

## 2 Ethnicities and multiculturalisms: politics of boundaries

---

*Jan Nederveen Pieterse*

How far have ethnic studies advanced past the finding that ethnicity is constructed, not primordial? While the “decolonization of ethnicity” is still under way, at times the stream of ethnic studies seems to add up to little more than a series of vignettes. Ethnicity is still talked about in a generalizing fashion, as if in each contribution the sociology of ethnicity has to be reinvented again and again. But what if we unpack ethnicity by means of a typology and taxonomy of ethnicities, and thus bring the sociology of ethnicity to the foreground and bring finesse and method into the discussion? This is the aim of the first chapter.<sup>1</sup>

The second aim of this chapter is to twin the ethnicity discussion with the discussion on multiculturalism – combining and contrasting discourses of ethnicity and multiculturalism. Multiculturalism, like ethnicity, is a moving target – an ongoing cultural flux and an institutional arrangement, a target of criticism or a reform platform. Ethnicity is a contemporary vocabulary for various notions of group boundaries; multiculturalism, likewise, is a discourse that negotiates group boundaries. Thus both ethnicity and multiculturalism address the underlying theme of the politics and discourse of group boundaries. Group boundaries, a fundamental theme in anthropology and social science, now come back in various guises, such as the “spatial turn” that takes us beyond notions of borderlessness and nomadism, and reterritorialization, border matters, border theory, border consciousness, and so forth (cf. Nederveen Pieterse 2002).

This discussion first problematizes ethnicity and the notion of “ethnic conflict.” Next I spell out four major varieties of ethnicity and consider each from the point of view of domination and emancipation. Ethnicities arise from different ways of drawing group boundaries; what sets diverse notions of multiculturalism apart also derives from different ways of drawing group boundaries. Notions of identity, difference, and inter-group relations interact to produce diverse angles on how group boundaries come about and decompose. In the closing section I consider how ethnicities relate to multiculturalisms and merge the two discourses.

### **The disease model and the emancipation model**

Let us consider two diametrically opposite positions in relation to “ethnicity” – the disease model and the emancipation model. One is familiar, the other less so, but both are readily understandable. To use a pessimistic but apt metaphor, ethnic conflict may be less like a common cold and more like AIDS – difficult to catch, but devastating once infected (Lake 1995: 3). Here the focus is on ethnic conflict, the metaphor is that of disease, and the implied process is one of inevitable disaster. This is a common doomsday scenario of ethnic politics. The sequel argument is that there are hundreds of peoples in the world and about as many conflicts and civil wars to come. This is a commonplace view: ethnicity is an evil politics stalking the Enlightenment world of growing modernization. This point of view has been common in media representations and particularly prominent (but not exclusively) in American sources, such as Moynihan (1992) and Kaplan (2000). A radically different view holds: recognizing rather than denying ethnicity holds the key to democratizing the state and development (Salih 1999: 3).

In this view, ethnic politics is an emancipatory politics. Ethnicity is grassroots politics and a vehicle of vernacular democratization. The emphasis is on the state, and development politics, and ethnicity is viewed as a means toward democratization. This revisionist position relates to wider concerns such as the reconciliation between traditional and modern institutions, whether modernization is indigenous or imported.<sup>2</sup>

There are other views, such as that the importance of ethnicity is being exaggerated,<sup>3</sup> but from the viewpoint of analyzing cultural politics these two diametrically opposite views, ethnicity as curse or as emancipation, are among the most significant positions. Much is at stake in these perspectives. The first implies a blank check for external intervention in local conflicts, while the rationale is profoundly pessimistic, i.e., conflict management without hope. The second opens the way to vernacular empowerment and endogenous politics, but in the process raises several problems.

These views leave us between a rock and a hard place. The first does not problematize nation-state politics, does not problematize the domination that has usually given rise to ethnic mobilization in the first place. It presents conventional politics, which is part of the problem, as the solution and thus in the name of conflict resolution offers more of the same. It addresses symptoms, not causes. At best it promises containment of the disease, not remedy. The second view does address state domination but does not reckon with the problem of domination-within-domination. Since the problem of state domination is familiar enough and widely

discussed, it is the second problem of domination-within-domination that needs focusing on. This means a double take or multifocus look at ethnicity. That ethnic politics shows features of both domination and emancipation at the same time, has been argued before (Nederveen Pieterse 1997a); now we go further into specifics.

If we seek to impose conditions on state action (as in various frameworks for collective rights and multiculturalism), should ethnic groups have *carte blanche*? While political discourse devotes much attention to the state, the politics of ethnicity is not talked about as much (cf. Rupesinghe and Tishkov 1996).

In relation to African politics, at times state and ethnic politics are combined. Thus, in one view, African polities have increasingly become kleptocracies and ethnicity is decentralized kleptocracy, in which ethnic conflict often serves as way to settle Mafia-like struggles (Bayart *et al.* 1999). According to a markedly different view, Africa works and works precisely through neotraditional institutions of redistribution via ethnic and kinship networks (Chabal *et al.* 1999).

These issues can be addressed from various points of view. An angle taken here is that of collective learning and reflexivity. The point of collective learning as a perspective is not to suggest some ideal standard, model, or end state, but to focus on the ongoing process and to view it as a social learning process, the objective of which is learning itself rather than some kind of “end of history” settlement.<sup>4</sup> Since learning is contextual, the question is which approaches are most conducive to collective learning in particular contexts.

An obvious question is if we seek collective reflexivity in relation to the state and public sphere (as in notions of reflexive modernity), what about reflexivity at the level of ethnic groups? Can we then view ethnic politics as an exercise in collective learning, in multiple directions – within and between ethnic groups, in their interaction with other social forces, in relation to the state and institutional change, and ultimately, at the international level? This implies a notion of reflexive ethnicity, and in fact multiculturalism can be viewed as precisely a politics of reflexive ethnicity.

### **Reflexive ethnicity and parallel universes**

The first consideration is to problematize ethnicity itself. Is the terminology of ethnicity appropriate at all? Does it belong to an era that is past? Does terminology matter? Are we walking into the twenty-first century burdened with nineteenth-century terminology? Is discourse itself a sign of the times or a badge of identity, a passport or green card to labor in

discursive worlds? In that case, which one to chose, and perhaps more important, how do they interrelate? To which ethnicity do the two arguments spelled out above apply? Do we inhabit parallel universes in which what is a problem in one setting pops up as a solution in another?

In academic discourse, in anthropology and sociology, perspectives on ethnicity have in recent years been increasingly problematizing and open-ended (e.g. Jenkins 1999). Ethnicity fades into race, nationalism, multiculturalism, identity politics, community. Its significance and dynamics are circumstantial, conjunctural, contingent. Early discussions of ethnicity in comparative politics and political science followed the political modernization paradigm in which all differences would lead to national integration and nationbuilding. Since the 1970s the awareness grew that modernization can also increase the salience of ethnicity and by the 1990s the focus had shifted to ethnic conflict. In most of these discussions ethnicity is presented as an independent variable. Yet, according to Rupert Taylor (1999: 121), what ultimately remains unresolved is where ethnicity comes from and what it actually is.

There is no need to rehearse the large and growing literature on this score (see e.g. Bulmer and Solomos 1999) except to make some key points. (1) There is no point or advantage to naturalizing, essentializing, or reifying ethnicity. There is nothing “natural” about ethnicity. Ethnicity need not be considered as a primary affiliation with given territorial or other claims.<sup>5</sup> (2) The term recalls the colonial era and the prejudices of colonial anthropology. One option is to discard the term ethnicity and opt instead for the plain language of cultural difference (cf. Nederveen Pieterse 1997). On the one hand, despite the constructivist turn, “ethnicity” bears the stamp of essentialist thinking; on the other, it works as a way to connect with the literature, and “culture” invites problems too. It might be preferable to speak of cultural politics or culturally inflected politics, in contrast to class, interest, and ideological politics, for all “ethnicity” ultimately comes down to some form of cultural difference – such as nationality, nationalism, language, religion, region, community, kinship, clan, caste; all of which, along with “race,” are themselves cultural constructs. However, similar problems as in relation to ethnicity apply to “culture,” which cannot be settled here.<sup>6</sup> A neat distinction between interest politics and cultural or ethnic politics is not tenable either, because interest too is culturally constructed, mediated, and articulated (as in class consciousness), so ultimately these distinctions do not hold; which is not to suggest that class dissolves into culture but merely that it cannot exist outside culture.

While the “thingness” of ethnicity is bracketed and questioned in social science and considered unresolved in political science, in policy

discourse, for instance in the context of “humanitarian intervention,” fixed assumptions and closed, narrow understandings of ethnicity tend to prevail.<sup>7</sup> “Managing ethnic conflict” has become another cottage industry. But, in fact, what are “ethnic conflicts”?

□ Hypothesis: When politics is upfront we speak of political conflict. When politics is opaque we say ethnic conflict.

Do we refer to conflicts in Kosovo and East Timor as ethnic conflicts? They are generally perceived as questions of nationalism in which ethnic groups play some part. What about Sierra Leone and Liberia? Political conflict refers to conflict among interest groups; these may be partly defined in cultural terms, but that does not necessarily alter the basic make-up of the situation. The visibility and transparency of “politics,” however, is also a function of social distance and political conditions, including channels of information. Up close or as locals we would know of the political interests that are at stake. On the other hand, locals may be hoodwinked too, for instance through the monopolization of media. Thus the conflict in Rwanda was a political conflict among rival regional interest groups which largely involved Hutus; but for political reasons it was presented in Rwandese state-sponsored media as an ethnic conflict (Uvin 1999). Let us note the gradual changes in perceptions of distant conflicts when through continued reporting and analysis the conflicts become less distant. Conflicts in Sierra Leone in the 1990s were originally represented and perceived as ethnic or tribal fury, but gradually the stakeholders’ interests became more visible: control over diamond mining and trade, warlords and gang warfare, small arms traffic and support for warring factions in neighboring countries.

□ Hypothesis: Majority politics are designated “political” and minority politics are termed “ethnic,” i.e. ethnicity is minority nationalism.

The war waged by the Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka is perceived as an ethnic or ethnonationalist struggle while Sinhala majority politics is tacitly treated as ordinary national politics. Yet, if we step into the minutiae of the situation we may find Sinhala majority politics every bit as “ethnic” and steeped in prejudice and cultural bias as Tamil politics.<sup>8</sup> This illustrates the tenuous and biased distinction between nationalism and ethnicity, which privileges and naturalizes majority interests and politics, as a bias inherent in the terminology of ethnicity.

□ Hypothesis: Nationalism refers to urban nationalism, while rural nationalism is often termed ethnicity.

According to Ramet (1996: 76), “the nationalist movement which made rapid gains after the death of Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito in May 1980, and which came into its own in 1987, relies above all on rural support and is, in essence, a profoundly rural phenomenon. To say this is also to suggest that Milosevic’s ascent to power represented the victory of the Serbian countryside over the city.” She distinguishes between urban nationalism and rural nationalism, which is “more ethnic” (1996: 72). Among all of Yugoslavia’s (former) provinces Serbia has by far the greatest percentage of the population engaged in agriculture (27.6 percent) (1996: 75). The conflict in Bosnia has been termed “urbicide” or a revenge of the countryside of predominantly rural Bosnian Serbs against predominantly urban Bosnian Moslems (Denitch 1994; Humphrey 1997).

### **Ethnicity is relational**

Chinese food eaten by Chinese in a Chinese restaurant overseas is food (a particular type of food, a regional food, etc.); the same food eaten by non-Chinese in the same restaurant becomes “ethnic food.”

These points suggest that “ethnicity” fades and interest comes to the foreground as a function of growing knowledge of the situation, that is, what may underlie the distinction is the difference between a local optics and long-distance optics. Second, the term “ethnicity” may be a function of majority–minority relations. Third, “ethnicity” may be a function of perceived rural–urban differences. Fourth, “ethnicity” is relational and contextual. In Dwyer’s words (1996: 4), “Ethnicity is a product of contact, not of isolation.” Since ethnicity is relational it necessitates the scrutiny of relationships; and since social relations change over time this gives rise to different types of ethnicity.

### **Ethnicities**

Reflexivity begins by opening up ethnicity, unpacking its “thingness,” viewing ethnicity as process and showing diversity underneath the label. While discussions of ethnicity often proceed as if there is only one type, ethnicity varies across a wide range in terms of salience, intensity, and meaning. Ethnicity can be unpacked by distinguishing four types which may be viewed as snapshots of ethnicity as a moving target.<sup>9</sup>

1. *Domination ethnicity*. Considering that the term “ethnicity” itself is a discourse of domination and the distinction between nation and ethnicity is tenuous, if nationalism takes the form of monocultural control it may be considered a form of ethnicity, or ethnocracy. Ethnic mobilization is often a reaction to the imposition of a monocultural regime and discriminatory treatment or regional uneven development.

2. *Enclosure ethnicity*. This exists in three varieties of dormant ethnicity, cultural confinement, and inward-looking ethnicity, which all share a restriction of mobility and space. This may be an existing condition (dormant ethnicity), involuntary (imposed) or voluntary (self-chosen).<sup>10</sup>
  - Dormant or latent ethnicity exists in an isolated group or where intergroup contacts have no or little salience, as in the case of the classic “primitive isolates” of anthropology.
  - Cultural confinement occurs as a consequence of conquest (Amerindians in the Andes driven up the mountains by the encroaching Hispanic conquests and latifundios) or external imposition (the Jews confined to ghettos, the segregation of African Americans under the Jim Crow laws, the Bantustans in Apartheid South Africa).
  - Inward-looking ethnicity refers to self-chosen segregation or dissociation as a strategy of building inner-group strength. Delinking itself can be a strategy of competition or preparation for competition. A mild variety is “buy black, vote black” and a stronger version is the Nation of Islam.
3. *Competition ethnicity*. Competition with the state or other cultural formations in relation to state power, resources, and development. This is the major problem zone of ethnic relations.
4. *Optional ethnicity*. Low-intensity ethnicity is light, volitional, and fluid, as in the case of ethnic entrepreneurs, symbolic ethnicity, ethnic chic, and shopping for identity (Waters 1990).

The question that arises next is how these varieties relate to one another, in other words the dynamics of ethnicity and the shift from one mode to another. A simple account is that nationalism awakens dormant ethnicity, imposes “minority” status or enclosure ethnicity, and over time enclosure ethnicity tends toward competition ethnicity. Competition ethnicity, in turn, over time tends toward the widening of choices of cultural affiliation because competition itself involves and generates the accumulation of crosscultural capital, which eventually may lead to optional ethnicity.

What is the status of this sequence – is it a likely or a necessary process, i.e. is teleology involved? Even if this sequence is widely observed, it does not mean it is universal. Under which conditions does this process apply? And how long does it take to unfold and what determines its pace? Is there only forward or also backward movement?

Experience and research suggest that these dynamics occur, but the instances where they do not occur, even though they may be relatively few, are precisely those that call for explanation. For instance, Sinhala Buddhist chauvinism in Sri Lanka has been maintaining its hold over a

Table 2.1 *Ethnicities*

Ethnicities	Variants	Keywords	Dynamics
Domination	Nationalism	Ethnocracy, chauvinism, monocultural regime	Engenders enclosure and or competition
Enclosure	Dormant, latent Confinement, ghetto Inward-looking, self-chosen	Low mobility, monocultural	Tends towards competition over time
Competition	Patronage. Survival	Mobile, bicultural Competition over niches, political and development resources	Tends towards optional ethnicity over time
Optional	Symbolic, low-intensity ethnicity Hybridity	Bicultural, multicultural Agency, ambivalence, opportunism Multiple identity	Beyond or after ethnicity

long period and continues to inform government policies and popular attitudes, thus reproducing the conditions in which Tamil nationalism can persist, resulting in a situation of ethnic gridlock. With these provisos, these dynamics have heuristic value, also in showing up counter instances. For a *précis* see Table 2.1.

### **Domination-within-domination**

If we assume that cultural differences are not problematic *per se*, then the main factor that makes cultural differences salient and problematic is if and how they intersect with power relations. This too needs to be considered in process form. Each variety of ethnicity then represents features of both domination and emancipation in different relational contexts. Thus the classic problem of domination-within-domination takes different forms across the varieties of ethnicity sketched above.

1. Nationalism may be emancipatory in relation to colonialism and external domination but turns into domination when it takes the form of internal colonialism, xenophobia, and chauvinism, imposes a monocultural regime and practices suppression and discrimination of minorities and deliberate uneven development across regions. An example is the double role of Kemalism in Turkey: emancipatory in

- relation to foreign powers and repressive in relation to minorities such as Armenians, Kurds, and Alevites.
2. (a) In dormant ethnicity, cultural difference is latent and not a political factor. (b) Cultural confinement often involves a chain effect in which the dominated reproduce domination within their own circles. Group membership is involuntary, internal differences are suppressed, group boundaries are rigid, individual choice is restricted and “passing” into another group is prohibited or discouraged. (c) Similar constraints apply to self-segregation (e.g. on the Nation of Islam, see Marable 1998).
  3. Competition ethnicity stretches across a range of culturally inflected politics that is too wide for comfortable generalizations. Unity is strength and therefore there may be a tendency toward suppressing internal differences. Competition means seeking advantage in relation to other ethnic groups, which may lead to differences being played up. The vast legacy of “ethnic jokes” is a mild reminder of this pattern. However, interethnic cooperation or rainbow coalitions can also be a competition strategy, such as the Jewish–black coalition in 1960s American politics.
  4. Optional ethnicity may be emancipatory by widening mobility and identity options, in effect to postethnicity. In optional ethnicity domination may relate to the self rather than others. Thus “passing” or adopting chameleon identities for the sake of mobility or gain can lead to alienation. An example is the practice of skin bleaching that is widespread across South Asia, the Middle East, parts of Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean and among immigrants in the West. Such politics of complexion includes “passing” in the United States, “browning” in Jamaica and the saying that “money whitens” in Brazil.

Table 2.2 gives a *précis* of the ambivalent politics of ethnicity on the argument that to each variety of ethnicity there is a dimension of domination and of emancipation in different relational settings.

Since ethnicity is relational it always involves interrelations among ethnic groups who are each not merely different but also different types of ethnicity. They are not merely different ethnic groups but different ethnic strata occupying different class positions. An example is the distinction between “race” and “ethnicity” in the United States, which Mary Waters (1996: 238) draws as follows:

European ethnic groups are generally composed of voluntary migrants and their descendants who chose to come to the United States. Those defined racially, such as blacks, Native Americans, Mexicans in the South-West, and Puerto Ricans, have generally been incorporated into the United States historically through conquest or the forced migration of slaves.

Table 2.2 *Politics of ethnicities*

Ethnicities	Domination	Emancipation
Nationalism	Monocultural control, internal colonialism, oppression of minorities, xenophobia Regional hegemonism	Self-determination Anti-imperialism, anti-regional hegemonism, anti-racism
Enclosure	Cultural exclusivism Suppression of internal differences (gender, class)	Self-determination, autonomy, dignity
Competition	Suppression of internal differences while seeking advantage over other ethnic groups	Collective struggle for improvement
Optional	Alienation, inauthenticity, posturing	Individual or collective improvement, agency, fluidity, multiple identity, play

Considering that mobility is a function of power, dominant groups and individuals are per definition more mobile than subalterns; they can choose to identify ethnic or postethnic, to identify “white,” to shop for identity, to identify as liberal or humanist, or to step outside the framework altogether and identify as world citizen. For “white ethnics” then, according to Waters (1996: 23–24), “ethnicity itself takes on certain individual and positive connotations. The process and content of symbolic ethnicity then make it increasingly difficult for white ethnics to sympathize with, or understand, the experience of a non-symbolic ethnicity, the experience of racial minorities in the United States.”

Another way of phrasing this is that since ethnicity is relational it implies multiculturalism of one sort or other. “Ethnicity” and “multiculturalism” then are two ways of describing the same situation.<sup>11</sup> Next, since ethnicity is always plural and implies ethnicities (for no ethnicity exists alone), to ethnicity there is always a reflexive moment (the exception is dormant ethnicity, which is nonethnicity or the absence of ethnic consciousness): ethnic consciousness implies awareness of other ethnicities. In a similar vein, multiculturalism implies multiculturalisms (for different ethnicities hold different views on the nature of their interrelations). This brings us to the question of multiculturalisms.

### **Multiculturalisms**

To contextualize multiculturalism, let’s consider first what it is not and what kind of thinking preceded it. Earlier views essentialized cultural

Table 2.3 *Responses to group differences*

Responses	Keywords	Examples
Status differences	Ascribed status	Caste, estates, helots, slavery, colonial colour bar, Apartheid
Relative autonomy	Different populations can practice their religion and culture	Ottoman millet system
Segregation	Territorial confinement (and different legal status)	Ghettos, reservations, Jim Crow laws, Bantustans
Assimilation	Convergence toward a given centre	Conversion. Melting pot, nineteenth-century <i>mestizaje</i>
Migration	Population transfer (forced or voluntary)	Pogroms, ethnic cleansing
Genocide		Armenians, Shoah

difference. To give one example, in the Romantic take on nations of Herder and de Maistre, each nation and people possesses its own genius and soul. In this view, the units of cultural difference are peoples; difference is typically expressed in language and other components of folk culture, and if boundaries do not naturally exist, state policy should strive to make them coincide.

But what if different peoples do coexist within the same polity as a consequence of migration, conquest, colonialism, or decolonization? Classic responses have been to institute status differentials (such as slavery, the caste system, and medieval estates), to provide relative autonomy within an overarching tribute-paying or imperial social formation (as in the Ottoman millet system), and assimilation. Other options are territorial segregation, population transfer, and genocide. Assimilation has been a major strategy to control difference, for instance the compulsory conversion of Jews and Moors in the wake of the Reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula. A familiar version of assimilation is the American melting pot. In Latin America *mestizaje* served as a hegemonic ideology of “whitening” and “Europeanization.” These are forms of monoculturalism, or nationalism framed by a cultural hegemony and center of gravity, which in the United States for a long time used to be WASP hegemony. Group boundaries are taken to be fluid except those of the dominant group: all groups are expected to gradually melt and converge on the center, the cultural identity of Americanism, which itself was not supposed to change. A *précis* of classic responses to cultural difference is in Table 2.3.

An early perspective on the coexistence of cultural groups is plural society, a notion coined by Furnivall (1939, 1956) to describe the situation in

the Dutch East Indies and colonial Burma. In the Dutch East Indies different populations (Muslims, Chinese, Dutch, and a scattering of Arabs) allegedly coexisted without mingling; they interacted only in the marketplace and thus made up a plural economy.<sup>12</sup> The idea of plural society has later been applied to other social formations such as the Caribbean, the American South, and the Philippines, and criticized in the process (Hollander *et al.* 1966). In England too, multiculturalism and the way in which cultural difference was recognized was originally patterned on the colonial experience (Ali 1992: 104). So the limitations of “plural society” are relevant to the further discussion:

- Group differences are treated as permanent.
- It ignores group intermarriage and intermingling. (Thus many Chinese in Java and elsewhere in Southeast Asia became integrated over time and intermarried with the indigenous population, giving rise to Mestizo groups; in the Malay world they were called “peranakan Chinese” in contrast to Chinese newcomers. The Dutch included newcomers from the Netherlands and the Indo-Dutch, who had been living in the East for generations, intermarried with locals, and developed a mixed colonial culture [“tempo dulu”]. An in-between group of lower status was “Indos,” the offspring of relations between locals and the Dutch, who assimilated within the native population. The native population in turn consisted of many different groups and strata.)
- It ignores varieties within groups.
- It ignores or downplays status differences between groups within the colonial power hierarchy.
- It echoes late-colonial fictions on the separation between population groups (which had developed in the mid-nineteenth century in reaction to ideas of “race” imported from Europe) and gives a view “from above” rather than accurately describing intergroup relations.

Another approach to the coexistence of different cultural groups is pillarization, which derives from the settlement achieved in the wake of the *Kulturkampf* in the Netherlands. Pillarization was the Dutch mode of cultural pluralism from the 1910s to the 1970s. Pillarization refers to the history of cultural difference within the nation along religious lines – among Catholics, Protestants, and the non-church affiliated. Equal rights in terms of state support for education were granted to Catholics only by 1917. Government funding of schools founded by religious organizations established the system of pillarization, also known as the “silver strings” between the state and Christian denominations. Over time it gave rise to different trade unions, universities, newspapers, and broadcasting for Protestants, Catholics, and the nonchurch affiliated, including socialists

and liberals (Goudsblom 1967; Knippenberg and de Pater 1988). At a later stage this served as a model for multiculturalism.

In the 1980s there was talk of the return of pillarization in regard to immigrants. Pillarization seemed a logical mode in which to incorporate the newcomers. Thus Christian Democrats spoke of “emancipation within one’s own circle,” just as sixty years earlier this applied to Catholics and Protestants who each received state subsidies for their schools and denominational institutions. There are, however, differences between denominational and multicultural pillarization. The religious pillars communicated among one another at the top, together their elites constituted a roof over the pillarized society. But the mini-pillars of the newcomers with their low socioeconomic status do not reach that high. This truncated mini-pillarization did involve subsidies for immigrant institutions. The second difference was the timing; multicultural pillarization set in when religious pillarization was past, in an urbanized and secularized society in which denominational differences were becoming a background rumor. In the course of the 1980s the pillarization model gave way to greater emphasis on integration, advocated by social democrats and liberals. In the 1990s this takes the form of emphasis on learning the language, courses in “citizenship skills,” and plans for immigrant employment schemes with a reporting system for companies (Nederveen Pieterse 1997b: 192–93).

The Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart was inspired both by Furnivall’s work on plural society and the Dutch policy of pillarization, which he combined in the prescriptive model of consociationalism (1975, 1977). In what is technically known as “ethnic conflict regulation,” consociationalism or powersharing is now still the leading model (Taylor 1999). The main objections to consociationalism are fairly familiar:

- It reworks the “plural society” and “pillarization” models.
- It does not sufficiently problematize “ethnicity” or group boundaries.
- The hybrids, the in-betweens are overlooked.
- It promotes patronage and clientelist politics.
- It produces static multiculturalism, as a mosaic of ghettos.
- New “mini-pillars” do not reach to the roof.

In this context, the proposal for accommodating ethnicity in African politics mentioned at the beginning does not really go beyond consociationalism. It represents an advance on conventional approaches to democracy in Africa that leave cultural difference out of the equation (an example is Wiseman 1997) and incorporates alternative development perspectives. The multilevel distribution of authority, as in Ethiopian ethnic federalism (state autonomy at federal levels and ethnic organization at local and

regional levels) matches the classic pillarization and consociationalism approaches. But there are no safeguards in this approach against patronage politics, or against ethnic rivalry spilling over political watersheds and contaminating or taking over higher levels of governance, resulting in ethnic polarization and ethnocracy. If local and regional power bases become ethnic vote banks, state autonomy is at risk. If this approach went together with participatory democracy and therefore decentralization, it would clash with the strict separation between levels of authority required by pillarization. Accordingly, the emancipation model of ethnicity *tout court* leads to recycling patronage politics, a classic predicament in African politics (e.g. Shaw 1986).

Experiences in the North involving immigration and minorities dominate the discussion of multiculturalism while experiences in the South are usually discussed under headings such as ethnic segmentation or communalism. Since what is at stake in multiculturalism is the redefinition of citizenship it is not surprising that the leading discourse on multiculturalism is normative political theory. Political theory and its inquiries into the citizenship rights and entitlements of latecomers to a polity hold policy implications, while sociology and cultural studies tend to play interpretative and critical roles. Combining ethnicities and multiculturalisms may serve to combine experiences and perspectives North and South and thus place discussions of multiculturalism on a wider canvas.<sup>13</sup>

Conceptions of multiculturalism generally derive from several sources:

- colonial societies (such as plural society);
- settlements of the Kulturkampf in European countries (such as pillarization);
- combinations of both (consociationalism);
- North American adaptations to changing demography and cultural hegemony (United States, Canada);
- and corporate marketing strategies (such as ethnomarketing).

The various notions of multiculturalism reflect these lineages. Multiculturalism on the model of pillarization is a static, conservative archipelago of cultural groups or communities, a mosaic of ghettos. Peter McLaren (1995: 120–32) distinguishes conservative, liberal, left-liberal and critical or resistance multiculturalism. Hollinger (1995) contrasts pluralist multiculturalism, in which groups are permanent, enduring, and the subject of group rights,<sup>14</sup> and cosmopolitan multiculturalism, which involves shifting group boundaries, multiple affiliations, and hybrid identities, and is based on individual rights. If cultures are viewed as porous and

interpenetrating, rather than as billiard balls, interculturalism would be a better term (Bernasconi 1998).

A familiar line of criticism dismisses multiculturalism as the cultural wallpaper of late capitalism (Jameson 1991; Žižek 1997), as the “bourgeois eclecticism” of corporate or consumerist multiculturalism *à la* Benetton (Martin 1998). A related notion is hegemonic multiculturalism *à la* the WTO (Matustík 1998). These forms of “managed multiculturalism” come in corporate and administrative varieties and reflect a “standard pluralism that not only leaves groups constituted as givens but entrenches the boundaries fixing group demarcations as unalterable” (Goldberg 1994: 7). The problem, however, is not that these forms of multiculturalism are managed *per se* (citizenship implies a relationship to the state and therefore some form of “management” or institutionalized settlement); the problem is on what terms they are managed. The multiculturalism = late capitalism view overlooks that cultural differences matter also prior to capitalism, recognizes but one variety of multiculturalism and one variety of capitalism, “late capitalism,” and by assuming that “identity can wait” reproduces class reductionism.<sup>15</sup>

These forms of “multiculturalism from above” do not address power relations and if we accept that multiculturalism is about the renegotiation of hierarchies and power relations in postimperial and postcolonial settings, these managerial multiculturalisms miss the point. Alternative options are critical, transformative (Chicago Cultural Studies Group 1994; Martin 1998; May 1999) or revolutionary multiculturalism (McLaren 1997). This view has been criticized for being “culturalist” and requiring stronger political economy (McLennan 2001), which may be valid, although it echoes the points made in critical multiculturalism itself; the work of critique is never finished. Critical multiculturalism is critical, first, in that it does not treat cultural differences as givens but problematizes them as differences-in-relation; and second, it is critical in that by incorporating class analysis and emphasizing relations of power, access to citizenship, and citizenship rights, it brings politics back into the babble of diversity.

Table 2.4 presents a schema of different multiculturalisms. The boxes are not mutually exclusive. This sample of views originates mostly from North America. The axes on which they are constructed include perspectives on difference (McLaren) and the nature of group boundaries and notions of rights (Hollinger, Kymlicka).

What underlie these varieties of multiculturalism are assumptions concerning identity and group boundaries and the nature of the state and citizenship. A general backdrop to understandings of multiculturalism is the liberal state. All multiculturalisms above, except the plural society

Table 2.4 *Multiculturalisms*

Multiculturalism	Keywords	Related notions
Conservative	Groups and differences are enduring Group rights	Plural society, pillarization, consociationalism Pluralist multiculturalism (Hollinger)
Liberal	A natural equality underlies differences; inequality indicates lack of opportunity	Diversity Corporate, ludic, consumerist multiculturalism (Benneton)
Left-liberal	Differences are viewed as "essence"	Positionality, standpoint theory, identity politics "Strategic essentialism" (Spivak). "Show one's identity papers before dialogue can begin" (McLaren)
Critical, transformative Fluid (Kymlicka)	Differences in relation (McLaren) Shifting group boundaries, multiple or hybrid identities, individual rights	Resistance multiculturalism Cosmopolitan multiculturalism, interculturalism

model, assume common citizenship and therefore a commitment to individual rights while ignoring noncitizens. In this general sense they are all liberal multiculturalisms: liberalism plus recognition of cultural differences. Liberalism is pluralism, which in multiculturalism is stretched to cultural pluralism (Kukathas 1998). A further assumption is a secure polity that has the capacity to guarantee and enforce citizenship rights.

The question is how individual rights and collective rights interrelate. Equality and difference is an old question, also in relation to gender. In North America a classic friction runs between the politics of recognition and those of redistribution (Fraser 1998). In an exchange with Iris Young (1998), Nancy Fraser argues that these are not reducible to one another and that the cultural left and the ideological left are divided. Young argues for a coalition politics that bridges these differences and Fraser responds that in reality such differences are being reproduced within these politics. Canadian multiculturalism is more fluid than United States multiculturalism. This debate calls to mind William Julius Wilson's plea to shift toward economic criteria for entitlement, to shift from "race" to class. Thus another way of phrasing this is that what is at issue is the need to strengthen the welfare state. In Europe, the friction between recognition and redistribution is tempered by the welfare state. In most European Union countries the recognition of collective rights based on

cultural difference assumes fixed group boundaries, but since citizenship generally provides more basic entitlements than the residual US welfare state (or workfare state), the pressure for group affiliation and identification is reduced.

This is where notions of identity come in and where the varieties of multiculturalism meet with the varieties of ethnicity discussed earlier, as twin sets of assumptions concerning identity and group boundaries. Consider, for instance, Will Kymlicka's views in relation to "American multiculturalism":

the appropriate form of multiculturalism must be fluid in conception of groups and group boundaries (new groups may emerge, older groups may coalesce or disappear); voluntary in its conception of group affiliation (individuals should be free to decide whether and how to affiliate with their community of descent); and nonexclusive in its conception of group identity (being a member of one group does not preclude identification with another, or with the larger American nation). (1998: 73)

This adds up to the following conditions for intergroup relations: fluid group boundaries, voluntary group affiliation, and multiple identification. These ideas would go a long way in addressing the question of domination-within-domination, but in the process they raise several problems. In essence, this treats ethnicity as if it is optional, while the realities it refers to are probably conditions of competition ethnicity. If the stipulated conditions would indeed exist there would be no need for ethnic competition. The emphasis on individual choice in Kymlicka's view may be specific to North American conditions. In a sense it begs the question: if individual choice indeed exists as a viable option, what is the problem? In addition, if cultural identity is understood to be a matter of individual agency it clashes with the allocation of group rights, which assumes ascribed status.

Also, the perspective is from the outside, from the point of view of the state and multiculturalism, not from the point of view of the groups. The problem is how is this to be institutionalized? Collective rights may be granted to right past discrimination and disadvantage, but once granted they rigidify group boundaries – how else to know who are entitled? Thus the side effect of some remedies is that they sustain or aggravate the problem of difference. There is a clash between collective rights and fluid group boundaries: collective rights turn group membership into an ascribed status, not a voluntary choice. In addition, collective rights foster ethnic organization and hence patronage. To the extent that this approach is relevant to multiethnicity it does not settle the question of multinational societies and indigenous peoples, such as Native Americans. Here again,

if collective rights are granted (such as tax exemption, welfare benefits, and free crossborder traffic) group membership is an ascribed status, not a voluntary choice.

A related problem is the question of hybrids and in-betweens. Nationalism (dominant culture, ethnocracy) and ethnic mobilization have both been highly visible and usually the field is seen as the friction between these two. But what about the in-betweens who are “neither and both,” who belong in neither camp or in both (Nederveen Pieterse 2004)?

For instance, in the United States, demographers speak of a silent explosion in the number of mixed-race people. Between 1960 and 1990, the number of interracial married couples went from 150,000 to more than 1.1 million, and the number of interracial children of course leaps accordingly. “Since 1970, the number of mixed-race children in the United States has quadrupled. And there are six times as many intermarriages today as there were in 1960” (Etzioni 1997). Thus Etzioni and others propose, in addition to the choice of sixteen racial categories that the Census Bureau offers Americans, a new ‘multiracial’ category. This idea has been infuriating to some African American leaders who regard it as undermining black solidarity. “African-American leaders also object to a multiracial category because race data are used to enforce civil rights legislation in employment, voting rights, housing and mortgage lending, health care services and educational opportunities” (1997). The proponents argue that this category – and a “category of ‘multiethnic’ origin, which most Americans might wish to check” – would help soften the racial and ethnic divisions that now run through American society. Amid ample controversy, the 2000 US Census for the first time offered Americans the option of multiple identification. This is but one example of the clash between the allocation of collective rights and the idea of multiple identity and fluid group boundaries.

If we juxtapose the varieties of ethnicity and of multiculturalism the problems become apparent. Domination ethnicity (monocultural nationalism) correlates with the suppression of difference through assimilation policies. Enclosure ethnicity suppresses differences through territorial segregation, often accompanied by ascribing a different legal status to different groups.

Liberal citizenship forecloses both these options. Here the real problem zone is competition ethnicity. Liberal multiculturalism sidesteps the question of competition by viewing inequality as lack of opportunity, thereby denying the problem of difference itself: a cultural division of labor that privileges some groups. Left-liberal multiculturalism recognizes this problem but in the process reifies and essentializes identities, so that what is a solution in one sphere (recognizing difference)

Table 2.5 *Ethnicities and multiculturalisms*

Ethnicities	Intergroup relations	Multiculturalisms
Domination	Assimilation	No (monoculturalism)
Enclosure	Segregation	No (apartheid)
Competition	Bicultural rivalries	Liberal, left-liberal, critical
Optional	Hybridity, postethnicity	Fluid, cosmopolitan

becomes a problem in another (reifying difference). Fluid and cosmopolitan multiculturalism, on the other hand, sidestep the problem of competition by treating ethnic identity as if it is optional already. That is, they mix up what might be the likely outcome over time (ethnic identity as choice) with the ongoing process (competition on the basis of identities). Table 2.5 gives an overview combining ethnicities and multiculturalisms.

### Coda

We can leave assimilation and hegemony out of the equation since they are essentially variations on monoculturalism. Multiculturalism concerns the redefinition of citizenship, and in effect the renegotiation of hierarchy, in societies where the composition of the population and/or the political balance of power has been changing. North America and Europe dominate in the discussion on multiculturalism, but of course changing demography and shifting cultural hegemony are conditions that pertain throughout the world.

In these situations what matters is neither pure and uncontested hierarchy nor enclosure (with reified or fixed cultural boundaries) nor optional identities (shopping for identity, ethnic chic, ethnicity lite, confetti culture), but the in-between zone of differences in relation, the zone where similarities between groups are sufficient to enable them to engage in competition for the same resources, while falling short of convergence upon sameness of identity or degree of mobility. It follows that in the realities of culturally inscribed inequality, of the multiculturalisms discussed above only critical multiculturalism is a pertinent option – on the understanding that as a critical perspective it poses more questions than it provides answers; but the questions are pertinent. Collective learning as a contextual process involves the awareness that each settlement is provisional, contextual, temporary. A settlement should have in-built provisos that avoid unnecessary closure and make it open to amendment. Standard pluralism shuffles stereotypes while fluid or cosmopolitan pluralism

overlooks stereotypes, assumes liquidity of identity and thus serves as a cure for which there is no ailment.

## NOTES

1. An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the conference *Nationalism, Identity and Minority Rights*, University of Bristol, 1999. Thanks to Emin Adas, Stephen May, and a reviewer for comments.
2. For instance, the historian Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba who long argued against the “imperial state” in Africa as a colonial imposition (1991) later became a spokesperson of the rebels in Eastern Congo.
3. For instance, according to Algis Prazauskas (1998: 2), “In the modern world, ethnic nationalism looks larger than life mainly because it has received wide coverage in the mass media and the lion’s share of ethnopolitical research deals with secessionist movements and regions of ethnic strife rather than with progress of national integration in much larger areas.”
4. Social learning is a salient theme in fields such as organization theory, social movements, industrial districts, research methodology, and development studies (cf. Nederveen Pieterse 2001b).
5. “Most rural Africa is still largely divided into ethnic territories (homelands) or enclaves inhabited by one or more dominant ethnic group. . . . Ethnic (or primary) affiliations still provide the basis on which individuals and groups gain access to land” (Salih 1999: 8).
6. One problem is the blurring of the distinction between “culture” and “cultures” or “cultural groups,” discussed in Nederveen Pieterse 2004.
7. An example is Lake 1995; a discussion is Nederveen Pieterse 1998.
8. When spending time in Sri Lanka I certainly thought so (cf. e.g. Nithiyandam 2000).
9. A full discussion of these ethnicities is Nederveen Pieterse 1997a; this section and the next draw on this while developing the argument further.
10. I don’t accept Portes’ (2000) distinction between *linear ethnicity* and *reactive ethnicity*; there is no such thing as linear ethnicity: if it were linear it would be dormant ethnicity; ethnicity is always relational (or else it would not be ethnicity) and thus reactive.
11. One might argue further that ethnicity implies ethnicities and therefore also a “multiculturalism” for the coexistence of ethnicities always involves a normative component and collective representations and ideological frameworks of differences-in-relation. Yet this would stretch the term “multiculturalism” beyond its usual meaning of positive valuation of cultural diversity, to *any* valuation of cultural difference (i.e. antisemitism, Jim Crow, and Apartheid would then be forms of multiculturalism too).
12. Furnivall’s original term “plural economy” (1939) was later stretched to plural society. This section draws on Nederveen Pieterse 2001a.
13. Ethnicity (multiethnicity, ethnonationalism, secession etc.) remains the common heading in the global South; yet multiculturalism is an emerging discourse in countries such as Mexico, Turkey, and Singapore. Parekh 2000 takes multiculturalism beyond experiences in the North.

14. A related notion is Terence Turner's "difference multiculturalism" (1994).
15. As rejoinder McLaren (2001: 416–17) proposes a materialist multiculturalism.

## REFERENCES

- Ali, Y. (1992) "Muslim women and the politics of ethnicity and culture in North England." In G. Saghal, and N. Yuval-Davis (eds.), *Refusing Holy Orders: Women and Fundamentalism in Britain*. London: Virago, pp. 101–23.
- Bayart, J.-F., S. Ellis, and B. Hibou (1999) *The Criminalization of the State in Africa*. London: James Currey.
- Bernasconi, R. (1998) "'Stuck inside of mobile with the Memphis blues again': interculturalism and the conversation of races." In Cynthia Willett (ed.), *Theorizing Multiculturalism*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 276–97.
- Bulmer, M. and J. Solomos (eds.) (1999) *Ethnic and Racial Studies Today*. London, Routledge.
- Chabal, P. and J.-F. Daloz (1999) *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*. London, James Currey.
- Chicago Cultural Studies Group (1994) "Critical multiculturalism." In David Theo Goldberg (ed.), *Multiculturalism: A Critical Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 114–39.
- Denitch, Bogdan (1994) *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Dwyer, D. and S. R. Drakakis (eds.) (1996) *Ethnicity and Development: Geographical Perspectives*. Chichester: Wiley.
- Etzioni, Amitai (1997) "'Other' Americans help break down racial barriers." *International Herald Tribune*, May 10.
- Fraser, Nancy (1998) "From redistribution to recognition? Dilemmas of justice in a 'post-socialist' age." In Cynthia Willett (ed.), *Theorizing Multiculturalism*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 19–49.
- Furnivall, J. S. (1939) *Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1956) *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India*. New York: New York University Press.
- Goldberg, David Theo (1994) "Introduction: multicultural conditions." In Goldberg (ed.), *Multiculturalism: A Critical Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 1–41.
- Goudsblom, J. (1967) *Dutch Society*. New York, Random House.
- Hollander, A. N. J. den, O. van den Muijzenberg, J. D. Speckmann, and W. F. Wertheim (1966) *De plurale samenleving*. Meppel: Boom.
- Hollinger, D. (1995) *Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism*. New York, Basic Books.
- Humphrey, M. (1997) "Civil war, identity and globalisation." *New Formations* 31: 67–82.
- Jameson, F. (1991) *Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. London: Verso.
- Jenkins, R. (1999) "Ethnicity etcetera: social anthropological points of view." In Bulmer and Solomos (eds.), pp. 85–97.

- Kaplan, R. D. (2000) *The Coming Anarchy*. New York, Random House.
- Knippenberg, H. and B. de Pater (1988) *De eenwording van Nederland*. Nijmegen, SUN.
- Kukathas, C. (1998) "Liberalism and multiculturalism: the politics of indifference." *Political Theory* 26 (5): 686–99.
- Kymlicka, Will (1998) "American multiculturalism in the international arena." *Dissent* (Fall): 73–79.
- Lake, David A. (1995) "Ethnic conflict and international intervention." La Jolla, University of California, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation Policy Brief No. 3.
- Lijphart, Arend (1975) *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- (1977) *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Marable, Manning (1998) "Black fundamentalism: Farrakhan and conservative black nationalism." *Race & Class* 39 (4): 1–22.
- Martin, Bill (1998) "Multiculturalism: consumerist or transformational." In Cynthia Willett (ed.), *Theorizing Multiculturalism*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 121–50.
- Matustik, M. J. B. (1998) "Ludic, corporate and imperial multiculturalism: impostors of democracy and cartographers of the New World Order." In Cynthia Willett (ed.), *Theorizing Multiculturalism*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 100–18.
- May, Stephen (ed.) (1999) *Critical Multiculturalism: Rethinking Multicultural and Antiracist Education*. London: Routledge Falmer.
- McLaren, Peter (1995) *Critical Pedagogy and Predatory Culture*. London, Routledge.
- (1997) *Revolutionary Multiculturalism: Pedagogies of Dissent for the New Millennium*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- (2001) "Wayward multiculturalists: a reply to Gregor McLennan." *Ethnicities* 1 (3): 408–20.
- McLennan, Gregor (2001) "Can there be a "critical" multiculturalism?" *Ethnicities* 1 (3): 389–407.
- Moynihan, D. P. (1992) *Pandemonium*. New York: Random House.
- Nederveen Pieterse, J. (1997a) "Deconstructing/reconstructing ethnicity." *Nations and Nationalism* 3 (3): 1–31.
- (1997b) "Traveling Islam: mosques without minarets." In Ayse Öncü and Petra Weyland (eds.), *Space, Culture and Power*. London: Zed, pp. 177–200.
- (1998) "Sociology of humanitarian intervention: Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia compared." In Nederveen Pieterse (ed.), *Humanitarian Intervention and Beyond: World Orders in the Making*. London and New York: Macmillan and St Martin's Press, pp. 230–65.
- (2001a) "The case of multiculturalism: kaleidoscopic and long-term views." *Social Identities* 7 (3): 393–407.
- (2001b) *Development Theory: Deconstructions/Reconstructions*. London: Sage.
- (2002) "Fault lines of transnationalism: border matters." *Bulletin of the Royal Institute of Inter-Faith Studies (Amman)* 4 (2): 33–48.

- (2004) *Globalization and Culture: Global Mélange*. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Nithyanandam, V. (2000) "Ethnic politics and Third World development: some lessons from Sri Lanka's experience." *Third World Quarterly* 21 (2): 283–312.
- Parekh, Bhikhu (2000) *Rethinking Multiculturalism*. London: Macmillan.
- Portes, A. (2000) "Globalization from below: the rise of transnational communities." In D. Kalb, M. van der Land, R. Staring, B. van Steenbergen, and N. Wilterdink (eds.), *The Ends of Globalization: Bringing Society Back In*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 253–70.
- Prazauskas, Algis (1998) "Ethnicity, nationalism and politics." The Hague: Institute of Social Studies Working Paper 280.
- Ramet, Sabrina Petra (1996) "Nationalism and the 'idiocy' of the countryside: the case of Serbia" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 19 (1): 70–87.
- Rupesinghe, K. and V. A. Tishkov (eds.) (1996) *Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary World*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Salih, Mohamed M. A. (1999) "Taking ethnicity seriously: another development and democracy in Africa." The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, unpublished paper.
- Shaw, T. (1986) "Ethnicity as the resilient paradigm for Africa: from the 1960s to the 1980s." *Development and Change* 17 (4): 587–606.
- Taylor, R. (1999) "Political science encounters 'race' and 'ethnicity'." In Bulmer and Solomos (eds.), pp. 115–23.
- Turner, T. (1994) "Anthropology and multiculturalism: what is anthropology that multiculturalists should be mindful of it?" In David Theo Goldberg (ed.), *Multiculturalism: A Critical Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 406–25.
- Uvin, Peter (1999) "Ethnicity and power in Burundi and Rwanda: different paths to mass violence." *Comparative Politics* 31 (3): 253–72.
- Wamba-dia-Wamba, E. (1991) "Philosophy in Africa: challenges of the African philosopher." In T. Serequeberhan (ed.), *African Philosophy: The Essential Readings*. New York: Paragon, pp. 211–46.
- Waters, Mary C. (1990) *Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- (1996) "Ethnic and racial groups in the USA: conflict and cooperation." In K. Rupesinghe and V. A. Tishkov (eds.), *Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary World*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, pp. 236–62.
- Wiseman, J. A. (1997) "The rise and fall and rise (and fall?) of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa." In D. Potter, D. Goldblatt, M. Kiloh, and P. Lewis (eds.), *Democratization*. Cambridge: Polity and Open University, pp. 272–93.
- Young, Iris (1998) "Unruly categories: a critique of Nancy Fraser's dual systems theory." In Cynthia Willett (ed.), *Theorizing Multiculturalism*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 50–67.
- Zizek, S. (1997) "Multiculturalism or the cultural logic of multinational capitalism." *New Left Review*, pp. 225.