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Europe, Traveling Light: Europeanization and Globalization

∞ JAN NEDERVEEN PIETERSE ∞

ABSTRACT

Europeanization is part of globalization and in this context the European Union is propelled by wider forces of technological, economic, financial and political change. Cultural identity is discussed against this backdrop. If presently there is a surfeit of national and ethnic identity talk, evoked from parochial perspectives, there is a deficit of European identity and reflexivity in terms of politics, political economy and the social capitalism which Rhineland Europe used to represent. An open, casual definition of European identity may be appropriate on historical grounds, in view of the multicultural antecedents of European cultures; on theoretical grounds, considering that culture is open-ended; on political grounds, in view of postnationalist definitions of citizenship. It may be welcome medicine for Eurochauvinism. It may also be pragmatic in relation to ongoing technological and economic changes. With a view to narrowing the split between disciplines and sensibilities it would be important to integrate cultural, political and economic analyses and to arrive at a forward-looking combination of agendas.

INTRODUCTION

According to conventional wisdom, globalization is market driven while regionalization is a public sector affair, but clearly these neat divisions do not hold. A more appropriate understanding is that regionalization (in the sense of macro-regionalism) is the current *form* of globalization, in the same broad sense in which nation state formation was the form of globalization from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. Broadly, then, European unification is part of globalization.

Major approaches to globalization are *globalization as modernization*, centred on neoclassical economics of growth along with Schumpeterian innovation; *globalization as liberalization*, or a neoliberal view centred on free trade and deregulation; and the social exclusion approach which focuses on social questions. These approaches are wide apart in terms of principles as well as policies. There is actually little point in deregulation without innovation, or in innovation and deregulation without social investments. None of these can stand alone. Yet on the whole neither European national governments nor the European Union have found a working combination and balance among these angles, witness the lingering stalemate on employment policies. Short of such a combination and synthe-



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sis the EU is unbalanced. There is no connection between the monetarist leanings of the European Monetary Union (which follows global monetarism) and questions of employment, welfare, and environmental sustainability. Each government participating in the EMU is walking a tightrope. The EU is divided in foreign policy, unbalanced in socio-economic policies, and selectively opening up to Eastern Europe and the southern Mediterranean, while hardening its borders to immigration.

The context of this reflection is an inquiry into questions of otherness and identity. In these times, what are appropriate ways to talk about European culture and identity? Or, is it appropriate to talk about European culture at all? What, in the present context of Europeanization, is the status and purchase of questions of cultural identity? What is the role of cultural analysis? If Europeanization is part of the momentum of accelerated globalization, to what extent is the EU in the driver's seat, to what extent is it driven? Arguably it is driven, primarily (and not only) by the same dynamics that propel corporations towards cooperation with other firms and world-wide competition for market share. By the same token, to the extent that it is not in the driver's seat, the EU is travelling light. 'Europeanness' does not necessarily count for much in this process, except as a politically enabling setting. There probably is an upside to this—the old world is renewing itself, and a downside—who knows where it is headed? Questions to consider to get a perspective on the situation include: the relationship between Europeanization and the dynamics of globalization, differences within Europe, and the present role of social democracy. Against this background, we can turn to questions of cultural identity, and consider 'other Europes' and the desirability of an open Europe.

Over time the imaginary of Europe has been undergoing drastic changes. In the nineteenth century Europe was represented as the heartland of civilization, progress and power. Europe, the citadel of the Great Powers, lorded over the world, as in the Berlin Congress carving up Africa. *The Götterdämmerung* of the turn of the century initiated the slide toward *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*. During two major wars 'the lights went out all over Europe' and hegemony shifted across the Atlantic. Through the Cold War, Europe was a space in-between and under the shadow of the superpowers. Questions of geopolitical and ideological allegiance dominated general discourse. In the 1980s Europe recovered dynamism en route to the New Europe of 1992. 1992 came and went and the EU remains divided in the process of integration.

Over the years the vicissitudes of building the single market have been a constant theme but otherwise there have been marked shifts in general Europe discourse from security to immigration to globalization. The security discourse predominated through the 1970s and early 1980s, focused on the East-West axis, Atlanticism, and peace and jobs.¹ The concern with immigration is associated with the increasing immigration flows to Europe as a consequence of economic stagnation or decline and political instability, in combination with population growth, in parts of the South, at a time when Europe is experiencing structural unemployment. Now for some time globalization has been high on the agenda.

EUROPEANIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION

Europeanization is part of a global reordering. In the words of Robert Cox: 'Three macro-regions are defining themselves respectively in a Europe centred on the EC, an East Asian sphere centred on Japan, and a North American sphere centred on the United States

and looking to embrace Latin America. The macro-regions are political-economic frameworks for capital accumulation and for organising inter-regional competition for investment and shares of the world market.² This notion is familiar enough, only the point on *inter-regional competition* is a little narrow. Inter-regional competition is only one dimension of contemporary regionalism. Inter-regional *cooperation* is as much in evidence, as in Trilateralism since the seventies and Ohmae's 'Interlinked Economies'. The Group of Lisbon mentions intensifying inter-regional rivalry as one scenario among several.³ Clearly it is mitigated by the trend toward seeking global market shares and interfirm cooperation across regional boundaries. It is a matter of analysis to examine to what extent and in which areas regional differences matter.

Certainly, in the words of Cox, 'Macro-regionalism is one facet of globalisation.' This is part of a historical trend. Historically there has been a relationship between the nature and scale of economic activity and the units of political organization. The EU process is reminiscent of earlier epochs of state formation. In the seventeenth century Westphalia system state territory was conceived as *sovereign* within controlled borders, the state regulating within and protecting without. With the onset of mercantilism the domain of the state became a closed *economic* space. The nation state set the stage for the development of the *national market* at a time when increase in market size was a requirement for economic modernization and industrialization. At the time when the family firm was the dominant form of enterprise and the national economy the most strategic arena the *nation state* became the dominant format of political organization. The 'new imperialism' of the late nineteenth century correlated with international sourcing and markets at a time when the leading form of enterprise was the large corporation. So all along there have been broad correlations between the units of political organization and modes of capital accumulation.

Early European unification, of the Benelux and the Treaty of Rome, belongs to an earlier phase of globalization. Europeanization since the 1980s unfolds in the epoch of *accelerated globalization* with transnational corporations as market leaders, which is now increasingly moving towards flexible accumulation and innovation-driven industrialization. Even so this is not simply a matter of economic determination. Throughout the process of Europeanization political considerations have interacted with economic parameters. European integration was founded on economic modernization but at every step along the way political considerations have been inseparably woven in. Unification has been driven by political federalist motives and by large corporate interests: at different times one or other set of motives predominated but they always interacted.⁴

Globalization/modernization

Globalization does not come alone but in a package. This interactive set of processes includes *informatization* in technology, *flexibilization* in production, consumption and labour markets, and as regards political reorganization *refiguration* of the state and *regionalization*. The current wave of accelerated globalization is driven by technological and economic changes. The development of new information technologies, microelectronics based computer and telecommunications technologies since the early eighties provides the technical means for financial globalization; it provides global product information and hence the globalization of demand, which in turn correlates with the globalization of sup-

ply. The shortening life cycle of products leads to pressure to expand market shares to amortize growing R&D cost: hence the trend towards global marketing, global advertising, global brand names. Hence also the globalization of competition and changing dynamics of global interfirm competition, in the form of inter-corporate tie ups, networking, mergers and acquisitions to handle the cost and risks of R&D and global marketing. Thus, globalization refers not simply to the growth of international trade and the role of TNCs, but to a new system of industrial organization which is variously termed flexible system production, post-Fordism, lean manufacturing, just-in-time capitalism, etc. These have altered the principles of scale and location of production. Globalization is a macro-economic phenomenon carried by micro-economic forces, i.e. on the level of firms.

Postwar technological changes have increased the mobility of capital and the ability to disaggregate production and seek lower cost production in low-wage countries in the South, while the mobility of labour and government jurisdiction remain stationary. In the 1970s this trend was referred to as the New International Division of Labour. The current trend of flexible accumulation partly deviates from this pattern: in several sectors production is again becoming more localized, as economies of market scope become more important than economies of production scale. Flexible production to meet changing consumer demand requires proximity to customers and competitors and close cooperation with subcontracting firms, and this diminishes capital mobility.⁵ The just-in-time inventory system, in which suppliers deliver direct to production lines (rather than to warehouses) hours before components are installed in the final product, requires close synergistic relations between assembling and supplier firms. Hence physical proximity becomes crucial, as against the NIDL logic of the geographical spread of components manufacturing to exploit low cost labour in offshore production sites. This implies a trend toward the regional re-integration of physical production; not sourcing globally, but locally or regionally.

Accordingly, rather than seeking cheap labour overseas other options become relevant: either importing low wage labour by lifting immigration restrictions, or widening the net to *incorporate* low wage zones. NAFTA, APEC and ASEAN are examples of the latter strategy⁶ and current EU policies seem to be oriented in the same direction. At least that would be one interpretation of the Barcelona Process.

In the 1980s classified documents referred to the southern Mediterranean as NATO's new 'southern flank'. The context was a new enemy image of 'Islamic fundamentalism', state-sponsored terrorism and assorted 'madmen' such as Khomeiny, Khadaffi and Saddam Hussein. EEC policies were conducted with one ear in Washington and backs turned to the South. Since then there has been a turn-around if not in imagery, at least in some respects of EU policy. As part of the Barcelona Process the EU has been making gestures of neighbourliness vis à vis the southern Mediterranean.⁷ Billions of ecu are being made available for development of the region. Turkey has joined the EU in a customs union. Initiatives such as MedCampus sponsor Middle Eastern-European academic cooperation. Countless projects and conferences promote or ponder the development of civil society in the Middle East and dialogue with Islam and the Arab world. What has been responsible for this turnaround and what are its ramifications?

All along the Mediterranean, EU countries advocated closer cross-Mediterranean cooperation on the grounds of geographical proximity, cultural continuities and economic opportunities. One of the reasons for the creation of the Arab Maghreb Union was to es-

establish a framework for collective bargaining with the EU, also at the instigation of Mediterranean European countries.⁸ On the part of the EU, a related consideration is a politics of prudence, also motivated by the dialectics of closure. Migration pressures are best mitigated by promoting development at the source. Pauperization and political unrest among neighbours, as in Algeria and Egypt, do not make for a felicitous ambience in Europe's backyard. Contributing to the development of the suburbs of Fortress Europe is a matter of common sense. Generally contemporary globality does not sit well with steep uneven development. Particularly if one takes into account options such as an 'Islamic bomb'. Probably still more important is the concern with enlarging the potential economic space of the EU. In the words of Jacques Attali: 'Remember: in twenty years time there will be two billion Chinese and one and a half billion Americans, north and south—but still only three hundred million Europeans, if we do not expand the Union. We have no choice: widen eastwards and possibly even southwards. If Europe can do with Africa and the Maghreb what the U.S. is now doing with South America, then the configuration of the twenty-first century will have been established.'⁹ This kind of ambition for a 'Greater Europe' defines its space but not its character.

Neoliberal Globalization

Another, parallel but distinct, dimension of globalization is the trend toward deregulation and liberalization. Since time immemorial free trade has been the argument of the strong, a politics of hegemony.¹⁰ The logic of monetarism plays into this. The internationalization of financial markets is a consequence of telecommunications technologies, as in twenty-four-hour electronic trading, the deregulation of banking, particularly in the United States, and the securitization of firms. The advent of the European Monetary Union means that 'sound money' or bankers' orthodoxy is setting the standards for economic convergence. In effect this means that structural reform is becoming the European standard. The EMU means the structural adjustment of Europe. It means finance capital setting the agenda for Europe, just as has been happening on a world scale by the IMF and World Bank. Rather than challenging neoliberal hegemony, the EU is de facto joining the Washington consensus.

Macro-regionalisms

Among the macro-regionalisms there are considerable differences.¹¹ NAFTA is much more market-driven than either European or Asian forms of regionalization which both involve state-managed modes of development and higher levels of state/capital cooperation. The various forms of cooperation in the Pacific Basin are centred on free trade with minimum institutionalization. European cooperation is the deepest form of regional integration which includes environmental standards and social policies regulating industrial relations, which are lacking in NAFTA and the Pacific groupings.¹²

Arguably, on the basis of hundreds of years of social cooperation, strong feudalisms and developed urban merchant cultures, and on the basis of 'Rhineland capitalism', continental Europe and Scandinavia represent a standard of *social capitalism* which might serve as the foundation of regional cooperation. Several factors, however, delimit this momen-

tum: globalization and its uncertainties, inter-regional competition, and internal differences within the European project. Besides at a time when social democracy is on the retreat within nations, can it serve as a beacon at the regional level?

Differences within the European Project

Europeanization involves an uneasy marriage of different forms of capitalism. Michel Albert contrasts 'Rhineland capitalism' and its consensus politics fashioned through coalitions of Christian and social democrats, to the free enterprise orientation of British and American 'Anglo-Saxon capitalism' ('Anglo-American' is a more appropriate term).¹³ The difference stems in part from historical patterns. Britain has long been a market-led, strong civil society with a minimal state while on the continent the French model of state-led development has predominated.¹⁴ The Scandinavian countries are variations on the Rhineland model of social, cooperative capitalism. East European countries, with Poland and Hungary in the lead, are adopting free enterprise capitalism at considerable social cost.¹⁵

Besides different political trajectories this involves institutional and cultural differences which affect the position of labour movements and social democratic parties in the different countries. That French socialists have been in the forefront of building a social democratic Europe reflects the general French idea of a progressive role of the state and, more generally, of an intelligent regulating authority. In the words of Julia Kristeva: 'In Europe we have a conception of the political that includes an educative role; it isn't so robotized as in the United States.'¹⁶ Jacques Delors' Europe is premised on the general idea of the state as educator, the state ahead of society.¹⁷ Schuman and Adenauer's Christian Democrat project of Europe was paralleled by a social democratic perspective. As early as 1951, Mitterand argued that democratic socialism could not be built 'in one country': Modern socialism, yes; liberal politics, yes. But nothing of all that will be worthwhile, comrades, without Europe. No achievement is possible within our country's territory and we would fail in our task if we tried to build a [limited] French socialism. There is no longer for us any possibility of technological modernization within our national frontiers.¹⁸ It is only fairly recently that English social democrats have begun to take the project of a progressive Europe seriously. 'New Labour' opts for a thin rather than a capacious state and likewise for a lean European governance structure.

The Crisis of Social Democracy

The present crisis of social democracy and the welfare state has several antecedents. The breakdown of the postwar social democratic consensus correlates with the refiguration of ideological discourse. Moments in this gradual process include the failure of social democratic parties and institutions to respond to the new politics of the 1960s and the structural weakness of labour in the context of economic restructuring. Social democracy has been inward looking, premised on the national economy and social partnership enclosed within the framework of the nation state. Because it has been societally inward looking it proved incapable of responding to global trends, including globalization itself, the global liberalization involved in the restructuring of the world economy, the new

international division of labour and the deregulation of global financial markets from 1973.¹⁹ State dirigisme could not respond to the crisis of Fordism and the emergence of neo-Fordism, and this precipitated the rise of the New Right in the 1970s and 1980s. What is now being added to this is the onset of flexible accumulation.

A further dimension is the restructuring of nation states in the epoch of accelerated globalization. States internationalize by pooling sovereignty and participating in international institutions and arrangements, while state functions are eroding due to deregulation and privatization. The restructuring of nation states takes specific forms in different countries: in Britain it has been associated with the process of imperial decline, in France with the erosion of statist institutions, in Belgium with uneven development and federalization, while in Italy the end of the cold war has brought an end to the anti-communist pacts. States are becoming competitor states vying with one another for inward investment.²⁰

Social democracy is a *national social contract* which has been intrinsically exclusionary and inward looking. The national crises provoked by immigration reflect the closed character of social democracy. Welfare states are in crisis because of the restructuring of production and the flexibilization of production and labour markets, because in the vortex of globalization states become competitor states, and because of the dilemmas of immigration. Generally speaking there may be three options for the reconstruction of social democracy:

NATIONAL SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

It is unlikely that social democracy can be rebuilt on a national basis, and questionable whether it would be desirable to do so for part of the price would be welfare chauvinism and racism. Another side of the equation is the logic of innovation-driven industrialization. Flexible specialization involves fewer layers of management and investment in multi-skilled/tasked work force: increase investment in modern infrastructure, education, human resource development. Social development comes back on the agenda, this time not as a Keynesian demand management principle but as a supply-side argument. Investments in education, health care, and housing have come back on the agenda as investments in productivity, along with building information infrastructure and institutional innovation. Only because of the short term needs for inward investment and thus competition, this agenda cannot be adopted by nation states alone, lest they invite social dumping.

REGIONAL SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

Social democracy could be rebuilt on a regional basis. But there are fundamental obstacles on the way. First, the main institutions and constituencies of social democracy parties, trade unions have been national organizations and their transnational horizon has been limited. More important, when national welfare pacts are eroding under the pressures of globalization, is welfare regionalism a viable option? It could be on the basis of an economic philosophy and strategy that accepts the economic advantages of *social capitalism*. There are enough pointers in this direction, such as new institutional economics, associative economics, and economic strategies centred on social and cultural capital. At the present juncture, however, they do not carry enough weight to form a coalition of interests strong enough to outflank the uncertainties associated with globalization, innovation and the hegemony of finance capital. Firms have so many other concerns—innovation,

informatization, technological change, market share—that their preference lies with flexibilization of the labour market, even as they benefit from and depend on government investment in social capital, human development and infrastructure. Another major consideration is competitiveness across regions. Social capitalism in one region could be outmanoeuvred by other regions. In other words, the main option for social capitalism is if it were implemented on a global scale, which brings us to the next option.

GLOBAL SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

The opportunities for transnational social policy,²¹ global Keynesianism²² and the democratization of global governance are as yet limited.

There is scope for a forward looking social agenda in Europe and beyond on the basis of a social partnership between government agencies, civic associations and firms. This can take the form of a broad conception of social development, not simply on political or normative grounds, but as an economic approach that is in line with technological innovation. Only the present political and institutional circumstances offer little room for this kind of agenda except on a local level.

CULTURAL IDENTITY?

Is there a completely new ‘today’ of Europe beyond all the exhausted programs of *Eurocentrism* and *anti-Eurocentrism*, these exhausting yet unforgettable programs? *We today* no longer want either Eurocentrism or anti-Eurocentrism. Beyond these all too well-known programs, for what ‘cultural identity’ must we be responsible? And responsible before whom? Before what memory? For what promise? And is ‘cultural identity’ a good word for ‘today’?²³

What is striking is the prominence of *culture* in many debates. Cultural identity, national culture, regional culture, ethnic culture, popular culture, cultural tastes, cultural politics, cultural studies surely this is the age of cultural surfeit. Earlier racism was recast from a biological argument to a discourse of cultural difference (new racism). The present trend correlates with the worldwide rise of politics of identity and difference since the 1980s. The culture of difference prevails, right and left, possibly because of the absence of a hegemony which serves as the centre and structure of a universalism.

That arenas are defined and debates conducted in terms of culture may be read also in terms of an absence: debates are *not* primarily conducted in terms of ideology or political economy. Or, more precisely, they are rearticulated along lines of cultural cleavage. This is associated with an overall change in the discursive field—the waning of the great ideologies and a cultural turn in everyday politics. The retreat—or, at minimum, refiguration—of the great ideologies has been taking place not just in the wake of the end of the cold war but gradually, reflecting a deeper crisis of modernity and the advent of the postmodern. These reorientations are correlated with structural changes such as globalization, the changing composition of the labour force, the shift in role emphasis from producers to consumers, not least cultural consumers, and the prominence of cultural industries. The cultural turn could open up a wider communicative space *if* culture talk is a synthesis that comprises politics and political economy in an inclusive understanding. What is happening more often is that culture becomes a generalized signifier for everything from nostal-

gic and unworldly culturalism to politically astute uses without distinction; it thus becomes a signifier of political displacement.

The two extreme positions with regard to the role of culture in social analysis are *culturalism* or 'culture leads', and *economism* or other forms of determinism, or 'culture follows'. Both are too simplistic to generate interesting analytics. What is interesting is the intermediate sphere of the relative autonomy of culture, in which culture both points the way, as the sphere of common sense in the making, and follows, in being embedded in political and economic structures and processes. The Gramscian notion of hegemony comes close to this. Broadly, contemporary national identity and European culture discourses are instances of 'culture follows'—follows welfare chauvinism and European unification, overdetermined by structural pressures. Is there scope for cultural identity and agency to play a part, without falling into the trap of culturalist idealism? This would involve a critical sense of culture itself as well as an open sense of identity.

Cultural identity is often evoked in essentially conservative terms. However, in the words of Derrida, 'What is proper to a culture is not to be identical to itself.'²⁴ Taking this cue it would follow that 'cultural identity' is a contradiction in terms. Culture, understood as all learned and shared behaviour and ideas, refers to a learning process which by definition is open-ended. Culture, then, is outward looking, a 'travelling' concept that cannot be spatially contained. More precisely, culture is a composite notion that refers to different layers and dimensions. Culture is not only learning, it is also knowing, i.e. an existing common sense that parallels social relations. This is the distinction between '*culture*' (knowing and learning) and '*a culture*' (knowing). Obviously the two interact in that knowing informs learning.

EUROPEAN CULTURE BABBLE²⁵

'Europe plays with identity. When necessary it can arouse identity.'²⁶ This is typically an outsider (American) perspective. This 'Europe' does not exist. On the other hand, in the flurry of Euro babble that comes with Europeanization certain imaginaries of Europe are being evoked. A limitation of most cultural identity talk about Europe is that it refers to Europe only in a particular mode and only to a particular kind of Europe—primarily northwestern Europe, the cultural heartland and also the political centre of gravity of the European Union. We might call this 'Europe's Europe', the textbook Europe of 'European Civilization' that corresponds to the picture postcard images held by Europeans and non-Europeans about Europe.

Euro-chauvinism, expressly focused on Europe, is presently weak and latent. In part it echoes the essentialist Europe talk of prewar times with its abundant Euronarcissism and racist overtones the continental ideology of the European Idea.²⁷ It differs from national identity discourse in that it typically harps upon culture and civilization, and the virtues of cultural variety—read: the different nationalisms that make up European identity: 'it searches for the things that reconcile and overcome national differences, and these are found in culture and civilization. . . . While Euro-nationalism strongly emphasizes culture, and High Culture in particular, conventional nationalist historiography focuses much more on battles, war heroes and accompanying virtues.'²⁸

Another line of thought is that what defines Europe is *modernity*. According to Agnes

Heller, 'Modernity, the creation of Europe, itself created Europe'.²⁹ But presently, in the age of polycentrism, European modernity is but a modernity among others. A group of female Japanese art history students visiting Europe for the first time and arriving in Amsterdam as their first stop, gave as their first impression that 'Amsterdam does not look modern'. They might as well have said that Europe is not western and that urban Japan is now more modern—more high-tech, more consumerist—than most of the West. Modernity and the Enlightenment served as a hegemonic discourse and so did the cold war, but neither continue to fulfil this role.

Anti-Americanism is another component of European identity and a sentiment that is often shared across the European political spectrum. Juan Goytisolo scathingly observes: 'For today's cultural programmers, to be in harmony with the values, criteria and fashions reaching us from North America is the most convenient, productive way of feeling European'.³⁰ Anti-Americanism is part of the cultural élite sentiment of the 'Athena complex' in which Europe plays 'Athena' to the United States as 'Rome'.³¹ Be that as it may, from the point of view of the South, Rome and Athena are both imperial centres and the United States and Europe together make up 'the West'. In the history of modern colonialism and imperialism both are equally implicated, united by a joint 'Columbus complex'. Thus, Samir Amin's discussion of Eurocentrism encompasses the United States.³² The notion of European identity separate from the United States is from the point of view of the South largely academic. It is academic also if we consider the recent and ongoing history of military intervention, from the Persian Gulf to Bosnia and back and forth.

The new Europe need not be viewed as another installment of European hegemony if we consider that 'The concept of European unity did not become politically important until Europe's position in the world was no longer one of dominance'.³³ This is the non-aggressive aspect of the new Europe. On the other hand, the exclusionary dimension of the new Europe—implicit in the very theme of Europe and explicit in relation to Europe's boundaries and border controls—involves symbolic violence against non-Europeans from the South as well as other forms of harassment, witness the ever rising visa requirements for entry into EU member countries. What is Europeanness then, is it an exclusive or an inclusive identity? How does one answer the question of Abdelwahab Meddeb: 'Peut-on être Arabe et Européen?'³⁴

OTHER EUROPEES

Most imaginaries focus on Europe's north-western heartland and neglect the Europe of the borderzones. Europe borders on North Africa and Turkey and includes the worlds of *mélange* Europe—Arabic Europe, as in al Andalus and Portugal; Slavic Europe, in Eastern Europe and the Balkans; Moslem Europe, as in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Greek and Cypriot borders with Turkey. Historically and culturally these are as much part of Europe as the heartland bordering the Rhine, for through this Europe of historical multiculturalism and multilingualism run the life lines that went into the making of European universalism.

The question of *other* Europes is, first, the question of Europe's uncertain boundaries—the old question whether Europe includes the Balkans, Russia, Turkey, to which markedly different answers have been given over time.³⁵ Remember that the Ottoman empire used to be referred to as 'the sick man of Europe'. Presently the difference between

heartland and borderzones has been narrowing. Now cultural mixing occurs not only on Europe's sprawling boundaries but increasingly also within Europe's heartlands. In the words of Paul Virilio, 'Les frontières sont dans la ville.'³⁶

Furthermore, what of the Europe of the others of immigrants, exiles, asylum seekers, travellers, Gypsies, strangers? The Europe of Finns in Sweden who used to call themselves 'the niggers of Europe'. An American observer notes: 'by now there are certainly towns in France that are recognizably "French" because of the Portuguese and North Africans eating lunch from paper bags on construction-site scaffolds; towns in Sweden that are recognizably Swedish because of the Turks and Greeks and Yugoslavs hanging out at the train station.'³⁷

What in fact about Asia's Europe, Africa's Europe, the Orient's Europe, America's Europe? That is, Europe influenced, propelled, shaped *from without*—Europe standing on the shoulders of other civilisations, Europe forced off its 'cape of Asia' westward because of pressures coming from Central Asia, the Arab world, the Ottomans.³⁸ What of Europe viewed, approached, interrogated, opened up, turned inside out, refigured by Arabs, Africans, Asians, past and present? This refers to deep historical strata and a vast terrain that stretches all the way from the Neolithic population movements, through medieval times when the Mediterranean was a 'Moslem lake', to the 'new helots' of modern times.³⁹

Part of this terrain is Yugoslavia's Europe and Sarajevo's Europe. The siege of Sarajevo was directed not only against Bosnian Moslems but against the very principle of cultural and ethnic mingling, for Sarajevo is an intercultural site. Sarajevo, like Andalusia before, like all of Europe's border zones past and present, is a site of cultural mixing. What was taking place then was a massacre of mixed identities in the name of ethnic purity not unlike five hundred years earlier when the Reconquest of Spain was conducted in the name of purity of blood (*limpieza de sangre*). The significance of Sarajevo is the stampede of new-found ethnic nationalisms crushing a site of mixture and *mélange*. In intercultural spaces communities are *fuzzy* rather than discrete, distinct, labelled, enumerated. The transition from fuzzy communities (with permeable boundaries) to distinct communities (with sharp boundaries), or the logic of interplay giving way to the logic of polarization and apartheid, has proved traumatic also in other countries, such as India.

Viewed from Sarajevo, Europe looks rather different than viewed from Paris, Bonn, London, Brussels. If we recognize that cultural mixing is part of the momentum of Europe, that Europe never could have become *European* without it, then the conflicts in former Yugoslavia are a trial of Europe itself—a massacre not of picture postcard little Europe, but of the real Europe of intercultural *mélange*. The European inability or unwillingness to seriously intervene in the Balkans (first recognizing Croatian and Slovenian separation and then failing to block Serbian expansionism, again in Kosovo) exposes the new Europe for its compromise character of economic resolve in combination with political indecision.

The selective closure of the EU means the restriction of labour mobility within the Schengen zone of the single market, while enhancing capital mobility within the EU.⁴⁰ Given the requirements of flexible specialization as well as the demographics in the EU (declining birth rates and the 'greying' of Europe), it is questionable whether the policy of closing off the EU to immigration is viable and sustainable even from an economic point of view.

Constituencies in favour of an *open Europe* include those to whom transregional links are important: specifically, sections of business and finance (not only the large corporations

but also medium-size firms), internationalist social democrats, migrants, intellectuals and artists,⁴¹ and the development constituency. Still other constituencies, overlapping with the above, favour *a mixed Europe*, a Europe that is not merely open in terms of its boundaries and borders but also in terms of its self-definition, its sense of self, on the basis of a historical and contemporary awareness of the importance of cultural exchange and *mélange*. These include those for whom Europe, by any European definition, is just too small—‘l’Europe petiteuse’.⁴² It includes transnational entrepreneurs, border zone migrants and intellectuals, Diasporas from the postcolonial world concerned with multicultural translation, and returnees from an empire who no longer fit back in the homefront.

In the end, the discourse of otherhood is wearying. What matters, and actually this is just a matter of common sense, is openness. There is no meaningful definition of either culture or identity except an open one. A people’s Europe is a Europe of people who are European ‘among other things’. In the words of Derrida: ‘I am not, nor do I feel, European *in every part*, that is, European through and through. . . . I feel European *among other things*.’⁴³ This is not a spectacular point. Several Eurobarometer surveys have found that ‘there is not much evidence for an emotional identification with “Europe,”’⁴⁴ and yet it is worth making because it makes explicit the case for soft boundaries between Europe and non-Europe, wherever they may happen to be.

CULTURE AND POLITICS

It would be far too easy for the worlds of culture and politics to remain disconnected. The thrust of cultural studies is interpretative. Its prominence signals the retreat of intellectuals from politics and, in turn, the bureaucratization of politics. With Gramsci and the Birmingham school of cultural studies this connection did exist, but gradually weakened in the wake of the linguistic and postmodern turns and an increasingly inward-looking textual approach to culture. The techniques of cultural analysis—hermeneutics, deconstruction—have increasingly become its horizon and agenda. Renewing the connection between culture and politics would involve re-embedding cultural analysis in sociology, political economy and technological change. It would mean recombining soft ‘culture’ with the hard stuff of economics and technology. In sociology and geography, for instance urban studies, this is being done.⁴⁵ Further, for cultural analysis to go beyond interpretation, to become interventionist, raises the question whether, by engaging in constructive criticism of the present, cultural analysis can be forward looking. Thus, would it be possible to combine the cultural and political agendas for Europe and find a common ground between them? Here this can only be attempted in a superficial way, first by juxtaposing the agendas, and then trying to find a common ground.

A cultural analysis of Europe points towards travelling light, in the sense of leaving behind the heavy luggage of imperialism and colonialism, racism and chauvinism, nationalism and parochialism. A political economy analysis, in one reading at least, may point the other way, towards Europe reclaiming its social capitalism and social democratic character. Presently the EU, coasting in the currents of accelerated globalization, caught between the logic of competitive innovation and a new social contract,⁴⁶ has not found a course of its own. What would be needed is a forward looking analysis that establishes a new articulation between competitiveness and social partnership or, more precisely, an argument ac-

ording to which social partnership is competitive. Such arguments may be found in ideas of associative democracy, social capital and social development.⁴⁷

In brief, a cultural analysis argues for an *open Europe*, an economic analysis argues for a *competitive Europe*, and a political economy perspective argues for a *social Europe*; and possibly the latter two can be combined in a *social and competitive Europe*. An agenda for an open Europe may include a postnationalist redefinition of citizenship⁴⁸ and a mild immigration policy with full citizenship rights for immigrants. It may further entail associate EU membership of East European and Maghreb countries and Turkey. A key question is, what would be the economics of such an agenda? One consideration is the enlargement of the European market along the lines of Attali's ideas mentioned above. The argument that the newcomers would be only beneficiaries and not contributors to the EU budget⁴⁹ is bureaucratic and superficial: far more is at stake. One of the reasons for building the European common market, in the first place, was the integration of southern European countries where demand for consumer durable goods is new rather than replacement demand: the same now applies to the East European and southern Mediterranean countries. Another element in this constellation is access to new labour supplies for a greying Europe. A further consideration is to valorize cultural diversity, not merely on political grounds, but as an *economic* asset as well. In brief, this concerns the role of cultural and social capital in economic invention and enterprise, an argument that has been made by Keith Griffin both on historical grounds and in prospective terms.⁵⁰ A related consideration is the creation of a greater European developmental sphere, which may ultimately encompass sub-Saharan Africa, in the form of a 'Marshall Plan' for Africa.⁵¹ To a certain extent, this relationship *de facto* already exists⁵² but if taken on across a broad front of political, economic and cultural considerations, it may acquire a more constructive and deeper content. This may be placed in the wider framework of Europe reclaiming a global political role: as a force for strengthening the international legal order, reinforcing the international public sector, promoting progressive multilateralism, striving for a transnational social policy, and democratizing international institutions.

Obviously this kind of agenda entails a price, also an economic and social price. However, not adopting such an agenda also entails cost, including the political and cultural costs of Fortress Europe and l'Europe petiteuse. An important point in this context is, rather than yielding to fragmentation, in theory and policy, to combine cultural, political and economic analyses and agendas.

NOTES

1. E.g., A.G. Frank, *The European Challenge*. London, Spokesman, 1983.
2. R. Cox, "Global Perestroika," in R. Milliband and L. Panitch (eds.), *New World Order? Socialist Register, 1992*. London, Merlin, 1992, pp. 26–43 (p. 34).
3. Group of Lisbon, *Limits to Competition*. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1995.
4. G. Ross, "Confronting the New Europe," *New Left Review*, 191, 1992: 49–68.
5. C. Oman, "Globalization and Regionalization in the 1980s and 1990s," *Journal of Development and International Cooperation*, 9 (16), 1993: 51–69.
6. W. Bello, *People and Power in the Pacific*. London, Pluto, 1992.
7. The Barcelona Process refers to the 1995 Barcelona conference on the EU and the Mediterranean. See

- the special section on "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership", *International Herald Tribune*, November 27, 1996 with articles such as Helen Cranford, "A Market of 800 Million: The Goal is to Create the World's Largest Free-trade Zone by 2010." Cf. Fathallah Oualaou, *Après Barcelone: Le Maghreb est nécessaire*, Casablanca/ Paris, Toubkal/Harmattan, 1996. Fatiha Talahite, *Le partenariat Euro-Méditerranéen vu du Sud*, *Maghreb-Machrek*, 153, 1996: 45–59.
8. A large part of the rationale for creating the AMU was to allow the Maghrib to bargain collectively with the European Community. About 70 percent of AMU countries' trade is with the EC. R. Mortimer, Regionalism and geopolitics in the Maghrib, *Middle East Report*, 23 (5), 1993: 16–19 (p. 18).
 9. J. Attali, "Asia's Doing It. America's Doing It. Let's Do It Here Too", *The European*, 26 Nov–2 December 1993.
 10. I. Wallerstein, *The Politics of the World-Economy*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984.
 11. Barbara Stallings (ed.), *Global Change, Regional Response: The New International Context of Development*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995.
 12. J. Cavanagh and S. Anderson, "History counsels 'No' on NAFTA and Europe offers practical insight," *New York Times*, 14 November 1993.
 13. M. Albert, *Capitalisme Contre Capitalisme*. Paris, Seuil, 1991.
 14. B. Badie and P. Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1983.
 15. F. Lapeyre, "Integration in the global economy, social exclusion and the sustainable growth objective: Case studies of Poland and Hungary," unpublished paper, 1997.
 16. J. Kristeva, "Foreign body, Conversation with Scott L. Malcolmson", *Transition*, 59, 1993: 172–83 (p. 179).
 17. J. Delors, *Our Europe: the Community and National Development* (Fr ed. 1988). London, Verso, 1992 (pp. 59, 64).
 18. Quoted in A. Clark, "François Mitterand and the Idea of Europe," in B. Nelson, D. Roberts and W. Veit (eds.), *The Idea of Europe: Problems of National and Transnational Identity*. Oxford, Berg, 1992 (p. 167.)
 19. S. Gunn, 1989 *Revolution of the Right: Europe's New Conservatives*. London, Pluto, 1989 (p. 15). G. Thompson, "Monetary Policy and International Finance," in B. Hindess (ed.), *Reactions to the Right*. London, Routledge, 1990.
 20. J. Peck, and A. Tickell, "Searching for a New Institutional Fix: The After -Fordist Crisis and the Global-local Disorder," in A. Amin (ed.), *Post-Fordism*. Oxford, Blackwell, 1994, pp. 280–315.
 21. A. de Swaan, "The Receding Prospects for Transnational Social Policy, Theory and Society," 26 (4), 1997: 561–575.
 22. Alain Lipietz, *Towards a New Economic Order*. Cambridge, Polity, 1992.
 23. J. Derrida, *The Other Heading*. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1992 (p. 13).
 24. Derrida 1992: 9.
 25. More extensive discussions of European cultural identity discourse are in J. Nederveen Pieterse, "Fictions of Europe," *Race & Class*, 32 (3), 1991: 3–10 and idem, "Europe Among Other Things: Closure, Culture, Identity," in K. von Benda-Beckmann and M. Verkuyten (eds.), *Nationalism, Ethnicity and Cultural Identity in Europe*. Utrecht University, Comparative Studies in Migration and Ethnic Relations, 1995, pp 71–88 (part of this argument is based the latter source).
 26. J. Kramer, *Unsettling Europe*. New York, Vintage, 1981 (pp. xiv–v).
 27. D. Hay, "Europe Revisited: 1979," *History of European Ideas*, 1981, 1 (1): 1–6.
 28. N. Wilterdink, "An Examination of European and National Identity," *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, 34 (1), 1993: 119–36 (p. 123).
 29. A. Heller, "Europe: An Epilogue?," in Nelson, Roberts and Veit (eds.), 1992 (p. 12).
 30. Juan Goytisolo, "1492," *Lusitania*, Special issue For/Za Sarajevo, 5, 1993: 123–6 (p. 126).
 31. M. Mooijweer, "Het Atheens Complex," *Intermediair*, 23 (16), 1987: 35–40.
 32. S. Amin, *Eurocentrism*. London, Zed, 1989.
 33. Wilterdink 1993: 125.
 34. A. Meddeb, "Peut-on être Arabe et Européen?" in *Le désir de l'Europe*, Les Cahiers de Strassbourg, Carrefour des Littératures Européennes, 1992, pp 79–82.
 35. Hay 1981, Wilterdink 1993.
 36. P. Virilio, "Les frontières sont dans la ville," in *Le désir de l'Europe*, 1992, pp 60–2.

37. Kramer 1981: xv.
38. This historical argument is developed in Nederveen Pieterse, *Empire and Emancipation*, London, Pluto, 1990 (Ch. 5); the theme of hybrid Europe in Nederveen Pieterse, "Unpacking the West: How European is Europe?" in A. Rattansi and S. Westwood (eds.), *Racism, Modernity, Identity*. Cambridge, Blackwell, 1994; and the question of hybridization generally in Nederveen Pieterse, "Globalization as Hybridization," in M. Featherstone, S. Lash, R. Robertson (eds.), *Global Modernities*. London, Sage, 1995, pp 45–68.
39. Cf. W. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982. J. Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989. R. Cohen, *The New Helots: Immigrants in the International Division of Labour*. Aldershot, Gower, 1987. Juan Goytisolo, "Constructing Europe's New Wall: From Berlin to the Strait," *Middle East Report*, 22 (5), 1992: 17–20 and "Tolède a Strasbourg," in *Le désir de l'Europe*, 1992, pp 23–7.
40. N. Hildyard, Maastricht: "The Protectionism of Free Trade," *The Ecologist*, 23 (2), 1993: 45–51.
41. E.g. P. Bourdieu, "L'internationale scientifique et artistique," in *Le désir de l'Europe*, 1992, pp 53–5.
42. L'Europe serait belle si l'Afrique n'en réduisait pas les dimensions, si l'Asie ne la réduisait pas. Il y a dans l'idée de l'Europe une arrogance colonialiste qui persiste et me déplaît. Il y a une petitesse revendatrice. . . J'aimerais l'Europe si elle se niait elle-même. René de Ceccatty, "Petite Europe," in *Le désir de l'Europe*, 1992, pp 92–3.
43. Derrida 1992: 82, 83.
44. Wilterdink 1993: 126.
45. E.g. J. Bird et al (eds.), *Mapping the Futures: Local Culture, Global Change*. London, Routledge, 1993. A. Amin and J. Hausner (eds.), *Beyond Market and Hierarchy: Interactive Governance and Social Complexity*. Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1997.
46. R. Petrella, "Europe Between Competitive Innovation and a New Social Contract," *Social Science Information*, 1995: 11–23.
47. Discussed in J. Nederveen Pieterse, "Growth and Equity Revisited: A Supply-side Approach to Social Development," *European Journal of Development Research*, 9 (1), 1997: 128–149.
48. G. Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*. London, Macmillan, 1995. G. Therborn, *European Modernity and Beyond*. London, Sage, 1995.
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50. K. Griffin, "Culture, Human Development and Economic Growth," University of California, Riverside, 1996, Working Paper in Economics 96–117.
51. On the ramifications of the European single market for Africa see E. Mayo, "The Implications of the European Community Single Market for Africa," in *Sub-Saharan Africa Beyond Adjustment*, pp 250–7; and D.C. Faber and T.M. Vijfeijken, "The Implications of Europe 1992 for Africa," in *Sub-Saharan Africa Beyond Adjustment*, The Hague, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1990, pp 257–65.
52. See Stallings 1995.