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Globalization and human integration: we are all migrants

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Abstract

This paper asks whether globalization involves a trend toward human integration. It is argued that this is a long-term, uneven and paradoxical process in which widening social cooperation and deepening inequality go together. In the second part, this is examined from the point of view of migration and diasporas, whose role has been historically underestimated. Instead of looking at migration from the point of view of the nation state, one can look at the state system from the point of view of migration. The global equation is complex and there are no easy shortcuts; several pointers towards constructive analytics and politics that are discussed include the following: (1) The relativization of the nation state framework—the nation state format is making place for a wider variety of governance arrangements. (2) Intercultural relations have been crucial to 'national accumulation' all along, though often their contribution has not been recognized. (3) In the era of regionalization, crossborder intercultural relations build social and institutional tissue that is vital to present and future economic performance—a case in point are Euro–Arab relations. (4) Ethnic economies may interweave economic regions spatially (as in the case of the Chinese diaspora in the Pacific Basin), while interethnic economies weave institutional links across segmented social formations.

1. Introduction

Does globalization involve a trend towards human integration? Growing worldwide interconnectedness or the 'shrinking world' and the trend toward the overall widening scale of human cooperation point in this direction. However, contemporary globalization also comes with polarizing effects that deepen uneven development and inequality on a world scale. Widening cooperation and deepening inequality are

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not a novel combination in history. Thus taking a long-term and evolutionary perspective on globalization can possibly overcome this problem. But this solution would in turn generate a different problem: teleological thinking, or attributing a direction to evolutionary change. Experiences with teleologies have not been fortunate; they have usually been steeped in cultural and ideological bias and associated with discourses of domination.[1] Familiar instances are religious prophecies (such as the Second Coming in Christianity), Marxism (world socialism), developmentalism and progress Western style (modernization=westernization) and the end of history (à la Hegel, Kojève, Fukuyama). If globalization can be taken to involve human integration, these problems need to be addressed.

Here I will argue that globalization involves a trend toward human integration on the basis of the following considerations and provisos:

- That globalization is viewed as a long term historical process
- That the trend towards human integration is viewed not as a straightforward but as a dialectical process
- That this perspective is combined with analysis of power and hierarchy
- That utopian visions of human unity are possibly taken as pointers but not as shortcuts
- That since globalization is a complex multidimensional set of processes (involving concrete processes, changing subjectivities and specific globalizing projects), movement towards human integration also unfolds unevenly across many different fields and dimensions
- That diasporas and migration are part of the trend towards human integration and in the process involve 'boon and bane' for sending and receiving regions
- That from this assessment follows a commitment to policy intervention towards global equity, for without it the notion of human integration would become manipulative or meaningless, hypocritical or rhetorical.

The first section of this paper addresses long-term trends and perspectives on globalization, contrasting them to Eurocentric views. What is also considered is the human body as a site of human integration. Taken up further are utopian and prophetic visions of human unity and the question of uneven globalization. The second part addresses the question of how migration and diasporas fit into this general picture.

2. Globalization as a deep historical process

That globalization is a long-term historical process is not the common assessment of globalization among economists, political scientists or sociologists, but it is among

[1] Teleological perspectives are criticized from a methodological point of view in Nederveen Pieterse [1].

some historians and anthropologists. Viewed as a long-term historical process the dimensions and components of globalization include the following:

- The ancient population movements across and between continents.
- Long distance crosscultural trade.
- The 'world religions'—if we consider the wanderings that have gone into the making, spread and varieties of Buddhism, Christianity and Islam.
- The diffusion of technologies including neolithic agricultural know-how, military technologies, numeracy, literacy, sciences; and the invention of new technologies due to intercultural contact.

These dimensions have been studied under various headings, well before the current terminology of globalization. Palaeontologists and philologists have studied ancient population movements. Crosscultural trade has been dealt with extensively (e.g. [2]). Karl Jaspers has thematized the role of the world religions in the "axial age". Goonatilake has taken up the intercultural history of science [3]. McNeill has studied the early diffusion of military and other technologies [4]. Andre Gunder Frank has argued for the centrality of Asian economies, well before and underlying the rise to prominence of the European economies [5].

In these views human integration belongs to a much deeper dynamic in which shifting civilizational centres are but the front stage of history, operating against a backdrop of much older and ongoing intercultural relations. It does not matter all that much whether or not one would place these long-term processes under the umbrella of globalization, or at any rate that is a different kind of discussion.[2] What does matter is the general, underlying sense of history in relation to space. Thus, for example, Robert Clark traces the "global imperative" back to pre-agricultural *Homo erectus*. In his view, "the essence of the human condition is a fundamental connectedness with parts of the universe across time and space" (p. 2) [7].

This kind of historical sensibility is profoundly different from the Eurocentric view that attributes human unification solely or mainly to the journeys of modernity. If global integration is primarily a *modern* phenomenon then it belongs in the historical chain of the European journeys of reconnaissance followed by expansion, imperialism, colonialism and decolonization. Then the world was an archipelago of fragments and existed in bits and pieces, until modernity and the moderns unified it. The Eurocentric view of history stands in contrast to the view that prevails among evolutionary historians, palaeontologists and anthropologists. This perspective prevails in most contemporary discussions, as with Giddens for whom globalization is one of the "consequences of modernity" [8] and all those who see modernity and its universalisms (which are rooted, in turn, in the classics) as the great unifying force in human history. It follows that human integration stands or falls with the fate of modernity (read: the West) and all disrupting forces within or outside modernity detract from the great historical momentum of the moderns. The barbarians at the

[2] For elaboration on different disciplinary perspectives on globalization, see Nederveen Pieterse [6].

gate and within the citadel of civilization are threatening human destiny. With this view comes a profound rhetoric of Western chauvinism and, usually, pessimism concerning its course or destiny—which is reflected in perspectives on global cultural relations[3], on the cultural contradictions of capitalism, on the 'Lebanonization' of American culture. Eurocentrism is replicated in structure by other parochial views—Afrocentrism, Indocentrism, Sinocentrism, etc. The Eurocentric and 'modernist' view of history appears superficial if only considered against the backdrop of the older universalisms rooted in religious worldviews: in fact, modern universalism replicated earlier religious universalism [11].

Taking a historical perspective on globalization it makes sense to distinguish different stages of globalization—e.g. ancient, modern and contemporary. Then contemporary globalization may be termed *accelerated globalization*. "Today's globalization process differs from that of earlier times in four ways: the volume of materials moved is larger; the speeds with which they are moved are faster; and the diversity of materials (matter, energy, information) moved is greater" [12].

While the attention is usually focused on cultural diffusion we can also consider the *human body* as a site of global human integration. Large population movements and significant turning points in intercultural contact have made of course for interethnic mingling and combinations and criss-crossing of gene pools and physiological features. They have also been marked by the spread of diseases. Thus Asian–European contact overland was marked by the outbreak of the plague in medieval Europe [13]. European–American contact had a devastating impact on the native Americans. Eventually also health care methods travelled widely. The spread of foodstuffs and eating habits has profoundly affected demographics and human densities. Forms of mobility (horse, saddle, bit, chariot, ship, compass, bicycle, automobile, airplane) have further affected human motion. Military technologies have affected the logics and logistics of conquest [4]. The diffusion of rhythms, music, movies and advertising has influenced sensory experiences, aesthetics, forms of intimacy and ways of experiencing the body. The same applies to clothes and fashions. The global spread of mass media and advertising dominated by Western images has affected local beauty standards, fostering, for instance, practices of skin bleaching in various parts of the South. Conversely, Orientalism and other 'non-western' influences have profoundly influenced Western styles[4]. Thus in ways both profound and superficial human integration is being reflected and refracted in our contemporary experience of our own bodies and those of others.

3. Utopian visions: human unity as a theme

Visions of common humanity and human unity have been evoked in the shift from tribal to universal religions. The shift from Judaism to Christianity, from the Old to

[3] Examples are [9,10].

[4] Cf. Bruignac-La Hougue [14,15].

the New Testament, opening the door to the gentiles, is a case in point. In different ways, Taoism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam are universal in scope and appeal. In the Koran cultural differences are presented as but a way for humanity to 'know one another'. In addition utopias and prophecies across time and place have evoked human unity—such as Joachim de Fiore (whose "third age" anticipated human integration) and Johann Münster of the Anabaptists [16].

Under what circumstances do cultures flourish? In one view, cultural efflorescence requires or is more common in local, small-scale social units. Thus according to Aurobindo, "Collective life diffusing itself in too vast spaces seems to lose intensity and productiveness" [17]. Nevertheless, Aurobindo adhered to a general process of human unity[5]. According to a different and in recent times more common view, cultural efflorescence has usually been based on intercultural mingling and mixture. It has often arisen out of the encounter of different cultures or human groups, at the confluence of great rivers, in major cities or centres where routes of travel and trade converged. It has often involved expansive or high-minded visions of human unity. Examples in Asia include the Mongols and their ecumenical interests and the Mughal Empire encompassing (and being encompassed by) multiple cultures and geographies. In the Arab world what comes to mind is the work of Rumi, Ibn Khaldun, the efflorescence of al Andalus in Moorish times, and as part of its cultural radius, the troubadour culture in the Provence. Other familiar episodes are the Italian Renaissance, the Enlightenment and the Romantics.

What these episodes have in common is that they were moments of intercultural synthesis uniting diverse elements in joint cultural achievement. The descendants often claimed them as expressions of regional genius (thus establishing the virtue and claim to power of the descendants) while their mixed history as a composite of diverse regional currents and flows faded from memory, just as the flows themselves dried up or changed course over time. In this sense none of the achievements of the civilizational centres are regional achievements: they are interregional achievements that are incomprehensible without their crosscultural infrastructure. Human memory retains the façade but overlooks the back entrances.

Even so, with these episodes of intercultural synthesis and efflorescence have come visions acknowledging or celebrating them—as with Goethe (and his *West–Ostliche Divan*), Leibniz, Beethoven, Kant's cosmopolitanism, the Quakers. And elsewhere, the Nahda, the Indian Renaissance, the Harlem Renaissance have been great evocative moments, partly in protest against Western colonialism.

Usually these universalisms have also been *centrisms*—one could write a history of the changing geographies and characters of civilizational centrisms over time. Unity has not generally been a level playing field. Often it involved a hierarchy organized in concentric circles around a core of accomplishment (such as attainment measured by purity of blood or of faith), or along a ladder with the true believers or the accomplished on top, sliding down the rungs towards the outcasts at the bottom. Human unity and human hierarchy therefore have usually travelled together.

[5] [18] A militant advocacy of localism is Mander and Goldsmith [19].

China as the Middle Kingdom is an example. In the European sphere what comes to mind is the tripartite world of the Middle Ages (with the sons of Japheth, Sem and Ham representing the three continents), the Adoration of the Magi (each representing a different part of the world), the heavens and hells in Dante's Divine Comedy (as a concentric mapping of worlds spiritual and terrestrial), the Roman Catholic world image of the four rivers as represented in Bernini's fountains in Rome. These have been mandalas of unity and mandalas of power, both of inclusion and exclusion. They have inspired gestures of crosscultural translation, hybridization and unification as well as crusades, witch-hunts, genocides, holocausts—at times involving the *same* paradigms, depending on whether one emphasizes the unity or the hierarchy. Unity has often been the inner meaning or intent and hierarchy the outward form. With the Enlightenment has come another series of Eurocentric views. Hierarchy has also been conceived in terms of political and military power (as in the interstate balance of power and the hierarchy of superpowers, great powers, minor powers and no power) and economic achievement. Thus the current hierarchy also runs between advanced, developing and less developed countries.

Political movements have taken up the theme of human integration and translated it into projects of political and cultural internationalism—such as the Jacobins carrying the republican ideals from France to England, Ireland, the European continent and the Americas. The national movements carried this momentum further. The worker movements raised the banner of unity and struggle—'workers of the world unite!' The women's movements merged with the anti-slavery movements [20]. Cultural internationalism took off after 1914–18 [21]. The anti-colonial movements proclaimed the unity of all the oppressed, *The wretched of the earth* [22]. Indeed to a large extent the question whether time has brought us closer to human integration depends on how one interprets the history of conquest, slavery, colonialism and imperialism. I favour an interpretation that stresses the dialectics of these episodes: empire and emancipation have been interactive, an intricate historical interplay [23]. Culture contact is, in the end, a collusion and not simply a collision [24].

In a sense the double character of unity and hierarchy, or hierarchical integration, also applies to the work of Teilhard de Chardin. His notions of growing planetary demographic density and hence 'complexification' and movement towards a noosphere, point toward the ultimate unification of humanity, at point 'omega'. In the process, critics have argued, Teilhard has underestimated global inequality and stratification.[6] Taking a shortcut to human unity can have, so to speak, a hierarchical effect. Hence taking human integration seriously means taking inequality seriously.

4. Uneven globalization

A important account of contemporary globalization refers to the *exclusion* of the majority of humanity—the majority in large parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America

[6] This is discussed in the context of critical holism in Nederveen Pieterse [31].

who are excluded from life in the fast lane, from the 'interlinked economies' of the 'Triad zone'. But it may be argued that exclusion is too crude and blunt a term to describe the actual situation.

> The middle class in developing countries participates in the global circuits of advertising, brand name consumerism and high tech services, which, at another end of the circuitry, increasingly exclude the underclass in advanced economies… The term exclusion ignores the many ways in which developing countries are *included* in global processes: they are subject to global financial discipline (as in structural adjustment and interest payments, resulting in net capital outflows) and part of global markets (resource flows, distribution networks, diaspora and niche markets), global ecology, international politics, global communications, science and technology, international development cooperation, transnational civil society, international migration, travel, and crime networks. For instance, the public health sector in many African countries is increasingly being internationalised. Thus, it would be more accurate to speak of *asymmetrical inclusion* or hierarchical integration. A classic term for this situation used to be 'combined and uneven development', but now one of the differences is that the units are no longer nations [25].

Thus, people in the South are *within* the reach of global mass communications and advertising, within the reach of the message but not necessarily the action. This is how an Albanian émigré describes the impact of Italian TV on Albanians during the old days of seclusion:

> Step by step the entire advertising message is extracted from its (pragmatic) context… The ultimate result is that ads are viewed as windows to an upper reality. This is the reality where people, and things, and behaviors, and actions are light, colorful, beautiful. People are almost always good looking, clean, and well dressed; they all smile and enjoy everything they do, and get extremely happy, even when confronted with a new toothbrush.…The repeated contact with mirages of a reality *beyond* the wall, not only created a diffuse desire, but also kept it alive for a sufficiently long time, so that desire could loose its initial property of being a(n) … impulse for action, and become a *state of mind*, similar to profuse, disinterested love [26].

At the other end of the TV set, viewers experience 'long distance suffering' and engage in schizophrenic behaviour—limited or vague gestures of solidarity, while finding shelter in the 'chauvinism of prosperity' that is being sustained by institutions and media. Electoral politics in the advanced countries tends to set up barriers to exclude terrorists and welfare recipients [27] and often this extends to asylum seekers, refugees and 'illegal migrants'.

North–South inequality runs very deep, n'en déplaise globalization and the 'deterritorialization of poverty' (i.e. the rich in the South and the poor in the North). It relates profoundly to world images and perceptions of globalization that are held also among the middle class in the South [28]. The poor majority and the middle

class in the South share national and regional destinies, suffer superpower geopolitics and geo-economics, Western double standards, and domestic political incompetence. Do development policies stand a chance in relation to the vast global differentials of power, technology and production? Whither the North–South gap is too large a question to take up here, but I should make at least these points. One is the issue of the globalization of risk—political, security, and economic and ecological risk. Second, besides the globalization of risk global inequality also involves a profound moral challenge [29]. Aurobindo, Habermas, Hans Küng and others have formulated universal planetary ethics [30]. Third, global poverty alleviation and eradication ultimately involves a politics of global reform, a politics of global equity and global inclusion, which can take many forms.[7] I now turn to migration in relation to globalization and human integration.

5. We are all migrants: migration and human integration

Taking a historical point of view, globalization and migration are twin subjects. The earliest migrations on record (around the area of Harappa) go back two million years. In a historical sense we are all migrants because our ancestors have all travelled to the places where we have come from. States that impose border controls may go way back in time, but their spread is a recent phenomenon (nineteenth century) and their covering the globe is more recent still. Few of our ancestors have lived under these dispensations. These are not merely 'academic' considerations. In a profound way our perspective on history shapes our perspective on migration. Presently the taken-for-granted way of looking at migration is from the point of view of the nation state. This implies a narrow take on migration, which in a growing body of literature is viewed in terms of political rights and constraints (citizenship, human rights), from a cultural point of view (identity, multiculturalism), or in a cost–benefit analysis from the point of view of the nation.

This reflection explores two considerations. The first is to bracket the conventional perspective on migration that takes the nation state as its point of departure, while the nation state is only a recent formation. A further consideration, mentioned above, is whether or not cultures flourish as a consequence of cultural mixing. This leads to familiar discussions of multiculturalism and associated moral, ideological and cultural preferences and questions of citizenship. The point here is not to rehearse the pros and cons of multiculturalism, which is well-trodden ground, but to explore the socio-economics of migration. This is only a limited treatment of a large terrain, a contribution to the discussion.

5.1. Migration and the nation state

Economic achievements are conventionally attributed to nations, reflecting nation-state predilections in politics and social science since the nineteenth century. The

[7] This is addressed in [31,32].

contributions of foreigners, migrants, diasporas, minorities have been generally ignored. They have been ignored in a fundamental sense because acknowledging them would go against the Zeitgeist, the nationalist ethos. If the period 1840–1960 has been the age of the nation, its peak time, it has been the age of oblivion of the migrant, the foreigner. In country after country the dark side of nation building has been the marginalization, expulsion, expropriation of foreigners—i.e. politics of national cleansing. Turkey (Armenians and others), Germany (Jews), Uganda (Indians), Nigeria (Ghanaians), Bulgaria (ethnic Turks) are familiar cases in point [33], but they are only the tip of the iceberg.

In the past decades the nation state pathos has been receding and in its stead have come globalization, regionalization and an 'age of ethnicity'. In some respects at least the nation state angle is not being taken for granted as before and now different sensibilities and problems emerge. Now when history, economic and otherwise, is revisited, a different picture emerges. New strands in economic analysis break with the conventions of nationalist historiography and credit the role of diasporas, minorities and ethnic groups [34]. In this view many of the achievements routinely claimed by the nations have to a significant extent been the work of travellers—traders, migrants, slaves, pilgrims, missionaries. Thus, the world of the nations has all along been interspersed with a world of diasporas. Some of these have been recognized—such as the Jewish, Chinese and Italian diasporas, also the African diaspora has been conspicuous; but many have been largely ignored except in local histories—such as the Greek, Armenian, Lebanese, Turkish, Egyptian, Indian, Malay, Mongol, Tibetan, Irish, Scottish etc. diasporas. Some run so deep in time that the names used to identify them—derived from nation states or civilizational areas—are not adequate. Some of the terms used in standard national historiography—such as 'Anglo-Saxon'—obviously refer to earlier migrations. In effect most 'national' identities are hyphenated identities, combinations of peoples that have been conventionally amalgamated under a political heading (such as Celts, Franks and others in 'France'). 'African' and 'Indian' migrations are obviously only approximations. The entities 'China', 'India' and 'Africa' did not exist until they were so named by Europeans. It has more often been regions (the Genoese), groups within regions (Ismailis from Gujarat, Parsis from Bombay), or ethnicities within nations that have been engaging in crosscultural chain migration.

A novel approach in economic research—partly inspired by the Unesco World Decade for Culture and Development—views intercultural contact as an engine of economic growth [35]. Intercultural contact in this view has been responsible for the diffusion of technologies and knowledges, and the invention of new technologies, inventions and forms of social and economic cooperation. This is why trade routes form an important strand in historiography as nodes and radiation points of economic activity and also as a backbone of cultural transformation (as in the work of Fernand Braudel). This applies to the past and the present.

This means something radically different from considering migration as an added value or cost to the nation. It goes beyond the preoccupation with ethnic economies, ethno-marketing or intercultural management. Rather, we come to see nation states as a *grid* that has been temporarily superimposed upon a deeper stratum of human

migrations and diasporas. We could then ask the reverse question: how useful is the nation state structure (national economies, national sovereignty, border controls) to migration, considering that migration is a major site of cultural creativity and economic stimulus? Presently the nation state grid as the central and preferred organizational form is gradually making place for a combination of different organizational structures and forms of governance—local urban, regional, international and supranational—such that institutional structures are increasingly becoming multi-scalar. If we recognize the profound role of migration and intercultural contact in general and in economic history, what does this imply for current policies? It adds a different dimension to multiculturalism, as a vital economic force, which is not unimportant in an era dominated by market values.

5.2. Migration and development

A key question to ask is not merely whether immigration is culturally desirable, morally preferable or politically acceptable, but whether and how it contributes to economic development. Is cultural mixing good for business? Probably the question is too wide, too general. It may not be really feasible to separate economic from other dimensions of migration; but since so many discussions follow different tracks, this option is followed here.

According to Thomas Sowell, migration and cultural diffusion are now separable: "the transportation of bodies and the dissemination of human capital have become increasingly separable operations, so that the historic role of immigration in advancing nations need not apply to its future role" (p. 299) [36]. "In short, international migrations have tended to become a less and less effective way of transferring human capital, at least as compared to alternatives that have emerged or grown in importance" [37]. This is part of a wider argument against cultural relativism, affirmative action and multiculturalism. Sowell concludes his study with an emphasis on the *creation of wealth* (and an implicit polemic with the emphasis on the distribution of wealth). There are several problems with this analysis. First it overlooks the capacity of migration to generate its own economic niches and resources. Secondly, by focusing on *human capital* it follows the liberal fallacy of viewing economics as an exchange among individuals, differentially endowed with skills and resources; thus it takes human capital as part of a liberal paradigm. In recent years this angle has been overtaken by the theme of *social capital*. Here the general perspective is that markets are socially embedded (à la Polanyi), economics is institutional and what matters to make economies tick is not just individual skills and endowments (human capital) but social relations and networks. Empirical research shows that "embeddedness increases economic effectiveness along a number of dimensions that are crucial to competitiveness in a global economy—organizational learning, risk-sharing and speed-to-market" [38].

Much interest in social capital has concentrated on ethnic economies: social capital in the form of trust lowers transaction costs within ethnic groups; within ethnic

groups social capital densities are highest and the pay offs greatest.[8] Jewish diamond traders in Antwerp are a classic example. Social capital also marshals economic resources: the Korean *hoa* releasing family labour and capital for small enterprises in the United States are an example [40] (cf. [41]).

While the ethnic economy argument demonstrates the role of social capital in wealth creation it is confined to interactions *within* ethnic communities and this involves some limitations. One is the reification of ethnicity: the salience and boundaries of ethnicity should not be taken for granted; its actual boundaries and practices are fluid.[9] The 'ethnic economy' in effect confirms ethnic boundaries, attributing greater solidity to them than may be justified. More important, it involves an inward-looking take on ethnicity and on social capital—while inward-looking ethnicity is but one modality of ethnicity [10] and what matters is not merely in-group social capital but also *intergroup* social capital. In-group social capital matches a conservative approach to social capital, as path dependence on the part of given social formations. It matches a static take on multiculturalism as an archipelago of separate communities, a mosaic of fixed pieces, like a series of ghettos or apartheid multiplied. This take on multiculturalism that parallels the old 'plural society' argument has often been criticized. Social capital in this sense would match a conservative approach, an economics of apartheid revisited. More fruitful is to view multiculturalism as intercultural interplay and mingling, an open terrain of criss-crossing cultural flows, in the process generating new combinations and options;[11] this applies politically, culturally and economically: in relation to interest coalitions, life style choices and economic opportunities. Along these lines there are several ways further—'immigrant economies', transnational diaspora enterprise, and general perspectives on cultural difference and development.

Further research on ethnic enterprise has yielded the concept of the *immigrant economy*. "Unlike ethnic economies, in which co-ethnics hire co-ethnics, immigrant economies arise when immigrants hire non-co-ethnic fellow immigrants" [45]. This case study of the Los Angeles garment industry notes that "only a third of immigrant employees found their jobs in a conventional ethnic economy" and instead draws attention to Asian entrepreneurs employing Latino workers. Immigrant economies are often part of crossborder migrant networks or transnational diasporas.

This principle of *economic relations across cultural difference* can of course be extended—beyond employment and production, to trade and retail, markets and investment; and beyond immigrants, to natives or nationals on the one hand and overseas linkages on the other. Since cultural differences often overlap with socioeconomic differences (the familiar race/class/gender patterns) in many contexts economic relations *across* culture/class differences are in fact as common as are economic relations within culturally homogeneous settings. Thus, in Latin America this involves relations between urban criollos and Ladinos and Indios; in Africa, between

[8] On the ethnic economy, see Light and Karageorgis [39].
[9] Cf. Shahanan [42].
[10] Cf. Nederveen Pieterse [43].
[11] Cf. Hannerz [44].

urban entrepreneurs and rural workers or suppliers, often belonging to different ethnicities; in North America, migrant labour and the Maquiladores, etc. These relations are so numerous and sprawling that they obviously involve many different types of relations across a wide continuum from exploitative to cooperative and synergistic relations. The profound historical significance and ramifications of such networks is well known, as shown in studies of Asian entrepreneurial minorities and their role in the making of the world economy [46] and other diasporas [47]. Stereotypes of the foreign entrepreneur or trading minority (such as the Chinese in Southeast Asia, Indians in East Africa and Southeast Asia, Lebanese and Hausa in West Africa, whites in South Africa) exploiting local labour may easily conceal the actual array and complexity of crosscultural social capital. Thus we should not merely consider segmented societies but also their in-between spaces and adjacent borderzones. We would need a typology of different types of crosscultural economic relations and the finer the maze of analytic categories, the greater the yield.

One of the obvious paradoxes of contemporary globalization is the free movement of capital and the restricted movement of people and labour.[12] This in itself creates an economic opportunity structure. Diasporas and transnational communities use the differentials created by political boundaries in a host of different ways, from grassroots transnational enterprises [50,51] to criminal organizations [52]. To address the paradoxes of globalization would involve far-reaching policy interventions such as global reform and global social policy [53]. Presently uneven development (such as differential wage rates, labour conditions and ecological standards) serves also as a major economic opportunity structure of differential market niches. Accordingly, the coalition in favour of major changes that would address development problems at the source—in the order of a global Marshall Plan, if that could be implemented at all—is too narrow.

5.3. Migration in Europe

In countries that have newly become immigration countries labour markets tend to be closed and there are institutional impediments in the way of integrating migrant labour. At the same time these countries have experienced ‘new migrations’ involving among others higher skilled labour. The Old World is becoming a New World for many but with old institutions. The dilemma for the left is either to protect or open the welfare state. The dilemma for migrants is to go legal and follow the official route and get deskilled and become dependent in the process; or to become active in enterprise in the black economy and risk becoming illegal. What is to be done? The options for the ‘Old World’ countries are either to lower or remove institutional impediments on labour markets and enterprise, or to accept hierarchical integration in the form of segmented labour markets to the disadvantage of migrants. The former may entail dismantling the welfare state to its residual form, as in the ‘New World’

[12] See Castles [48]. Only few are consistent in that they favour free trade as well as open immigration policies. A rare example is Bhagwati [49].

model of free enterprise, which also entails ghettos and social gaps. This implies a scenario of 'Californianization' while California is being 'Brazilianized'. Keynesianism is not likely to be revived on a national basis and regional EU-wide social settlements are slow in the making. Is the alternative to reduce institutional impediments and go American? Part of the American way is individualism, ghettos and crime.

To sum up, I have argued that globalization involves human integration, but that this is a long-term, uneven and paradoxical process. In the global human condition, widening social cooperation and deepening inequality go together. The global equation is complex and there are no easy shortcuts; yet there are several pointers towards constructive analytics and politics. Key arguments that add to the equation include the following: (1) the relativization of the nation state framework—the nation state format is making place for a wider variety of governance arrangements; (2) intercultural relations have been crucial to 'national accumulation' all along, though often their contribution has not been recognized; (3) in the era of regionalization, crossborder intercultural relations build social and institutional tissue that is vital to present and future economic performance—a case in point are Euro–Arab relations; (4) ethnic economies may interweave economic regions spatially (as in the case of the Chinese diaspora in the Pacific Basin); (5) interethnic economies weave institutional links across segmented social formations.

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