who used the work "to investigate how 'metrosexuality' is emerging in Zulu culture and how it is negotiated in a mediated globalised context" (Mthiyane 2010, p. 184). Mthiyane interviewed two young Zulu men from Durban, self-identified as having a "metrosexual masculine identity". These interviews investigated how the participants conceptualized masculinity and how it related to metrosexuality, the media, and Zulu culture.

"Sabelo" is a 23-year-old marketing student and "a budding entrepreneur" by day, who works as a bartender in a premier Durban nightclub. Andile, also 23 years of age, resides in an established and economically comfortable suburban area, is a graduate of the University of KwaZulu-Natal, and is employed as "an events-organiser and a stylist" (Mthiyane 2010, p. 175).

"Metrosexuality" and its practices are seen as inherently cosmopolitan, and those "who practice metrosexuality therefore acquire cosmopolitan traits automatically" (Mthiyane 2010, p. 184). The study investigated a macro-phenomenon on a micro-level. The particular study investigated the link between this phenomenon and its mediation through internationally franchised magazines. Following the precept from Rantanen that "mediagraphies offer a way to understand how individuals… not only are influenced by globalization but also contribute to it" (Rantanen 2005, p. 29), Mthiyane (2010, p. 174) set about investigating "how young Zulu men navigated through men's lifestyle magazines to inform their metrosexual identity".

Discussing the concept of "masculinity", Mthiyane takes as his point of departure the dominant, if somewhat stereotypical, perception: "if you ask someone what a 'man' is like, you often get a series of adjectives such as strong, independent, logical, dominant" (Kahn 2009, p. 47). These perceptions of masculinity provide little help for Mthiyane's informants, who experienced difficulty in pinning down precisely what they understand by the term. As Sabelo simplistically explained: "Masculinity refers to the traits and behaviour of men at a given period of time" (Sabelo in Mthiyane 2010, p. 175). This behavioral conception of masculinity is buttressed by his second interviewee, Andile, who states that "for me masculinity in the traditional sense is what society deems masculine" (Andile in Mthiyane 2010, p. 176). There remains a set of "dominant ideals of masculinity" (MacKinnon 2003, p. 3), but different cultures have varied expectations and beliefs about masculinities (Kahn 2009). The highly constructivist nature of masculinity takes on resonance when dealing with a particular, concrete situation – that of Zulu male identity. In a highly patriarchal society, any show of "weakness" or "femininity" is taboo. "I know with Zulu culture *awusiyo insizwa* (you're not a man) unless you carry yourself in a certain way and if you allow a more sensitive side to come through, your masculinity comes into question" (Sabelo in Mthiyane 2010, p. 176). Masculinity in contemporary Zulu culture, as in any cultural setting, is practiced through relationships. As with all understandings of culturally based identities, masculine gender identity is never stable and as with any gender identity is constantly in a process of re-negotiation. While many of the older rites of passage have been superseded and "traditions such as stick fighting are no longer practiced", a man is deemed to be a man "by how he carries himself and the respect he commands" (Sabelo in Mthiyane 2010, p. 176). Central to this playing out of roles is the patriarchal nature of Zulu culture and behavioral expectations towards women and girls, illustrated in Sabelo's account of his own familial experience: "my Gran, she believes that *umkhulu* (grandfather) should have his own plate, his own spoon, and chair". Andile concurs: "even now in 2010 you'll find a man will beat his own wife, because, traditionally the man speaks and the woman listens and woman's role is in the kitchen and the man is authoritative and the man is the decision maker" (Andile in Mthiyane 2010, p. 177). He goes on to say:

> I come from a Zulu family and they do traditional things. Because I'm the first born and I don't have a father or grandfather, I'm "the man". So the fact that I'm still quiet young is not the issue; because I'm the eldest I have to play the role of the man in the home. Its tradition, in the African culture it has always been like that, that the man is responsible for certain things, the man is the one that goes to the sacred space or *umsamo* to speak to the ancestors (Mthiyane 2010, p. 177).

Mthiyane (2010, p. 177) concludes that

> [t]hese responses illustrate that in Zulu culture your degree of "masculinity" is also measured by the respect you command from your female counterpart. This is due to the culture's patriarchal nature. Men who place their female counterparts on an equal level to them are seen to have been emasculated.

Despite this dominant Zulu worldview, masculinity's conceptual fluidity suggests that these ideals can change over time. Sabelo's self-perception is more urbane than that seemingly dictated by his position in Zulu culture: "I am taking a step away from what our fathers thought it should be, where a man never cried, never showed emotion and all those things" (Mthiyane 2010, p. 177).

Though not concretely defined, "metrosexuality" is understood by Mthiyane's respondents as

> a man who's in touch and not afraid to embrace a more feminine outlook on things but not saying that he's not truly masculine. He is able to take both sides into account and conduct himself accordingly, able to walk that fine line in between where you need to be sensitive and feminine on the one side but you also know that you're pretty masculine (Sabelo in Mthiyane 2010, p. 178).

Metrosexual expression is closely related to the behavior and appearance of men. Mthiyane uses this position to explain the ways in which his respondents *practice* their self-proclaimed metrosexuality: "the general practices of metrosexuals are focused on presentation and can include plucking or tweezing eyebrows, doing manicures, hand and face scrubs. These are some of the behaviours of metrosexual men which can be traditionally considered feminine" (Mthiyane 2010, p. 180). Metrosexual men are also distinguished by their fashion sense: "My fashion sense is influenced by – I would say – Italy. Most of the influential designers come from Italy today and most of the big fashion houses are from Italy" (Andile in Mthiyane 2010, p. 182). When asked to comment on what influences transformation in the representations of masculinity, the participants responded by stating: "the media is the biggest influence, I mean if you look at it, it has moved away from the likes of your hairy men with hairy chests, to clean, waxed and shaven men and its all the media's doing" (Sabelo in Mthiyane 2010, p. 178). Andile suggested that media, such as television and magazines, portray men in specific ways according to the prevailing fashions, the "in-thing". This constructed vision of the "new man" or "soft masculinities", often described in contradistinction to traditional masculinity, have always existed. What has changed with the years is how they are packaged and mediated, presented as a fashionable and acceptable social construct of "metrosexuality" (MacKinnon 2003, p. 13). For the respondents in this study, the characteristics of this "new man" have been gleaned from the pages of glossy, "lifestyle" men's magazines. At first glance this appears to be a highly cosmopolitan idea; Mthiyane's respondents agree on the popularity of international franchises such as *Men's Health* and *GQ (Gentlemen's Quarterly)* magazines that they buy on a monthly basis. Andile (in Mthiyane 2010, p. 179) goes further by stating that his "style" is copied from these magazines: "through media and magazines you find that the perfect man is always being portrayed like on the cover of *Vogue*. You find that the perfect man is on the cover, very well taken care off. I buy a lot of GQ, lifestyle magazines".

The globalizing effects of media, in this instance men's magazines, can be attributed in part to their interconnectedness as commodities produced by multinational media corporations and distributed internationally with local editions of the same magazine format in different countries. The magazines are slightly altered to cater for the host country but the values of the country of origin are still inherent. The wide distribution of these media results in a sharing of information, ideas, and experiences, which is characteristic of globalization. On the South African market, men's lifestyle magazines are usually based in European or American countries with branches elsewhere in the world. *GQ* magazine, for example, is based in the United States but has a South African edition.

Thus, for the "global South" this kind of "globalisation", as Anthony Giddens (1991) reminds us, looks very much like "westernisation". For Mthiyane, this illustrates the influence that Western countries have on the world. Although the practice of metrosexuality is not premised on masculine ideals of any specific culture, its values are largely Western and European, and thus frequently interpreted as an example of the concept of cultural imperialism.

While in global terms personal grooming and respect for female partners may not seem very transgressive, living an openly gay lifestyle takes even more courage. Matthew Beetar, a self-identified white, urban, middle-class gay man living in Durban, used his own experiences to initiate his assignment on the use of the web by four fellow gay men (Craig, Mick, Scott, and Steph) in Durban. Drawing partly on his own reflective experience, together with one-on-one in-depth interviews followed by a focus group discussion, he explored "the perceptions of Durban city, … the context of this space and place" and how "mediated globalisation affects the lived experiences of my subjects" (Beetar 2008, p. 148). Beetar begins his study by noting that in "a national context of Constitutional protection and the seeming advancement of gay rights in the form of the Civil Unions Act it is easy to become seduced by a perception of security and tolerance" (Beetar 2008, p. 149). While South Africa has become a major international tourist destination for gay men and women on the basis of Constitutional antidiscrimination provisions, the daily lived experiences of gay men in Durban, given its variety of seemingly oppositional cultures, traditions, and religions, remains challenging. All of Beetar's (2008, p. 149) participants "revealed a distinct discomfort within Durban". While all the respondents were "out", all recounted wariness around fully expressing their sexual identities. There are only two openly gay spaces in Durban – a club called *The Lounge* and a bar/restaurant called *Bean Bag Bohemia*. Outside of these spaces the participants have been met with hostile and dehumanizing behavior.

Clearly, these constraints are not unique to Durban; they are part of a wider set of "globalised hegemonic heteronormative discourses and ideologies". Beetar (2008, p. 151) notes:

> The politics surrounding gay identity are thus complicated in a context of globalisation: the national and international discourses of intolerance are countered by the cosmopolitan quality of Durban as a city space, and the lived realities of these white urban gay men.

For the four respondents, the web has played, and continues to play, an important role in the exploration of homosexuality and the formation of an individualist subjectivity. Usage of the web allowed them into a transnational "gay space", free from the physical and ideological constraints of their everyday Durban existence. All four participants have used the web to explore questions and unfamiliar feelings, largely due to the lack of such avenues of subjectivity formation in the "reality" of Durban life. Scott, who described his high school years as an emotionally trying period, balancing the expectations of heteronormativity placed on him as a high-achieving scholar and student leader (he was head prefect at a prestigious boys-only school) and a provincial sportsman, utilized the web to help him come to terms with his attraction to men. As he reflected,

> the Web allowed me to find out information about gayness. When I realised I was attracted to men I didn't feel I could tell anyone. So I searched the Web for this information. It was the only resource I had – I didn't have any gay friends. I specifically looked for a way to meet South African gay boys. I also looked for what kind of medical conditions were associated with anal sex – I thought there were many (Scott in Beetar 2008, pp. 151–152).

The liminal tensions between his "expected role" and the lack of available resources prevented him from fully exploring a sense of self. All four shared similar uses for the web in the past: they used the web to discover information that was not easily available to them in Durban, including where to meet other gay men; what it "meant" to be gay; the experiences of gay people around the world; how to "cure" homosexuality; and how to "come out".

More generally, the web has provided a crucial platform to explore health-related concerns, allowing them to question gay-related HIV questions, with Steph's reason being that he "was too embarrassed to speak to [his] parents" (Steph in Beetar 2008, p. 152). While Craig did not explicitly pursue such questions on the web, he acknowledged that his participation in numerous chat rooms, while he was at school, contributed to his understanding of what it "meant" to be gay. In a moment of candid reflexivity, Beetar notes that he personally was able to

> reflect on the importance of the Web in my own life, where I wrestled with religious anxieties and questions of my sexuality by engaging with the seemingly other-worldly discussions between gay Reverends from America, "gay churches" in the United Kingdom, and gay marriage across the globe. Both my and the participants' understanding of what homosexuality encapsulates, and the scope for change, have been profoundly influenced by information available on the Web (Beetar 2008, p. 153).

All the participants have, in the past, created web-based "profiles" on social networking sites and have international web-based "friends" or contacts on sites such as *Facebook* and *MySpace*, or services such as *Mig33* (a web-based program, similar to Instant Messaging), whom they have never met, yet are friends for the primary reason of sharing a sexual orientation. Scott's first boyfriend, with whom he genuinely perceived himself to be in a relationship, was a man he had met online but had never met, and nor did they ever meet, in person. Other websites frequented by Beetar's respondents include *Mamba* and *Gaydar*, international websites specifically created for gay men and women. *Gaydar* was favored for its anonymity, for the possibility of connecting openly with other gay men and yet hide their "real" identity.

In considering whether the use of the web by his informants adds to the heterogeneity or the homogeneity of their experience, Beetar is ambivalent. On the one hand, he points out that the

> combination of the participants' utilisation of the Web to explore aspects of their identities and the ultimate translation of such exploration to a level of lived experience, whether through Mick's use of the Web to deal with a broken relationship or Scott's use of the Web to meet his partner of nearly three years, speaks to the localising of global gay experiences,

> or "glocalqueering" (Lim 2005, pp. 383–405) and reflects a liberating and heterogenising quality of mediated globalisation: it can diversify restricting macro identities to include the availability of suppressed and oppressed liminal identities (Beetar 2008, p. 155).

However, an irony of their Web use is that Beetar's respondents know more about global, cosmopolitan gay cultures than they do about local South African variation: "None of the participants are aware of other South African homosexual identities, which includes a history of "black youths from the townships, white mineworkers, lesbian sangomas[3], rich white 'entertainers' from the suburbs, coloured moffie drag queens, cross-racial working-class couples, political prisoners and sex workers" (Gevisser and Cameron 1994, p. 3). The formation of identity for the participants is based firmly on a Western mediation of homosexuality. This lack of knowledge and, more tellingly, lack of interest, in local expressions of gay culture is in stark contrast to the identification with cosmopolitan expressions. The connectivity into the ambit of a gay male culture is premised entirely on the concerns of Western white gay men, and speaks to the maintenance, if not construction, of existing localized concerns and undermines the heterogeneity they cherish.

Concluding Thoughts: The Local, the Globalization, the Cosmopolitan and Research Methodology

All the assignments were conducted in the city of Durban, and, indeed, Durban and its surroundings feature almost as characters in the narrative of many of the micro-studies. While the much vaunted "death of place" may have become theoretical buzz words when discussing the consequences of globalization, the reality remains that for the vast majority of the world's citizens, they will never move far from their home city, and their experience of "globalization", for the most part, will be an imaginary, mediated one. Despite the much vaunted opportunities offered by "new technologies", for most, global consciousness is lived as local consciousness. The potentialities of the web and mobile telephony platforms and networks including Skype, the highly hyped Facebook, Twitter, Mxit (a very popular South African variant), and numerous others, provide opportunities for greater interaction. Debates on the role of the "new media" have set the tone of the globalization debate since the 1990s, resulting in the "old media" largely being ignored. However, by focusing specifically on the technology, we often lose sight of the fact that it is people who communicate with other people in one way or another. Mediagraphies are a useful methodology that can bring the role that "old media" have in the world today back into the picture. This is where personal media histories are illuminating.

Since the initial projects showcased here were inspired by Terhi Rantanen's work, it is appropriate to close this chapter by going back to her. A central theoretical precept in her writing is that of "cosmopolitanism", a term she extends from the commonly held understanding as being "familiar with or representative of many different countries and cultures – having an exciting and glamorous character associated with travel and a mixture of cultures" (Pearsall 1999, p. 322), and traditionally seen as the preserve of wealthy elites to a concept "on the move", redefined as "everyday cosmopolitanism" (Rantanen 2005, p. 124). A cosmopolitan identity cannot be achieved as something cohesive and complete. Rantanen (2005, p. 124) argues that "people can develop cosmopolitan qualities" through exposure to different "zones" of everyday cosmopolitanism. Together, these form a scaffolding for many of the assignments presented here. While global exposure is important, our cosmopolitan outlooks emerge from synthesizing a range of influences, many – but not all – of which will originate from our socialization (Hopper 2007, p. 176). Thus mediagraphy provides a methodology of global mediagraphy useful in exploring "not only how individual [family members] in different locations were affected by globalization, but also how they contributed to it". The approach of juxtaposing "'big' overarching theories with 'small' individual life histories and seeing whether they fitted together" is both inventive and topical (Rantanen 2005, p. 141).

It is not the purpose of this chapter to explore various theoretical aspects of globalization, as these have been well rehearsed elsewhere. Our purpose is to elucidate a *methodological intervention* through which researchers – in this case, our students – are able to explore everyday issues around globalization. Primary among these has been the relationship between cultural change, cosmopolitanization, and globalization.

Notes

1. The period 1977–1978, during this regime, was known as the "Red Terror" led by Mengistu Hailemariam. This period saw tens of thousands of politicians, intellectuals, and other "enemies of the state" tortured and murdered. This began as Mengistu attempted to transform imperial Ethiopia, with its ancient Christian heritage, into a Soviet-style worker's state.
2. Unmah = A Hadith (tradition) of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) compiled in *Sahih al-Bukhari*. Kitab al-Adab. vol. 3, p. 12 states: "The believers, in their love and sympathy for one another, are like a whole body; when one part of it is affected with pain the whole of it responds in terms of wakefulness and fever."
3. Traditional healers and diviners.

References

Beck, U. (2002) The cosmopolitan society and its enemies, *Theory, Culture and Society*, **19** (1–2), 17–44.

Beetar, M. (2008) *Mediated Globalisation: Gay Identity and the World Wide Web*, Unpublished research project in manuscript. (UPRP) CCMS, UKZN Durban, pp. 134–163, available at http://ccms.ukzn.ac.za.

Castells, M. (2000) *The Rise of the Network Society*, 2nd edn. London: Blackwell.

Ebrahim, S. (2008) *My South African-cum-Seychellois-cum-Indian Heritage: A Comparative Analysis of Mediated Cosmopolitanism Across Three Generations of the Dawud family*, Unpublished research project in manuscript. (UPRP) CCMS, UKZN Durban, pp. 80–133, available at http://ccms.ukzn.ac.za.

Ely, M. (1991) *Doing Qualitative Research: Circles within Circles.* London: Routledge.

Emslie, N.A. (2006) *Mediated Globalisation: A Mediagraphy of Television in South Africa*, unpublished research project in manuscript. (UPRP) CCMS, UKZN Durban, pp. 1–24, available at http://ccms.ukzn.ac.za.

Featherstone, M. (1995) Global and local cultures, in J. Bird, B. Curtis, T. Putnam, G. Robertson, and L. Tickner (eds), *Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 169–187.

Gevisser, M. and Cameron, E. (eds) (1994) *Defiant Desire: Gay and Lesbian Lives in South Africa*. Braamfontein: Ravan Press.

Giddens, A. (1990) *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Giddens, A. (1991) Modernity and self-identity, in M. Waters (ed.), *Modernity Critical Concepts: Volume II Cultural Modernity*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 175–187.

Gillespie, M. (1997) Local uses of the media: negotiating culture and identity, in A. Sreberny-Mohammedi *et al.* (eds), *Media in Global Context. A Reader*. London: Arnold, pp. 323–337.

Hafez, K. (2007) *The Myth of Media Globalization*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hall, S. (1996) Who needs identity?, in S. Hall and P. du Gay (eds), *Questions of Cultural Identity*. London: Sage Publications, pp. 15–30.

Hannerz, U. (1990) Cosmopolitans and locals in world culture, *Theory, Culture and Society*, **7** (2), 237–251.

Heater, D.B. (1999) *What is Citizenship?* Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press.

Heuva, W., Tomaselli, K. and Teer-Tomaselli, R. (2004) The political economy of media in Southern African, 1990–2001, in P. Thomas (ed.), *Political Economy of the Global Media*. London: Zed Books, pp. 97–117.

Hopper, P. (2007) *Understanding Cultural Globalization*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Kahn, J. (2009) *An Introduction to Masculinities*. Malden, MA, and Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.

Lim, E.-B. (2005) Glocalqueering in New Asia: the politics of performing gay in Singapore, *Theatre Journal*, **57** (3), 383–405.

Logie, A. (2006) *You Look Just Like Your Mother: Questioning the Homogenization of Cultural Identities by Investigating a Family's Individual Fashion Identities over the Last Seventy Years*, Unpublished research project in manuscript. (UPRP) CCMS, UKZN Durban, pp. 25–56, available at http://ccms.ukzn.ac.za.

MacKinnon, C.A. (2003) *Sex Equality: Lesbian and Gay Rights*. New York: Foundation Press – West Group.

Mthiyane, N. (2010) *A Man of the World: Metrosexuality as an Emerging Masculine Identity in Zulu Men*, Unpublished research project in manuscript. (UPRP) CCMS, UKZN Durban, pp. 164–186, available at http://ccms.ukzn.ac.za.

Pearsall, J. (1999) *Concise Oxford Dictionary*, 10th edn. New York: Oxford University Press Inc.

Rantanen, T. (2005) *The Media and Globalization*. London: Sage.

Seid, A.A. (2006) *The Four Generations of Iman's Family Mediagraphy*, Unpublished research project in manuscript. (UPRP) CCMS, UKZN Durban, pp. 57–79, available at http://ccms.ukzn.ac.za.

Tomlinson, J. (1999) *Globalisation and Culture*. London: Polity Press.

27

Europe

A Laboratory for Comparative Communication Research

Claes H. de Vreese and Rens Vliegenthart

Introduction

Comparative communication research (CCR) was a relatively late arrival to the field of media studies and communication science. Compared to related disciplines such as sociology and political science, communication scholars were slow to turn to comparative research. While those other social sciences have had a long tradition in including, for example, multiple countries in their designs and analyses, communication scientists for a long time relied mainly on single country studies. Four decades ago, and again in the early 1990s, Jay Blumler and Michael Gurevitch (1995) concluded that comparative communication research was in a stage of infancy and only developing slowly.

In 2009, political scientist Pippa Norris concluded that comparative communication research had not yet "flowered fully into mature adulthood" (Norris 2009, p. 1). The major challenges observed deal with the conciseness of concepts, the standardization of measures, the search for typological schema, the selection of cases, and the lack of archives for common and accessible datasets.

Compared to political science, it is indeed true that the field of political communication and communication research more generally is lacking behind. Comparative political scientists have developed specific journals (e.g., *Comparative Political Studies*) and there have been large-scale investments in data collection efforts (such as the European election study), and a tradition of utilizing large scale social sciences datasets (such as the Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey). It is in the tradition of Lijphart (1999) and Przeworski and Teune (1970) that comparative politics is defined as a combination of a substantive focus (e.g., on countries' political systems) and as a method of identifying and explaining similarities and differences between different countries while using underlying common concepts.

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

In communication research, Paolo Mancini recently (2010) concluded the following about CCR: comparisons take place all the time, but many of these comparisons are implicit and only a few of them explicit. He, however, is positive about recent developments and concedes that more and more explicitly comparative endeavors occur. Recent volumes by Hallin and Mancini (2004), Esser and Pfetsch (2004), and Strömbäck and Kaid (2008) bear tribute to this development. Mancini (2010) observes that one reason for this increase in comparative work is a shift in focus from individuals to systems. Looking at many of the recent studies, this is indeed to a considerable extent true, since many of those contributions focus on macro-level factors and system observations. However, we argue that such a macro-level focus alone – though being very useful in many respects – will not provide answers to many of the questions that are at the core of our discipline. Rather, we believe that CCR should be inspired by and push an agenda that combines a macro- and micro-level perspective and considers that *individuals (or other micro-level units) are seen as nested in systems*. Such an agenda offers the opportunity to assess the impact of both macro- and micro-levels and their interaction on individuals' attitudes and behavior.

In this chapter we outline different types of CCR and discuss the analytical implications of different questions asked. We focus on Europe and more specifically the European Union (EU) as the example and as both the empirical and conceptual playground for CCR (see also de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2011). We bring together a typology of CCR (Vliegenthart 2011) and the research on the EU in an empirical example where we pursue different analytical strategies providing answers to different questions for CCR. We evaluate the outcomes of this exercise in the light of the voiced criticism on and chances for CCR.

A Typology of Comparative Communication Research[1]

There is no one single way to do comparative research. Many different analytical strategies can be chosen to answer a whole range of different research questions. When evaluating the current state of the CCR field, it becomes clear that less advanced strategies prevail over more complicated designs. Additionally, often a mismatch between the study's research question and research design exists. In many instances, the latter is not apt to answer convincingly the research question posed. In this section, we sketch, based on an earlier overview by Vliegenthart (2011; see Table 27.1), different comparative questions that are addressed in the recent literature and the empirical problems that are encountered when addressing those questions.[2]

A comparison can entail multiple things. In many instances comparative research focuses on large system units such as countries, organizations, cultures, and so on, but this is not necessarily so. Whether research can be called comparative depends both on the research question and design. The simplest research questions are descriptive in nature and deal with the issue to what extent a (theoretically interesting) phenomenon occurs (differently) across units. An example of such a study is Dimitrova and Strömbäck's (2005) comparison of the newspaper coverage of the Iraq War in the United States and Sweden. Here, the units that are compared are countries. Often, the questions that are

Table 27.1 Overview of research questions, particularities of data and types of analysis (Vliegenthart 2011) (printed by permission of Routledge, New York).

Research question	*Often encountered particularities of the data*
Descriptive	Limited number of cases
Basic explanatory	Limited number of cases
Comparison of relation	Limited number of cases
	Dependency of observations
Comparative explanatory	Dependency of observations

posed in this type of study are implicitly or explicitly phrased as explanatory ones – as is the case in the Dimitrova and Strömbäck's study as well. They investigate whether differences in media coverage between the two countries can be explained by the positions of political actors and journalistic values and norms. While differences in coverage between the two countries might be in line with expectations derived *theoretically* from different political and journalistic practices, this relationship cannot be tested *statistically*. The researcher then encounters the problem of "too few cases, too many variables". After all, there might be multiple other factors that account for differences between the two countries than the one(s) being mentioned in the theoretical section of a paper, even when the design of most systems adopted is similar (assuming that the countries are very similar in many of their structural characteristics) (Przeworski and Teune 1970).[3] In statistical terms, the "descriptive" type of research question is not the most difficult one to answer. In most of those instances, "ordinary" statistics such as, for example, mean comparisons can be used. Sometimes, also other more complicated techniques such as cluster analysis and multidimensional scaling can be used. In those instances, more than two countries are compared and they are positioned in relation to each other, demonstrating which countries can be regarded as similar on a set of variables.

The second type of research question is an explanatory one. Here, the question that is addressed is how characteristics of the units can explain differences in some kind of output variable that is usually measured within each unit. De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2011), for example, ask the question of how the level of euroskepticism in a country influences the coverage of the 2004 European Parliamentary election campaign. Again, in principle regular multivariate statistical techniques, such as regression analysis, can be applied to what can be labeled the "basic explanatory" type of research question. In many instances, however, the number of cases causes problems: to conduct multivariate statistical techniques a considerable number of cases is required and practical constraints (e.g., data availability or effort to collect those data) can obstruct the researcher in an effort to include enough cases in the study.

The third type of research question focuses on the relationship that exists between an independent and a dependent variable and whether this relationship is similar in different contexts. In his typology, Vliegenthart (2011) labels them the "comparison of relation" type of research question. An example is provided by Holtz-Bacha and Norris (2001). In their study on the positive effects of public television preferences on political knowledge, they demonstrate that this relation holds for ten of the fourteen European countries included in the analysis. As their study shows, to answer this type of research question, multiple analyses can be done – for each unit separately. Alternatively – but yielding similar results – the researcher can opt for an analysis that includes the observations from all units, and as independent variable dummies for each of those units, the independent variables of interest and interaction terms between the two; if these interaction terms are not significant, one can safely conclude that the relationship between the independent and dependent variables does not differ across countries.

The fourth type of question is probably the most interesting and challenging. It focuses on explaining variation in relations across units. This type of research question can be called "comparative explanatory". Studies employing this type of question are relatively scarce. An example of such a study is the cross-national comparison that Shehata and Strömbäck (2010) make with regard to the influence of political interest and education on news consumption. They find that those influences differ considerably across countries and – more importantly – demonstrate that this fluctuation can be attributed to media environment characteristics such as high newspaper concentration. This high newspaper circulation decreases gaps in newspaper reading between those with high and low levels of education and political interest. This relation can be investigated using interaction terms between variables at the systems level and variables at the individual observation level. Significant interaction terms indicate that the variable at the systems level (i.e., newspaper concentration) affects the relation between an independent variable (political interest and education) and the dependent variable (newspaper reading). Here, indeed, individuals are nested in larger systems and explanations at both levels and their interaction are taken into consideration. Statistically, this typically requires using multilevel modeling.

EU Communication Research Revisited

Using the typology above we can revisit the literature on communication, media, and the European public sphere (see de Vreese 2007 for an overview). Substantively this research focuses in particular on the mass media. One group of studies has concentrated on the necessity and prerequisites for a "truly" European public sphere. A second group of studies has focused on specific cases and specific segments among which a European public sphere is or has been in existence. A third group of studies has focused on the indicators and extent to which Europeanization in the national public spheres can be identified (de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2011).

Looking at the third group, which is the most empirical and comparative strand of the three, research has centered around identifying the European and transnational nature of news in Europe. Core questions have been whether themes of European integration and collaboration are on the news agenda and whether the media cover topics from other European countries (also referred to as horizontal and vertical Europeanization; see Koopmans and Erbe 2004). Vertical Europeanization refers to national actors addressing European actors, national actors addressing European issues, or European actors partaking in national debates on European issues. Horizontal Europeanization is referred

Table 27.2 Different types of comparative research questions with example studies.

Research question	*Key studies*
Descriptive	Trenz 2004
	De Vreese *et al.* 2006
	Koopmans 2004
Basic explanatory	Peter, Lauf, and Semmetko 2004
	De Vreese *et al.* 2006
	Vliegenthart *et al.* 2008
	Schuck *et al.* 2012
Comparison of relation	Wessler *et al.* 2008
Comparative explanatory	Boomgaarden *et al.* 2012

to as national media covering issues in other EU member states and national actors addressing issues or actors in another EU member state.

Following the typology of CCR advanced above we can review and classify some of the key studies (see Table 27.2).

In the first category the research endeavors are aimed at describing, outlining, and summarizing similarities and differences, typically across countries and in some instances across time. One example is the analysis of broadsheet newspapers in 2000 in Germany, France, Britain, Italy, and Spain by Hans Jorg Trenz (2004, 2005). He found evidence of a "transnational resonance of political communications", implying that in relation to specific actors and institutions cross-references are present. Three types of "European" news were distinguished: news characterized by a shared meaning of European events and issues; Europeanized news characterized by the secondary impact of European events and issues on national news coverage; and national news on domestic events and issues characterized by evolving forms of European monitoring and rhetoric.

The Europub project (http://europub.wz-berlin.de), investigating print news in 1990, 1995, and 2000–2002 found strong Europeanization in the Swiss public sphere, the United Kingdom to be a deviant non-Europeanized case, and public spheres in Italy and the Netherlands to be less European since discussions about European issues largely take place among national actors. Issues such as monetary politics and immigration show signs of vertical Europeanization while horizontal Europeanization is virtually absent (Koopmans 2004).

The study by Claes de Vreese and colleagues (2006) on the news coverage of the 1999 and 2004 European parliamentary (EP) elections finds an increasing salience of the EP elections in the news and an increasing Europeanization over time as well as significant differences between the European countries. Both of these studies are examples of studies that aim to *describe* – guided by a theoretical framework – the differences in media content without formally testing explanations for the differences and similarities.

In the second basic explanatory category Peter, Lauf, and Semetko (2004) showed how European parliamentary election campaigns were covered in television news in 1999 and, using multivariate analyses, established that there is more coverage of the

European elections on public broadcasting channels in countries where citizens are dissatisfied with their national governments. Likewise, de Vreese, Lauf, and Peter (2007) found that the 1999 European elections were more visible in countries in which elite opinion about the EU was polarized. Schuck *et al.* (2012) investigated the factors that *explain* the variation in campaign coverage of the 2009 European parliamentary elections using a cross-national media content analysis conducted in all 27 EU member states. Findings showed that time, country, and media characteristics all mattered in explaining the way media frame elections, but to different extents and with different emphasis. Especially the level of conflict framing (Neuman, Just, and Crigler 1992) was contingent upon the medium, the electoral system, and public aversion against the EU.

Another notable study in this category looks at both media content and public opinion. Rens Vliegenthart and colleagues (2008) demonstrated in a time-series analysis including seven countries how variation in information contexts, in particular the framing of the EU, affects public EU support. This study is an example of how media content analyses can be integrated with survey data, at the *aggregate* level, to understand changes in public opinion in a cross-nationally comparative perspective.

In the third category of studies Wessler *et al.* (2008) addressed the issue of whether a relationship that exists between an independent and a dependent variable holds in different contexts (hence the label "comparison of relation") and looked at public opinion in a country, its size, power, number of correspondents in Brussels, and the editorial missions to explain differences in the coverage of European affairs. This analysis was conducted separately for different countries and the results are compared post hoc.

In the fourth and final category Boomgaarden *et al.* (2012) looked at the interaction between different levels of *explanations* for cross-national and over-time variation in the news media coverage of EU affairs. The article drew on large scale media content analyses of newspapers and television news in EU-15 (1999), EU-25 (2004), and EU-27 (2009) in relation to European parliamentary elections (where the numbers show the number of European Union member states participating). It investigated predictors for variation within and change between the coverage of these elections. It focused in particular on explanatory factors pertaining to the country, the media, and the political elites. Most of its findings address the second type of research questions, but when looking at the over-time changes in coverage, questions that are comparative–explanatory are also addressed. Results showed, for example, that the more strongly national parties were divided about the EU, the stronger the increases in EU news visibility were – and thus the smaller the explanatory power of the visibility in the previous elections was.

The section above reviews and classifies the "European public sphere" literature and large scale comparative media content analyses as examples of different types of CCR. Such studies are at the core of communication science whereas other studies, for example, in public opinion and political science research, focus on survey-based studies only. There are only a few examples of the use of media content data *and* survey data at the individual level that is also explicitly comparative. Typically the comparisons are rather in the third category of CCR looking at the same relationships in different countries without addressing differences in those relationships across countries (e.g., de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006). This type of study looks at media effects on individuals' attitudes and behavior when it comes to EU issues. In many of the media effect studies, the notion of media use is central. Media use and exposure are typically seen as independent variables in media effects and public opinion research, but media use is also an outcome variable that can be influenced by various factors located at the level of individuals, systems, and individuals nested in systems. In that way, it offers a nice and straightforward example to illustrate the application of the four different types of CCR questions using a large scale dataset collected in the weeks before the 2009 European parliamentary elections.

An Empirical Example

In our empirical example we look at the question of to what extent we can predict media use during the 2009 EP election campaign using both system level (media systems) and individual level (political interest) variables, as well as their interaction. We address examples of the four different questions introduced in the previous sections, but first introduce the data we employ.

This study is part of the 2009 European Election Campaign Study. A two-wave panel survey was carried out in twenty-one European Union member states. Respondents were interviewed about one month prior to the June 4–7, 2009 elections for the European Parliament and immediately after the elections. Fieldwork dates were May 6–18 and June 8–19, 2009. The survey was conducted using computer-assisted web interviewing (CAWI).

Sample

The fieldwork was coordinated by TNS Opinion in Brussels and involved TNS subsidiaries in each country. All subsidiaries comply with ESOMAR guidelines for survey research. A total of 32 411 18-year-old + respondents participated in wave one and 22 806 respondents participated in wave two. On average, 1086 respondents per country completed the questionnaires of both waves, varying from 1001 in Austria to 2000 in Belgium. In each country, a sample was drawn from TNS databases. These databases rely on multiple recruitment strategies, including telephone, face-to-face, and online recruitment.[4]

Questionnaire and Translations

The questionnaire was developed in English and translated into the different national languages. It was then translated back into English as an additional check of the accuracy of the translations. The translation was supervised by the research team and it was carried out by TNS (which also executes and translates the Eurobarometer surveys). Irregularities and problems arising from this process were resolved by deliberation. For more information, see de Vreese *et al.* (2010).

The panel survey was accompanied by a content analysis of two news broadcasts and three national newspapers in all twenty-seven European countries (for more details about this study, see PIREDEU.EU). However, in this example we only use the survey data. Our focus is on media use, one of the central variables in communication research. We focus more specifically on the use of broadsheet and tabloid newspapers, as well as news broadcasts on public and commercial television channels. The use of various news broadcasts is captured by the following question, asked in the second wave of the survey: "In a typical week, how many days do you watch the following TV programs?" It then listed the main news broadcast from the public television station, as well as the most widely watched commercial news broadcast. Answers ran from 0 to 7. Similarly, the question "In a typical week, how many days do you read the following newspapers and magazines or listen to the news on the radio?" was used to ask the use of the most widely read tabloid as well as two national broadsheet papers. Again answers ran from 0 to 7.

For some of the analyses, we created a variable that we label "public TV dominance", which divided the individual score on the public news broadcast use by the commercial news broadcast use. In order to circumvent missing values due to dividing by zero, we added 1 to both the public as well as the commercial news broadcast score.

As an independent variable, we use political interest. This variable is argued to increase public broadcast viewing (e.g., Norris 2002). It is measured by the following question in the first wave of the survey: "How interested are you in politics?" and runs from 1 ("not at all interested") to 7 ("very interested"). Additionally, we use "media system" as a system-level independent variable. The literature suggests that use of different media differs considerably across systems (Norris 2002; Hallin and Mancini 2004). Here, we largely follow Hallin and Mancini's classification of countries in "liberal" (in our study the United Kingdom and Ireland), "democratic–corporatist" (the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland), "polarized pluralist" (France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece). We created an additional category that we labeled "East-European" and included all other countries. We now address examples of the four different types of research questions.

Research Question 1

We first compare the use of public and commercial news broadcasts in different countries. Figure 27.1 positions the various countries on both variables. As can be seen, there is considerable variation across countries. At first sight, this variation does not seem to overlap to a large extent with the distinction in different media systems, though we do find a considerable number of the East European countries at the upper-left side of the graph, indicating high levels of commercial news watching and low levels of public news watching. Belgium shows the highest scores on the public broadcast variable, while Bulgaria scores highest on the commercial broadcast variable.



Figure 27.1 News broadcast watching in twenty-one EU countries.

A similar analysis can be done for newspaper use. Here we look at the score for the tabloid and a mean score for the two broadsheet newspapers. Figure 27.2 displays the results. Again, we see considerable variation, with, for example, democratic–corporatist countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and France among the lowest in overall newspaper reading (lower-left corner of the graph), while some others score high on the tabloid use (Sweden, Finland, and Austria).

Research Question 2

Are we able to *explain* variation in media use based on the distinction made between media systems? As an example, we look at the "dominance of public TV" variable. To see whether the mean score on this variable differs significantly across countries that are classified differently on the media systems variable, we conduct a one-way ANOVA. One might, for example, expect the East European countries to score lower on this variable. Results suggest, even with the relative low number of cases, significant differences across media systems exist ($F = 4.095$, $p < 0.05$). Mean comparisons indicate that, indeed, East European countries score lowest on the dominance of public TV. The differences with liberal (0.88 points; $p < 0.05$) and democratic–corporatist



Figure 27.2 Newspaper reading in twenty-one European countries.

countries (0.66 points; $p < 0.05$) are indeed significant, while the difference with polarized pluralist countries is not (0.33 points; $p = 0.19$).

Research Question 3

We now move to the individual level and look at the impact of political interest on the dominance of the public TV variable. Here, we make a comparison of the relation between countries by running separate regression analyses for each of the countries and compare their results. These regression analyses are very basic ones, with political interest as the independent variable and dominance of public TV as the dependent variable. Additionally, gender, age, and education are included as control variables.

The results suggest that in most of the twenty-one countries, there indeed exists a positive relationship between political interest and dominance of public TV, meaning that people with more political interest are more likely to turn to public broadcasting to get their news. This relation is significant (at least $p < 0.05$) in fifteen of the twenty-one countries. In five countries, there is no significant effect (Denmark, Poland, Finland, Slovakia, and Greece) and in one country a negative effect is found (France). This makes

Table 27.3 Predicting the dominance of public TV.

	Fixed-effects	*Random-effects*	*Cross-level interaction*
	B	*B*	*B*
Education	0.095***	0.091***	0.091***
Age	0.010***	0.010***	0.010***
Gender	–0.152***	–0.147***	–0.146***
Political interest	0.087***	0.083***	0.045
Liberal	0.861**	0.535	0.501
Continental	0.654**	0.715**	0.721*
Polarized pluralist	0.740**	0.317**	0.277
Interest*liberal			0.077
Interest*continental			–0.011
Interest*polarized pluralist			0.098
Constant	0.222	0.385*	0.400*
Variance country level	0.161	0.207	0.205
Variance political interest		0.010	0.008
Variance individual level	2.595	2.571	2.571
Log-likelihood	–43294.179	–43215.262	–43218.495

Note: Unstandardized coefficients from multilevel models. *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$; $N = 22\,806$.

clear that, overall, the relation is in the expected direction, but that there might be country-level characteristics that moderate the effect.

Research Question 4

Finally, we look into the potential moderating influence of the media system on the relationship between political interest and dominance of public TV. We pose the question of whether this relationship is similar across those media systems. To answer this question, we conduct multilevel analyses, which include political interest, age, gender, and education as individual-level independent variables, three dummies for the media systems (East European as the reference category) as country-level independent variables and dominance of public TV as the dependent variable. We present three models: one fixed-effects analysis, one random-effects analysis that allows for variation of the effect of political interest across countries, and the same model including the interaction terms for the media system dummies and political interest. Table 27.3 presents the results.

The results confirm a positive main effect from political interest. Again, we find that respondents in East European countries score lower than in other countries. In this model, which has the individual as the unit of analysis and controls for several other characteristics, differences with all three other media system types are significant. The second, random-effects, model shows that there is indeed significant variation in the effect of political interest between countries, though it is rather limited (a variance of 0.010 compared to, for example, 0.207 for variance across countries). The final model demonstrates that this variation cannot be attributed to media systems: all three interaction effects are insignificant and the unexplained variance is only marginally and nonsignificantly reduced to 0.008. Therefore, we can conclude that, indeed, the effect of political interest differs across countries, but that this variation is not caused by media systems.

The empirical example – demonstrating each of the four types of CCR – shows the value and potential of each type of question and analysis. Each example is comparative, but the questions asked and the analyses run to provide the answers differ. The examples are not to suggest that one approach is right or superior to another, which depends on the question at stake, but the examples do stress that often many of the comparative questions that can be asked require thinking about individuals that are nested in systems. Such questions require the appropriate statistical modeling.

Discussion

Europe can be considered a laboratory for comparative communication research. One continent, many countries, and citizens are nested in what are often nationally delineated media and political systems. European parliamentary elections are particularly suited to answer both substantive questions about European integration, elections, media, and citizens, but they are also highly suited for advancing our thinking about comparative communication research: when studying these elections, research centers around comparing a concurrent and similar event that offers more opportunities to keep event characteristics constant than in a comparison between different domestic elections in different countries, as is common practice in much of current comparative research.

Previous work on understanding the European public sphere, often through extensive cross-national comparative analyses of the media's coverage of the EU and European integration, has tended to be focused on descriptive research endeavors outlining similarities and differences. Examples of explanatory research gravitate toward studies that compare relationships in different countries and contexts. Only in recent years has communication research begun to explore the possibility and advantages of explaining variation across units. Europe, with its variation on several relevant accounts, forms a perfect laboratory to pursue and push this research further.

If CCR is to escape the infancy and meet the critique voiced by some (Norris 2009), we need to work together! To enable more sophisticated comparisons we need to move beyond the small-*N* comparisons, and we need to include – both for theoretical as well as analytical purposes – both more cases (e.g., more countries) *and* more levels (this can be individuals, but also, for example, news outlets) (see Boomgaarden *et al.* 2012; Schuck *et al.* 2012).

An additional challenge to be met for CCR is to develop good academic practices such as actions to ensure data comparability and infrastructures enabling accessible data repositories. Again, the European elections provide an example to be followed by other communication researchers. The project *Providing an Infrastructure for Research on Electoral Democracy in the European Union* (PIREDEU) was a central and concerted effort to collect media and analyze the coverage of the 2009 elections. These data are publicly available on www.piredeu.eu, including a documentation of the codebook and the study. Such efforts not only enable comparative studies of the 2009 elections but are also part of developing a data infrastructure that will allow for comparisons over time when the database in expanded. In that way we can start to analyze media coverage also in a diachronic comparative perspective.

Europe thus offers ample opportunities for advancing CCR. However, even with the measures outlined above we are not there yet. The challenges pointed out by Norris (2009) still merit serious attention. To mention maybe the most important one: for databases to be useful, we need a greater conciseness of concepts and operationalizations used and more efforts need to be vested in our case selection.

Finally, despite its comparative qualities, Europe also offers constraints and limitations. First, most comparisons focus on West European countries and there is only sporadic work including East European countries (Toka and Popescu 2008). Second, the conclusions drawn from *intra*-European comparisons are obviously limited to the European situation. This is an important constraint. Still, there is more comparative mileage in Europe than taking a starting point in unique political and media systems such as the United States and comparing this system to one or several systems elsewhere. Third and finally, while Europe can teach us a lot about voters, the media, and politics, it is also important to note that the dynamics of European politics is often very different from the dynamics of politics in European countries. European elections are by no means the same as national elections and conclusions from studies into the EP elections can, for example, only to a limited extent be generalized to domestic elections in the EU member states. These shortcomings notwithstanding, it is clear that CCR is moving from infancy to adolescence, that projects such as the one described in this chapter can contribute to this development, and, overall, that there is plenty to be optimistic about.

Notes

1. This section draws heavily from Vliegenthart (2011).
2. For all research questions, the question whether cases are truly comparable needs to be addressed. This question relates to issues such as measurement bias and structural equivalence. Additionally, different statistical techniques are appropriate. We do not discuss those issues in detail here. For an overview, see Vliegenthart (2011).
3. In their study Dimitrova and Strömbäck (2005) adopt a very different systems design, which makes it even more difficult to assess which factors cause variation in coverage.
4. Each database consists of between 3600 (Slovakia) and 339 000 (the United Kingdom) individuals. Quotas (on age, gender, and education) were enforced in sampling from the database. The average response rate was 31% in wave 1 and the re-contact rate was on average 80% in wave 2. The samples show appropriate distributions in terms of gender, age, and education compared to census data. As we are mostly interested in the underlying relationships between variables, we consider the deviations in the sample vis-à-vis the adult population less problematic and we exert appropriate caution when making inferences about absolute values.

References

Blumler, J.G. and Gurevitch, M. (1995) *The Crisis of Public Communication*. London: Routledge.

Boomgaarden, H.G. *et al.* (2012) Across Time and Space. Explaining Over-Time and Cross-Country Variations in the Coverage of European Elections, Manuscript under review.

de Vreese, C.H. (2007) The EU as a public sphere, *Living Reviews in European Governance*, **2** (3), accessed 02/10/2010, http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2007-3.

de Vreese, C.H. and Boomgaarden, H.G. (2006) News, political knowledge and participation: the differential effects of news media exposure on political knowledge and participation, *Acta Politica*, **41**, 317–341.

de Vreese, C.H. and Boomgaarden, H.G. (2011) Size and Euroskepticism. explaining variation in the news coverage of European elections, in F. Esser and T. Hanitzsch (eds.), *Handbook of Comparative Communication Research*. New York: Routledge.

de Vreese, C.H., Lauf, E. and Peter, J. (2007) The media and European Parliament elections: second-rate coverage of a second-order event?, in W. van der Brug and C. van der Eijk (eds), *European Elections and Domestic Politics. Lessons from the Past and Scenarios for the Future*. University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 116–130.

de Vreese, C.H. *et al.* (2006) The news coverage of the 2004 European parliamentary election campaign in 25 countries, *European Union Politics*, **7** (4), 477.

de Vreese, C.H. *et al.* (2010) *Documentation European Election Campaign Study*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam School of Communication Research.

Dimitrova, D. V. and Strömbäck, J. (2005) Mission accomplished? Framing of the Iraq War in the elite newspapers in Sweden and the United States, *International Communication Gazette*, **67** (5), 399–417.

Esser, F. and Pfetsch, B. (2004) *Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases, and Challenges*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hallin, D. and Mancini, P. (2004) *Comparing Media Systems. Three Model of Media and Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Holtz-Bacha, C. and Norris, P. (2001) 'To entertain, inform, and educate': still the role of public television, *Political Communication*, **18** (2), 123–140.

Koopmans, R. (2004) Who inhabits the European public sphere? Winners and losers, supporters and opponents in Europeanised political debates, *European Journal of Political Research*, **46** (2), 183–210.

Koopmans, R. and Erbe, J. (2004) Towards a European public sphere? Vertical and horizontal dimensions of Europeanised political communication, *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, **17** (2), 97–118.

Lijphart, A. (1999) *Patterns of Democracy*. New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press.

Mancini, P. (2010) *Comparative Communication Science*. Keynote lecture to the ECREA Conference, Hamburg, Germany.

Neuman, W.R., Just, M.R. and Crigler, A.N. (1992) *Common Knowledge: News and the Construction of Political Meaning*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Norris, P. (2002) *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Norris, P. (2009) Comparative political communications: common frameworks or Babelian confusion?, *Government and Opposition*, **44** (3), 321–340.

Peter, J., Lauf, E. and Semetko, H. (2004) Television coverage of the 1999 European parliamentary elections, *Political Communication*, **21**, 415–433.

Przeworksi, A. and Teune, H. (1970) *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*. New York: Wiley-Interscience.

Schuck, A.R.T. *et al.* (2012) Explaining campaign news coverage: how medium, time and context explain variation in the media framing of the 2009 European parliamentary elections, *Journal of Political Marketing* (forthcoming).

Shehata, A. and Strömbäck, J. (2010) A matter of context. A comparative study of media environments and news consumption gaps in Europe, *Political Communication*, **28** (1), 110–134.

Strömbäck, J. and Kaid, L.L. (eds) (2008) *Handbook of Election News Coverage around the World*. London: Routledge.

Toka, G. and Popescu, M. (2008) Inequalities of political influence in new democracies, *International Sociology*, **37** (4), 67–93.

Trenz, H.-J. (2004) Media coverage on European governance: exploring the European public sphere in national quality newspapers, *European Journal of Communication*, **19** (3), 291–319.

Trenz, H.-J. (2005) *Europa in den Medien. Die Europäische Integration im Spiegel Nationaler Öffentlichkeit*. Frankfurt: Campus.

Vliegenthart, R. (2011) Advanced strategies for data analysis: opportunities and challenges of comparative data, in F. Esser and T. Hanitzsch (eds), *Handbook of Comparative Communication Research*. New York: Routledge.

Vliegenthart, R. *et al.* (2008) News coverage and support for European integration, 1990–2006, *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, **20** (4), 415–439.

Wessler, H., Peters, B., Brüggemann, M., Kleinen-von Königlow, K. and Sifft, S. (2008) *Transnationalization of Public Spheres*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

28

The Global–Local in News Production Tales from the Field in the "Shoes" of Journalists

Lisbeth Clausen

Given the importance of news media and news culture in today's society, ethnography is an efficient tool for delivering insights into the nature of news work and the dynamics of political and cultural information in news.

The "classic" ethnographic studies have brought important insights into news production. The method of intensive and extensive newsroom observation has generated ethnographic insights into the cultural milieu and professional ideology of journalists (Cottle 2007). These studies, with a few exceptions, have hitherto mainly been done in Western newsrooms. Studies by the American political scientist Ellis S. Krauss (Krauss 2000; Krauss and Pharr 1996) and the present study (Clausen 2003a) of Japanese newsroom practices are still among the few extensive ethnographic investigations outside the Western realm. Against the more historical account by Krauss, who provides an American perspective through interviews, the present study focuses on the observation of micro-*processes* in news production from a European perspective. It deserves notice that while the Japanese dual broadcast system of one public service and several commercial stations in many ways resembles the European broadcast systems, much research on Japanese media and politics consists of comparative studies between the rather different systems of the United States and Japan. Krauss addresses the problems of comparing such different systems by noting that his study inevitably finds media institutions in Japan and the United States fundamentally different. This problem, he notes, is also apparent in US reporting about Japan. Many institutions and practices that American reporters find "unique" about Japan resemble those found in Europe (Krauss and Pharr 1996, p. 268). According to Krauss, the problem is that it may be giving a false impression of both nations: the former as a deviant and the latter as the norm. Frequently, it is the United States that is "unique" and not Japan (Krauss and Pharr 1996, p. 268).

Since the early ethnographic studies, economic, political, and importantly technological change has led to a reconfiguration of news production and journalist practices,

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

which, as Cottle argues, calls for new theoretical assumptions and new avenues for ethnographic research (Cottle 2000, 2007). These global changes have equally influenced production practices in Japan, and the issues under discussion are equally applicable in the Japanese case. Changes in technology, mergers, and acquisitions in media organizations, broadcast regulations, and the marketization of news were found to cause changes in mentalities and some areas of news production practices in Japan while some professional issues remained similar. This chapter discusses the methodological approach to observations in Japanese newsrooms in relation to assumptions and findings in Western studies. It first describes the empirical base for the field studies in newsrooms in Japan. Subsequently, it provides tales from the field in relation to six orthodoxies in Western studies of news production. The conclusion provides suggestions for future research.

Tales from the Field: The Context of the News Room Studies in Japan

Tales from the field will draw on two newsroom studies in Japan from 1996/1997 and 2002.

The first study was part of the international news flow in the 1990s study (Stevenson 1995; Clausen 2006, 2009) based on observation at the public service station NHK from June–November 1997 and TV Asahi July–August 1997. Forty formal interviews were conducted with personnel from all levels of the companies as practiced by several scholars in news production (Warner 1971; Epstein 1973; Schlesinger 1978; Paterson 1996). It did not include executives at the boardroom level but drew on the expertise of extra media members such as former journalists and members of the press clubs. Interpersonal communication through computers and the use of technology was not part of the study (Paterson 1996; Cottle 1999). The entire duration of setting up the study, getting access, and observing in the newsrooms was one and a half years from 1996/1997. Through observation on and off and then three consecutive months of regular observation at NHK, and the more occasional observation opportunities at TV Asahi, I was familiar and had talked with most of my interviewees on several occasions. Some had already explained part of their working experiences before the actual interview but volunteered information again when the tape-recorder was turned on. The interviews took different directions according to the position and experience of the interviewee. Trainees and scriptwriters were generally very detailed in their explanation of procedures, where highly ranging executives with many years in the news production business were more apt to explain production strategies as "a sense of news". Generally, the news producers were eager to participate in the study and talked with no reservations. Most talked at length about an issue, especially the journalists, who had been active on location and engaged in the specific news events. Some interviewees, especially those in managerial positions and some of the anchors, did not recollect the actual production process of the three "global" news items that were the focus of the study (Clausen 2003a, 2004a). They had been preoccupied with different aspects of production and the specific news was not present in their minds. A short news presentation may have enhanced their recollection of the events. However, in most cases they contributed with more general information about international news production.

I adhered to the same basic questions throughout the entire interview period (which lasted from May 1996 until November 1997). This strategy was not followed to quantify answers, that is, generate positivist results, but in order to get multiple insights into the research issues (which only became apparent after some investigation and observation at the stations) by making questions based on the same interview cues. This strategy gave access to a large scale of "interpretative schemes" about a limited number of phenomena:

- The production of international news
- Decision making
- News criteria and news values
- Audiences
- The political message of the station
- The production of the three particular "global" news items.

When introduced to the general research aim some talked at length. Others were more concise in their answers. Many of the foreign correspondents seemingly enjoy being on the other side of the microphone. The interviews resulted in many "self-containing stories" about news production. These individual stories were later "torn apart" and reassembled in sections of generalized themes.

The second study is based on newsroom observation, interviews, and tape-recorded news output. I spent September 11 in the production studio (studio and stadium) of TV Asahi and made interviews with news producers and executive managers at TV Asahi and NHK before and after the event in the month of September 2002. Later in May 2003 I visited the NHK and TV Asahi offices in Washington DC to conduct retrospective interviews about the production of this particular news item. The analysis of news output is based on tape-recorded material of the prime time programs at the public service station NHK, and the commercial stations TV Asahi, TBS, TV Fuji, and NTV. The programs last about 2 hours, including commercials, and serve as reference to the general strategies at the stations. The late evening (flagship) programs of each station are analyzed in depth. The political commentary in the programs have been translated and coded by research assistants at Keio University in Tokyo. Twenty-three programs and documentaries in the week of the 9/11 event, provided by the NHK Culture and Broadcast Research Centre, was drawn upon to present an overall view of the broadcast of the event in Japan (Clausen 2003b).

"Classic" and "Second Wave" Studies in News Production

The chapter layout is inspired by Simon Cottle's outline of "classic" news production studies related to what he terms the more recent "second wave" studies (Cottle 2000). The six orthodoxies are listed as a number of questions used to discuss the observation of production processes and analysis of news output in Japan moving from the classic studies to the second wave – and beyond:

- Bureaucratic routines versus cultural practices?
- Professional "objectivities" versus new(s) epistemologies?
- Hierarchy of access versus cultural symbolism?
- The forgotten audience versus the imagined audience?
- Public knowledge versus popular culture?
- Homogenization or heterogenization?

The orthodoxies listed by Cottle provide a platform for reviewing previous literature and for discussing issues in recent news production studies that apply (or do not apply) in a concrete field study in newsrooms in Japan.

Bureaucratic Routines or Cultural Practices?

The first orthodoxy concerns the notion of "bureaucratic routine", which has been a central notion in the classic news production studies. The "classic studies", including those of Warner (1971), Epstein (1973), Altheide (1976), Tuchman (1973, 1978), Schlesinger (1978), Golding and Elliott (1979), Gans (1980), Bantz, McCorkle, and Baade (1981), and Soloski (1989), identify the importance of "routine" in news production. Also the notion of routine is emphasized in the study by Schlesinger (1978): "The news we receive on any given day is not as unpredictable as much journalistic mythology would have us believe. Rather, the doings of the world are tamed to meet the needs of a production system in many respects bureaucratically organised" (Schlesinger 1978, p. 47). According to Schlesinger, the routines of news production have definite consequences for the structuring of news. To delineate the main features of these routines "goes some way towards providing a rational understanding of an important form of work" (Schlesinger 1978, p. 47). Along the same line, Fishman (1980) concludes that news workers "do not invent new methods of reporting the world on every occasion they confront it. They employ methods that have been used in the past; they rely upon the standard operating procedures of their news organisation and of their profession" (Fishman 1980, p. 14). Maintaining the notion of routine, Bantz, McCorkle, and Baade (1981, p. 385) compare television news operations to a "news factory". The reporters and photographers are nearly identical in terms of the production of a uniform product within a limited period of time. The "news factory" system reduces a news worker's personal investment both in the segment he or she helps produce and in the entire newscast. This is the consequence of the news workers' lack of control over the final product (Bantz, McCorkle, and Baade 1981, p. 382). The theories of "routines" are well established. They are used not only to describe working processes in mass communication organizations but in organizations at large. Routines help explain the flow of work (of informational and material products). The notion of routines as a means to describe communication in organizations is productive in a sense because it provides a way to categorize and create regularity and manageability in a job that is inherently unmanageable. However, in the study of micro-processes in Japanese newsrooms the functional and deterministic notion does not suffice. The daily occurrences, the decision-making processes and the complex negotiations of information can hardly be described as "routine" in the experience of news producers (Schultz 2007). That at least is not how most news producers would categorize the way they experience their work (Schulz 2007).

A shift from the study of routine to the study of "practice" (Cottle 2000) implies an understanding in this project of communication as a cultural practice or ritual (Carey 1989). The notion of "practices", however, was replaced further in the fieldwork in Japan with notions of "considerations" and "strategies". These notions imply nuanced forms of agency by including the intentions and emotions of news producers (strategy implies both influences of organizational structures as well as features of the individual news producer). Journalistic agency thus involves "subjective" strategies. This may be more in accordance with the early gate-keeping studies (White 1950) and less with bureaucratic "routines" as described in the "classic studies". However, where the 1950s study of subjective biases relied on one newspaper editor, "Mr Gate", the present study is based on interviews and experiences of forty "gate-keepers" or rather "cultural mediators". Where the subjective approach of the early gate-keeping studies involved de-contextualized studies of professional biases, the present approach includes several *contextual* levels of influence on news production, namely the global (analysis of global news items' content and genre), the national (press clubs and national media (agencies) and political institutions), the organizational (public service private values and decision-making processes), and the professional (journalistic experience) (Clausen 2004c).

Although news producers were, in fact, tied by all kinds of constraints they did seem to have room for individual maneuvering. The theoretical approach in this project assumes news producers to be knowing and active individuals. Hence, the application of this more subjective approach enabled exemplification of knowing and purposeful news producers (Clausen 2003a). But how was access to the more emotional (subjective) sense-making of journalist achieved? Getting access to organizations and people in the international news rooms is a delicate matter. International news production is closely connected to political and diplomatic issues and potent tension field between internal and external affairs. Being an academic, female and foreign (and fluent in the Japanese language) turned out to be strategic resources (see Clausen 2004b). The following describes how a common ground between a researcher and news producer was constructed.

News Producers as Cultural Mediators

In the early stages of my fieldwork, international affairs and the experience and interest in other cultures was a connecting point in conversation with the news producers. All staff members in the international newsrooms at both NHK and News Station had been stationed abroad for longer or shorter appointments. The challenge of gaining and mediating knowledge (information through experience) to a "home" audience was a common point of interest. The "coexistence of cultures in the individual experience" (Hannerz 1997, p. 239) and the communication of it was a vocational challenge for the foreign correspondents and the revolving point of interest in the present project. The experiences and learning of the news producers *and* the foreign researcher was in a sense similar to the "cosmopolitan" as described by Hannerz (1997). The notion "cosmopolitanism" (including bureaucrats, politicians, business people, and diplomats) entails a certain orientation toward others (journalists may be introvert or extrovert with varying degrees of cultural competence):

> Cosmopolitanism is first of all an orientation, a willingness to engage with the Other. It is an intellectual and aesthetic stand of openness toward divergent cultural experiences, a search for contrasts rather than uniformity (Hannerz 1997, p. 239).

The "orientation" towards others includes an element of acceptance that cultures are divergent. Divergent rests upon the assumption that culture is a collective phenomenon, which is primarily linked to interactions and social relationships, and only indirectly and without logical necessity to particular areas in physical space. "Cultures tend to overlap and mingle" (Hannerz 1997, p. 238). "Competence" (or preferably intercultural communication skills) Hannerz defines as both a generalized and a more specialized kind. "There is the aspect of 'a state of readiness', a personal ability to make one's way into other cultures, through *listening, looking, intuiting and reflecting*" (Hannerz 1997, p. 239; my emphasis). There is a cultural competence or a built-up social skill in maneuvering more or less expertly with a particular system of meanings and meaningful forms. Competence, according to Hannerz, with regard to alien cultures itself, entails a sense of mastery, as an aspect of the self. One's understandings have expanded a little as more of the world is somehow under control. Yet, according to Hannerz there is a curious, apparently paradoxical, interplay between mastery and surrender for the cosmopolitan (which also concerns the news producer and the ethnographer). In some cases the cosmopolitan may construct his or her own unique personal perspective out of an idiosyncratic collection of experience. In others, she or he may negotiate with the other culture but accept it as a package deal. Even this surrender is a part of the sense of mastery. Yet, the surrender is of course only conditional. The "cosmopolitan may embrace the alien culture, but s(he) does not become committed to it. All the time s(he) knows where the exit is" (Hannerz 1997, p. 240). The possibility of "exit" is against the anthropological ideal of assimilation and oneness with the people investigated. Exit nevertheless is always a possibility of the researcher (and the journalist abroad), which has different implications for relationships during fieldwork. The "locals" first of all do not have an opportunity for exit, which always makes an imbalance that can be positive and negative for both parties. The positive part is that communicating with a foreigner creates new spaces or "free zones" in which conditions for communications are independent of restrictions and inhibitions of the surrounding culture. Much can be said within these "free zones" (new frameworks of social interaction) and it is within the ethical considerations of the researcher not to compromise the volunteer. Over time, I became part of the Japanese newsrooms and became acquainted with the staff. I continuously approached news producers with questions about their work procedures to measure my perceptions with theirs. But not only did I have an exit, I also let them have one. Every day, I checked in at the front reception at NHK who called the chief desk in the international department to give me a visitor's pass. After a while, the chief desk suggested a permanent pass, but I kept checking in at the reception to give him an opportunity to renegotiate access if he felt that my presence in the newsrooms was intruding.

Although I set out to explore the working strategies and sense-making of news producers without applying the theoretical and (in some studies) practical notions of "routine" as an explanatory category of news production, other categories such as the obsession with "time", the exercise of legitimizing information, and the strategies of making news factual as described in the "classic studies", and elaborated upon below, were equally pervasive in the Japanese newsrooms.

Professional Objectivity or New Epistemologies?

The second orthodoxy is the journalistic claim of a shared professional ideology of "objectivity". Scholars of the "classic" news production studies agree that "objectivity" is the most important professional norm (Gans 1980; Soloski 1989; Tuchman 1972). The claim of objectivity refers to a practice in which several sources are sought out for legitimizing news information. However, even though this may be a general notion through history, the orthodoxy of "objectivity" cannot any more be assumed to represent a generalized journalistic commitment (Cottle 2000). The present study of Japan's public service station, NHK, supports this notion of change. In other words, the individual news producer's interpretations and strategies for making "objective" news was found to differ from ideal to real. Seemingly, the value in international news was expressed according to the political stance of the broadcaster, which was pro-government at the public service station and anti-government at the commercial station. The Japanese public station (in a perceived role as a government spokes channel) would criticize the United States only as far as the international agencies were concerned, but never more. The private station had no qualms in this matter, and engaged in open criticism through subjective presentation style. The criticism for the particular news on the United Nations women's conference in China in 1995 was mainly against the domestic and Chinese governments (Clausen 2001).

Other news values besides objectivity were listed as classic criteria for foreign news. Galtung and Ruge (1965) argued that there were culture-bound factors influencing the transition from "events" to "news", and the four factors were deemed important in the North-Western part of the world were:

> The more the event concerns elite nations, the more probable that it will become a news item.
> The more the event concerns elite people, the more probable that it will become a news item.
> The more the event can be seen in personal terms, as due to the action of specific individuals, the more probable that it will become a news item.
> The more negative the event in its consequences, the more probable that it will become a news item (Galtung and Ruge 1965, p. 56).

In other words, the more the event concerns elite or center people, the more probable that it will become a news item and there is some measure of ethnocentrism or cultural proximity operative (Galtung and Ruge 1965). The hypotheses of Galtung and Ruge have been influential in international news research. Although critical objections have been raised against their heuristic model of news criteria and the narrow methodology employed (Hjarvard 1995), the theoretical points listed above concerning international newsworthiness are still applicable. The fieldwork observations of news production and content analysis proved the center and elite concern, the concentration on people and the ethnocentric and cultural proximity thesis, to be valid. It deserves notice that the feeling of "proximity" was not merely related to geographical distance but rather a calculated news production means of constructing a sense of closeness and familiarity between the viewers and event by drawing upon previous knowledge about the country in focus. Alternatively, a familiar situation or a recognizable story frame would be set up in order to create familiarity. A negative "spin" in the reporting of the UN Conference was employed as an effective rhetorical means to make complex information coherent by the National station. Hillary Clinton featured in all reports with similar pictures of agency or national pool visuals, just as national politicians were featured when in action according to UN protocol performances of government leaders and events. Concerning questions about objectivity this quote demonstrates an immediate reaction to a straightforward question: "Objective [laughter]. It's very difficult." Another early observation in news production studies, which is prominent in the present study, was as pointed out by Grey (1966), who noted that a journalist's decision about what should pass through the "gate" depended on what other journalists were doing and saying. In other words, journalists feel compelled to validate their own news sense by showing that others are interested in the same story. While Grey was studying Supreme Court journalists in the United States, studies in Japanese newsrooms of international news producers and their relations to agency footage and other stations news coverage showed that close attention to other journalists on location and to other media reports were standard procedures, as described here:

> Most news sources first come from the agencies. We get information from CNN, AP and Reuters about an event. Then to make sure we then contact our own correspondents around the world. In some cases they get together with the CNN correspondent and make something together. So nobody knows, what is the correct information? The visuals and movie material on the VTR may be the occasion of the event. These are facts. We can see that someone is shot or running away but we do not know what happens. The interpretations of events are a complex affair (Interview, news producer 2002).

Besides validating own interpretations, an eye on other media and international agencies (Boyd-Barrett 1998) was necessary due to fierce competition among media and the reluctance to let the competition get a "scoop". Staff in the newsrooms and journalists in the field were continuously watching the presentations of competing national channels and foreign national and international networks to be in tune with recent developments in their search for news angles on stories. News values that sum up many of the above studies of global and local news production and resemble most of those mentioned in the *international* newsrooms of the present study have derived from research on the international news agencies (Paterson 1998, p. 93). The list includes *timeliness*, *proximity*, *consequence*, *human interest* (emotional value), *prominence*, *conflict*, and, importantly, *visual quality*, and finally *topicality*. Topicality (*topics* or *wadaisei* as it was termed in Japanese) was mainly mentioned in the commercial newsrooms. The value of topicality was more prominent in the "infotainment" genre news programs of broadcast news. *Topicality* (which included accidents, disasters, and social stories) was an incorporated news value replacing political economic commentary at some commercial stations. This bore witness to the market orientation of news production, mentioned above.

In sum, news criteria and news values were asked about in the study while answers went in multiple directions. The notion of "objectivity" may have been recognized as a "classic" journalistic news criterion, but the philosophies behind the notion were put into practice with variations from the prestigious public station, NHK, at one end to the commercial and gradually more "populist" even "tabloid" presentation forms of five commercial stations at the other end. The "ideal", which was the notion of "objective" reporting, was a virtue, but this basic journalistic criteria was often compromised in the "real" situation of news production. The news production practices and considerations were greatly influenced by business and marketing decisions. Even at NHK, which was based on a license fee and therefore not dependent on sponsorship, the market mechanisms and concern with viewer ratings were at work (see below). The private stations at the other end of the spectrum made what they called "instant news", which involved the production of informational products that, like instant food, were easily consumed and immediately digestible. *Instant news* play on the famous Japanese instant nuddles (*ramen*) and refer to the fact that news must be easily consumable or immediately digestible – when again it caters to immediate consumer gratification. If the consumer is gratified they will not change the channel.

An emotional appeal of "human interest" stories, rather than the appeal to rationality with statistical corroboration and political economic commentary, is termed a "subjectivist" epistemology (Cottle 2000, p. 25). The subjectivity can be constructed through a variety of textual means, including prominent use of visual, vernacular language, and interviews designed to elicit emotive and experiential accounts. The "subjectivist" epistemology and its variant forms are not necessarily confined to the populist appeals and excesses of tabloid output. According to Cottle (2007), attention to mainstream, and even prestigious, "serious" news output also reveals how elements of this subjectivist news epistemology are becoming textually inscribed across the range of news forms. The subjective approach was represented in the Japanese international news production in a variety of forms from "news" to "views" journalism (see below). Nevertheless, it deserves mention that the Japanese public service (NHK) and the commercial station (TV Asahi) were more "objective" in their approach to international news coverage than their Danish counterparts (Clausen 2004c).

Hierarchy of Access or Cultural Symbolism?

The third orthodoxy suggested by Cottle is the question of access. The question of access to media coverage implies access to the symbolic environment of society. The notions do not exclude each other but are mutually dependent, as argued below. If organizations are constituted in communication, they exist not only as activity systems but also as symbolic realities in interaction with the surrounding symbolic environment. A news organization selects items from among the pool of stories available. If a news editor does not select a news story, it fails to become part of the symbolic environment (Bantz 1990, p. 503). For the broadcasting station and the nation, this event never happened. Access to the symbolic environment is therefore vital for social actors and has implications for democracy.

The question of access, according to Cottle (2007), combines the view of bureaucratic processes and the ideology of objectivity discussed above. The media, on the one hand, use sources to legitimize their information and hierarchical access, and these routine connections to legitimate sources in return routinely privilege the voices of the socially powerful and marginalize or even silence those of the institutionally nonaligned and powerless, as described by Gitlin (1980). It is generally agreed in news production studies that economically and politically powerful sources have more access to the media and, therefore, more opportunity to insert messages into media channels (Gans 1980). Resource-poor groups may have to resort to deviant acts to attract media attention. The existing social order is thus maintained through a hierarchical order of access to media. The police (Fishman 1980) or government bureaucrats (Shoemaker and Reese 1996) are among the privileged sources. In the Japanese case, the relationship with government and business officials through the press club system maintains the social structure and hierarchical order in a "cozy" relationship between the political and economic elites and the press (Feldman 1993). The notions of hierarchical access and an ideological hegemony of capitalistic elites are expressed in their most extreme forms by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky in *Manufacturing Consent* (1988). Herman and Chomsky offer a "conspiracy" model of the mass media. They compare the American press with Pravda in the Soviet Union and argue that the propagandistic character of news is due to the fact that the news is produced by a concentrated industry of several dozen profit-making corporations. The industry depends on advertising for its profits and government officials for its sources. It is intimidated by right-wing pressure groups and imbued with anti-communist ideology. The orthodoxy of hierarchical access has been widely propagated in critical media studies.

The empirical analysis of newsroom practices in this fieldwork shows that multiple interests are at work at different levels of decision-making processes within media organizations. Influences work top-down and bottom-up. News workers belong to different networks within the organization and operate daily in different production units.

Incidentally, I met a female journalist and, while talking, I learned that she had been networking within TV Asahi to include reports from the UN Conference on Women in Beijing 1995. She had been to the Scandinavian countries and was interested in the democratic model of quota systems for women. She was actively pushing for implementation of government equal rights policies. The famous speaker Ms Komiyama also was pushing at every opportunity she had on air for equal rights. The commentator Mr Wada noted that all UN conferences were opportunities for men and that it was about time to have a women's conference. Finally the producer Mr Wade made the working goal of the women's conference to make stories for both men and women. While this made a lot of sense from a liberal feminist point of view it was also good for business. Incidentally, a commercial on Shiseido's *eau de cologne/perfume* for men and women followed the news show. The many interests and influences in the newsrooms along with what was possible on location were "determining" factors and actors in the final transmissions.

A dictation by elites did not find empirical grounding in the study of micro-processes. The notion of conspiracy resembles that of routine, above. These notions reflect the conceptual frameworks employed in news production studies. Macro-perspectives and middle-range analysis of empirical fields allow for such gross categorizations whereas closer investigation and "thick" descriptions of micro-processes provide more nuanced pictures. In other words, in a close investigation of micro-processes, multiple contextual influences emerge in which the notions of "routine" and "conspiracy" do not suffice.

As noted by Cottle, critical studies tend to be less theoretically sensitive to, and empirically underplay, the ways in which cultural forms employed in news can condition the way in which news producers position news actors symbolically (Cottle 2000, p. 27). The present study attends in detail to how the journalist's (preconceived) story ideas or strategy result in the pursuit of certain voices and commentary which elicit the expected statement. It was found that sources were actively selected to represent the particular interests of the news producers. The choice of "voices" between the public service station and the commercial station differed greatly according to the political ethos of the station. A boom in public journalism and viewer initiated footing, particularly in relation to the 9/11/2002 reporting, provided access to viewers. Given the commercial station's commitment to adversarial journalism, it showed more "creativity" in the strategic use of ordinary people's "voices" than the public service station.

Thus, the present study of public service and commercial stations sheds light on different aspects of the notion of "hierarchical" access by analyzing which and how "voices" are represented in news. This process is found to involve multiple external and internal factors and actors at different hierarchical levels. Differing organizational factors as well as the motivation and expertise of individual news producers were found to influence the choice and staging of actors in news. Ultimately, the hierarchy and perceived importance in the symbolism of consumer society differed from the hierarchy of official elitist political symbolism.

The Forgotten Audience or the Imagined Audience?

The fourth orthodoxy concerns the "forgotten audience", which is referred to in "second wave" studies as the "imagined audience". The lack of involvement of news audiences in processes of news production has been a repeated orthodoxy. Cottle refers to the study

Table 28.1 Ratings of the flagship news program at the Japanese public and private stations. Based on ratings by Video Research, Week of September 11, 2002.

Ratings	6.9 NHK	**19.5 NTV**	7.6 TBS	9.3 Fuji TV	9.3 TV Asahi

by Schlesinger, in which the problem is addressed as a missing link between the standardized production routines (that work themselves out within and organizational structure) and the needs of a news audience (Schlesinger 1978; Clausen 1997). Although asserting that the "missing link" between producers and audiences is now an orthodoxy in the field, Cottle (1993) reports that his own study of regional news program production showed that newsroom staff had little knowledge of program ratings and audience profiles, even though senior managers claimed that these were taken very seriously. The audience according to Cottle was thus, in a sense, still "forgotten". Against these findings, Japanese news producers expressed varying degrees of awareness and knowledge about and not least involvement of their audiences, as elaborated further below.

According to Cottle, "mass audiences", by definition, have been unknowable to news producers as well as to news academics, notwithstanding the production of institutional audience research ratings or academic surveys (cf. Cottle 2000, p. 28). Large audiences, in Cottle's view, are always going to prove elusive as empirical, complexly differentiated objects of inquiry, and research instruments, at best, are destined to produce blunt findings only (Cottle 2000, p. 28). An "imagined audience", however, as studied by Cottle (1993) (and in the present project), "can reveal much of interest about the different constructions and appeals of different news forms as well as their selection and inflection of particular news stories" (Cottle 2000, p. 29).

In the light of these structural changes, the present study found that the Japanese news producers did inscribe "imagined audiences" into their particular news forms. Meanwhile, as noted above, top editors, news desk staff, script-writers, and correspondents included viewer considerations in the processes of story-framing, choice of visuals, actors, and verbal accounts. The considerations of audiences were included in the communication strategies at both the individual and group level of decision-making. Audience considerations were found to have a prominent place in the minds of the news producers.

Winner of the 9/11/2002 Ratings Game

NTV gained monopoly on the world live transmission of the documentary based on a fireman's camera recording of the event. The documentary "9/11 camera inside the building" was acquired for 100 million dollars. NTV reached a viewer rating of 30.4 from 20.00 to 21.54 o'clock. The success and viewer interest in this documentary affected the following news program "Dekigoto" (News Events), which reached a viewer rating average of 19.5 (see Table 28.1).

NTV won by far the viewing game this time. "The result is irrevocable." However, according to an Asahi paper commentator (the paper and television draw on the same

Asahi corporation experts) there was much criticism in the way that the program was presented filled with commercials and audiences continuously kept in suspense by promised exciting footage after the commercial break. The documentary continued into the news program and it was difficult to figure out when the documentary ended and the news program started. This was also due to the fact that the Japanese actor and film producer was on Ground Zero in New York so was presenting his view of the commemoration event part of the documentary or the proceeding news program? This overlap was not unusual but was exaggerated and caused criticism.

In conclusion, interviews about the "imagined audience" revealed a dimension of news differentiation in the selection and inflection of particular news stories. The "marketization" of news was found to have considerable influence for the simple reason that audience popularity meant increases in market shares, which attracted sponsors at the commercial stations and gave a competitive edge to the public service stations, which was important for professional pride and reputation. It also attracted sponsors at the commercial stations and helped in budget negotiations at the public service station. Market ratings were circulated daily and mentioned at evaluation meetings. They appeared to be the *raison d'être* of the investigated flagship news programs.

Public Knowledge or Popular Culture?

The fifth orthodoxy introduces two different views on news. First, news may be understood as public knowledge, which represents the normative functionalistic perspective on news production, which was prominent until the mid-1980s. Second, news may be seen as public culture, which reflects a cultural approach to news introduced in the 1980s cultural studies approach in audience reception studies.

Liberal as well as critical positions concerning news production, the latter defending the news media as public watchdog, organ of political opinion-formation, and facilitator of processes of democratic representation, have shared a rationalist approach to "public opinion" based upon ideas of informal transmission. According to Matsuyama (1993), the Japanese press is very anti-establishment. The reason for this is the powerful and pro-conservative sentiment in Japan, including some press circles. In order to keep a better balance the press has to be progressive. This does not mean support for the opposition parties but rather that the liberal press castigates governmental shortcomings with great zeal (Matsuyama 1993, p. 8). The anti-establishment attitude dates back to the end of the Second World War, when even the liberal paper, Asahi, cooperated with the military government. As a reaction to this experience, it has become the instinct of newsmen since the war not to curry favor with the government or with any part of the power-establishment (Matsuyama 1993, p. 6). Susan Pharr, in an analysis of media and politics (Krauss and Pharr 1996), uses the metaphor of a *trickster* to describe the Japanese media as having a role involving all of the above. The media is outside the established order and functions as a mediator between that order and the realm of *chaos* (the unknown) and also the realm of *cosmos* (values and meaning). The media in this view ideally performs the role of evaluator of the established order, and is thus a critic and provider of alternative perceptions and meaning concerning the way the state and its opposition say things should be (Krauss and Pharr 1996). According to Pharr, the media in Japan, like the media elsewhere, take all these positions at different times. The notion of trickster is based on the analysis of the role of the Japanese media from political scandals to shaping public opinion. The insights of some of these contributions were used for discussion of the political character and influence of politics on news production, as observed in the newsrooms (Clausen 2001).

Finally, the relationship between the media, public, and politics has been theorized by Youichi Ito (1994 1996) to explain the influence of mass media on the government's decision-making. In a tripolar model including the government, the public, and the media, Ito analyses the atmosphere (*kuuki*) and dynamics of influence between these three main constituents of collective political decision-making. The model is based on the assumption that mass media contents are basically heterogeneous in a pluralistic democracy like Japan. The notion of *kuuki* (atmosphere) was referred to in the newsrooms in relation to political tension or diplomatic winds. A sense of news was referred to as *kan* (sense) or *haragei* (gut feeling).

As observed by Cottle, today's news forms, which are seemingly trading on the terrain of popular culture, are anything but a mediation of rational information. Supporting this argument, Dahlgren (1992) argues that given the specific audio-visual structure of TV news and its production conventions, as well as the epistemic qualities of television, it is more instructive to treat TV news as a form of "cultural discourse", rather than "information". As such, "the daily recurrence and readily recognisable features of the programmes serve to link the viewer and his/her everyday life to the larger world in a manner which is ritualistic, symbolic and ultimately mythic, rather than informational" (Dahlgren 1992, p. 205). The real significance of television lies elsewhere, within the more fundamental domain of the organization of collective perception. For these authors, television is the key to understanding a historical transformation currently underway in the very manner in which we collectively produce meaning, or literally "how sense is made" (Dahlgren 1992, p. 205). Similarly, Hjarvard (1999) points to the differentiation between news as public knowledge or as popular culture based on an epistemological view. The understanding that news is knowledge and communicated in a process of "transmission" is favored in a positivist or empirical philosophical tradition, while the understanding that news is public culture and communicated as ritual is favored in a philosophy of social construction. The approach to studying Japanese newsrooms was a more interpretative and social constructivist approach to communication, which I shall discuss below. The production of news reports from "new journalism" and "live" reports to talk-show journalism and "infotainment" employs "aesthetic" effects and appeals in their visual and verbal expressions. News – even the "short news" and "straight news" – through this lens have incorporated forms and expressions that guide aesthetic impressions. Some journalistic forms are connected with high degrees of authenticity and legitimacy. Authority is, among other effects, a result of conventional aesthetic forms. A nonnarrative factual form is often considered more "true" than a narrative form, which mixes information, interpretations, and attitudes (Hjarvard 1995, p. 27). Thus, aesthetic application, as pointed out by Hjarvard, is not only used in the construction of social and symbolic artifacts but is also applied in the mediation of factual information such as news. For instance, in the news studio of TV Asahi (or stadium as it was called) a reporter who had investigated the 9/11 attack, and who had made a documentary about one terrorist, brought with him an original knife, which was on the news counter throughout the anchor's interview with him. The knife is referred to a few times during the news reporting by the female anchor. A popular game in Lebanon is shown: people fold a dollar bill into the form of a plane and a picture of the burning towers supposedly appear. Many times the cameras zoom in on these artifacts, used aesthetically as factual (authentic) information with much emotional drama. Another example may be the anchor Chikushi Hiroshi, who chose to attack the "fairness" doctrine of the American constitution by asking "What is fairness?" in a long speech with the Japanese characters in calligraphy reading "righteousness" on the background wall. Loud dramatic music supports his mood. He even asked viewers to fill out a list of questions on the Internet: How fair is the United States in the fight on terror? The vote is 98% not fair and 2% fair. This result was much in line with the message of his speech.

In conclusion, the theoretical framework of the present study combines the understanding of news as "public knowledge" *and* "popular culture". The distinction between the two was, however, expressed in the newsrooms. There was a perceived gap between the perception of news as "public knowledge" and "popular culture", which was connected to the problem of "business reals" and "professional ideals", as discussed above. The "business reals" refer to the competitive market orientation in news production, which was inevitable at the commercial stations, and the "professional ideals", the traditional journalistic norm, which were practiced at the public service station. Executive news producers at all five stations and newsroom observation at the public service and the commercial stations revealed that the market orientation and entertainment focus were gradually winning terrain over the traditional model of "objective" journalism.

In a global perspective, the marketization of news has influenced news production worldwide. The European break with the public service monopoly and the new competition of commercial station news programs has changed news programs and communication forms from being perceived as public knowledge to communication forms that may be recognized as public culture. In Japan, where the dual broadcast system already existed, the new influences led the commercial stations to break with the public service style of news transmission. The introduction of "news magazine" style programs in the 1980s, which were funded by commercials, broke with the public service tradition and incorporated aesthetic expressive forms from other public cultural domains.

Homogenization or Differentiation?

The sixth orthodoxy concerns the homogenization or differentiation (heterogenization) of news products and production procedures. The view of homogenization is, according to Cottle, based on theorization of news as organizationally disposed, as a matter of bureaucratic routine and shared professional ideology. These theories point towards news homogenization, standardization of form, and ideological conservatism. In the 1970s and 1980s this model tended to apply to the prevailing critical theories, and neo-Marxist theories of ideological reproduction in particular. The new perspectives on globalization in news production studies differ from these. As suggested by Cottle:

> Today theory has moved on and there is generally an increased recognition by most media academics of the more dynamic and contested nature of public discourses as well as the textual complexities involved in the representational play of power. "Discourse", "hegemony", "public sphere" are today's key concepts in the arsenal of news researchers and each, in its variant interpretations, often signals this more fluid, less certain, more politically contingent, less ideologically closed, state of affairs. Even political economy perspectives point to economic trends that need not always further trends of global media conglomeration and consequently news homogenisation (Cottle 2000, p. 31).

In support of the differentiation theory, Volkmer in "News in the Global Sphere" (1999) describes the new developments towards the transnationalization of news programming as fragmented, diversified, and segmented. The newsroom observations in Japan also point to a differentiated view of news production in a global context. The production procedures at the public service and commercial stations differed greatly according to national, organization, and professional contextual traits (Clausen 2004c). Although news formats may be similar (standardized) worldwide, the content differs according to the influences of factors and actors (processes of "domestication") at each of these contextual levels (differentiation) (Gurevitch, Levy, and Roeh 1991; Cohen *et al.* 1996). Concerning the nationally integrative character of national broadcasters, a foreign desk journalist at NHK expressed:

> We have to broadcast to the Japanese people. This is our most important task. We have to talk to the Japanese people. The correspondent in DC who watches the headlines on US TV and reads them in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*. These headlines are of course different from the headlines in Japan. That is natural. The main mission is to make news for the Japanese people. This point is the most difficult to understand for the foreign correspondent. The foreign correspondents want to make the Japanese people understand the international situation through the headlines in Washington D.C. But this does not work. A sense of news is developed over the years. Really good correspondents have experience in different countries. They have knowledge of other national matters as a native. It means to know a situation in a foreign country as well as a native. Hence deliver it to the Japanese people. They are self-made through experience.… Knowing about… domestic institutions provide the basic social knowledge about society. After gaining this basic knowledge they learn to report about it to the Japanese people. It is essential to know how to send a message to the Japanese people and after this they will go abroad (Interview, news producer 2002).

This observation in one of the most advanced public service and private media systems in the world thus provides the "why" examples for a differentiated view on news output and news production. Nevertheless, as Cottle (2000) suggests, the news field is subject to powerful countervailing forces of homogenization, which make political economy perspectives as relevant as ever in the interrogation and explanation of dynamics in the marketplace and in commercial conglomeration.

From the "Classic Studies" to the "Second Wave" – and Beyond

Drawing upon the outline by Cottle (2000), the chapter presented tales from the field in an Asian newsroom to discuss six orthodoxies of the classic ethnographic studies. In summary, this study shows how the notion of "routines", which connotes bureaucratic systems in a deterministic way, when replaced with the notion of working "strategies", enables descriptions of production practices to be unfolded in their complexities. It shows how access to news media may be understood not only as a possibility for a hierarchy of powerful elites to engage in hegemonic and ideological "conspiracy" but as a public forum or a universe of cultural symbolism that features "voices", visuals, and artifacts selected and incorporated by news producers in various ways. It further shows how the "forgotten audiences" and "imagined audiences" have become professionally inscribed (even involved) actors in news production. The awareness of viewer ratings was omnipotent in the newsrooms. The fieldwork observations provide the basis for telling tales about how notions of "public knowledge" and "popular culture" are blurred in micro-processes. It provides empirical evidence that there is an increasing integration of information and entertainment ("infotainment"). In other words, news producers increasingly prioritize emotional aspects of news events over political and economic commentary, which has traditionally characterized "objective" news reporting. The latter is gradually becoming a mythical notion in newsrooms in Japan, although it is still expressed as a professional norm. In a concern for ratings and commercial success, public (although to a less extent) and private broadcasters negotiate their commitment to the journalistic ideal of "objectivity". The recent more subjective journalistic styles are strongly guided by global commercialization and liberal economic trends. Finally, despite the global interconnectedness at all levels from consciousness, formats, supply, and people – and theories of global homogenization – the newsroom observations provide an empirical case of differentiation.

On a final note, while the orthodoxies based on Western philosophy of polarization provided a helpful platform for telling tales from the field, future ethnographic studies may gain from philosophical inspiration by the Eastern notion of paradox. The complexities of news production between the global and local in the shoes of a journalist may not be explained by either/or but by both/and.

References

Altheide, D.L. (1976) *Creating Reality: How TV News Distorts Events*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Bantz, C.R. (1990) Organizational communication, media industries, and mass communication, in J. Anderson (ed.), *Communication Yearbook*, vol. 13, Newbury Park, CA: Sage, pp. 502–510.

Bantz, C.R., McCorkle, S. and Baade, R.C. (1981) The news factory, in G.C. Wilhoit and H. deBodk (eds), *Mass Communication Review Yearbook*, vol. 2. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, pp. 366–389.

Boyd-Barrett, O. (1998) Global new agencies, in O. Boyd-Barett and T. Rantanen (eds), *The Globalization of News*. London: Sage, pp. 33–53.

Carey, J. (1989) *Communication as Culture*. London: Unwin Hyman.

Clausen, L. (1997) International news in Japan. A reception analysis, *Keio Communication Review*, **19**, 39–67.

Clausen, L. (2001) *The "Domestication" of International News: A Study of Japanese TV Production*. Copenhagen: Samfundslitteratur, 331s. PhD series 2001–21.

Clausen, L. (2003a) *Global News Production*. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press.

Clausen, L. (2003b) Global News Communication Strategies: 9.11.2002 around the World, *Nordicom* Review, **24** (2), 105–115.

Clausen, L. (2004a) Intercultural encounters in the global transmission of news. Perception and production of cultural images, in J. Gustafsson, and M. Blasco (eds), *Intercultural Alternatives: Critical Perspectives on Intercultural Encounters in Theory and Practice*. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press, pp. 103–132.

Clausen, L. (2004b) Doing field work in Japan. Design, access and role of the researcher, Working Paper 73. Department of Intercultural Communication and Management, Copenhagen Business School.

Clausen, L. (2004c) Localising the global. The "domestication" of international news media culture and society, *Media Culture Society*, **26** (1), 25–44.

Clausen, L. (2006) Journalism, in R. Robertson and J.A. Scholte (eds), *The Encyclopaedia of Globalization*. New York: Routledge, pp. 687–690.

Clausen, L. (2009) International news flow, in S. Allen (ed.), *The Routledge Companion to News and Journalism Studies*. London: Routledge, pp. 127–136.

Cohen, A., Gurevitch M., Levy, M. and Roeh, I. (1996) *Global Newsrooms, Local Audiences: A Study of the Eurovision News Exchange*. London: John Libbey.

Cottle, S. (1993) *TV News, Urban Conflict, and the Inner City*. Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press.

Cottle, S. (1999) New(s) times. Towards a "second wave" of news ethnography, Paper prepared for presentation at the News Panel of *IAMCR Conference* at Leipzig, July 28, 1999.

Cottle, S. (2000) New(s) times. Towards a "second wave" of news ethnography, *The European Journal of Communications Research*, **25** (1), 19–41.

Cottle, S. (2007) Ethnography and news production: new(s) developments in the field, *Sociology Compass*, **1** (1), 1–16.

Dahlgren, P. (1992) What's the meaning of this. Viewer's plural sense-making of TV news, in P. Scannell, P. Schlesinger, and C. Sparks (eds), *Culture and Power*. London, Newbury, and New Delhi, Sage, pp. 201–218.

Epstein, E.J. (1973) *News from Nowhere: Television and the News*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Feldman, O. (1993) *Politics and the News Media in Japan*, Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.

Fishman, M. (1980) *Manufacturing the News*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Galtung, J. and Ruge, M.H. (1965) The structure of foreign news, *Journal of Peace Research*, **2**, 64–91.

Gans, H.J. (1980) *Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek, and Time*. New York: Vintage Books.

Gitlin, T. (1980) *The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Golding, P. and Elliott, P. (1979) *Making the News*. London: Longman.

Grey, D.L. (1966) Decision-making by a reporter under deadline pressure, *Journalism Quarterly*, **43**, 419–428.

Gurevitch M., Levy, M. and Roeh, I. (1991) *Global News Rooms. Local Audiences. A Study of the Eurovision News Exchange*. London: John Libbey.

Hannerz, U. (1997) Cosmopolitans and locals in world culture, in M. Featherstone (ed.), *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalisation and Modernity*. London: Sage, pp. 237–251.

Herman, E.S. and Chomsky, N. (1988) *Manufacturing Consent*. New York: Pantheon.

Hjarvard, S. (1995) TV news flow studies revisited, *Electronic Journal of Communication*, **5** (2–3), 24–38.

Hjarvard, S. (1999) *TV-nyheder i konkurrence [Television News in Competition]*. Copenhagen: Samfundslitteratur.

Ito, Y. (1994) An application of the Tri-Polar Kuuki Model to the withdrawal of the United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill in Japan, Paper presented to the *International Association for Mass Communication Research*, June, Seoul.

Ito, Y. (1996) Influence of mass media on government's decision-making: a case study on the withdrawal of the United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill, in D.L. Paletz (ed.), *Political Communication in Action*. Cresskil, NJ: Hampton Press, pp. 63–89.

Krauss, E.S. (2000) *Broadcasting Politics in Japan. NHK and Television News*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Krauss, E.S. and Pharr, S. (eds) (1996) *Media and Politics in Japan*. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press.

Matsuyama, Y. (1993) Mass media and democracy, Paper presented at *Harvard Business School*, March 30, 1993, Boston, MA.

Paterson, C. (1996) *New Production at Worldwide Television News (WTN): An Analysis of Television News Agency Coverage of Developing Countries*, PhD Dissertation. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Paterson, C. (1998) Global battlefields, in O. Boyed-Barett and T. Rantanen (eds), *The Globalisation of News*. London: Sage, pp. 79–104.

Schlesinger, P. (1978) *Putting Reality Together*. London: Methuen.

Schutz, I. (2007) The journalistic gut feeling, journalistic doxa, news habitus and orthodox news values, *Journalism Practice*, **1** (2), 190–207.

Shoemaker, P.J. and Reese, S.D. (1996) *Mediating the Message: Theories of Influences on Mass Media Content*. White Plains, NY: Longman.

Soloski, J. (1989) News reporting and professionalism: some constraints on the reporting of news, *Media, Culture and Society*, **11**, 207–228.

Stevenson, R. (1995) *Project Proposal. Corporate Study of Foreign News and International News Flow in the 1990s*, accessed 05/09/1997, http//sunsite.unc.edu/newsflow/.

Tuchman, G. (1972) Objectivity as strategic ritual: an examination of newsmen's notions of objectivity, *American Journal of Sociology*, **77** (4), 660–679.

Tuchman, G. (1973) Making news by doing work: routinising the unexpected, *American Journal of Sociology*, **79** (1), 110–131.

Tuchman, G. (1978) *Making News: A Study in the Social Construction of Reality*. New York: Free Press.

Volkmer, I. (1999) *CNN News in the Global Sphere. A Study of CNN and Its Impact on Global Communication*. Bedfordshire: University of Luton Press.

Warner, M. (1971) Organisational context and control of policy in the television newsroom: a participant observation study, *British Journal of Sociology*, **22**, 283–294.

White, D.M. (1950) "The gate keeper": a case study in the selection of news, *Journalism Quarterly*, **27**, 383–390.

29

"Africa Talks Climate"

Comparing Audience Understandings of Climate Change in Ten African Countries

Anna Godfrey, Miriam Burton, and Emily LeRoux-Rutledge

The Case of *Africa Talks Climate*

Speaking at a press event in March 2010, Raila Odinga, Prime Minister of Kenya, declared to the Kenyan and international journalists gathered in the room: "We have failed to communicate climate change to our people. We must, and will, do better in the future. *Africa Talks Climate* has opened my eyes" (*Africa Talks Climate* Press Launch, Nairobi, March 2010). His comments were prompted by the findings of a comparative, qualitative research study conducted in ten Sub-Saharan African countries by the BBC Media Action (then known as the BBC World Service Trust[1]), funded by the British Council.

BBC Media Action is the BBC's international development charity.[2] Its Research and Learning Group (R&L) specializes in the design and delivery of research that provides insight into the role of media and communications in the field of international development. Drawing on a network of researchers across Africa, in 2009 the Research and Learning Group delivered *Africa Talks Climate*, the most extensive research conducted to date on the public understanding of climate change in Africa.

Africa Talks Climate has received much acclaim. In 2010 it won the Climate Change Communicator of the Year award from the US Center for Climate Change Communication at George Mason University; it has been commended by the likes of Nobel Laureate Professor Wangari Maathai and used by the Commonwealth Broadcasting Association in workshops with senior media practitioners across Africa. Yet researchers faced many challenges in the design and implementation of the research.

The present chapter outlines the findings from the ten-country study, sets them in context, and critically reflects upon the practical and methodological challenges of conducting comparative qualitative research of this kind. Following *Africa Talks Climate* from its inception through to its public reception, the chapter illustrates how many of the theoretical considerations of comparative research, outlined elsewhere in this volume, play out in a real-life context.

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

Climate Change in Africa

It is important to be precise about the objectives of comparative research (Livingstone 2003). The overall aim of *Africa Talks Climate* was to assess public understanding of climate change in Africa, and identify how communication and media could best support Africans' responses to climate change.

Climate change is one of the most important global issues, yet it has taken at least twenty years to become an international priority. In many ways, this is because climate change was originally communicated as a scientific problem. Complex, confusing, and at times contested scientific information has resulted in a slow public and political response to the climate crisis. The climate change debate has so far taken place in industrialized nations, among publics largely safe from the worst effects. For many of those publics, climate change is an abstract concept. Yet in numerous parts of the developing world, climate change is far from abstract – it is already determining the course of people's lives. Extreme weather events and greater unpredictability in weather patterns are having serious consequences for people who rely on land, lakes, and seas to feed themselves and to earn a living. As a result, the developing world's engagement with the issue is evolving.

Africa, in particular, is one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change and climate variability. According to the Global Humanitarian Forum (2009), of the twenty countries in the world most vulnerable to climate change in socio-economic terms, fifteen are African. As climate change threatens Africans' health and homes, and the natural resources upon which many depend to survive, Africa's population faces an urgent crisis. For people already struggling with the challenges posed by climate variability, environmental degradation, and poverty, climate change represents a tipping point.

Rainfall patterns across Africa have changed markedly, and yields from rain-fed agriculture could halve in the next decade (IPCC 2007). A decline in yields is predicted to lead to a greater risk of malnutrition for people who rely on the land to eat, and increased food insecurity for those who rely on buying food in the marketplace (Stern 2006). Indeed, there have been recent food crises in Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, and Ethiopia (at time of writing in 2010). Imports may also be affected, and food aid is threatened by climate change in the Midwest of the United States.

Climate change is likely to alter the transmission patterns of diseases such as malaria (Stern 2006). Increased incidences of cholera and meningitis are also thought to be linked to variations in climate. Diarrhea, asthma, and stroke affect more people when temperatures rise (IPCC 2007). The stark impacts of changing rainfall patterns on Africa are manifest. A more powerful hydrological cycle will bring other challenges, including flooding. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change says that

> by the 2080s, many millions more people than today are projected to experience floods every year due to sea-level rise ... [largely] in the densely populated and low-lying mega-deltas of Asia and Africa ... small islands are especially vulnerable (IPCC 2007, Fourth Assessment Report).

The links between environmental degradation, political tension, and conflict have been highlighted for many years. Environmental degradation reduces the supply of food and fresh water, and resources such as land. Climate change is predicted to exacerbate conflict in Africa, and in some cases is already doing so.

While Africa will be among the regions worst affected by climate change, the continent is not a significant emitter of greenhouse gases. African fossil fuel emissions account for only 3.7% of the global total. Fossil fuel emissions per capita in Africa are also among the lowest in the world.[3] Yet Africa is already suffering, and will continue to suffer, some of the most devastating consequences of climate change.

The Role of the Media

In this context the media has a potentially important role to play in helping people understand and respond to climate change, and in supporting governments, national and international NGOs, scientists, religious leaders, and community leaders to communicate better on the issue. Effective responses to climate change will, to some extent, be determined by how well the causes and long-term consequences are understood by citizens and policy makers and by how well citizens are able to use their understanding to meet immediate and long-term needs.

As well as shaping "worldviews", the media can provide spaces for dialogue and mediated discourse, and can provide a unique conduit for people in the developing world to communicate their own perspectives and demands to the rest of the world. Yet the world's media struggles to report and communicate this relatively new, complex, and evolving phenomenon in ways in which their audiences understand. The African media is no different in this respect. There is a fundamental shortage of relevant, useful information on climate change specifically for African audiences, and the public awareness campaigns that saturate Western media are still largely absent in Africa, especially outside major urban centers. As a result, African voices are largely missing from the international climate change debate.

Audiences typically go through processes of "sense-making", interpreting media in ways that are meaningful to their lives (Hall 1980; Livingstone 1990; Gillespie 2005), and new information is usually interpreted in the context of existing knowledge (Goffman 1974). However, until now – aside from a few opinion polls in Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa, and some small-scale perception studies (Van der Geest 2004; Mbow *et al.* 2008; Mertz *et al.* 2009) – there has been a dearth of research on Africans' perceptions of climate change.

Africa Talks Climate was founded on the belief that those worst affected must be better informed in order to understand and effectively respond to their changing climate. It sought to identify how communication and media strategies can be tailored to support Africa's response to climate change. It recognized that an effective response will, to some extent, be determined by how well the causes and long-term consequences are understood by its citizens and policy makers and by how well citizens will be able to use this understanding to meet their immediate and long-term needs. In all, over one thousand citizens and two hundred opinion leaders took part across ten countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Comparative Research: Challenges and Opportunities

Africa Talks Climate had to overcome a number of challenges. The initiative sought to explore a topic for which there exists little previous research and so quantitative methods were not considered appropriate. Surveys are rarely useful unless there is some understanding of the complexity of a topic, and context and meaning are vital to understanding how to engage African populations on the issue. As such, the research required a qualitative approach. This further complicated the challenge of comparing across countries: the research attempted to compare across nations, without the unit of comparison being nationally representative.

Cross-national comparisons have been described as theoretically upsetting (Øyen 1990), exciting but difficult, creative but problematic (Livingstone 2003), impossible (Steier 1991), and opening up new avenues (Blumler, McLeod, and Rosengren 1992). Various authors have pointed out that cultures map poorly on to nations, and that nations are rarely self-contained, closed, or homogenous (Clifford 1997; Livingstone 2003). Yet despite the fact that funding is still often concentrated at a *national* level, it has been noted that funding bodies and policy imperatives increasingly favor *comparative* research (Øyen 1990; Livingstone 2003). This was the context in which *Africa Talks Climate* was designed.

Why Compare?

Given that climate change transgresses national boundaries and will continue to have cross-border political, economic, and cultural implications, *Africa Talks Climate* necessarily had a cross-national approach. The research was designed to distinguish between those features of public understanding of climate change common to *all* audiences and those that are nationally exceptional, in order to inform both regional and national communication strategies. These distinctions were made to support the design of regionally appropriate, audience-specific messaging and outreach campaigns targeted at the citizens of these countries.

By including ten countries, *Africa Talks Climate* avoided being "culturally blinkered" (Blumler, McLeod, and Rosengren 1992). As Kohn (1987, p. 725) states, "any comparisons we make within a single country are necessarily limited to one set of political, economic, cultural and historical contexts represented by that particular country". It was hypothesized, however, based on the results of the pilot study in Nigeria, that across all countries understanding of climate change as a scientific concept would be low, and influenced by pre-existing knowledge. The *Africa Talks Climate* study sought to pool data from many countries to show how this theory applied in each one of those countries.

The decision to compare ten countries was also influenced by an understanding of editorial priorities and recognition that media audiences are not necessarily defined by national boundaries. For example, the BBC Swahili radio service reaches various countries, including Kenya and Tanzania, both of which are included in the *Africa Talks Climate* initiative.

What to Compare?

Country Selection

Livingstone (2003) has examined epistemological and practical issues related to cross-cultural research. She finds that it is common to seek out similarities and differences between cultures, but suggests that the issue of *which* nations to include in a comparison deserves more attention than it often receives. Following pilot research in Nigeria, the study was extended to another nine countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. There were a number of reasons for the extension of the study. The Nigeria pilot uncovered findings that were new and were perceived to have significant implications for climate change communication. With the world's attention turning to the impact of climate change on Africa, it was recognized that other African countries could benefit from a similarly in-depth examination of how their populations understood the issue of climate change.

The selection of the ten countries included in this research involved long deliberation between BBC Media Action and the British Council, as well as consultations with a number of stakeholders, inside and outside Africa, working within the development and climate change fields.[4] Country selection was informed by pragmatic and, to a lesser extent, theoretical considerations. These considerations included inter alia country-level research capacity, security conditions,[5] and the presence of a BBC Media Action or British Council office to facilitate fieldwork and secure high profile interviews. Where possible, countries were selected to maximize diversity with respect to the geographic situation within Africa, climate, demographics, language, and media capacity. A number of economic, social capital, and governance indicators were also considered in country selection. The countries selected were: DR Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.

Selection of Locations within Countries

Livingstone (2003) highlights the challenge of treating nations as units, given that individual nations often encompass multiple cultures. In the light of Livingstone's arguments, it is fair to question whether DR Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda can be said to represent ten cultures, since there are subcultures within each nation. Recognizing this, the selection of respondents took into account a range of criteria, including location, language, and profession or livelihood, to understand the breadth of opinion and understanding among citizens within each country. The fieldwork locations were selected on the basis of desk research and consultation calls with the country advisory group. The environmental challenges represented in these areas had already been linked to climate change, to some extent, or could be further exacerbated by climate change in the future. The selection of respondents was also informed by gender and age, which are themselves cultural issues.

The selection of locations that were broadly representative of the manifestations and implications of climate change represented a particular challenge. Although progress has been made on developing the scientific projections of future climate change impacts, many scientific predictions are relevant only at the regional level, and are therefore not sufficiently localized to inform the selection of focus group locations.

Selection of Research Participants

As a result, focus groups were held with farmers and fishermen, pastoralists and business people, women and men, rich and poor, rural and urban. Although there is insufficient localized scientific data to define "at risk" groups, given the implications of climate change for certain livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa, individuals working in specific industries, including fishing, crop farming, and pastoralism, were purposefully targeted.

The research approach sought to compare not only public understanding of climate change across countries but also within countries. Focus groups were designed so that the perceptions of those represented in each group could be compared. Participants in each focus group occupied a similar socio-economic class or profession. Socio-economic class was determined based on participants' income, education, and profession in the principal cities; it was not possible to determine socio-economic class outside of these cities, however, due to limited data on socio-economic indicators. Profession was therefore used as a guide in these areas.

Groups were designed to be single sex, to conform to religious and cultural practice in some locations,[6] and to be fairly homogenous with regards to profession so that the findings from focus groups with similar characteristics could be compared across the different countries.

The research teams in each country conducted around twenty in-depth interviews with opinion leaders to elicit the views of policymakers and opinion formers on the issue of climate change. These opinion formers were individuals with a particular interest in climate change or an informed opinion from a certain field, region, or subject area within the country. Interviewees were selected based on desk research and consultation with the local advisory group and local researchers. Opinion leaders were selected from six different sectors, according to a quota. The sectors were: government, the media, the private sector, religious institutions, local and national associations (e.g., farming associations) and NGOs and academic institutions. In all *Africa Talks Climate* countries, every effort was made to speak to the climate change focal point at the national government level. The remaining ministries were selected according to the ways that climate change played out in the country. These categories were represented in each country according to a quota so that the commonalities between different groups could be explored across the ten countries.

How to Compare?

> … undoubtedly, one should not underestimate how much can be learned from colleagues from different cultures, or what can be achieved given the combined creative intelligence of a diverse but focused group sharing their insights and energies (Livingstone 2003, pp. 481–482).

The structure of BBC Media Action's Research and Learning Group facilitated comparison in a way that is not always possible when distinct institutions in separate countries undertake cross-national research. Local R&L researchers based in the countries in which research took place conducted fieldwork and analyzed the findings, while researchers in London developed an overview of the findings across countries. Nevertheless, comparison was a challenge. Kohn (1987, pp. 728–729) says:

> There are … difficult problems, problems of interpretation. Particularly when one finds cross-national differences, and expert knowledge of all the countries is essential – knowledge most easily achieved, of course, by collaborators who have expert knowledge of their own countries … Even when such collaboration exists, though, sharing knowledge, interpreting within a common framework, even having enough time together to think things through at the crucial junctures, does not come easily.

Balancing the need for methodological standardization and the need to develop, culturally, linguistic and context specific research tools and analysis was a consistent challenge. The *Africa Talks Climate* research team developed a set of "guiding principles" to define collective quality standards. These principles were applied to every stage of the project, from the development of a uniform set of questions to inform desk research, through to the elaboration of a standard coding frame and reporting templates. They also ensured the development of an international advisory group, an advisory group in each country, and the delivery of thematic and skills training for all fieldworkers, while allowing the research teams, with their cultural and linguistic knowledge, to lead on ensuring the contextual validity of the research.

The creation of a "common language" that the teams could use, both to understand the topic of climate change and to communicate the research, began with training. The thematic training was the same for all the researchers involved in the project and afforded an opportunity for the researchers to talk across countries. English was the lingua franca for the international research team. For example, the first training hub took place in Nairobi before the first stage of fieldwork and involved researchers from Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana, and Ethiopia. Local experts in climate change, including researchers from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), led the thematic training while BBC Media Action led the research skills training.

To reduce the likelihood that differences in *Africa Talks Climate* findings were what Kohn (1987, p. 720) describes as "an artefact of differences in method" – the research team tried to design the research to be comparable. The researchers worked to "establish both linguistic and conceptual equivalence in questions and in coding answers, and to establish truly equivalent indices of the underlying concepts" that would find solutions to some of the challenges posed by the number of different people, cultures, and languages involved in the study.

By working to develop a consistent methodological approach in each of the ten countries, the data gathered allowed for a consistent reading across the countries. As a result, an analysis of the data revealed commonalities among different groups of respondents that crossed country borders. The influence of spiritual belief on their understanding of weather changes was particularly prominent among women and rural populations, for example. By analyzing the data from focus groups and in-depth interviews across the ten countries, the research team identified a "knowledge spectrum". This emerged as a way of describing the concentration of detailed knowledge of climate change among just a few respondents in large cities, in contrast to the general lack of understanding of global climate change among populations living in rural areas.

Moderators used a structured discussion guide to lead the focus groups. This was refined after the *Africa Talks Climate* pilot study in Nigeria, during which several improvements were made. The guide was translated into local languages before being piloted and refined during the week of fieldwork training. There were also opportunities to refine the research instruments further during the piloting in each of the respective countries. The emphasis was placed on developing a common research instrument that could be tailored to the local context by the local research team.

As well as focus groups being single sex, moderators for each group were the same gender as the participants in the group. All discussions were conducted in the local language. Discussions were convened in a total of twenty-five languages.

To begin with, participants were shown eight images representing nature, including trees, water, and the sun, and asked if they had any words to describe the images all together. In this way the discussion guide sought to elicit words used to describe "nature". The participants were then asked if they had noticed any changes in nature over the course of their lifetimes and were invited to share stories about these changes.

The second set of images shown to participants represented a range of issues that can be linked to climate change. There were fifteen such images, showing issues such as drought, crop failure, erosion, and flooding. Participants were asked if the pictures had anything in common and were then invited to choose the two images that had the greatest impact on their lives. A discussion of the chosen images followed.

The next section of the discussion guide introduced the concepts of climate change and global warming, without actually introducing the terms. Two statements were read out to participants:

- Statement 1. Scientists are saying that human beings are causing weather patterns over time to change around the world.
- Statement 2. Scientists are saying that human beings are causing the temperature of the earth to increase.

Participants' reactions to these statements were discussed. Finally, the terms "climate change" and "global warming" were explored. These terms were intentionally introduced relatively late in the discussion guide based on experience from the pilot study in Nigeria, which suggested that most participants would not be familiar with the terms.

Subsequent sections of the guide explored responses to climate change, barriers and facilitators to environmental stewardship, rural–urban migration, and the potential role of the media. With the exception of Nigeria, the discussion guide was the same for all *Africa Talks Climate* countries. It was translated into local languages through a consultation process with the moderators who spoke those languages.

In-depth interview guides were designed to explore interviewees' understanding of climate change, their attitudes towards the issue, their experience of working on the issue, if relevant, and their assessment of public understanding and perceptions of climate change. Four different guides were created for government and NGO, private sector and media representatives, and faith and local leaders. These guides were translated, as appropriate, into local languages.

Using Express Scribe, verbatim local language transcripts and English translations were produced for each focus group and interview. In the case of DR Congo, local language transcripts were translated into French. These were systematically coded using Atlas.ti software by a team of international researchers to draw out the insights and themes presented in the reports.

During fieldwork and analysis, there was frequent discussion of the emerging themes. The annual BBC Media Action Research and Learning Workshop also afforded the researchers an opportunity to come together in the same place and share insights during the analysis stage. It soon became clear that there were a number of common themes across the countries, which the research teams dubbed "frames". Having a common shorthand for the "tree frame", the "ozone frame", and the "smoke frame", for instance, allowed the teams to pinpoint the themes that were common to all countries – and to analyze where some findings departed from the common mental "model" that had emerged from the focus groups and in-depth interviews.

The common language of frames informed the development of two consistent coding frames, one for focus groups and one for in-depth interviews. These contained bespoke codes for certain countries. The lists of codes in the code frames were generated through a detailed consultation process that began with open coding. In addition, in pairs or threes, researchers trained and tested each other on the agreed code frames. They applied the code frames to transcripts and shared questions and challenges. At least one person in every group had coded or reviewed coding from another country to ensure that groups learned from the coding challenges emerging from other countries. In most instances, the English language transcripts were coded. The transcripts of some countries, however, due to delays in fieldwork or translation problems, were coded in local languages. At the end of the training, and after a minimum of two transcripts had been coded collectively, the intercoder reliability score was calculated by assessing whether researchers were coding the same sections of text using the same codes. Intercoder reliability ultimately averaged 0.92. Coding enabled the researchers to group the data according to emerging themes; each code was then analyzed to pull out the insights and findings.

The analysis of the in-depth interviews began in a similar way. However, in order to understand the commonalities across different sectors and to explore the nuances of the policy context in each country, the research teams went back to the original transcripts to support the analysis of the in-depth interviews.

One of the keys to a consistent analysis was to come to an agreement on when to *stop* comparing. This was especially important, given that fieldwork and analysis took place in two stages, in two groups of five countries, and given that learning and analysis developed over the course of the two phases. Our agreement on how to analyze the data was based on an understanding of what was important for the end user, and the knowledge that the findings and recommendations would be used in different ways, from the regional and national policy level to the local level.

In order to ensure that the commonalities and differences across countries and regions were accurately represented in the reporting, a comparative reporting format was developed in collaboration with editors within the research and communication teams, who between them worked across all eleven reports.

Common Framings

The research revealed common framings of climate change in different countries and also important misunderstandings, attitudes, and concerns, which opened up critical doors for more effective communication on this topic in Africa.

Almost all the people interviewed said that the "weather" was changing and that these changes were already affecting their lives. People reported less predictable seasons, particularly the loss of distinct rainy seasons, increases in temperature, and more frequent and intense droughts and floods. They were also very aware of environmental degradation. This is because changes in the environment (and weather) have a direct effect on people's daily lives.

Although people have existing methods to cope with weather changes, many, especially rural populations, felt that their strategies were failing in the face of increasingly unpredictable weather patterns. Most of the current response strategies that respondents described were reactive. Most people said they react after problems have manifested themselves, rather than preventing and preparing for them. In the face of drought, people in rural communities described resorting to unclean water sources, relying on family for support, and only in some cases diversifying their livelihoods. Many rural people, particularly women, said that they would turn to prayer to help them. Most people said that they would be forced to migrate if the problems they were facing were to become more severe or frequent.

Although people recognize that their weather is changing and that these changes are profoundly affecting their lives, few link these changes to global climate change. Yet many of the weather and environmental changes that people had observed were potentially linked to climate change or could be exacerbated by climate change in the future. There is clearly a role for the African media to play in drawing links between people's observations and the scientific basis for climate change. While this presents an opportunity, the research identified a number of barriers to effective communication on climate change, for which communicators will need to develop solutions.

Language creates one such barrier to communication. In many of the ten countries, most people did not recognize terms for "climate change" or "global warming" in either local languages or widely spoken international languages, such as English, French, and Arabic.[7] There is no easy translation for climate change in many African languages, so people hear the words and literally translate them to understand their meaning. In Bari (a Sudanese language), for example, the only way to translate the term "climate change" is to list the components of weather, so that it becomes "changes in clouds, rainfall, wind, and temperature, and seasons". This translation lists changes in weather and makes no reference to the long-term nature of changes in "climate". Doing so would render the translation even more unwieldy. The implication, then, is that when you say "climate change" to someone in Africa, it does not convey anything about greenhouse gases,[8] global emissions, or long-term changes in climate.

In the absence of a solid scientific understanding of climate change, most people reach for explanations that build on their existing knowledge. Such pre-existing concepts are often referred to as "frames of reference" (Goffman 1974). They influence the likelihood that people will accept or reject new information because people process new information by drawing on their existing beliefs, knowledge, and values. The discussions of the terms and concepts of climate change and global warming revealed five important frames of reference that influence people's understanding. While these were common across the ten countries, some were more prominent in some countries, and among certain groups, than others. The five "frames" were: an emphasis on trees; a belief that weather is influenced by the will of God; conflation of the phenomenon of climate change with ozone depletion; a belief that air pollution changes the weather; and an understanding that localized heat causes local changes in the weather. These frames of reference can function as barriers or as facilitators to effective communication on climate change and can help communicators in Africa make their content relevant to their audiences.

Tree Frame

The importance that people attached to trees is informed by a belief that they attract rain. A woman from Marangu, Tanzania, was typical in saying: "As we all know, forests … attract rain, so if the forests are cut down, there is drought." While scientists do not necessarily agree that trees attract rain, they are agreed that forests recycle rain through a process called evapotranspiration; this means that water vapor coming off the leaves of trees evaporates and falls again. People across the ten countries appreciated the shade provided by trees and saw them as a means of protection against extreme weather, such as flooding, landsides, and high winds. However, there was little awareness that trees act as carbon sinks to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions that cause climate change.

The implications of the emphasis on trees are both positive and negative. On the one hand, people may be motivated to plant and preserve trees, which is a good thing from an environmental perspective. On the other hand, their understanding could provide a false sense that all climatic problems, such as drought and desertification, can be solved at a local level through tree-planting. A man from Tendouck, Senegal, was typical in his belief that "if [the forest] lives, the rain will fall as it should". Given that trees and their importance are a strong presence in the African consciousness, they could provide a useful entry point for raising awareness of climate change and introducing new information and locally relevant adaptation strategies.

God Frame

Some people linked changes in the weather to their faith. "The secret is with Allah," explained an older woman from Afar, Ethiopia. "Allah brings the rain. The one who causes the drought … is Allah." In general, the will of God was mentioned most often by women, people in rural areas, and people with a lower level of education. Extreme weather events in particular are often viewed as punishment for human sin. "[God] punishes people because we do bad things," says a young woman from Dakar, Senegal. "He shows his strength with the hurricanes and storms."

Religious faith, however, does not necessarily preclude acceptance that human beings can affect the weather. A man from Bakwa Nsumpi, DR Congo, explained: "When God created the world it was perfect, but humans are causing [the changes we have observed]. When we cut down trees for example, we upset the rains." Some, on the other hand, believed that changes in weather are "out of their hands". This was especially true of those in rural communities. "Heavy wind … is from God, so we can only pray for the relief of it but no one can stop it," says a farmer from Jigawa, Nigeria. Finally, some people feel that there are other supernatural causes for extreme weather. A few women in Ikeja, Nigeria, for example, speak of the sea as a goddess, while some women in Limpopo, South Africa, describe the sea as a mermaid ("mamokiba"), whose anger can unleash flooding and destruction.

Because of the importance of religion for many Africans, it is important to be sensitive to people's faith when communicating about climate change. As ideas of environmental stewardship are present in many religions, faith leaders themselves can be powerful allies in climate change communication. This is particularly true in DR Congo, Ethiopia, and Nigeria.

Ozone Frame

Those respondents with some awareness of the science and terminology of climate change often confused it with stratospheric ozone depletion. Most people who made this mistake incorrectly attributed increases in temperature to ozone holes. They believed that holes in the ozone layer allow more sun to reach the earth, which makes it hotter. A man from El Obeid, Sudan, was typical in saying that humans "are destroying ozone layers and causing a lot of global warming". Others thought that the ozone layer caused global warming by trapping heat. A man from Cape Flats, South Africa, explained that, "When they say greenhouse [effect] it means that the ozone layer starts to work as a greenhouse and traps heat, and the earth starts to get warm." Finally, many inaccurately identified the activities most responsible for climate change as being responsible for ozone depletion. "Global warming is being caused by the use of fertilizer … flaring of gas, and some other things," claims a man in Lagos, Nigeria. "When it escapes into the air it causes holes in the ozone level and the ultraviolet sun now penetrates into all the earth." In reality, although ozone holes allow ultraviolet radiation to reach the earth's surface, which damages human skin, they do not themselves cause an increase in the earth's temperature.

A woman from Kinshasa, DR Congo, described greenhouse gases as "gases that destroy the ozone layer", and similar descriptions were given by others. This confusion may stem from the fact that CFCs are a greenhouse gas, as well as being responsible for stratospheric ozone depletion. The danger in confusing climate change with ozone depletion is that people seeking to address climate change may select the wrong activities. For example, reducing CFCs was effective in dealing with ozone depletion, but is less effective in combating global warming, which is primarily caused by carbon dioxide emissions. Furthermore, ozone depletion was largely addressed by regulation in the late 1980s, while the human activities that cause climate change are ongoing.

However, the image of "ozone holes" clearly appealed to the public imagination. This suggests that future climate change communication in Africa would benefit from similarly visual explanations of climate change.

Smoke and Heat Frames

Respondents' understanding of environmental changes is influenced by their perception of air pollution. Many attributed increased temperatures, changes in weather, and, to a lesser extent, ozone depletion to smoke or gases they can see. They connected pollution to heat, but did not relate pollution to greenhouse gas emissions and the mechanism of global warming. Rather they see, and in some cases feel and smell, pollution changing the air around them. The examples of pollution that people produce range from car exhaust to cigarette smoke to the burning of firewood. Yet most respondents were not aware of invisible gases such as carbon dioxide that contribute significantly to climate change. These was especially true in urban areas, where people see, smell, and breathe car exhaust fumes, smoke from industry, and fumes from waste, and believe that the pollution they experience affects the air and temperature more generally. Many respondents believed that the pollution they see increases temperatures. A Kenyan pastoralist explained: "When the smoke is released in to the atmosphere it affects the clouds and as a result the sun becomes very hot."

As well as visual cues like smoke, some respondents interpreted the stench of pollution as a sign of environmental degradation. "I also think littering destroys the weather," said a woman from Moshi, Tanzania. "You find that some trash smells very bad and this interferes with the weather." Some respondents also believed that smoke directly causes changes in their climate. "Change [in weather patterns] is also caused by these factories, when the smoke comes out and goes up to the sky," explained a man from KwaDukuza, South Africa, "the polluted air comes out and mixes with the air in the sky and causes rain which in turn causes floods." There was a tendency to associate visible smoke with the concepts of climate change and global warming. As well as cars and factories, people cited smoking cigarettes, bush burning, and cooking with firewood as causes of climate change. "When we smoke we send bad air in [to] the environment, this leads to global warming," said a young man from Kampala, Uganda.

Some respondents discussed global warming in relation to localized increases in ambient temperature. People felt heat emanating from a car's engine, a person's body, or the walls of a building, and inferred that such heat had broader implications for the weather.

Some people understood this direct heat, produced in their immediate surroundings, to have an impact on other aspects of the weather, such as rainfall. "Everyone wants to build factories," said a rice farmer from Tendouck, Senegal, "and their heat, mixed with the heat of the burning forests, has weakened the clouds that cause the cold and the rain." Many respondents mentioned overpopulation as a source of heat.

A man from Bagamoyo, Tanzania, expressed a view that many hold: "When humans were few, temperatures were okay but the moment they started multiplying then that is when the heat started." Overcrowding was seen as the main source of heat, as a woman from Bahir Dar, Ethiopia, explained: "For instance, densely populated areas and buildings that have been built closely are causes of warming." Although ambient heat can indeed increase local temperature, this is not the mechanism by which global warming occurs.

Other Frames

In some countries, other frames of reference emerged. In DR Congo, some people are concerned about the part played by science and technology in changing the weather. Most of this worry about science is expressed in relation to scientific research and its impact on the ozone, although a few people were concerned about the impact of weapons on temperature and climate. In South Africa, climate change was linked to large global events. Throughout South Africa, Ghana, and Uganda, many said that as populations grow, they will exhaust available resources.

South Africans also mentioned a number of additional barriers to engaging with climate change and protecting the environment, most notably that of convenience. While they were aware that activities such as recycling and reducing car use can combat climate change and have a positive impact on the environment, there was a strong feeling that people "want everything to be convenient" and are unwilling to make personal sacrifices in their day-to-day lives, especially if it involves their "time and money". Many people were also aware that a number of South Africans "do not believe" in climate change or else do not accept the seriousness of the problem, especially those from older generations.

Reach and Impact

Too often research is not given the coverage or profile it may deserve – critiqued for being too narrow or lacking in breadth to appeal to mass audiences, and thus not warranting column inches or air time. Conducting rigorous comparative research is only part of the equation; communicating it to effect real communicative or policy change can be the hardest, and often most overlooked, part of the research arithmetic. For this reason, and recognizing the potential irony in conducting research on communicating climate change only to communicate it poorly, *Africa Talks Climate* was designed as a research and communications initiative, supported by a communications strategy and project ambassadors,[9] to generate media and policy interest in the research at multiple levels (local, national, regional, and international) and to effect policy and development change.

Africa Talks Climate was launched ahead of the UN climate change summit that took place in Copenhagen in December 2009, which sought to broker a new climate change treaty. An executive report based on the findings from all ten countries and ten individual country reports were published and launched at national and international levels last year. They have also informed an influential BBC Media Action policy briefing entitled

Least Responsible, Most Affected, Least Informed: Public Understanding of Climate Change in Africa (Deane 2009), which drew attention to the need for more effective communications with populations affected by climate-related problems. *Africa Talks Climate* also joined forces with BBC colleagues to produce two BBC World Debates and a special edition of the BBC World Service live debate program *World Have Your Say* to provide expertise and a different angle on news coverage of climate change to global audiences. *Africa Talks Climate* also brought renowned Senegalese musician Baaba Maal to COP 15 itself, to articulate the message that provision of information to affected populations is key to tackling climate change and to present recommendations for more effective communication to world leaders.

BBC Media Action hopes to continue supporting Africa's response to climate change. Only when governments, NGOs, and the media in Africa are comfortable talking about climate can they communicate it effectively to citizens and only when African citizens are clear about climate change and its implications for their lives can they respond effectively to it.

Conclusion

> It would be hard to exaggerate the amount of time, thought and analysis that must go into the effort to achieve comparability of methods, concepts and indices. There are also issues in the standards of research employed in different countries (Kohn 1987, pp. 727–728).

The findings of *Africa Talks Climate* are all the more compelling by the fact that the research initiative from which they are drawn is unique. The challenges involved in comparative media research are considerable. Yet in the context of an international challenge such as climate change, research of this kind is an urgent necessity. The research throws up questions for which solutions still need to be found; those working in development, media, and other fields will require both practical and theoretical support in answering them.

Acknowledgments

Africa Talks Climate was funded by the British Council. The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the UK Department for International Development (DFID) to BBC Media Action's policy and research programs. *Africa Talks Climate* publications are available from www.africatalksclimate.com.

The authors are grateful to the British Council and the *Africa Talks Climate* advisory groups for their support throughout this project. This chapter is based on the research and experience of the dedicated *Africa Talks Climate* team: Musa Abubakar, Femi Akinlabi, Allan Oniba Alana, Apune Jacob Alfred, Solomon Amare, Selam Ayalew, Miriam Burton, Susan Cooke, Grace Davies, Adanech Dutu, Ahmed Abdalla Ghidar, Anna Godfrey, Elshaday Kifle, Mercy Kimaro, Perest Kujang, Bolanle Lasisi, Emily

LeRoux-Rutledge, Chima Ljeaku, Leah Matthews, Patrick McCurdy, Anu Mohammed, Ruman Ronald Moi, David Musiime, Lucy Neville, Sam Otieno, Ed Pauker, Kayshinee Rye Ramchurn, Bayissa Urgessa, and Augustine Yelfaanibe.

The chapter has been produced for BBC Media Action independently from the BBC and BBC World Service and should not be taken to reflect official BBC policy or that of any of the project's funders. Any mistakes are those of the authors.

Notes

1. The BBC World Service Trust changed its name to BBC Media Action in December 2011.
2. BBC Media Action aims to reduce poverty and promote human rights. Providing people with relevant information so they can address the issues affecting them is at the heart of BBC Media Action's work. The organization works with media to inform, educate, and empower people living in poverty to help improve their lives. It believes that the media has the power to transform, giving millions of individuals the information they need and bringing people together to engage in debate and have their voices heard.
3. The only African country with significant emissions is South Africa, which ranks 13th in the world for fossil fuel emissions. However, emissions from Africa are increasing.
4. BBC Media Action and the British Council set up an informal advisory network of climate change and development experts to inform *Africa Talks Climate*. An advisory group was established in each country to provide technical knowledge on climate change and insights into the local climate context in that country.
5. Security concerns limited the scope of the research in Sudan, for example, and in DR Congo, where we did not travel to eastern parts of the country.
6. This ensured that participants had the opportunity to discuss more sensitive issues and were not overwhelmed or embarrassed by the presence of the opposite sex. Although it was not necessary to hold single sex groups in all locations, to avoid the introduction of extraneous variables, the same focus groups methodology was applied in all locations.
7. The exception is South Africa, where there is near-universal recognition of the terms in English. Generally recognition of climate change terminology is higher in urban areas. Citizens from the capital cities and larger urban centers in many of the countries tend to give the most detailed descriptions of climate change. Yet most people find the terms difficult to explain.
8. It appears that the "greenhouse" metaphor may not be appropriate to the African context. However, this question merits further research. The research found that although some people use the terms "greenhouse gases" and the "greenhouse effect" spontaneously, few give fully accurate definitions of these concepts.
9. BBC Media Action would like to express gratitude to the commitment and continued support from our *Africa Talks Climate* Ambassadors – the environmentalist and Nobel Laureate, Wangari Maathai, and the acclaimed Senegalese singer and songwriter, Baaba Maal.

References

Blumler, J.G., McLeod, J.M., and Rosengren, K.E. (eds) (1992) *Comparatively Speaking: Communication and Culture across Space and Time*. London: Sage.

Clifford, J. (1997) *Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Deane, J. (2009): Least Responsible, Most Affected, Least Informed: Public Understanding of Climate Change in Africa. BBC WST Policy Brief, http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/pdf/wstrust/PB_climatechange_web.pdf.

Gillespie, M. (ed.) (2005) *Media Audiences.* Maidenhead, UK and New York: Open University Press.

Global Humanitarian Forum (2009) *Human Impact Report: Climate Change, the Anatomy of a Silent Crisis.* Geneva: Global Humanitarian Forum.

Goffman, E. (1974) *Frame Analysis.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Hall, S. (1980) Encoding, decoding, in S. During (ed.), *The Cultural Studies Reader.* London: Routledge, pp. 90–103.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2007) *Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Kohn, M.L. (1987) Cross-National Research as an Analytic Strategy. American Sociological Association, 1987 Presidential Address, *American Sociological Review*, **52**, 713–731.

Livingstone, S. (1990) Interpreting television narrative: how viewers see a story, *Journal of Communication*, **40** (1), 72–82.

Livingstone, S. (2003) On the challenges of cross-national comparative media research, *European Journal of Communication*, **18** (4), 477–500.

Mbow, C. *et al.* (2008) The history of environmental change and adaptation in Eastern Saloum, Senegal: driving forces and perceptions, *Global Change and Planetary Change*, **64** (3–4), 210–221.

Mertz, O. *et al.* (2009) Farmers' perceptions of climate change and agricultural adaptation strategies in rural Sahel, *Environmental Management*, **43** (5), 804–816.

Øyen, E. (1990) The imperfections of comparisons, in E. Øyen (ed.), *Comparative Methodology, Theory and Practice in International Social Research.* London: Sage, pp. 1–18.

Steier, F. (1991) Reflexivity and methodology, in F. Steier (ed.), *Research and Reflexivity.* London: Sage, pp. 163–185.

Stern, N. (2006) *The Stern Review on the Economic Effects of Climate Change.* London: HM Treasury.

Van der Geest, K. (2004) *"We're managing!" Climate Change and Livelihood Vulnerability in Northwest Ghana*, Research Report 74. Leiden: African Studies Centre.

30

Organizing and Managing Comparative Research Projects across Nations

Models and Challenges of Coordinated Collaboration

Frank Esser and Thomas Hanitzsch

The Rising Tide of Comparative Communication Research

It is no longer necessary to urge communication scholars to "go international" in their research. There is now a widespread appreciation of the potentials of cross-national collaborations and comparative research. This is clearly indicated by a steadily mounting body of literature and a growing number of cross-national research projects. Political changes and technological advancements have clearly supported this trend. The end of the Cold War and the onward march of globalization have made it much easier for scholars to exchange ideas and meet with their colleagues from afar. At the same time, new communication technologies have triggered the rise of institutionalized international networks of scientists, as communication between researchers and coordination of large-scale international projects has become easier than ever before.

It is no exaggeration to say that, over the last ten years or so, comparative research has become a somewhat fashionable area in the study of media and communication. There are many substantial reasons for such a growing interest in looking beyond national borders: an increased awareness of globalization as a process that is very much related to communication processes and the development of the contemporary mediascape, a growing awareness of intensifying transnational media concentration, and the ever more widespread use of the Internet for facilitating easier access to information around the world.

It is in these recent years that comparative research on media and communication has moved from mere description to explanation, from conceptual oversimplification to theoretical sophistication, from juxtaposition of countries to a theory-driven selection of cultures, and from often anecdotal evidence to methodological rigor. These developments have clearly demonstrated the rich potential and power of comparative approaches

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

even to open up new avenues in communication and media research. We would like to mention four major areas where comparative research can prove its superiority.

First, most scholars argue that comparative research is "valuable, even indispensable, for establishing the generality of findings and the validity of interpretations" derived from single contexts (Kohn 1989, p. 77). In so doing, it forces us to revise our interpretations against cross-cultural differences and inconsistencies. Only comparative research allows us to test a theory across diverse settings and evaluate the scope and significance of certain phenomena, which itself is an important strategy for concept clarification and verification (Gurevitch and Blumler 1990). The argument of political scientists Foweraker and Landman (1997, p. 46) also holds true for the realm of media and communication research: since the real world cannot be subjected to experimental control, comparison acts as a substitute for experimentation.

Second, comparative research not only contributes to our understanding of the workings of media and communication in different cultural contexts but also helps us develop and contextualize the understanding of our own societies (Gurevitch and Blumler 1990). Without cross-national comparison certain national phenomena may become naturalized even to the extent that they remain invisible to the domestic-bound researcher. In this respect, comparative research can be seen as an antidote to ethnocentrism.

Third, and related to the point just mentioned, comparative research can prevent us from overgeneralizing from our own, often idiosyncratic forms of media and communication. It helps us realize that Western conceptual thinking and normative assumptions underpin much of the work in our field and that imposing them on other cultures may be dangerous. In this regard, comparative research can clearly contribute to the development of universally applicable theory, while at the same time it challenges claims to universality (Esser and Pfetsch 2004; Livingstone 2003).

Fourth, and lastly, engaging in comparative work helps us foster international scholarship and sustain networks of researchers across continents. It facilitates international exchange of knowledge between scholars and institutions, including those operating in regions not yet adequately represented in our field. In treating the world as a "global research laboratory", comparative research enables scholars to learn from the experiences and initiatives of others. In so doing, it makes an important contribution to a global knowledge society.

While the value and success of comparative research is clearly undeniable, it often requires extensive resources in terms of time, manpower, funding, and infrastructure. Cross-national projects usually swallow up far more resources than domestic endeavors. The acquisition of central funding for large-scale comparative field research is extremely difficult as most funding bodies still operate on the national level. While collaboration is certainly a key to solving many problems related to mostly scarce resources in academic research, there are also many substantial reasons why collaboration makes a lot of sense. One of these is that the collective cultural expertise of a collaborative research network can never be achieved by a single researcher. This holds true even if collaborative research is sometimes described as "exhausting", "a nightmare", and "frustrating" (Livingstone 2003, p. 481; see also Jowell 1998).



Figure 30.1 Basic model of international research (Hasebrink and Herzog 2002).

Hence, the question is not whether or not collaborative research is a worthwhile avenue in comparative research. The more pressing question is how to organize and manage collaborative international communication research effectively. This will be the focus of the following sections. The various models we will discuss are drawn from Hasebrink and Herzog (2002) and are put into the broader context of our own experiences and those of colleagues. In particular, we will evaluate the models with regard to their respective advantages and disadvantages.

Early Forms of Comparative Research

We may call the first model for organizing and managing comparative communication research the *basic model* (Figure 30.1).

In the basic model, communication scholars no longer want to confine their research activities to their home country but wish to draw conclusions from a comparison of the other contexts of their respective home systems. Although this approach involves the comparison of two or more contexts, it cannot be seen as genuinely international in nature, as researchers are hardly able to treat the various contexts on an equal basis. Researchers using the basic model will most likely observe the other context (B) through the lens of their home context (A). The home context therefore serves as a backdrop – and often the point of reference – for the subsequent examination and evaluation of the other contexts.

This kind of comparative research is very popular because it minimizes many problems usually associated with cross-cultural research. It seems very efficient and inexpensive, and one can carry out a project without having to bother with a network of collaborators. However, major problems may occur if researchers do not recognize and acknowledge how deeply embedded their units of analysis are in the cultural, historical, and social settings of the respective contexts. Moreover, comparative research within the basic model may lead to interpretations that lack contextual knowledge. Researchers are not likely to have an equal cultural expertise in all investigated contexts, and this likelihood further decreases with the number of contexts compared in a study. Investigators



Figure 30.2 Centralized model of international research (Hasebrink and Herzog 2002). ($$$ indicates research dollars and illustrates who is obtaining monetary funding for research projects)

are equipped with specific cultural experience acquired in their respective cultures, and they tend to see, more or less consciously, other contexts through the prism of their own cultural socialization.

Although the perspective of an outsider can sometimes be an advantage and help contextualize culture-specific or even idiosyncratic evidence, many facets of a culture can only be understood and properly interpreted from within. Only after years of doing on-site research and reading countless books may a researcher be reasonably equipped to carry out an adequate and equal comparison of two contexts. This becomes even more difficult with the number of contexts investigated. Researchers will have to process massive amounts of information and this may easily exceed a researcher's capabilities.

One way of overcoming the deficiencies of the basic model is to switch to the *centralized model* (Figure 30.2), where an international research institution takes the lead in a project.

Ideally these "international research centers" employ communication scholars from various contexts who provide extensive expertise on foreign media systems. Such centers are ideal institutions for centrally controlled, competent, in-house comparative international research. Unfortunately, we have not seen many successful examples of this kind of cooperation. One example was the European Media Institute, which no longer operates in the way it was originally designed. The institution was not able to secure the necessary funds to support its infrastructure and body of researchers for a longer period of time. This already points to one of the central problems of the centralized model: it requires substantial and reliable funding to sustain its operations and these funds are difficult to secure, especially in times of global economic volatility.

Two institutions of this kind still in existence are Freedom House and IREX. Freedom House annually publishes its widely used *Freedom of the Press* index, while IREX provides a *Media Sustainability Index* summarizing the conditions for independent media in eighty mostly developing and transitional countries. The two institutions are mainly funded through American money, most notably from USAID, and this may indicate another weakness of the model: due to the global political economy of academic research, these international research centers are often financed by institutions from the West. Not surprisingly, the flow of money is often accompanied with Western conceptual thinking (e.g., definitions of "press freedom") and methodological preferences. This, at least in



Figure 30.3 Correspondents model of international research (Hasebrink and Herzog 2002). ($$$ indicates research dollars and illustrates who is obtaining monetary funding for research projects)

the past, led some critics to complain about "research imperialism" and a strengthening of existing economic and cultural dependence (Halloran 1998, p. 45). Special care needs to be taken in the centralized model about the cross-cultural suitability of concepts used and normative standards employed to prevent misleading or even invalid conclusions from being drawn.

A slightly different form of organizing and managing international comparative research is the *correspondent model* (Figure 30.3).

The correspondent model still relies on a central research institution, but it is less staff-intensive and less dependent on a centralized infrastructure. The idea here is that a "central institution" – which can be any scholar's office, university department, or nonuniversity institution – obtains funding for a comparative project, usually through a grant from a national or transnational science foundation. This central institution, or headquarters, develops a conceptual framework and research methodology first, and then contacts communication researchers (A–D) in the various contexts (A–D) who can be considered experts in the study's main area.

The contacted collaborators, or "satellites", must accept the theoretical framework and research design; they serve as national experts whose core responsibility is simultaneous data collection. Synchronized data gathering is supported by various structural measures (like centrally distributed guidelines and instructions) to guarantee equivalence of case selection and research methods. Once the field research is completed, correspondents return their data to the central institution where it is analyzed and interpreted within the theoretical framework decided upon earlier by the principle investigators.

This model requires detailed coordination and tight supervision of the work carried out by the national correspondents in order to secure equivalence on all levels across all contexts. If successfully executed, the correspondent model is capable of generating equivalent, comparable results that can be interpreted consistently.

In many cases, however, participating scholars would prefer a more democratic management that also allows for more room for personal research interests. In fact, the correspondents model works best if the participating researchers are prepared to "take orders" from the headquarters and are prepared to participate in a project that leaves them with limited academic freedom. The workflow in this model is built on a clear hierarchy based on centralized funding and planning.

For all these reasons, in practice this model is usually realized in much softer, less hierarchical forms. Nonetheless, even in more moderate forms, this model has to deal with problems similar to those raised with regard to the centralized model. Central research institutions are often located somewhere in Northern America or Central Europe where large grants and technical resources for large-scale comparative projects are readier available. Stevenson (2003) compared the academic world to the center-periphery model described by Immanuel Wallerstein and concluded that colleagues at the "periphery" often have problems finding adequate resources to carry out even modest projects. It is for this reason, Stevenson says, that some lack experience in advanced research techniques and have limited possibilities to produce work that gets accepted for publication in journals controlled by scholars at the "center" (e.g., US-based academic journals).

In the face of the political economy of research, Stevenson often sees scholars from the more privileged West in the "driver seat" of large projects. At the same time he sees participating researchers from the periphery who are concerned about an imposition of Western theories, concepts, methods, and publication strategies on the project that have not been thought through. It follows that all participating researchers should be aware of a potentially substantial and diverse range of perspectives within a project, and that participants may have different cultural backgrounds, as well as distinctive understandings of team work, division of labor, work structures, information exchange, and, perhaps most importantly, communication habits.

Collaborative Research

The previous models of managing and coordinating comparative research may not be subsumed under the category of "collaborative research". Collaboration entails more intellectual freedom for all participating researchers in a project and is therefore much better suited to the realities of international research where academic resources are unevenly distributed. Collaborative research means that partners can bring in their intellectual capabilities and cultural expertise at any stage of the project. Furthermore, collaboration also entails cooperative exploitation of a project in terms of publication track and academic reputation.

A more democratic model is the *coordinated cooperation model* of international research (Figure 30.4).

The network basically consists of researchers (or institutions) from different contexts whose positions within the project are generally considered equal except for the fact that one scholar serves as "project coordinator". The main difference to the previous model therefore is that all involved researchers participate on an equal base in the development of theories, concepts, research design, and research tools. This type of coordinated cooperation is the kind of research network promoted by the European Commission. In order to facilitate research initiatives from across EU member states, the European Commission launched the "Framework" funding program in 1984 that is built on an



Figure 30.4 Coordinated cooperation model of international research (Hasebrink and Herzog 2002). ($ indicates research dollars and illustrates who is obtaining monetary funding for research projects)

understanding of research as coordinated cooperation. In addition to the "Framework" funding program where the entire grant is provided by Brussels, there is a second scheme by the European Science Foundation (with "Eurocores" and the "Research Networking Program") where participating researchers are responsible for securing additional funding to cover field research in their respective countries.

The coordinated cooperation model is currently gaining ground in comparative communication research. In its most frequent form, researchers gather at international workshops and conferences prior to the actual start of the project to reach an agreement on all necessary steps. Then, the project coordinator – who in most cases is the same person who initiated the project – develops a "master research proposal" that is shared among all participating collaborators. These researchers know their respective contexts extremely well, which makes it possible to realize more complex research designs with several analytical foci. Often this model is realized without the involvement of EU institutions and just relies on the participants' ability to obtain funding from their respective national science foundations. One recent example for such a strategy of coordinating and managing comparative research is the "Foreign News on TV" study that involves researchers from about twenty countries and is headed by Akiba Cohen (see his chapter in this volume, Chapter 31).

A major problem of the coordinated cooperation model is that participating researchers have to come to an agreement on conceptual and methodological decisions on a voluntarily basis, and this can turn out to be difficult for many reasons. Livingston (2003) hit a point when she said that at many project meetings researchers find themselves not only comparing their findings but also their theories, methodological preferences, research ethics, writing styles, and publication strategies. Livingston makes another important point in noting that participating researchers must be able to sustain good working relationships across geographical distances and over a considerable time period. Some colleagues, she writes, may suffer from difficulties with writing and working in a foreign language; some may be affected by limited funding and institutional support;



Figure 30.5 Coordinated, fully comparative cooperation model (Hasebrink and Herzog 2002). ($ indicates research dollars and illustrates who is obtaining monetary funding for research projects)

others may even experience anxieties concerning issues of data ownership and intellectual property that may arise during the collaboration process. In sum, comparative work relies not only on time, funding, and mutual interest but also on goodwill and trust (Livingston 2003). All these points need to be addressed ahead of time to avoid irritations that often surface in later stages of a project.

There may be substantial scientific problems as well. The participating researchers have to find a solution for how to deal with different academic cultures and scientific socializations. Too much theoretical diversity can seriously threaten a collaborative project. The first option to deal with theoretical diversity is a centralized strategy where one theory is decided on and all potential alternatives are being disregarded. Swanson (1992) labeled this the "avoidance strategy". The second path is a theory-neutral strategy where data gathering is planned without any guiding theory and the theory-work only enters the picture much later when the results are being interpreted. Swanson called this the "pre-theoretical strategy". The third strategy is the least common denominator approach, where the project is guided by a very general and very broad theoretical perspective that serves as an umbrella for very divergent scientific approaches. Swanson called it the "meta-theoretical strategy". Personal experience tells us that reaching an agreement on which theories to use has always been a difficult decision.

The coordinated cooperation model is the prerequisite for the last and most advanced cooperation model – the *coordinated, fully comparative cooperation model* (Figure 30.5).

This model refers to the data analysis stage after all data have been gathered in the different contexts. In the data gathering stage, scholars examine their own home country, but in the data analysis stage, each scholar works with the entire dataset and analyses research questions that involve all the contexts in the project. In this way, it becomes a fully comparative project. Every participating scholar examines a different unit of analysis (or research question) and compares all contexts with regard to this aspect. The coordinated, fully comparative cooperation model is the most advanced because it requires the various researchers to have sufficient background knowledge on all participating contexts in order to reach meaningful interpretations of the results.

This model of cooperation is actually more common in the natural sciences than in the field of media and communication research. One reason may be that media phenomena tend to be strongly determined by culture and language, and scholars will rarely feel confident enough to draw competent comparisons across many societies and cultures. Another reason may be lack of interest and a predominantly regional focus. The idea that scholars from around the world would collectively interrogate the data often fails because scholarship, like news, is mostly local. Researchers are often more interested in interpreting their own national data and then publishing the data in local journals. A third problem is that collaborative projects require frequent and extensive meetings for scholarly exchange and mutual planning. The reality, however, is that international conferences, which provide convenient opportunities for project meetings, often leave little time to discuss matters thoroughly.

Toward Institutionalized Forms of Collaboration: The Worlds of Journalism Study

Research projects are not always static entities. They often change, grow, and evolve from small pilot studies into large-scale comparative endeavors. In the course of their evolution, these projects may go through several stages, in each of which taking a different shape in terms of project coordination and management. The "Worlds of Journalism Study" (www.worldsofjournalism.org), initiated and coordinated by one of the authors of this chapter, belongs to this category of projects. The study was initially set up in 2006 as a pilot project granted by the German Research Foundation. The overall purpose of the project was to map journalistic cultures onto a grid of common dimensions and explore their variation across nations, various types of news organizations, and different professional milieus.

The grant covered field research in Germany and five additional countries. The project coordinator exclusively designed a conceptual model that served as a theoretical framework for the study (Hanitzsch 2007). The researchers in the other five countries received subsidies from the German headquarters and hence served as "correspondents" with limited academic freedom with respect to the conceptual ground on which the study was built. The cooperation strategy therefore followed the *correspondents model*.

As the project became better known in the scientific community, several researchers from additional countries expressed their interest in participation, extending the range of coverage to twelve countries in early 2007. Since this first "enlargement" happened at a time when the research design was being developed, the study switched to another model of cooperation, the *coordinated cooperation model*. Principal investigators from the various countries gathered for a three-day meeting in order to discuss the research design and research tools on the basis of a draft that was prepared by the coordinator.

While field research had already started in some of the countries, the network continued to grow larger, in part because researchers from a number of countries brought in their own money and partly because additional central funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation allowed the inclusion of some more countries. This resulted in a mixed model of cooperation. Those who joined early participated in the development of an appropriate methodology, while the latecomers had no chance but to accept the overall conceptual and methodological framework. Furthermore, the study even gradually moved to the application of the *coordinated, fully comparative cooperation model* as some of the project collaborators participated quite actively in data analysis and interpretation well beyond the scope of their respective countries. The example shows that the five discussed models of coordinating and managing comparative research projects are actually ideal-type models. Most of the time a study may actually fall between two models or move across models over the course of time.

Today, the Worlds of Journalism Study has evolved into one of the largest collaborative endeavors in the field of journalism research, as it brings together scholars from more than twenty countries, spanning almost all major regions of the world. The project has not only generated various conference presentations and publications in respected journals (e.g., Hanitzsch *et al.* 2010, 2011) but has also been successful in creating a growing community of researchers who collaborate in terms of conceptual ideas, methodological development, data gathering, and collective publication. As the members of the network thought about the potential of repeated replications of the project, a sixth model of cooperation started to take shape: the *institutionalized democratic cooperation model.*

As with the previous five models, scholars of media and communication do not have to reinvent the wheel here. Several neighboring disciplines, such as sociology, psychology, and the political sciences, have long implemented forms of institutionalized and truly democratic collaboration. A well-known example is the World Values Survey (WVS), which traces people's values and beliefs in more than eighty countries. Born out of the European Values Survey that started in the early 1980s, it is today coordinated by the renowned political scientist Ronald Inglehart. In terms of internal coordination and management, the WVS is steered by an executive committee whose members are elected.

How can comparative researchers benefit from such an institutionalized network? The Worlds of Journalism Study's statute mentions a few important reasons (see http://www.worldsofjournalism.org/statute.htm): *first*, an institutionalized form of collaboration provides a permanent intellectual platform for the exchange of ideas and evidence, as well as for conceptual and methodological discussions; *second*, it helps establish and maintain sustainable collaborative partnerships; *third*, it will ultimately generate a rich data pool to which all participating researchers will have access; *fourth*, it will make it easier to acquire funding for research projects that cut across national and cultural boundaries as an established institution may be more successful in approaching alternative and nonacademic sources for central funding; and, *fifth*, an institutionalized model can create and foster a community of researchers with common interests and make it much easier to receive help from colleagues in specific countries.

In early 2011 the Worlds of Journalism project was therefore turned into the Worlds of Journalism Study, which is now governed by an Executive Committee (EC) that consists of elected scholars representing all major world regions. The responsibilities of the EC are the principal coordination of the study, acquisition of central funding, recruitment of new members, and organization of workshops and meetings. Decisions about the network's future strategy and research projects are ultimately subjected to the general assembly. In addition to the EC, a Scientific Advisory Committee is in charge of the development of comparative concepts, research designs, and methodological tools.

Looking at other disciplines that have longer histories in comparative and cross-national research, we think that collaborative and institutionalized forms of cooperation will be the future. These modes of collaboration may require more deliberation and patience as the number of participants grows and with them, inevitably, the number of – often conflicting – ways of going about comparative research. At the end of the day, however, collaborative and institutionalized models of cooperation may turn out to be extremely effective in generating large datasets across time and space, further opening up new avenues and opportunities for comparative researchers.

Conclusions

Before embarking on a comparative cross-national project it is important to decide on a formal model of cooperation. The models we have discussed here draw on ideas put forward by Hasebrink and Herzog (2002). The funding situation often predetermines the selection of a model. An important motivation for other scholars to join a comparative project is summarized in the principle of "give a little, get a lot" (Stevenson 2003). In other words, in return for contributing a small amount of data on one's own country, each collaborator is promised the complete dataset in return. The underlying hope is that individual participants will find creative ways of analyzing the data and of testing hypotheses in a way that would not be possible when being limited to the scope of data from a single country only. The second project principle is a promise to "seek collective publications" of results while encouraging participants to also publish on their own. For some, an individually authored chapter in a book published in Europe or the United States is an important professional achievement. For others, local publications in the local language are more important.

A "worst case scenario" is that the effort to coordinate the project becomes too time and energy consuming, with the result that the project is never fully completed and fully published (a fate suffered by several collaborative international projects in our field). Another real danger is that so many compromises are made between the participants (in terms of theory and method) that the study becomes so unoriginal and noninnovative that its results simply cannot compete with the state of the art in the field anymore.

An "ideal scenario", based on mutual exchanges between international academic communities and supported by national and international associations, would be the emergence of strong ties between collaborating researchers. These could then set the stage for cross-cultural projects that would be sufficiently funded to cover all costs for research, administration, and travel, would stimulate teaching, address socially relevant questions, and generate intriguing results that leave a profound imprint on the respective field of research.

References

Esser, F. and Pfetsch, B. (eds) (2004) *Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases, and Challenges.* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Foweraker, J. and Landman, T. (1997) *Citizenship Rights and Social Movements.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Gurevitch, M. and Blumler, J.G. (1990) Comparative research: the extending frontier, in D.L. Swanson and D. Nimmo (eds), *New Directions in Political Communication: A Resource Book.* Newbury Park, CA: Sage, pp. 305–325.

Halloran, J.D. (1998) Social science, communication research and the Third World," *Media Development*, **2**, 43–46.

Hanitzsch, T. (2007) Deconstructing journalism culture: towards a universal theory, *Communication Theory*, **17** (4), 367–385.

Hanitzsch, T., Anikina, M., Berganza, R., Cangoz, I., Coman, M., Hamada, B., Hanusch, F., Karadjov, C.D., Mellado, C., Moreira, S.V., Mwesige, P.G., Plaisance, P.L., Reich, Z., Seethaler, J., Skewes, E.A., Noor, D.V. and Yuen, K.W. (2010) Modeling perceived influences on journalism: evidence from a cross-national survey of journalists, *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, **87** (1), 7–24.

Hanitzsch, T., Hanusch, F., Mellado, C., Anikina, M., Berganza, R., Cangoz, I., Coman, M., Hamada, B., Hernandez, M.E., Karadjov, C.D., Moreira, S.V., Mwesige, P.G., Plaisance, P.L., Reich, Z., Seethaler, J., Skewes, E.A., Noor, D.V. and Yuen, K.W. (2011) Mapping journalism cultures across nations: a comparative study of 18 countries, *Journalism Studies*, **12** (3), 273–293.

Hasebrink, U. and Herzog, A. (2002) Vergleichsweise schwierig: Internationale Kooperation, in K. Hafez (ed.), *Die Zukunft der International Vergleichenden Kommunikationswissenschaft in Deutschland.* Hamburg, Germany: Deutsches Übersee-Institut, pp. 155–169.

Jowell, R. (1998) How comparative is comparative research?, *American Behavioral Scientist*, **42** (2), 168–177.

Kohn, M.L. (1989) Cross-national research as an analytic strategy, in M.L. Kohn (ed.), *Cross-National Research in Sociology.* Newbury Park, CA: Sage, pp. 77–102.

Livingstone, S. (2003) On the challenges of cross-national comparative media research, *European Journal of Communication*, **18** (4), 477–500.

Stevenson, R.L. (2003) Mapping the news of the world, in B. Dervin and S.H. Chaffee (eds), *Communication, a Different Kind of Horse Race: Essays Honoring Richard F. Carter.* Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, pp. 149–165.

Swanson, D.L. (1992) Managing theoretical diversity in cross-national studies of political communication, in J.G. Blumler, J.M. McLeod, and K.E. Rosengren (eds), *Comparatively Speaking: Communication and Culture across Space and Time.* Newbury Park, CA: Sage, pp. 19–34.

31

Benefits and Pitfalls of Comparative Research on News
Production, Content, and Audiences

Akiba A. Cohen

It is difficult, if not impossible, to determined what kind of media genres have been studied the most, but an educated guess would seem to indicate that *news* has been examined more often and more in-depth than any other content form. Taking into account all traditional and new media – newspapers, radio, television, and the Internet – news dominates the scene.

While proponents of every kind of fictional content might say that their domain is of paramount importance in peoples' lives, news can be critical, even a matter of existence. As Shoemaker (1996) suggested, people are "hardwired for news". People use information that is provided as news, consciously and unconsciously, in a variety of forms and via different platforms to assess their situation, to plan the coming day (as well as the more distant future), and to take note of threats and potential dangers.

Yet it is not always simple to determine what news is and which events are newsworthy. Professionals who deal with such events on a daily basis, namely journalists and editors, select events and convert them into news items but they do not always agree on the process.

In our day and age, most news is provided by four media: newspapers, radio, television, and the Internet. Of the four, television is probably the most ubiquitous. Wherever one goes today, including some of the most remote places around the globe, you will encounter it. Even if you travel in a country where the language spoken is totally strange and unfamiliar to you, if you turn on the television set in your hotel room you will immediately recognize a newscast when you see it. Moreover, if you are a person interested in what is happening around the world – and have therefore traveled to that country – you are likely to grasp a gist of some of the things that are being narrated on the screen. But can we say that news is news is news? Yes and no!

In recent decades, scholars in many countries have been studying television news. They have been doing so not only because it has justifiably been considered as a major

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.

transmitter of information to the public, but also because it is a powerful political tool, and despite significant changes in the media ecology – mostly due to advances in technology, mainly with the advent and increasing use of the Internet – television news is still considered by most people as their main source for news.[1]

Comparative research on media in general and on news in particular has been around for quite some time (Blumler, McLeod, and Rosengren 1992). For several decades, once television became an established household medium and television news became an omnipresent feature of its programming, studies began to appear that examined the contents of the newscasts.

Some of the earliest comparative studies of television news looked at the three American networks – ABC, CBS, and NBC – but lo and behold, virtually no differences were found among them. Indeed, why should there have been differences? After all, the three networks provided news to the same audience base, the three networks operated within identical corporate cultures, economic structures, and ideologies, the technology that they all used was the same, and even the reporters and anchors (now referred to as "talent") had the same backgrounds and experience. In fact, if differences were to be found the researchers would be hard-pressed to explain them.

More recently, *cross-national* comparative research on news has become a growing field of research, mostly regarding television. This is probably the case because of globalization in general and the prominence of more and more global broadcasters. On the face of it, cross-national comparisons are more likely to discover differences; after all, there is much variation among countries, nations, and cultures. Is news the same all over? Of course it is not. Should it be the same? There is no reason for this. And does all this matter? Of course it does.

Doing cross-national research on news is a highly complex, expensive, and difficult endeavor. Livingstone (2003, 2010) cites several scholars who feel that, in general, cross-national comparative research on media is so fraught with problems to make it useless. I tend to disagree.

This chapter is an attempt to show that although it is indeed extremely difficult, the study of news in a comparative context is so important that it is incumbent upon scholars to find the way to alleviate the potential problems and thereby enable valid research in this area.

Ingrid Volkmer, the editor of this volume, has asked me to present a personal account of a research program that has spanned nearly three decades in which I have looked at various aspects of news from a cross-national comparative perspective. I offer here some personal – needless to say highly idiosyncratic – experiences on this kind of research. I shall raise a variety of problems and try to show how solutions might be achieved. And yet, I have no perfect solutions to offer here (nor, to be sure, is there perfection in any other area of research), but the alternative of quitting means turning off our intellectual curiosity and this is surely not the road to be taken.

The Benefits of Comparative Research on News

As I have implied above, I believe there is no question about the virtues and benefits of comparative research, especially in our age of globalization; hence I will devote most of this text to its pitfalls. Few would argue in principle against the comparative approach.

Perhaps only ethnocentric or even indolent scholars – I would hope that there are no such folks around – would claim that such research is unnecessary and hence suffice with local or domestic research. Domestic research on news is no doubt very important, but the added dimension of comparative research can be an eye opener. It can tell us much about our own by learning about others.

In his important volume, *Cross-National Research in Sociology*, Melvin Kohn (1989) presented a typology of four models for cross-national research. In each of Kohn's models the *nation* is contextualized in a different way. In this section I present four of my own studies, each of which might be considered *ex post factum* as an attempt to exemplify one of Kohn's models.

I first briefly describe each of the studies and how they fit Kohn's typology; later I will enumerate several pitfalls concerning comparative research on news and provide what may hopefully be at least some possible solutions to the problems. While, as noted, Livingstone (2003, 2010) is somewhat pessimistic about the potentials of comparative research in general, I believe that in the area of news several important strides have been taken during the past two decades or so.

Nation as Object of Study

In this model, the countries chosen for comparative research are those in which the researcher is interested per se, that is, the countries are of interest because of what they are and what they specifically represent.

In our study *The Holocaust and the Press: Nazi War-Crimes Trials in Germany and Israel* (Cohen *et al.* 2002) we compared only two countries – West Germany (before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989) and Israel. Why only two? Because we were specifically interested in Germany and Israel and only in them. It was an historical study of sorts spanning a period of 43 years. The study was about how the Israeli and the West German press, from 1946 to 1988, dealt with four major Nazi war crime trials, each lasting from nearly one year to more than two years: the Nuremberg trial, conducted from October 1945 to November 1946; the Eichmann trial held in Israel from March 1961 to January 1962; the Auschwitz trial, held in Germany from November 1963 to September 1965; and the Demjanjuk trial, back in Israel again, which began in January of 1987 and ended in May 1988.

The rationale behind the study was that since the Holocaust that took place during World War Two in Europe was hardly reported in real time; the world had no way of knowing what was happening. For several decades since the end of the War, numerous trials were conducted in which many perpetrators of war crimes were brought to justice. We assumed that the press in Germany and Israel – the two countries with presumably the greatest interest in the reported atrocities – used the trials as opportunities to re-tell the story of the Holocaust, time and again, but each time from a more distant time frame.

Using Kohn's typology, this study fits the "Nation as Object of Study" model. We were only interested in comparing the overtime Israeli press coverage of the trials with the Germany press coverage as well as across the two countries' political spectrums (we did this by analyzing Left Wing, Center, and Right Wing newspapers in both countries.

We had no interest in reaching generalized conclusion about how the war crime trials were reported in other countries even though some trials did take place elsewhere over the years.

We created a very detailed codebook, which we used for a content analysis of several thousand statements that appeared in the news reports.[2] Among others, we examined the salience of the items; their nature and form; how they relate to the various trials; the historical context presented, if any; various themes relating to the memory and understanding of the Holocaust; and the questions of whether or not lessons can be learned from what happened in that dark period.[3] Due to space limitations, I cannot go into the findings of the study. Suffice it to say that some very interesting differences were found between the Israeli and German coverage of the trials in terms of identification and dissociation.

Nation as Context of Study

According to Kohn's second model, some studies attempt to test hypotheses concerning generalizations about certain concepts or phenomena. In such studies, nations are used as exemplars.

In a more recent volume, *News Around the World: Content, Practitioners, and the Public* by Pamela Shoemaker and myself (2006), the goal was to study the concept of newsworthiness around the world. Much had been written about the criteria that determine whether or not an event, a person, or an idea would become news. It has also been said, more than once, that journalists notice when something is newsworthy but they often are not able to verbalize and explain how they arrived at such a conclusion.

In this study we reduced many criteria of newsworthiness into two main concepts: deviance and social significance. In other words, to what extent are the levels of deviance and social significance of the event, person, or idea – ranking from high to low – determinants of becoming a news item? We went ahead and subdivided each of these concepts into several elements. Thus, for deviance we dealt with statistical deviance, social change deviance, and normative deviance. Regarding social significance we looked at political significance, economic significance, cultural significance, and public significance. The main objective of the study was to determine to what extent newsworthiness in general and deviance and social significance in particular (including their respective breakdown into subcomponents) are universal or relevant only in certain countries.

The study was conducted in ten countries: Australia, Chile, China, Germany, India, Israel, Jordan, Russia, South Africa, and the United States. In each, we analyzed the contents of a composite week of news in two cities – the country's main city and a city in its periphery – in three media outlets: a daily newspaper, a television channel's main (evening) newscast, and a leading radio news program. In each city we also conducted focus groups with journalists, public relations practitioners, and two groups of citizens, one from a low socio-economic stratum and one from a high socio-economic stratum. The content analysis measured the extent to which the various news items were deviant and socially significant. In the focus groups we asked the participants to discuss these concepts. We also asked them to rank the newsworthiness of several news items that appeared in the content analysis, as they perceived them. We then correlated the rankings among the various focus group participants as well as with the real rankings based on the content analysis.

Nation as Unit of Analysis

Kohn's third model uses nations as the unit of analysis, namely, each nation serves as one unit or data source. This model requires researchers to identify certain dimensions along which nations could be placed in terms of their respective magnitudes. With these kinds of data, correlations could be calculated among dimensions.

The study of *Social Conflict and Television News* (Cohen, Adoni, and Bantz 1990) worked along these lines. We were interested in the way television news presents social conflict, both domestic and foreign. We hypothesized that how conflict is presented on television is a function of the extent to which there is government influence on broadcasting and media competition. To test this hypothesis we needed countries that could be ranked in a certain order (from high to low or from low to high) on these two independent continua. We worked in five countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Israel, and South Africa (during its Apartheid period). These countries, it was argued, could be arranged from high to low in terms of media competition and from low to high in terms of government control over media contents. Thus, the United States would be considered as a country with the greatest amount of competition in the media and South Africa with the lowest competition. Conversely, the United States was lowest in government control over media contents whereas in South Africa the government exercised the most control over news contents.

The contents of two 12-day samples of newscasts – four years apart in 1980 and 1984 – were analyzed in the five countries. The core of the analysis dealt with the characteristics of three dimensions of social conflict: the complexity of the conflicts, their intensity, and the extent to which they are solvable. The most severe conflicts would be those that are highly complex, highly intense, and difficult (if not impossible) to resolve. These dimensions of social conflict were also used to formulate a survey, administered in each of the countries, in which respondents were asked about their perceptions of how social conflicts are presented on television in their country and how social conflicts "really" are.

Data analyses in this study dealt first with the way television news presented social conflict, based on the content analyses. This was followed by multivariate analyses of the respondents' perception of social conflicts as they appear on television and in the "real" world. Finally, correlations between perception and contents were calculated.

Nation as Component of a Larger International or Transnational System

The final model offered by Kohn was that in which nations are components in an international or transnational system. Our study that took this approach focused on the News Exchange Service of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) and appeared as

Global Newsrooms, Local Audiences: A Study of the Eurovision News Exchange (Cohen *et al.* 1996). The main *raison d'être* of the Exchange, known as the *Eurovision News Exchange*, is to provide television footage of events taking place in member countries to television services in other countries that have no other means of obtaining such materials.[4]

The goal of that study was first and foremost to learn about this highly complex, innovative (established in 1958)[5] multinational news exchange service, the ideology behind it, and its day-to-day operations. Like the study of social conflict and television news, this study also spanned several years. The bulk of the study took place in eight European and Middle Eastern countries: the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, Spain, Jordan, and Israel.[6] It included site visits where observations and interviews were conducted in 1987 and 1994 with gatekeepers of foreign news, two waves of content analysis (a week in February and a week in June 1987), and focus groups with viewers of various socio-economic strata.

On the same days of the content analyses in 1987, we also recorded the daily conferences that took place with the representatives (referred to as "contacts") of the member stations of *Eurovision* during which decisions are made regarding what footage would be provided via satellite feeds during the course of the day. In addition, we recorded the evening newscasts in the countries of the study in order to examine if and how the provided footage was actually used by the stations in their evening newscasts. Lastly, in five of the eight countries we conducted focus groups in which we showed the participants their local version of three news items shown in all the countries, based on *Eurovision* footage. We asked the participants to discuss their perceptions of how their local station presented these foreign items and how they made use of common materials made available to all stations. In doing so we highlighted the domestication process of foreign news, that is, how the home country presents foreign stories so that it can be comprehensible and relevant to domestic viewers.

The Pitfalls of Comparative Research on News

In this global age, endless products and services go across national borders. Other than minor differences, a McDonald's hamburger sandwich is the same wherever it is eaten (and where on earth hasn't the yellow M reached?). A Benetton t-shirt is a Benetton t-shirt wherever it is sold. An ATM card is an ATM card wherever it is used. As for media, any novel, say the Harry Potter series, is the same wherever it is read, except, of course, for the need to have it translated into the vernacular.[7] The same goes for a film or television drama (or soap opera) produced in one country and shown in another; all it needs is dubbing or subtitles and it's ready to go. With news, however, the situation is different. News reports on an event are typically adapted and presented in a way that makes sense to the reader, listener, or viewer. In many cases, the text – both verbal and, in the case of television, the visual parts as well – are edited and composed to be relevant to the viewer. Most events would likely be presented at least somewhat differently in different countries. In fact, they would be presented differently even within a country, in different newspapers, on different television or radio channels, and in different news portals.

Selection of Countries and Media Outlets

The first critical issue in comparative research is selecting the appropriate countries for comparison and the most relevant media outlets therein. Ideally, the choice of countries should be based on a theoretical rationale. It is not enough to simply do a study with colleagues in other countries because they are friends, they work well together, they have similar interests, etc. In reality, however, this is easier said than done.

In the study of the Nazi war crime trials the choice of Germany and Israel was obvious; these are the two relevant countries for the comparison. In the *Eurovision* study, the selection of several member countries also makes sense if we wish to learn about the organization as a whole and cannot study each and every member country. In the study on social conflict in television news the selection was alright but surely other countries might have been selected that could be placed along the two continua. In the study of newsworthiness, however, the choice of countries was quite random (where cooperating colleagues could be found) and they did not necessarily represent a sufficiently broad sample to make universal generalizations, as was the objective of the study.

Similar problems arise when selecting the media outlets. In the case of the *Eurovision* study there was no problem since all stations were members of the EBU, and the study was about the EBU. In the German–Israeli study of the war crime trials the newspapers selected presented a broad spectrum in terms of the political inclination of the press in both countries, but of course there were others that could have been selected, especially in Germany, where many newspapers are published.[8] In the study of social conflict, the choices in South Africa and Israel were clear because at the time there was only one television channel in each. In the other three countries there were also very few channels and hence the selection process was reasonable. In the newsworthiness study, however, in some central and peripheral cities the choices were not simple. Can one single newspaper represent all the potential major (central) newspapers in Russia, China, India, or the United States? Surely not!

Sampling Frames

The value of any study lies in part in the nature and quality of the sample used. In the comparative research context a general question is whether or not the samples in all the countries must be identical in size. They do not. But care must be taken if and when overall data are presented, across the countries, to assign proper weights when needed.

What about the actual sample size? There is no clearcut rule, but for news contents the minimum should be one week. Ideally, samples should be larger than one week. However, if only one week is used, it might be a good idea to use a constructed week. This means that one day is taken from a series of consecutive weeks. For example, Monday is selected from the first week, Tuesday from the following week, and so forth. This makes it possible to cover a more extended overall time period and not rely on a single consecutive week. If several weeks are used, it would be good to select weeks with gaps among them in order to spread the sample over a wide period of time. In comparative research, however, this increases the likelihood of "hitting" holidays or other special events in some countries, which we would prefer to avoid.

Functional Equivalence

Functional equivalence of concepts or entities is another difficult problem that often arises in comparative cross-national research. Take a simple concept – the main (or major) newscast of the day. What is meant by this? Is it the longest newscast? Is it the one viewed by more people than any other? Are there any other characteristics that define it? It is quite likely that this seemingly simple concept can take on different meanings in different countries.

Take another example: public service versus commercial stations. Not all so-called public service stations operate in the same way, under the same type of regulation, etc. The same may be true regarding a commercial station. Is it privately owned? Is it regulated by a public body even though it is financed by advertising? Here, too, there can be different nuances that do matter.

When doing comparative research, the goal is to use concepts or entities that have the same meaning in all the countries of the study. This is not always possible, however, so researchers must strive for the closest option. In all the studies described above we had to take such factors into account.

Contingency Plans

Every plan is a basis for change no matter how much effort goes into the planning. Whenever research is planned, especially in a cross-national setting, a mishap in one country may affect all others. Thus, for example, the recording of news contents must be planned and coordinated in advance by checking each country's calendar in order to avoid holidays and other significant events (such as forthcoming elections) that might create a skewed picture.

Even after careful planning, there may be a need to halt the process in mid-course if, for example, an unusual event occurs somewhere that could "distort" the "normal" turn of events. Here, too, it is not easy to decide what constitutes an "unusual" event. For example, on one day in our social conflicts study John Lennon was murdered. We decided that although the event was indeed quite extraordinary, we kept that day in our sample.

A similar kind of problem can arise if, for example, a technical mishap occurs in one country such as a recording failure. Should that day be deleted from all the countries or should it be considered as "missing data". Today, it might be easier to retrieve missing newscasts thanks to the Internet and other sources, but in some locations this still proves to be a significant problem.

Access to Journalists

One of the growing problems is getting access to journalists. With the increasing interest in journalism and media studies and the subsequent rise in the number of studies conducted, access to journalists is getting more difficult. Once upon a time journalists were flattered when approached for interviews or for the possibility to open the newsroom or studio for observation. Today, however, journalists have become weary of researchers and students and often view their presence as a nuisance. We have been witnessing increasing rates of decline in requests for interviews. Today scholars need to resort to good connections and sophisticated persuasive messages to get journalists to cooperate.

Access to Respondents

The problems associated with doing survey research have increased in recent years. Once upon a time, folks would be happy to open their door and allow an interviewer into their home. This situation is all but gone for various reasons. For many years the telephone has become the medium of choice for interviews but this option has been fraught with problems, too, such as high refusal rates, the inability to conduct interviews lasting more than several minutes, and sampling problems, mainly due to the increasing use of mobile telephones.

In recent years, there is a move toward interviews via the Internet. On the one hand, there are great advantages to this format, especially the ability to present the interviewee with links to visual examples of materials from newspapers or television or audio clips from radio. However, on the other hand, in some countries the Internet has still not reached a penetration rate that would enable good sampling. Even in countries with high usage of the Internet, the sampling is not entirely random, and hence is far from perfect.

Selection and Training of Coders

Perhaps the most important role in content analysis is that of the coders of the content. These people – most often students – must be trained for the task. The more elaborate and complex the codebook, the more effort must be made in the training process. This rule always holds.

In comparative cross-national research the main problem lies with the need to have all coders in all the countries do their work in an identical fashion. Ideally, all coders should be trained together, which would mean bringing them together at some convenient location. This, however, is virtually prohibitive cost-wise. The next best way might be to assemble in one location a team of coders who originate from all the participating countries and who are thus familiar with the cultural context of the news in their home countries. They would then code the contents in one location under the supervision of one researcher. This strategy is sometimes possible if there are only a few countries involved, but when the study is comprised of a large number of countries it is not feasible. As a result, in most studies the coding ends up being done in each of the countries by local coders. In this situation, due to the need for functional equivalence, coders in the different countries may encounter problems merely because some of the concepts (or variables) to be coded are not identical.

Reliability of Coding

Calculating the reliability of the coding is a *sin qua non* in content analysis. When dealing with a single dataset, such as in one country, calculating reliability is a relatively simple operation. The literature is rife with coefficients that can be used and the decision rests upon the level of measurement of the variables and the number of coders who coded the materials.

In the comparative cross-national context the reliability issue is much more complex. Assuming, as we do, that the coding will be done in each of the countries by local coders, two points need to be made. First, it goes without saying that the reliability coefficients used must be the same in all locations. Second, it is very likely that the number of coders used in each country is different (because of the differential amount of materials coded and/or the logistics of the coding process). In any event, since the number of coders is taken into account in the calculation of some of the coefficients, the maximum level of reliability may be affected.

Funding

Comparative research is expensive. It is generally more expensive than simply adding the cost of the study in each of the countries. One model of fundraising is to locate one source of money for the entire project. Depending on the nature and scope of the project, however, this can be quite an exorbitant sum. The other option is for each country to obtain its own funding. This is not easy either since there are different cost factors and procedures to follow.

Also, as it turns out, there is much variability in the cost of performing identical functions in the different countries. Thus, for example, there is wide variation in the cost of student labor; also, the cost per interview in surveys can fluctuate tremendously. All these points need to be taken into account when planning the study.

Dropouts

As noted, the more countries that are involved in the study, the more likely it is that some will drop out at some point before its completion. This is almost inevitable, but it is important to do as much as possible to minimize it.

One reason for dropouts, as noted, is funding problems. Each country team should have its resources arranged ahead of time. However, on occasion, even during the course of the study, financial problems may arise (this happened with one of our colleagues in a recent study).

Social Relations

Doing cross-national comparative research involves scholars and students from different cultures and backgrounds. This is one of the most enjoyable aspects of such academic work. However, it can also be problematic at times, with conflicts having to do with both the substance of the research as well as the personalities of the people involved.

The more people involved in the study, the more likely there will be disagreements among them. It is important to listen to varying opinions, but in the end someone must take charge and make decisions. It can be very useful to make clear who the "leader" of the project is so that this person will make the final decisions on controversial issues.

It is also important to have the team members meet face to face from time to time. Usually, the most convenient forums for such meetings are international conferences of professional associations, which most of the participants attend. My experience has also been to try to arrange meetings at least in some of the participating countries.

One touchy subject that may come up concerns the authorship and timing of publications. Given the relatively long – sometimes very long – duration of cross-national studies, there may be varying needs of the participating scholars. Younger and nontenured team members are usually more concerned about publishing quickly. Also, and of course related to this, is the question of journal articles versus a book volume. Another issue can be the identity of the lead author and the number of coauthors of any given publication, especially since not everyone contributes equally in the writing process.

The basic remedy is to establish a publication "policy" for the group and to make clear, as early as possible, what the publication goals will be, who will take responsibility and lead certain parts of the study, etc. In our work, the general approach has been that publications dealing with the overall array of countries ought to be coauthored by all interested participants whereas publications emanating from the data of a single country could be authored by that country's researcher or team; bilateral or multilateral country analyses, if relevant, would be authored by the relevant participants; and so forth.

Start-to-Finish Research

To end this essay, I wish to discuss briefly the concept of start-to-finish research. This concept was coined by Braman and Cohen (1990). The idea behind it was the need to conduct studies of news that would cover the entire process from the creation to the consumption of news. There are three basic elements in the process: production, content, and consumption.

Typically, studies of news focus on only one of these elements. Numerous studies have been conducted on the news production process; many scholars have examined the contents of news; and others have focused on the consumption of news, mainly on attitudes toward news and cognitive aspects relating to comprehension of news. Fewer studies have looked at two of these elements in the same project, mostly combining production and content or content and consumption. It is rare to find studies that include all three elements. This is mostly due to the greater complexity of such studies, the need to have scholars who are experts in the different areas (nobody can be an expert on everything), the long duration of such studies, and the impulse of scholars to publish their work in article form and without delay (it is impossible to include everything in a brief article or chapter).

I have been fortunate to work with some wonderful colleagues over the years who had the knowledge, expertise, as well as the needed patience to work on long and elaborate projects that were able to tap the three elements. My best example so far for this approach was the study of the *Eurovision News Exchange*. In that study we looked at the production of the news that went around the world, the contents that were aired, and the way viewers in several countries made sense of it.

Another study, not mentioned earlier, is still underway. It concerns foreign news on television. The objective was to look at the production of foreign news, the contents of foreign news, and viewers' interest and use of foreign news. In addition, the study compares foreign news to domestic news and to "hybrid" news – items that are domestic but with a foreign element and items that are foreign but with a domestic element.

There are three phases in the study. In the first, a content analysis was conducted of news during 4 weeks (over a 3-month period) in early 2008 of the main evening newscast of two channels per country: the public service broadcasting channel and the commercial channel that enjoys the highest rating. Seventeen countries took part in this phase. The second phase was a representative telephone survey of the adult population in twelve of the countries (the other five countries did have sufficient funds for the survey). The final phase of the study was in-depth interviews with the gatekeepers (editors) of foreign news in the stations that were analyzed. These are being done in the countries that ran the surveys.

Ordinarily, such interviews would be conducted at the beginning of the project. In our case, however, we felt that we knew enough about the selection and composition processes of news in general and foreign news in particular. The main purpose of these interviews was to ask the gatekeepers what *they* believed were some of the main empirical findings of the content analysis and the survey responses. In other words, we wanted to determine to what extent the journalists were aware of the product they create – the contents – and what their viewers thought about the various issues surrounding foreign news. This "reverse" order enabled the editors to self-reflect, something that they hardly ever do.

In my view, this study best exemplifies the possibilities and pitfalls of this kind of research. On the positive side, we covered all aspects of the process and were able to link the content, survey, and in-depth interview data together. On the other hand, we lost several countries along the way, and the levels of reliability of the content data varied from location to location.

Conclusion

This chapter sought to take the reader through a series of cross-national comparative studies of news by illustrating the great potential in such work while not underestimating the inherent problems therein. In our global age, with the ever increasing availability of media outlets around the globe, it seems almost unthinkable to refrain from serious attempts to do comparative research in general and on news in particular.

As noted, more comparative studies have been done on television news, less on newspapers and the Internet, and few and far between on radio. Most studies have tackled only one medium and few have simultaneously dealt with several media. Most studies have used but one methodology while very few have used multimethodological approaches.

Decades ago, comparative research would have been virtually impossible, in part due to the difficulties of scholars to communicate efficiently among themselves across national borders. Today's technologies have totally removed such obstacles.

There is still much to investigate. Great opportunities exist coupled with yet unsolved difficulties. However, it is surely worth the effort.

Notes

1. In a recent yet to be published study of foreign news on television that I have been conducting with colleagues from various countries, we conducted surveys in thirteen countries with representative samples of the populations. Respondents were asked to estimate the amount of time they devoted "yesterday" (referring only to week days) to watching news on television, reading newspapers, and surfing the Internet for news. Across all countries ($n = 10\ 347$), 54% did *not* read a newspaper, 64% did *not* use the Internet for news, and only 23% did *not* watch TV news "yesterday". Also, 30% said they never use the Internet for news, 14% said they never read newspapers, while only 7% said they never watch news on television.
2. The analysis consisted of 3567 news items in Germany and 5673 items in Israel.
3. Due to space limitation, I did not go into the finding of this and the other studies reported below. Some readers may already be familiar with some of them and those who are not are invited to look at them in greater detail.
4. It should be noted that nonbroadcasting television news services have also been in the business of providing footage from around the world in collaboration with the *Eurovision News Exchange*. These include the former Worldwide Television News (WTN), now Reuters Television, and the former *Visnews*, now Reuters Television.
5. While the EBU was the first broadcasting union, today there are several others, including the Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union (ABU), the Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU), the African Union of Broadcasting (AUB), and several more.
6. Broadcasters from several non-European members were also part of the Exchange, including North African and Middle Easters countries. Today, many more countries are part of the *Eurovision News Exchange*, including countries of the former Soviet Union that had its own exchange service – *Intervision* – prior to 1989.
7. Admittedly, any translator would produce a different outcome when working on a particular text.
8. Another problem in this study was the goal of using the same newspapers that were published during the entire time span of the study, from 1945 to 1988, but certain newspapers folded during that long period.

References

Blumler, J.G., McLeod, J.M. and Rosengren, K.E. (1992) An introduction to comparative communication research, in J.G. Blumler, J.M. McLeod, and K.E. Rosengren (eds), *Comparatively Speaking: Communication and Culture across Space and Time*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, pp. 3–18.

Braman, S. and Cohen, A.A. (1990) Research from start to finish, in J.A. Anderson (ed.), *Mass Communication Yearbook*, 13. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, pp. 511–518.

Cohen, A.A., Adoni H. and Bantz, C. (1990) *Social Conflict and Television News*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Cohen, A.A., Levy, M.R., Gurevitch, M. and Roeh, I. (1996) *Global Newsrooms, Local Audiences: A Study of the Eurovision News Exchange*. London: John Libbey.

Cohen, A.A., Zemach, T., Wilke, J., and Schenk, B. (2002) *The Holocaust and the Press: Nazi War-Crimes Trials in Germany and Israel*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Kohn, M.L. (1989) Introduction, in M.L. Kohn (ed.), *Cross-National Research in Sociology*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, pp. 17–31.

Livingstone, S. (2003) On the challenges of cross-national comparative media research, *European Journal of Communication*, **18** (4), 477–500.

Livingstone, S. (2010) Cross-national comparative media research: aligning theoretical, practical and political considerations, Keynote Lecture given at the ECREA preconference *Doing Global Media Studies: Comparative Methods of Transcultural and Transnational Media Research*, Bremen, October 11, 2010.

Shoemaker, P.J. (1996) Hardwired for news: using biological and cultural evolution to explain the surveillance function, *Journal of Communication*, **46** (3), 32–47.

Shoemaker, P.J. and Cohen, A.A. (2006) *News Around the World: Content, Practitioners, and the Public*. New York: Routledge.

Index

The Handbook of Global Media Research, First Edition. Edited by Ingrid Volkmer.